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Introduction
CyCon X is the tenth iteration of the annual International Conference on Cyber
Conflict, organised by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
and taking place in Tallinn from 29 May to 1 June 2018. Over the years, CyCon has
become a world-recognised conference addressing cyber conflict and security from
the perspectives of technology, strategy, operations, law, and policy. We are always
glad to see our friends in Tallinn again – a number of them have been involved with
CyCon since its origins a decade ago – and we also welcome newcomers, who can
discover the cyber debates and ‘white night’ walks in Tallinn’s Old Town. We are
proud to offer them all the opportunity to meet and learn something new from each
other. If CyCon has been able to contribute to interdisciplinary understanding of cyber
conflict and security throughout the years, then it has achieved its main goal.
CyCon X’s core topic is ‘Maximising Effects’. Since the very beginning, cyberspace
has provided unparalleled opportunities to achieve effects in new and novel ways.
Today, cyberspace provides a technological platform and an environment for diverse
actors, with both good and bad motivations, to influence everyone and everything.
Maximising effects in the cyber realm is important for business, media, governments
and military, and even private users. However, how will this be achieved and what will
the consequences be? How will AI, machine learning and big data help to maximise
effects in cyberspace? How will international law develop in light of the serious
effects of state-sponsored operations that may or may not be hard to attribute? The
effects generated through cyberspace, including new instabilities and vulnerabilities,
will require new policies, legal frameworks and technological solutions to maximise
security.
In response to the Call for Papers in June 2017, almost 200 abstracts were submitted
in October. After a careful selection and peer review by the Academic Review
Committee, this book contains 22 articles whose authors were invited to present at
the conference.
Christopher Whyte, Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan Maness
describe the prospects for open-source, public data collection for cyber security
events and present an initial data collection and analysis of interstate cyber conflict
incidents involving the United States. Aaron F. Brantly examines the applicability of
deterrence in the digital age and for digital tools, based on examples from both within
and beyond cyberspace. Max Smeets and Herbert S. Lin aim to explain if (and how)
offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to change the role of military power
and argue that these capabilities can alter the manner in which states use their military
power strategically. Quentin E. Hodgson seeks to develop an understanding of how
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states use cyber capabilities to coerce others for political objectives and examines the
use of cyber operations by North Korea and Russia in recent years as part of their
broader strategies. Daniel Moore argues that military offensive network operations
can be usefully cast into a two-part taxonomy: event-based attacks and presencebased attacks – these two types offer different solutions, encompass varying risks, and
may require different resources to accomplish.
Martin C. Libicki shows how cyber espionage between state adversaries can ‘alter
the balance of a confrontation’ and ‘shape the inferences that the other side draws
about one’s intentions’ in cyberspace. Brad Bigelow suggests that ‘cyberspace’ as
a label for a domain should not be confused with the individual networks – some
interconnected (‘open’) and some relatively isolated (‘closed’) – involved in military
operations; and illustrates the importance of precision in describing the composition
of cyberspace. Kim Hartmann and Keir Giles investigate the potential opportunities
and challenges of an adjustment to the principle of net neutrality to facilitate defensive
action by legitimate actors; how this adjustment could contribute to regaining control
in congested cyber domains in the case of national or international cyber incidents;
and the associated risks. Robert Koch and Mario Golling analyse the development
of both cyber threats and defence capabilities during the past 10 years, evaluate the
current situation and give recommendations for improvements, including an overview
of upcoming technologies that will be critical for cyber security. Kārlis Podiņš and
Kenneth Geers describe the technical aspects of malware re-weaponisation and the
implications and ramifications of this phenomenon for a range of strategic concerns,
including weapons proliferation and attack attribution.
Turning to the legal perspective, Asaf Lubin provides his view of how low-intensity
cyber operations and peacetime espionage operations should be subjected to a
single regulatory framework: that cyber law and espionage law should be viewed
as ‘communicating vessels’. Krisztina Huszti-Orban explores the division of
responsibilities between the public and private spheres in countering terrorism and
violent extremism, focusing on ways to ensure that Internet intermediaries follow
international human rights standards in the process. Peter Z. Stockburger examines
the precautionary principle in international law and argues that its application can
help crystallise the due diligence principle in cyberspace. Cedric Sabbah suggests a
shift in the approach to cyber norms development: due to the lack of consensus in the
UN GGE process, the international community should support the discussions that
are already occurring between cybersecurity regulators and authorities. Finally, Jeff
Kosseff proposes and elaborates on four goals of common international principles
for cybersecurity law: modernisation of cybersecurity laws; uniformity of legal
requirements; coordination of cooperative incentives and coercive regulations; and
supply chain security.
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There are seven articles with a technological viewpoint, the first being a case
study authored by Martin Strohmeier et al. exploring the collection of air traffic
communication data via open source intelligence methods, for tracking mission
critical military and governmental movements. Next, Roland Meier et al. present a
threat-intelligent feed that exhibits a robust resistance to tampering attempts in order
to provide organisations and individuals with the most original, most valuable and
newest feed entries. In their article, F. Jesús Rubio Melón and Artūrs Lavrenovs
provide an examination of HTTP security headers of one million most popular websites
to assess web security policy implementation rates compared to its HTTP equivalents.
Giovanni Apruzzese et al. present an in-depth analysis of adopted machine and deep
learning algorithms and their usability for intrusion detection, malware analysis, and
spam detection. Regarding insider threat and malicious agents, David Gugelmann
and David Sommer et al. explore a novel hidden screen watermarking technique for
infiltrated organisations to more rapidly identify and reduce threats after document
leaks have occurred. Roman Graf and Ross King’s contribution explores an
automated approach for incident reports management, using neural networks and smart
contracts. Finally, Steven Noel et al. highlight a prototype tool aimed at improving
network security while simultaneously supporting the protection of mission-critical
assets in enterprise or military environments.
All the articles in this book have gone through a double-blind peer review by, at
minimum, two members of CyCon’s Academic Review Committee. We greatly
commend the members of the Committee for guaranteeing the academic quality of
the book by reviewing and selecting the submitted papers.
Academic Review Committee Members for CyCon 2018:
•
•
•
		
•
•
•
•
		
•
•
•
•
•

Siim Alatalu, NATO CCD COE
Dr Elie Alhajjar, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Prof Robert E. Barnsby, Army Cyber Institute;
United States Military Academy
Prof Col Daniel Bennett, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Prof Giuseppe Bianchi, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy
Bernhards Blumbergs, CERT Latvia
Václav Borovička, National Cyber and
Information Security Agency, Czech Republic
Maj Pascal Brangetto, French Ministry of Defence
Dr Russell Buchan, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
LtCol Joshua Bundt, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Dr Joe Burton, University of Waikato, New Zealand
Dr Steve Chan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
		
•
		
•
•
•
•
		
•
•
•
•
•
		
•
		
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Prof Thomas Chen, City, University of London, United Kingdom
Prof Michele Colajanni, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy
Torsten Corall, NATO CCD COE
Dr LtCol Christian Czosseck, NATO CCD COE Ambassador; CERTBw
Prof Dorothy E. Denning, Naval Postgraduate School, United States
Dr Kenneth Geers, NATO CCD COE Ambassador; Comodo
Keir Giles, Chatham House, Conflict Studies Research Centre,
United Kingdom
Rudi Gouweleeuw, Netherlands Organisation
for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
Prof Michael Grimaila, Air Force Institute of Technology, United States
Dr Jonas Hallberg, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)
Dr Jakub Harašta, Masaryk University, Czech Republic
Jason Healey, Columbia University, School of International
and Public Affairs, United States
Prof David Hutchison, Lancaster University, United Kingdom
LtCol Daniel Huynh, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Prof Gabriel Jakobson, Altusys Corp; CyberGem Consulting
Cpt Raik Jakschis, NATO CCD COE
Taťána Jančárková, National Cyber and Information Security Agency,
Czech Republic
Prof Eric Talbot Jensen, Brigham Young University Law School,
United States
Dr Jan Kallberg, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Maj Harry Kantola, Finnish Defence Forces
Prof Sokratis K. Katsikas, Norwegian University of Science & Technology
Dr Panagiotis Kikiras, European Defence Agency
Markus Kont, NATO CCD COE
Jarkko Kuusijärvi, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
Clare Lain, NATO CCD COE
LtCol Franz Lantenhammer, NATO CCD COE
Dr Scott Lathrop, Soar Technology, Inc
Artūrs Lavrenovs, NATO CCD COE
Dr Sean Lawson, University of Utah
Dr Corrado Leita, Lastline Inc.
Dr Lauri Lindström, NATO CCD COE
Dr Kubo Mačák, University of Exeter, United Kingdom
Prof Olaf Manuel Maennel, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Dr Matti Mantere, Nordea Bank AB
Prof Evangelos Markatos, University of Crete, Institute of Computer Science,
Greece

•
•
		
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
		
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
		
•
•
•

Dr Paul Maxwell, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Maj Markus Maybaum, Bundeswehr Cyber Security Centre;
NATO CCD COE Ambassador; Fraunhofer FKIE
Roy Mente, Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
Tomáš Minárik, NATO CCD COE
Maarja Naagel, NATO CCD COE
Dr Jose Nazario, Fastly Inc.
Dr Lars Nicander, Swedish National Defence College
Maj Erwin Orye, NATO CCD COE
Dr Anna-Maria Osula, NATO CCD COE
Dr Nikolas Ott, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Dr Rain Ottis, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Prof Stephanie Pell, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Piret Pernik, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia
Mauno Pihelgas, NATO CCD COE
Cpt Roy Ragsdale, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Tarmo Randel, NATO CCD COE
LtCol Glenn Robertson, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Prof Gabi Dreo Rodosek, Bundeswehr University Munich, Germany
Henry Rõigas, Guardtime
Prof Juha Röning, University of Oulu, Finland
Ragnhild Siedler, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
Dr Max Smeets, Stanford University, Center for International Security
and Cooperation (CISAC), United States
Dr Edward Sobiesk, Army Cyber Institute, United States
Dr Daniel Spiekermann, FernUni Hagen/German Police Forces
Dr Tim Stevens, King’s College London, United Kingdom
Dr Kris Stoddart, Aberystwyth University, United Kingdom
Morta Strazdaitė, Paris School of International Affairs, France
Dr Michail Sulmeyer, Harvard Kennedy School, United States
Prof Bradley Thayer, Tallinn University, Estonia
Dr Jens Tölle, Fraunhofer FKIE, Germany
Lorena Trinberg, German Armed Forces
Krista Jean Tuthill, Booz Allen Hamilton
Prof Risto Vaarandi, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Ann Väljataga, NATO CCD COE
Matthijs Veenendaal, Ministry of Defence (Defence Cyber Command),
the Netherlands
Prof Ari Visa, Tampere University of Technology, Finland
Prof Col David Wallace, United States Military Academy
Prof Bruce Watson, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
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•
•
•

Prof Sean Watts, Creighton University Law School, United States
Cdr Mike Widmann, NATO CCD COE
Prof Stefano Zanero, Polytechnic University of Milan, Italy

We would like to thank the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
and its Estonia Section for again serving as a technical co-sponsor for CyCon and
this publication. In addition, we highly appreciate the NATO CCD COE staff for their
excellent organising skills and assistance during the publication process.
Special thanks are due to Dr Joe Burton from the University of Waikato, New Zealand,
(16846.304 km away from Tallinn, according to Google) for his contribution to the
work of the CyCon 2018 Programme Committee and to the Conference Proceedings.
Finally, we thank all the authors of the papers in this publication for their outstanding
submissions, their friendly cooperation, and their efforts in advancing research on
cyber security.
The CyCon X Programme Committee
Lauri Lindström
Raik Jakschis
Tomáš Minárik
Ann Väljataga
NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence
Tallinn, Estonia, May 2018
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Abstract: To date, researchers studying cyber conflict through publicly available
information sources have either selected on the actor or selected on the intrusion
method when coding events. Both approaches lead to distinct challenges when it
comes to result validation and the avoidance of selection bias. This article describes
prospects for open-source, public data collection for cyber security events. We
present an initial data collection and analysis effort of interstate cyber conflict
incidents involving the United States as a pilot study. Using a tailored collection of
more than 155,000 documents from print-only media sources, we describe a method
to process data, parse document elements, and populate an event dataset. Human
coders are then tasked with validation of incident information, after which the search
code is updated to ensure greater accuracy in subsequent runs. In the study, the data
produced are compared with previously available data on cyber conflict involving the
United States. We demonstrate that the method can effectively capture and describe
cyber conflict incidents for researchers to study in a broad range of research efforts.
Moreover, this method captures greater granularity within cyber conflict episodes,
which are inherently multi-faceted. This approach to cyber conflict analysis carries
with it several distinct advantages over alternative research designs, in that it promises
to produce significantly larger amounts of pertinent metadata than might otherwise be
possible.
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1. Introduction
Researchers analyzing the scope and scale of global cyber conflict face significant data
collection challenges. In particular, the process of determining who is responsible for
observed cyber incidents that are often covert by design produces research constraints
for researchers seeking to describe modern competition, conflict and confrontation
empirically (Gartzke and Lindsay, 2015; Rid and Buchanan, 2015). How can
researchers systematically study cyber incidents globally and document recurrent
patterns and trends, given inherent restrictions on coding what are essentially covert
operations?
Such challenges are pressing for scholars and practitioners alike insofar as both aim to
develop a sophisticated body of knowledge regarding the drivers, determinants, and
effects of conflict waged via networked information and communications technologies
(ICT). To date, the cyber security field tends to rely on thin case study descriptions of
cyber incidents, using crucial cases to make inferences about actor motivation and the
larger context of the cyber conflict, as well as using deductive reasoning to produce
a foundation of theoretical knowledge regarding cyber conflict. For example, major
work on the Stuxnet attack tends to take this form, with scholars debating the efficacy
and larger implications of the series of espionage and degradation intrusions launched
by multiple states against Iranian targets (Lindsay, 2013; Slayton, 2017; Kello, 2017).
With respect to deductive reasoning, major studies use a series of anecdotal examples
to work through a series of logical claims about cyber deterrence and crisis escalation
in cyberspace, even including paralyzing cyber first-strikes and offensive action
(Libicki, 2012; Gompert and Libicki, 2014; Whyte, 2016; Nye, 2017). Despite its
classified nature, most intelligence analysis of cyber events likely replicates these
methods. Faced with a poverty of data, analysts and scholars alike use individual
incidents and deductive reasoning to illuminate emerging threats and opportunities in
cyberspace.
To date, research that systematically collects data on cyber incidents is scarce.
Outside of work on cyber rivalry and limited studies of denial of service attacks
within a conflict setting, both of which limit the sample under investigation, most
of the cyber security literature lacks large databases and robust samples (Valeriano
and Maness, 2014; Valeriano and Maness, 2015; Kostyuk and Zhukov, 2017; Whyte,
2017; Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 2018). The absence of large datasets limits
the development of inductive meta-theories about cyber conflict. Policy makers and
scholars cannot determine whether an intrusion event is an isolated and insignificant
incident, or consistent with a larger correlate of cyber conflict, without understanding
the true scope of cyber interactions.

10

For scholars interested in the cyber domain, assessment of information derived from
publicly-available outlets is an option that is as attractive as it is problematic. The
capture and treatment of massive amounts of published data pertaining to cyber conflict
promises a unique resource for those seeking to assess the context of cyber security
engagements. Nevertheless, such approaches often garner broad criticisms pertaining
to generalizability and methodology. If much of what constitutes cyber conflict is
covert, how can data produced from information found in the public sphere offer
researchers the opportunity to generalize? Even if that hurdle were to be cleared, how
can researchers reconcile attribution challenges in determining the sources, targets
and technical shape of varied cyber interactions? Without some notion of reliability as
a measurement of the value of such information, open source data efforts are likely to
run into serious problems.
This article addresses the data challenge at the core of cyber security. First, we address
the utility of open-source data collection on cyber conflict processes for scholars and
practitioners alike. In addition to being the most promising route available for academic
researchers to develop a robust knowledge foundation from which to undertake
sophisticated analyses, assessing open access materials both allows researchers to
look at the context of cyber conflict and provides opportunities for use of advanced
analytic methods that can parse signal from immense noise. Second, we describe an
approach – commonly found in research on political violence, and in recent efforts
to build comprehensive conflict event data – for producing cyber conflict data that
draws from public-facing information sources and allows the researcher to address
validation shortcomings inherent to such an approach. Then, we demonstrate the value
of this approach by employing a tailored collection of more than 155,000 documents
from print media sources in the United States, in order to produce data on interstate
cyber interactions across a two-year period. This approach performs on par with data
previously produced via traditional collection approaches and, insofar as different
elements of episodes are captured, produces a more granular picture than has been
produced in prior large-N work on cyber conflict. Likewise, opportunities to enrich
such data via additional treatment of surrounding text and linked documentation
promise further value to researchers seeking to understand the sociopolitical context
of cyber conflict (Schrodt, Beieler, and Idris, 2014).
The article proceeds in five sections. First, it considers the state of cyber conflict
data production, describes the few attempts that have been made to date to produce
systematic accounts of warfare conducted online, and outlines enduring challenges.
Then, we make a case for the clear utility of data produced from publicly-available
information sources. Third, we describe the requirements for robust, replicable efforts
to develop such data resources for scholarly use, before demonstrating this via the
presentation of two years’ worth of event data on interstate cyber conflict involving

11

the United States. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments,
and a demonstration for both researchers and policymakers as well as practitioners.

2. Cyber Conflict Data: Prior Efforts
and Enduring Challenges
The incidence of cyber conflict dates back to the early 1980s with episodes such as
the Farewell incident, in which the CIA targeted KGB technology transfer programs,
and the Cuckoo’s Egg hack-back, in which private network operators identified Soviet
operatives (Stoll, 1988; Healey and Grindal, 2013). In spite of this, systematic and
comprehensive resources describing cyber conflict incidents are virtually non-existent.
Major political science efforts to catalogue different forms of interstate conflict and
political violence fail to include cyber actions, either owing to their ambiguous origins
or to difficulty attributing the incident. Stuxnet, for example, although a crucial case
in descriptive treatments, is often not represented in major databases due to attribution
issues, difficulty dating the start and end of the incident, and the question of whether it
was the United States or Israel that launched the action (Radford, 2016).
This general lack of focus on cyber conflict issues in the context of broader efforts to
record and problematize international security dynamics is troubling for a number of
reasons. Foremost among these is the fact that there is arguably a consensus among
political scientists that cyber instruments work as adjunct modifiers – essentially force
multipliers – of conventional and asymmetric warfare (Gartzke, 2013, Valeriano et al.,
2018). This suggests that cataloguing cyber incidents is useful not only as a means
of assessing conflict restricted to that domain, but also as a means of understanding
a critical variable in broader conflict processes. Without better understanding of the
nature of cyber conflict, scholars and security practitioners of all stripes are (and will
be) hard pressed to describe accurately how digital actions and possibilities intersect
with existing mechanisms of human interaction. Indeed, without such a development,
it is likely that we inject bias – from using data obtained only from select stakeholders
or employing methods that misunderstand the significance of different actors – into
our continued efforts to construct knowledge of macro global security processes.
The main reason that no comprehensive data resource to describe cyber conflict exists
is that the attribution of cyber incidents is not always feasible (Rid and Buchanan,
2015; Lindsay, 2015). This is true on two fronts. Firstly, the method is covert: while
there are often observable outputs of cyber conflicts, where victims (or, in rare
instances, observers) report on incidents or attackers broadcast their involvement, this
is not always true. Indeed, anecdotal evidence and simple recognition of the scope of
the domain to be canvassed by researchers suggests that this is true only infrequently.
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Bound up in this problem is the manner in which the digital world operates. Whereas
with other forms of conflict – terrorist attacks, for instance – it may be possible
to adjudicate reasonably on the frequency of otherwise invisible attacks based on
knowledge of past actions, analytic breakdown of capabilities, or journalistic efforts
to validate rumor, the same is not generally accepted in cyberspace. Even where
indicators suggest the existence of incidents to researchers, validation usually requires
the cooperation of victims or infrastructural stakeholders (i.e. backbone operators or
non-backbone ISPs). Thus, particularly where relevant actors are motivated by the
possibility of reputational, financial or political costs, confirmation of the full scope
of cyber conflict is difficult for those operating in the public domain.
Added to these challenges are the dual problems of bounding scale and controlling
for negative cases. With respect to scale, a successful cyber operation might involve
thousands of individual intrusion incidents. For example, spear phishing campaigns
that resulted in the compromising of the German Bundestag and, more recently, the
U.S. Senate, involved hundreds of e-mails sent to unsuspecting elected officials and
staffers.1 Does each e-mail constitute an individual cyber intrusion, or can researchers
include them all as one campaign? Regarding negative cases, researchers must
acknowledge the fact that cyber security firms, journalists, and governments tend to
report only successful intrusions or attempts that nevertheless cause at least some
measure of disruption (Brodsky, 2008). Unsuccessful intrusions, which likely are
significantly larger by count, are thus under-reported.
Similarly, the second facet of the reporting problem lies with the value of information
that can be obtained. Though such challenges are often surmountable, as we describe
below, it is certainly true that gathering enough detail on a given incident to allow
sociopolitical attribution is possible but difficult. Despite the clear imperative social
scientists have to use any and all information available in attempting to understand the
world around them, efforts to understand cyber phenomena better regularly run into
criticism, as operating in a covert domain will generate no observable data (Lewis,
2002). This point fundamentally misunderstands the meaning of covert action,
however, which implies a difficulty in determining responsibility, but not whether or
not the event occurred.
Datasets are routinely released in the broad international relations field cataloguing all
manner of security phenomena.2 Among these, a small number are broadly focused
on conflict with a relatively unlimited remit. Rather than focus solely on the efforts
of terrorist non-state actors, insurgent movements, social activists or state militaries,
such data collection efforts aim to catalogue the full spectrum of conflictual incidents
1
2

See inter alia http://www.zeit.de/digital/2017-05/cyberattack-bundestag-angela-merkel-fancy-bear-hackerrussia and http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/368671-russia-linked-hackers-targeting-us-senate.
See, for instance, the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs) at
the Correlates of War project, the International Crisis Behavior project (https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/) and
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (http://ucdp.uu.se).
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around the world. Over the past few years, such efforts have rapidly become more
sophisticated. Efforts like Phoenix3 and the Integrated Conflict Early Warning System
(ICEWS)4 provided extremely granular information on the nature of security events
worldwide using a series of automated data scraping, parsing and treating methods,
often in tandem with human validation inputs. Such approaches constitute the new
normal for political science researchers in terms of the resources being made available
to study international conflict. And yet, these macro efforts to describe global security
matters do not systematically aim to capture all manner of cyber incidents (though
they may include individual, prominent events) as part of their approach. This is
possibly because the various attack chain elements that constitute the wide array of
techniques of interest to cyber conflict scholars are not obviously conflictual in nature,
and thus present a challenge when determining inclusion.
To date, there is only one dataset that accounts for all actors, states, and regions in
the world available to scholars interested in the contours of global cyber conflict. The
Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute dataset (DCID) describes interstate cyber conflict
over more than fifteen years and employs a Correlates of War (CoW)-style coding
scheme to describe the character of cyber warfare campaigns among rival states. The
authors of DCID, Valeriano and Maness (2014, 2015), include a range of information
on the type of instruments involved in observed cyber events, the impact of such
events, and more. The data collected originates from publicly-available descriptions
of cyber conflict incidents, including news stories, industry and government reporting,
and expert testimony. Nevertheless, as the authors freely admit and others note
(Radford, 2016), DCID was designed as an initial effort to scope the cyber conflict
domain by selecting on rival states most likely to engage in cyber conflict. It is not
aimed at the production of cross-domain conflict data, and does not draw from the
universe of possible information on cyber incidents in a comprehensive sense. While
outputs of the project might describe contours of cyber conflict between rival actors,
any comprehensive effort to produce cyber conflict data must inevitably drop such
selection parameters in order to ensure generalizability. Thus, the need to address
the role of future open source data collection on cyber conflict is twofold, insofar as
researchers must grapple with both absent resources and limited foundational efforts
from which to begin their investigations.
Briefly, the data collection approach we describe below addresses these dual needs
and goes a step further than previous social science projects. We rethink prior
approaches to data collection in line with work undertaken in political violence and
terrorism research programs, and expand beyond a limited focus rival states. In doing
so, we provide for reliability checks that have been absent – or hard to effect – in past
efforts, and argue that sophisticated data collection in this vein must turn to human
reliability checkers for all machine learning processes. The result would be a dataset
3
4
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See http://openeventdata.org/datasets/OEDA.datasets.php.
See https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/icews.

both large and relatively free of the errors common to other large event databases,
such as ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015) or IDEA (King and Lowe, 2003). Part of the
reason we argue that this will be the case is the fact that projects like ICEWS and
IDEA aim to capture all events between all actors annually. A cyber conflict effort
would include a significantly reduced scope of inquiry, and would make the parsing of
signal from noise a more feasible task. In short, though we cede the point that there are
limitations to any open-source data collection effort on cyber conflict patterns in the
form of lagged information about cyber threats that occur in clandestine settings, such
an effort would regardless lead to a useful resource useful to cyber-security scholars
across a range of disciplines, upon which others can build in the future.

3. The Utility of Open Source Data Collection
Open-source collection of information on cyber conflict processes represents the
future of data generation in the field, but also presents many challenges. Whereas
most open source data collection seeks to parse signal from noise, a cyber conflict
effort will miss things simply because not all of the signals are observable from the
public sphere.
Why should researchers even attempt to undertake open-source collection of
information on cyber conflict trends, given the inherent problems in doing so? We
argue that there are three reasons. First, social science research on cyber conflict
requires a foundation of knowledge from which to build and infer. Second, assessing
open-access description of cyber conflict allows researchers to look at both the
content and context of cyber interactions. Third, there are distinct benefits to a
scaled-up approach to studying cyber conflict over traditional small-n approaches, as
there is additional clarity and opportunity to use advanced analytic methods to parse
observable relationships.

The Need for a Knowledge Foundation

Most simply, there is a clear need for foundational knowledge about cyber conflict.
At present, there is a relative lack of empirical work in the domain that presents a
comprehensive and systematic description of the global impact of the information
revolution. One clear argument in favor of scholarly attempts to build a representation
of such processes via collection of public-facing information is quite simply that
scholars are duty-bound to utilize any resource available in trying to contribute to the
condition of knowledge on a given topic.
More pressing than the duty of social scientists, however, is the need to develop
knowledge foundations in order to spur the development of a robust research
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program. The nature of the development of research programs is a source of hot
debate among both classical and current philosophers of the social science enterprise.
It is generally acknowledged, however, that research programs are layered bases
of theoretical knowledge where peripheral hypotheses linked to core suppositions
are appraised with the aim of advancing the state of a given field (Jackson, 2008).
Often, hypothesis testing results in rapid rethinking of specific assumptions such that
there is a revolution in macro knowledge. In the debate about progress in the field
of International Relations, Lakatos is often invoked as the exemplar for establishing
which theoretical ideas are of value over others (Vasquez, 1997). This view requires
the development of a theoretical and empirical core, which then is investigated with
the purpose of seeking advances over prior investigations. Advances can be examined
in the context of providing more theoretical and empirical context over past efforts
(Lakatos, 1970).
At present, the research program on cyber conflict is still in its infancy. The condition
of general core knowledge at the heart of the research program is remarkably unclear,
which suggests that there is a strong imperative to articulate macro-theoretical
perspectives. Given this, the need for projects that aim for comprehensive modeling
of the scope of global cyber conflict is particularly pronounced.

The Context of Cyber Conflict

Building from the perspective that meaning emerges from the interaction of empirical
dynamics and the human treatment thereof, researchers should attempt to undertake
open-source collection of cyber conflict trends. Such an approach will inevitably
capture more than just the actuarial detail of cyber incidents offered by thick case
descriptions; specifically, open-source data collection allows researchers the
opportunity to understand the context and content of cyber conflict dynamics more
fully. Via the capture of textual metadata, cataloguing of adjacent conflict phenomena,
and more (Hopkins and King, 2007), open source data modeling of cyber conflict
trends (given relevant controls for duplication of information) offers the ability to
understand the nature of information about cyber conflict that exists in the public
sphere. Social science scholars of cyber conflict are, for instance, naturally interested
in how framing of conflict influences the discourse and deliberation of policymakers,
practitioners, and the general public. Is a particular cyber event over-reported in
news media? What kinds of information are used in public discourse to construct
attribution cases, and do these assessments vary given the context of, say, ongoing
foreign policy spats with particular foreign countries? Do certain kinds of attacks
receive more negative coverage, and how are relevant stakeholders discussed in
such coverage? Understanding such dynamics is critical to efforts that aim to gain a
systematic understanding of public reactions to cyber threats, the manner in which the
citizenry ascribes responsibility for cyber security to public or private sector actors,
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and more. Public-facing data promises an ability to answer fundamental questions
about the relationship between cyber conflict and the sociopolitical environment in
which foreign policymaking and strategy development take place. Answering such
questions should be of paramount importance to scholars.

The Benefits of Scale

Finally, efforts to scale up data collection using computer coding, web scrapping, and
machine learning exponentially increase the available data. This universe of big data
provides an empirical foundation from which to sort signal from noise in a way that is
difficult to do where less input data is involved. This effort requires narrowing search
terms based on automated construction of parameters and machine learning, followed
by subsequent Bayesian updating of the process based on human review and validation
of subsets of input data (as described in Hopkins and King, 2010; Ward, Beger,
Cutler, Dickinson, Dorff, and Radford, 2013). At the level of the research project, the
benefits of such an approach are obvious. With ICEWS, researchers reported a 50%
increase in accuracy with semi-supervised approaches using large amounts of input
information over those that had previously attempted only to have machines sort raw
data. In essence, sophisticated application of an ontological understanding of conflict
processes in coding massive amounts of data allows dissection of information in a
way that is not possible with small samples.
At the level of the research program on cyber conflict processes itself, the clear benefit
of scale is clarity. Given inherent attribution issues associated with cyber incidents,
researchers need to cast their net as wide as possible to include not just major media
outlets, but also government documents and cyber security reporting. Cyber security
firms in particular are a critical source of reporting. These third-party firms have a
financial and reputational incentive to report on the nefarious acts of government
operatives online. They are constantly monitoring and looking to expose major
intrusions (see, for instance, Kaspersky, 2015). Shifting to a machine-coding scheme
that collects disparate sources brings these perspectives together in building a cyber
security incident database. The combined observations, even if still imperfect, are
orders of magnitude better than any one reporting line.
Put together, each argument for the construction of a larger-event based dataset of
cyber interactions is not only needed, but prudent and responsible. The production
of knowledge is a process fraught with friction, but we can reduce the hindrances
common at the start of such enterprises by seeking to establish an empirical baseline
early in the lifespan of a research program. Now we move to a formal description of
how such a process of data collection takes place, and observe our results in the pilot
study.
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4. Building a Large-Scale Data Collection
and Treatment Pipeline
Machine-coded event datasets such as Phoenix or ICEWS are developed using
publicly-available resources.5 To date, most efforts in political science have used news
stories scraped from RSS feeds, repositories like Factiva, and outlet websites. It is,
however, possible to draw information from any text resource. Although researchers
are likely to favor news stories of various kinds for event data production, it is possible
to utilize social media data feeds and information like industry reports.
The production of event data from large corpora is relatively straightforward.
Unstructured information is taken from feeds and repositories using the researcher’s
favored method of text crawling and fed into a database program. From there,
information can be sent in a specified format to a program that produces structured,
usable event data. A number of such programs exist, but the most well known
are TABARI/PETRARCH/PETRARCH2, a series of Python-based programs
that treat text and produce data. The function of these programs is also relatively
straightforward. Text inputs are broken down to the level of individual sentences and
are parsed to produce an XML input that includes both the original text and a language
element breakdown. From there, files are passed through the main program, which
references a series of preset dictionaries to produce structured data. The dictionary
inputs represent the expected vocabulary pertaining to a given topic and are designed
by the researcher.6 The resultant structured data are then usable by researchers or
are available for further enrichment. Up to the point described here, data output by a
program like TABARI would include event description, source and target information,
and metadata (date, source of information, etc.). Further enrichment of this data
for the purposes of understanding the context or surrounding content can then be
achieved via further application of a range of text modeling, entity extraction, and
topic modeling tools, with human interaction only required when specifying input text
or when making a particular effort to enrich descriptive event data.

5

6
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The same is true for both data based on the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO)
framework (Gerner, Schrodt, Yilmaz, Abu-Jabr, 2002) and the Global Database of Events, Language, and
Tone (GDELT) (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). These efforts, and earlier ones like the Conflict and Peace
Data Bank (COPDAB) and the World/Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) (Azar, 1980), provide granular
information on human behavior drawn from an immense collection of available public sources of input
data. CAMEO and other frameworks are employed for the purposes of structuring and making sense of the
resultant information for analytic purposes.
Recently, some advances have been made in automatically generating dictionaries based on the input text
(Radford, 2016) specifically in the context of cyber security.

5. The United States’ Experience with
Interstate Cyber Conflict, 2013-14
In order to demonstrate the utility of such a machine-coded event data production
approach to comprehensively scoping the cyber domain, we supplement our arguments
here with an application of PETRARCH27 to a limited corpus of news stories pertaining
to cyberspace and information security issues published in the United States. After
discussing our data production effort, we present data below on incidents involving
the United States and other countries, and compare our results to those of the only
existing cyber conflict data resource (DCID). Though this demonstration is a limited,
proof-of-concept effort that focuses on two years and one country’s relationships with
other countries, we note that results match and arguably outperform those of DCID.
Given that this data emerges from a relatively small scrape of available information
on national cyber security events, the opportunity for expanded efforts seems clear.

Constructing a Demonstration Dataset Using Machine-Coding

The foundation of our demonstration dataset is a corpus of documents downloaded
from LexisNexis. The documents that make up our corpus were selected based on two
sets of criteria. First, we select on only United States-based print and wire publications
so that we can effectively gauge the viability of a machine coding approach to event
data production at the level of an individual country. Second, we collate all news
articles that correspond to an extensive formula of keyword collocations that aim
to capture all coverage of cyber security issues. The result is an extensive corpus
of more than 155,000 news stories across more than thirty years. For purposes of
matching outputs to DCID and assessing the viability of a machine-coding approach
in the context of the contemporary landscape of cyber conflict, our construction of the
demonstration dataset presented below focuses on a two-year period between 2013
and 2014. Specifically, data is drawn from 859,423 input text files at the level of
individual statements (sentences).
Raw text taken from LexisNexis is passed through several stages of treatment prior to
the output of structured event data. First, text is parsed using the Stanford Core Natural
Language Processing (NLP) suite of available programs, which tag named entities
and parts of speech (i.e. nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc.) found in the text (Manning,
Surdeanu, Bauer, Finkel, Bethard, and McClosky, 2014). The parsing process outputs
an XML file that details a breakdown of different language elements. This provides the
constituency tree parse necessary for event coding using PETRARCH2. Then, a glue
program is used to format raw text chunks and the parsed language information into
a file format specified by the authors of PETRARCH2 (see inter alia Beieler, 2016).
Finally, these files are passed to PETRARCH2 for analysis. Analysis of text fragments
at the level of sentences works via reference to a series of dictionaries to which the
7

See https://github.com/openeventdata/petrarch2.
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program refers. These dictionaries contain vocabulary for types of conflict actions to
be coded, agent types to be considered, and actors that might specifically be identified;
the dictionaries can be automatically generated (Schrodt, Beieler, and Idris, 2014;
Radford, 2016) but are generally updated manually by the researchers, as was the
case here. The resultant data output includes information on the type of conflict action
recorded, the source of that action, the target of that action and metadata pertaining to
the incident (date, type of agent in the context of a particular actor, etc.).

Resultant Data on U.S. Experience with
Interstate Cyber Conflict, 2013-14

Our demonstration set of incident records includes 512 distinct events for the two-year
period between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 2014. Of those events, 279 events
pertain directly to the United States insofar as the machine-coding process identifies
either the originator or target as being American. This is not to say that the United
States government or a particular federal entity is linked with every event; rather,
this number refers to any actor (often named but sometimes an unknown hacker) that
is identified as having a relationship with the United States (i.e. an American firm,
individual or domestic person, for instance). Of events that link an incident directly
to the United States (as a discrete entity) or the U.S. government, the U.S. is coded
as the originator of a cyber conflict incident in 151 instances, and as the target in 91
instances.
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF CYBER CONFLICT INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE U.S. (TOTAL), 2013-14.

Figure 1 presents the raw count of incidents involving the United States (total
attribution, not only government or national attribution) captured in our demonstration
machine-coding effort for the years 2013 and 2014. Of these 279, the bulk are identified
from March through July of 2014. This is perhaps unsurprising, as this constitutes
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the period of time immediately following data breaches at Target, Inc. The Target
hacking episode stands as one of the first major instances of a major private firm in
the United States going public with the theft of information pertaining to millions of
consumers. This period also follows the release of information by Edward Snowden
at the end of 2013 pertaining to U.S. cyber operations and electronic surveillance
programs, as well as intrusions at the Office of Personnel and Management (OPM)
which would stay secret until early 2015. It is worth noting, however, that this data
includes both government and non-government activity as captured in open-source
reporting, potentially including criminal actions and espionage.
FIGURE 2. TYPES OF CYBER CONFLICT EVENTS CAPTURED
INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES, 2013-14.

Our test dataset also captures information about the nature of different conflict
actions. At the highest level, our approach presents the researcher with six categories
of cyber actions – denial of service, vandalism, generic cyber intrusion, malware
usage/infection, information doxing, and the apprehension of an involved actor. The
denial of service and vandalism categories capture events that specifically reference
the terminology of defacement and DDoS. The infection category captures incidents
that reference the discovery or presence of a piece of malware based on a set of
preset terms and specific malware instances (added to the program dictionary). Cyber
intrusions generically refer to cyber actions linked with terminology indicating
use of force (‘attacked,’ ‘hacked,’ ‘breached,’ ‘infiltrated,’ etc.) and can therefore
cover a wide array of incident types. Apprehension events include instances where
perpetrators of an act are caught, arrested or identified. Doxing events include those
wherein information is intentionally leaked or released.
Figure 2 breaks down the set of incidents we found involving U.S. actors (as either
originators or targets) in 2013 and 2014. By far, the most common incidents recorded

21

are the apprehension of actors and generic cyber intrusions. Apprehension incidents are
coded in a relatively straightforward fashion in that PETRARCH2 identifies language
elements pertaining to the arrest and capture of people. Again, cyber intrusions are
coded in such a way that a broad number of methods and techniques can produce a
cyber intrusion event (such as hacking, intruding, gaining access, injecting code, etc).
By contrast, denial of service attacks and digital vandalism are rare in this data set,
whilst the leaking of information and incidence of malware (wherein input text does
not suggest an attacking action) are uncommon.
FIGURE 3. SOURCE COUNTRIES FOR CYBER OPERATIONS TARGETING
THE UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT/MILITARY TARGETS).

By means of demonstrating the manner in which machine-coding approaches are
useful for capturing attribution within dyads (i.e. where one actor can be seen to
have engaged with another), Figure 3 outlines originator countries for all actions
on targets coded as either U.S. government/military targets or ‘the United States.’
As above, these originator countries are not necessarily identified as government/
military/intelligence targets, although many are. It is worth noting that the largest
category is ‘unknown’, where the program is unable to identify a country with which
to link a cyber conflict action; this result in itself highlights the attribution challenge
faced by researchers in this vein. In almost no instances does this mean that there is
no information on the originators of actions; rather, source information is most often
tagged at the level of agent types, meaning that no country or specific threat actor
can be identified, but the program identifies the originator as a foreign individual or
criminal organization. Following this category, the next categories of action are linked
with the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and countries linked in
analytic work on global cyber conflict with both these countries, such as Moldova and
Malaysia. A relatively high percentage of attacks attributed to the U.S. were incidents
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where U.S. individuals or groups were involved in cyber conflict actions (mostly
being apprehended by authorities).8
FIGURE 4. TYPES OF CYBER CONFLICT ACTIONS FOR ATTACKS
ON THE UNITED STATES FOR CHINA, RUSSIA AND UNATTRIBUTED INCIDENTS.

Among the three largest originators of conflict actions targeting the United States
and its government or military-intelligence apparatus, cyber intrusions are the most
common type of event for both China and nationally un-attributable actors. Intrusions
might include a wide range of possible techniques, but generally refer to a forceful
infiltration without permission, as exemplified in incidents like the OPM hack. With
Russia, however, although a substantial percentage of actions linked with the country
are generically coded as cyber intrusions undertaken against the U.S., the bulk of coded
cyber conflict actions are coded as malware infections. Though such a conclusion
is purely speculative, this trend does fit with the narrative of existing research on
the nature of global malware distribution, the role of Eurasian organized criminal
enterprises in underwriting major ransomware, denial of service and phishing attacks,
8

Regarding the methodological challenges facing the researcher in assessing cyber conflict processes,
another point worthy of note off this finding is the degree to which offensive deception is not only
possible, but normal. Operators may take steps to mask their point of origin when launching offensive
or exploitative actions. See, for instance, http://www.star-telegram.com/news/nation-world/national/
article96062667.html.
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and on the unique character of the Russian cyber ecosystem that leverages third-party
criminal enterprises (Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, 2017).

Capturing Major Events

The data described above represent only a limited demonstration of how a machinecoding approach to open-source data collection can furnish scholars with unique
information about the scope of global cyber conflict. But does the method of approach
really function better than traditional human equivalents? Can automated coding of
event data match or outperform the research skills of human coders wading through
similar information in order to parse signal from noise?
Here, we briefly consider these questions by comparing the results of our demonstration
dataset to the preceding DCID cyber conflict data collection effort. Specifically, we
ask if incidents involving the United States during 2013 and 2014 that are catalogued
in DCID were captured by our initial coding of cyber conflict incidents using an input
set of information drawn from all U.S. newspaper sources. Given that our selected
input source is news reports, the band of incidents we are most interested in assessing
here is those cyber conflict interactions that begin within the period covered (i.e. on
or later than January 1, 2013). DCID contains 21 such incidents, which are detailed
in Table 1.
TABLE 1. CYBER CONFLICT INTERACTIONS (DCID) BEGINNING AFTER JANUARY 1, 2013.

Start Date
1/15/13
4/1/13
9/23/13
9/24/13
9/30/13
10/23/13
2/1/14
3/1/14
3/15/14
3/15/14
5/5/14
6/2/14
6/3/14
6/4/14
9/1/14
10/26/14
11/6/14
11/8/14
11/15/14
11/24/14
12/10/14
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Our demonstration dataset produced and presented here records events pertaining
to 14 of the 21 cyber conflict interactions beginning after January 1, 2013 in the
DCID dataset (see Table 2). Importantly, incidents not captured by the machinecoding treatment of news stories from the United States largely fall at the end of
the period covered. This implies that non-capture is the result of a delay in reporting
cyber incidents, and that this issue will be alleviated by a larger time span examining
disclosures that happen at a later date (as with the OPM hack, which was revealed in
2015). Moreover, the demonstration dataset contains 1.301 events for each interaction
described in DCID, meaning that the average incident described there is matched
by more than one reported interaction (even after controlling for duplicates) in the
machine-coded version. For instance, the University of Connecticut hack in 2013 was
caught twice, with one event annotation describing the infection of computers at the
institution, and a later report describing a purposive cyber intrusion aimed at stealing
user information.
TABLE 2. CYBER CONFLICT INTERACTIONS IN DCID
(BEGINNING AFTER JANUARY 1, 2013) CAPTURED BY DEMONSTRATION SET.

Start Date
1/15/13

Recorded?
Y

4/1/13

Y

9/23/13

N

9/24/13

Y

9/30/13

Y

10/23/13

Y

2/1/14

Y

3/1/14

Y

3/15/14

N

3/15/14

N

5/5/14

Y

6/2/14

N

6/3/14

N

6/4/14

Y

9/1/14

Y

10/26/14

Y

11/6/14

Y

11/8/14

Y

11/15/14

Y

11/24/14

N

12/10/14

N

Given these basic results, we argue that it is reasonable to expect that machine-coding
of cyber conflict information can at least match human coder efforts. Indeed, since
automated coding of cyber conflict incidents invariably captures the detail of particular
actions, it seems reasonable to say that event data production using programs like
PETRARCH2 quite clearly outperforms all prior traditional efforts because the scope
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is much more comprehensive than a selection on rivals. Specifically, the capture of
unique features of different elements of a cyber conflict campaign is a natural byproduct
of the heuristic-style approach taken by such programs to describing conflict.
Moreover, machine coding of large quantities of publicly-available and publiclyproduced textual information stands to help researchers significantly in addressing
attribution challenges with cyber conflict research. Though political attribution of
cyber attacks is not always feasible and technical attribution is enduringly challenging
– if not actually impossible – the use of open source documentation offers researchers
advantages on two fronts. First, scale brings with it options for verifying the existence
of a particular event (and agency therein) in the form of replicable coding rules that,
for instance, only report an incident feature that appears in multiple independent
reports. Second, open source data collection generates information that is contextually
defined. Regardless of whether or not one considers an effort along these lines to be
100% accurate or not, it is indisputably the case that data collected will reflect the
state of public knowledge on a given incident. This is significant because much of
what social scientists aim to study with cyber conflict patterns is based on context and
perception.

Next Steps

No data collection program of approach is perfect. Both this research team and
others attempting to produce a reasonably comprehensive data on global cyber
conflict using machine-coding of open source information must grapple with distinct
methodological issues over and above the macro challenges of such an approach, as
described in the sections above. In addition to this challenge, we must also grapple
with the construction of additional independent variables in the composition of cyber
security data such as indicators of severity, effects, efficacy, actors, cascades, malware
tools, and other associated variables.
From our experience in producing the demonstration dataset employed in this section,
we argue that two specific methodological challenges in particular are worthy of
attention. First, any major effort to leverage state-of-the-art event data production
approaches in this vein must consider the fact that available tools remain relatively
dumb. That is to say that tools like TABARI and PETRARCH are entirely focused on
extracting meaning from a relatively simple understanding of how language works at
the level of the statement. This inevitably leads to errors that need to be checked by
human coders when, for instance, the program fails to recognize that a particular event
is being offered as a hypothetical.
Correcting such errors might take one of several forms. Simply put, however, the
idea for researchers moving forward – the gold standard approach – should be a
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hybrid approach consisting of what has been presented here alongside relevant
human reliability coding for the purposes of more effectively training algorithms for
automated coding. Far from suggesting that researchers use preset understandings
of cyber conflict ontologies expressed in dictionaries set by scholarly panels, future
work should construct and continually reconstruct the tools of event detection from
the collections of information being processed. Doing so will allow researchers
to control for several things, not least potential problems with the irrelevance of
robustness checks as work is scaled upwards, and the shifting terminology – and even
the changing nature – of cyber conflict.
Of course, this first challenge leads to additional work for the researcher that might, in
the future, be remedied with increased reliance on machine learning augmentations of
current approaches. The second (related) major challenge is that researchers aiming
to produce event data must recognize that incident capture is often only meaningful
alongside the relevant capture of contextual metadata. Enrichment of event data with
information about its construction, framing and more stands to benefit researchers
from many disciplines and provides deep detail that compensates for the necessary
position researchers must take in producing data that will – at least in terms of how
much of cyber conflict can truly be observed – be good, but perfect. Moreover, in the
research program on cyber conflict, addressing the attribution problem effectively
means providing for uncertainty in empirical investigations. Without appropriate
efforts to ensure that quality and certitude metrics are provided by researchers
alongside a host of metadata on the presentation of raw information pertaining to
cyber conflict, efforts to produce comprehensive resources for the research program
will be enduringly limited.

6. Conclusion
Though the scope and scale of cyber conflict has grown exponentially over the past
four decades, scholarly efforts to examine the domain in a comprehensive fashion
remain lacking. To some degree, as we have outlined above, this makes sense as
there are real challenges for researchers in the form of attribution difficulties, timing
of disclosures, and self-interested gatekeepers of useful data. Given these barriers,
lack of enthusiasm for and interest in setting up open source efforts to produce cyber
conflict event data is understandable.
We have argued, however, that there is both a clear need and a compelling set of
reasons for the development of machine-aided, large-scale data production efforts
that utilize public-facing information. Though some argue that open source coding
of cyber conflict incidents is impossible due to the covert nature of many acts in
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the domain, we both argue and demonstrate that this misstates the issue for security
researchers. Data coding carried out in this way both (1) parallels the contours of
previous data produced on the subject and (2) additionally provides information on the
sociopolitical context of cyber operations. In short, not only does the scope of such an
approach to data collection promise an ability for researchers to generalize and crossvalidate; it also provides the tools to study cyber conflict in its proper international
context, examine the tools utilized in each attack, and understand the nested sociopolitical dynamics at work during cyber conflicts.
Over and above other factors, an effort to provide comprehensive data on the scope of
global cyber conflict as it presents in public-facing information sources stands to give
researchers the tools needed to build a robust knowledge foundation. At present, the
research program on cyberspace and international security lacks an extensive set of
core theses and assumptions that can be challenged. Part of the reason that such a core
has been slow to develop is that building bridges between otherwise disparate efforts
to flesh out specific topics within the research program is extremely difficult without
such a comprehensive data foundation. Even if such a foundation were to contain flaws,
it would still function as a common platform upon which researchers could situate
meaningful research questions and assumptions, contextualize small-n research,
and critique methodological approaches. Naturally, this kind of methodological
approach will not include – but rather will stand to augment understanding of – the
‘thick’ context of cyber conflict, from strategic and institutional cultures to cognitive
processes. As projects from Correlates of War to those of the Political Instability Task
Force have demonstrated on numerous fronts, however, event data and inferences
made from them are necessary elements of field-defining research.
Finally, such an effort to build open source data resources also directly stands to benefit
policymakers and practitioners. In addition to the clear added value that comes with
improved scholarly knowledge of a given topic, academic data resources might be
used by both public and private sector actors as a reference to help excise conjecture
from the discourse. An academic basis of knowledge on cyber conflict, founded on a
common data resource, affords practitioners the opportunity to involve themselves in
scholarly and public debate on issues that can be corroborated without surrendering
private information advantages.
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Abstract: What is the role of deterrence in an age where adept hackers can credibly
hold strategic assets at risk? Do conventional frameworks of deterrence maintain
their applicability and meaning against state actors in cyberspace? Is it possible
to demonstrate credibility with either in-domain or cross-domain signaling or is
cyberspace fundamentally ill-suited to the application of deterrence frameworks?
Building on concepts from both rational deterrence theory and cognitive theories of
deterrence this work attempts to leverage relevant examples from both within and
beyond cyberspace to examine applicability of deterrence in the digital age and for
digital tools in an effort to shift the conversation from Atoms to Bits and Bytes.
Keywords: cyber, deterrence, denial, punishment

1. INTRODUCTION
The challenge of the digital era is not to define deterrence. Deterrence is a welldefined concept that has been studied and practiced throughout history and to an
even greater depth following the advent of nuclear weapons. The present challenge
it is to understand the role digital technologies play in the broader scope of interstate
deterrence. Deterrence in one domain rarely if ever operates independently of other
domains. Much of the literature on cyber deterrence focuses on within domain
deterrence. Yet, this is a dangerous constraint that elevates risks and minimizes the
probability of success. This paper seeks to draw out the literature on deterrence and
identify its applicability within a newly delineated domain of interactions, cyberspace.
The resultant analysis strives to encompass the complexity of deterrence and advance
an argument beyond within domain modeling.

31

Classical deterrence centers on a potential adversary’s cost-benefit calculus to
dissuade specific actions and differs from compellence by focusing on ex-ante
behavior manipulation through a priori uses of force or other tools of state power.
Both compellence and deterrence are forms of coercion, however, the former employs
both hard and soft power both in the present and future with continued or escalated
actions, while the latter threatens use of force (power) absent their employment. The
focus below is on ex-ante actions by states and sub-state entities that threaten, but that
do not use the tools of state against an adversary to manipulate their decision-making
calculus. Additionally, actions undertaken independent of threats that can, ex-ante,
reduce the benefits associated with a given attack are examined.
Focusing on classical deterrence and deterrence by denial helps illustrate the
similarities and differences between deterrence in the pre- and post-delineation of
cyberspace as a domain of military operations. Deterrence in cyberspace has been
addressed by a variety of scholars across the subfields of International Relations.1
Many examinations of cyber deterrence rely on direct applications of IR theory absent
robust technical understandings of how the domain functions. The development
and application of classical deterrence theories to a domain necessarily requires an
understanding of how state and non-state actors achieve, develop, and assess costs and
benefits within this domain.
This work proceeds in three sections. First, it examines some of the relevant literature
on deterrence and identifies some of the gaps within the field and provides a trajectory
for the subsequent sections to examine a more dynamic theory of deterrence in
cyberspace. The second section focuses on the technical, tactical, operational, and
strategic aspects of the domain in an effort to identify those areas where deterrence can
alter the costs-benefit analysis of adversaries. Third, the work concludes by providing
a discussion on national strategy development for integrated cyber deterrence
incorporating the lessons from the first two sections.

2. FROM ATOMS TO BITS AND BYTES
Deterrence is not a novel concept. The classical IR cannon on deterrence can be traced
back to the Peloponnesian War and the threat of violence in response to adversary
actions.2 Yet, more modern formulations of deterrence are largely rooted in the
nuclear world following World War 2. The most common form of deterrence known
as conventional deterrence was established by Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling and
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others and focuses on the ex-ante dissuasion of adversaries through the threat of expost costs in response to potential adversary actions.
Robert Jervis identified three “waves” of deterrence theorizing to which a potential
fourth wave has been added by Jeffery Knopf.3 First wave deterrence theory rested
on the rise and consequences of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie et al. asserted that
the use of nuclear weapons had almost no innate strategic or tactical value outside of
being a threat against an adversary.4 The consequences of nuclear weapons use, even
in limited strike situations, would quickly and dramatically escalate. This escalation
made the limited use of such weapons untenable in all but the most extreme situations.
Lawrence Freedman summarized the second wave as the realization that “total war
could now only be threatened, but never fought”.5
Second wave deterrence posited how nuclear weapons could be threatened and the
dynamics of those threats.6 Thomas Schelling and others posited a series of conditions
in which states could develop deterrence in the nuclear era. As Jervis noted, second
wave theorizing became extremely popular because of its abstraction and logical
structuring.7 Game theory and other rational models were used to illustrate rational
costs and benefits, creating models suited to rigorous concepts of rationality.8 The
second wave arose under stable bi-polar conditions in which it was assumed states
engaged in rational decision-making in matters of foreign policy and national security.
Schelling found deterrence largely dependent upon credibility and rationality. He
illustrated that signaling potential costs to an adversary absent credibility creates
deterrence failure. By using divergent game-theoretic structures from prisoner’s
dilemma to chicken – theorists developed arguments about deterrence. Despite
rigorous theory, this abstraction contained systemic flaws and gave rise to a third
wave of deterrence.
The third wave of deterrence theory in the 1970s addressed challenges beyond game
theoretic models, including the failing rationality. Irving Janis and Graham Allison,
both, but with different perspectives, illustrated the weaknesses of rationality in
decision-making.9 The third wave led to extensions into cognitive psychology and
behavioral studies. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janis Stein provided insight
into the general problems associated with parsimonious use of rationality through
case analyses. Specifically, Jervis et al. identified the potential for over-valuation of
3
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certain attributes of classic deterrence that might inadvertently make conflict more
and not less likely.10
Jeffrey Berejikian incorporated Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s analysis of
prospect theory into the deterrence calculus and challenged parsimonious rational
thought by illustrating cognitive dimensions associated with decision-making beyond
groupthink and bureaucratic processes. His work highlighted issues related to risk in
cognitive decision-making that undermine rationality. Concepts such as sunk costs or
tying hands fit well within parsimonious deterrence theory, yet the mechanisms that
made them effective were not well understood prior to the third wave.
Although modern deterrence theory encompasses a spectrum from pure rational
modeling to cognitive models, the objective of deterrence as identified by John
Mearsheimer remains the development of fear of the consequences (in particular of
“military action”) or a “function of costs and risks”.11 Developing shared knowledge
about costs and risks for nuclear events differs from non-nuclear conflicts. Early
deterrence models relied heavily on rationality and parsimony but did not underestimate
the clarity provided by the use and subsequent impact of the weapons themselves. The
generation of fear or knowledge of consequences to assess costs and risks loses clarity
the as analyses shift away from nuclear weapons. Lawrence Freedman defines single
weapon or type of warfare deterrence as “narrow deterrence”.12 Narrow deterrence is
less effective when expanded beyond single weapon or type warfare.
General or broad deterrence covers a range threatened actions to dissuade an adversary.
Freedman writes: “broad deterrence involves deterring all war”.13 Ted Hopf explains:
within deterrence there is a need to expand deterrence beyond the scope of military
tools to the entire range of options available to actors.14 Extending analysis further,
scholars also emphasize concepts of direct deterrence and extended deterrence. Direct
deterrence is concerned with actions against “your” state and its immediate interests
as opposed to extended deterrence – dissuasion of adversary actions against a third
party or non-immediate interests. Delineating between these two types of deterrence
in a globalized world is difficult. Cyberspace compounds the challenge of delineation
because attacks on foreign infrastructure can and do have ramifications globally.
Concepts of the means to achieve deterrence or more simply how to deter are
often contested. Threats can be narrowed to weapon type or category, or include
10
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interdependent relationships such as diplomatic, informational, military and economic
effects. Threats signaling a potential response to adversary action should provide
clear, unambiguous consequences. The ex-ante threat should causally lead to an expost consequence; punishment.
Often left out of traditional international relations literature, deterrence by denial
has seen a surge of interest in the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Alex
Wilner defines deterrence by denial as “reducing the perceived benefits an action is
expected to provide a challenger”.15 Deterrence by denial in the physical world often
includes hardening targets by building higher walls, adding security mechanisms, or
other tactics to reduce the susceptibility of targets to attack. If the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI – also known as Star Wars) had been successful, it would have been a
deterrence by denial strategy to limit the effect of Soviet nuclear weapons. Commonly
used forms of deterrence by denial in conflict zones include land mines, razor wire,
surface to air missiles (SAMs) and fortifications.
Deterrence by punishment and denial are intended to manipulate the cost-benefit
analysis of an adversary. To function they must both be credible. Credibility requires
undertaking ex-ante costs by the deterrer. Threats absent ante impetum costs lack
credibility. A state without nuclear weapons cannot credibly threaten nuclear
retaliation. If a state wishes to deter it must provide demonstrable evidence that it is
able to carry out its threat.
Likewise, deterrence by denial fails when it lacks the material capabilities to deny.
The Maginot Line built by the French following World War I stands an example of
failed deterrence by denial. The French system of fortifications on portions of their
northern territory failed because the line itself only covered one vector of attack into
France. The elevation of costs to a potential attacker must be complete and provide
no reasonable alternatives to achieve the attacker’s intended utility. Both strategies
require ex-ante costs by the defender to alter the ex-post perceived benefits of an
attacker. Punishment strategies increase adversary costs after a violation and denial
strategies increases adversary costs in advance of a violation.
Deterrence by denial is a successful strategy in many instances; SAMs effectively deter
enemy aircraft. The relative costs of upgrading certain denial tools is comparatively
less than the costs of surmounting them. In the case of SAMs, the United States
spent billions of dollars to defeat the S-300 missile system (~$100 million/system).16
Following the development and use of stealth, S-300 designer Almaz upgraded its
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systems to the S-400 variant with greater accuracy and anti-stealth technology.17 The
cost ratio between the denial tool and offensive weapon system is approximately 1 to
1,000. The defensive and offensive capabilities, industrial, and financial resources of
these two states exceed most other nations. Even with a $18.5 trillion GDP a $1 to
$1,000 cost to benefit ratio is high and demonstrates how denial can be a remarkably
effective strategy.
Deterrence by denial is not always successful as illustrated by the Israel – Hamas
conflict. In response to Hamas’ use of Katyusha rockets, Israel developed the Iron
Dome System. Iron Dome batteries cost $100 million and each rocket costs $50,000.18
To intercept an incoming Katyusha rocket, the Israelis launch 2 interceptor rockets.19
By contrast, Hamas spends between $500 and $1,000 per rocket launch.20 If the cost
of the battery is ignored, the cost of deterrence by denial is still between 100 to 1 and
200 to 1.
Denial strategies are not passive. They require continuous modification relative
to adversary capability development. Static denial strategies in cyberspace or in
conventional conflict are likely to have limited credibility over time. Similarly,
punishment strategies also require constant updating in relation to adversary
capabilities and geopolitical considerations. In cyberspace, this involves adapting
denial strategies to technological advances such as artificial intelligence, polymorphic
malware and the Internet of Things, to name just a few.
Punishment strategies also require ex-ante costs. Below the nuclear threshold, threats
of force are common, yet the credibility of these threats is difficult to establish.
Alexander George and Richard Smoke identify three attributes important for signaling
in conventional deterrence: “(1) the full formulation of one’s intent to protect a
nation; (2) the acquisition and deployment of capacities to back up that intent; (3) the
communication of intent to a potential aggressor”.21 These three aspects are also at
times limited in their ability to convey commitment to fulfill the intent.22
Charles Glaser, writing on cyber deterrence, established four components of basic
deterrence:
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“1) the benefits of taking the action—the larger the benefits, the
harder the adversary is to deter; 2) the probability of achieving the
benefits—the higher the probability, the harder the adversary is to
deter; 3) the costs the defender will impose if the adversary takes
the action—the higher the costs, the more likely the adversary is
to be deterred; and 4) the adversary’s assessment of the probability
that the defender will inflict these costs—the higher this probability,
the more likely the adversary is to be deterred”.23
George and Smoke and Glaser acknowledge the challenge of establishing not just
threats of punishment, but the credibility associated with carrying out that threat.
Creating material capability (i.e. weapon systems capable of carrying out a given
threat) and clear signaling might occur and yet the utilization of this capability in
response to an adversary’s action will lack credibility (fulfillment of commitment)
unless it contains what James Fearon refers to as hand-tying within a sunk costs
framework.24 Credibility and hand-tying are most closely associated with extended
deterrence, yet when expanding deterrence to cyberspace it also finds relevance. The
establishment of credibility through hand-tying establishes a forcing mechanism for
decisions, indicating costs have already been incurred or are likely to occur. This
subsequently alters the cost-benefit calculus of retaliation. The stationing of US
forces in West Berlin serves as an example of hand-tying through prospective costs.25
An attack on West Berlin would have resulted in sunk costs and provided a strong
inducement or “tripwire” to actuate US retaliatory threats. Nearly all forms of kinetic
attacks against the direct interests of a nation implicitly include hand-tying. It is
unclear how to effectively signal prospective costs within cyberspace to an adversary.
Charles Glaser identifies several problems associated with deterrence by punishment
specific to cyberspace that extend beyond basic credibility issues. First, he notes that
deterrence often relies on the attribution of an adversary’s actions.26 In cyberspace,
this can be difficult and time-consuming.27 Although the attribution problem is
decreasing as more data becomes available, it does not eliminate uncertainty.28
Second, hands-tying and other forms of credibility enhancing measures are likely
lacking in cyberspace. Moreover, the ability to respond within domain simply might
not be possible within certain conditions.29 Third, Glaser identifies potential spillovers
23
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in which limited within domain options result in cross-domain, kinetic responses.30
To date there is limited evidence of cross-domain responses and therefore lacks in
credibility. Moreover, cross-domain retaliation alters the escalation framework
from digital to kinetic or other and poses a challenge for states wishing to establish
credibility while controlling potential escalatory behaviors.
Deterrence is more than simply threatening punishment. Deterrence requires
substantial target relevant costs and the development of mechanisms to establish that
further costs are credibly wagered to provide clarity for an adversary. The goal of
this clarity is to establish within an adversary’s calculus that their expected gains are
less than any potential losses incurred. Reassessments of rational modeling and the
increasing importance of cognitive modeling increase the value of tailored deterrence
strategies predicated on the uniqueness of conditions and actors. Paul notes that
deterrence is complex and is most logically broken down into five ideal types:
“(1) deterrence among great powers; (2) deterrence among new
nuclear states; (3) deterrence and extended deterrence involving
great powers and regional powers armed with chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons; (4) deterrence between nuclear states and
non-state actors (5) deterrence by collective actors”.31
It follows that tailored deterrence for cyber actors is also one potential avenue of
exploration.
The potential for tailored deterrence strategies could be highlighted in numerous
significant cyber incident cases. The 1998 cyber attack code-named SOLAR
SUNRISE discovered by US Air Force Computer Emergency Response Team
(AFCERT) stands as a prime example. The three-week hack affected more than 500
systems across the US Air Force, Navy, NASA, Lawrence Livermore Labs, MIT,
Harvard, and UC Berkeley. The attack coincided with increased tensions between
the United States and Iraq and resulted in high-level governmental meetings to
identify a proper response action.32 At the time, the attack was believed to be statesponsored cyber attack focused on degrading US military capabilities. Subsequently,
it was discovered that the attack was conducted by two California teenagers with
guidance from Israeli hacker Ehud Tenebaum. The incident is relevant to tailored
deterrence because it highlights challenges faced in developing a deterrence strategy.
The adversaries were domestic, yet foreign inspired and attacked the operational
infrastructure of the Department of Defense. No form of deterrence by punishment
delineated above could have appropriately accounted this challenge. The only realistic
30
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deterrence frameworks for SOLAR SUNRISE would have been deterrence by denial
or punishment in cooperation with allies.
Richard Kugler writes that a strategy or general framework for deterrence in cyberspace
must necessarily be tailored to differing threats, situations, and objectives.33 The
threats, situations, and objectives in cyberspace differ from the concerns addressed
by first wave theorists. While the potential for physical damage through cyberspace
has been demonstrated in tests such as the Aurora generator experiment that resulted
in the destruction of a multi-ton diesel generator, or the Stuxnet attack that destroyed
segments of a centrifuge cascade in Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, many attacks do not
have kinetic parallels.34 Building on Kugler, Jeffrey Cooper identifies three important
factors that frame concepts on deterrence in cyberspace. First, there is a wide range of
actors each with different capabilities and attributes as well as cost benefits structures;
second, cyberspace is a unique operational domain that carries with vastly different
concepts of risk and reward; third, to develop deterrence, models must be applicable
to the virtual and physical aspects of the domain.35
This section has provided a summary of a large and robust literature on deterrence. The
concepts that need to be carried forward include, the type of deterrence, the credibility
of that deterrence and the attributes of the environment in which deterrence occurs,
and who and what actors and weapons are to be deterred. The next section builds on
the literature above, with a specific emphasis on the technical, tactical, operational
and strategic attributes of cyberspace.

3. ONE SIZE DOESN’T FIT ALL
To deter adversaries in cyberspace it is helpful to first define what cyberspace is and
what types of actions and actors a state would like to deter. The US Department of
Defense defines cyberspace in the following way:
“Cyberspace consists of many different and often overlapping
networks, as well as the nodes (any device or logical location
with an Internet protocol address or other analogous identifier)
on those networks, and the system data (such as routing tables)
that support them. Cyberspace can be described in terms of three
33
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layers: physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona.
The physical network layer of cyberspace is comprised of the
geographic component and the physical network components. It
is the medium where the data travel. The logical network layer
consists of those elements of the network that are related to one
another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network, i.e.,
the form or relationships are not tied to an individual, specific path,
or node. A simple example is any Web site that is hosted on servers
in multiple physical locations where all content can be accessed
through a single uniform resource locator. The cyber-persona
layer represents yet a higher level of abstraction of the logical
network in cyberspace; it uses the rules that apply in the logical
network layer to develop a digital representation of an individual
or entity identity in cyberspace. The cyber-persona layer consists
of the people actually on the network”.36
The inclusion of the full definition illustrates the complexity within which defense
strategists and operators in the various services engage. Because the domain spans
the physical, logical, and persona layers, deterrence strategies can reasonably occur
within and across all three. This fundamentally differs from the conceptualization
of deterrence in physical domains of land, sea, air, and space. Physical domain
deterrence might include physical and cognitive aspects analogous to the cyber
persona and physical network layers, however, the logical layer is wholly absent.
The cyber persona layer also diverges significantly from personas within the physical
domain as individuals and states have the capacity to alter their attributes within the
persona, logical, and network layers.
To construct a meaningful model of deterrence in cyberspace we must first ask what
it is we wish to deter. Herein lies the largest distinction between deterrence in the
physical world and in cyberspace. Whereas in the physical world deterrence is directed
most commonly against physical attacks against specific assets or categories of assets
that when attacked provide strong, largely non-repudiable forms of attribution, in
cyberspace deterrence is directed against manipulations of the elements within the
environment and the environment itself. Manipulation of elements of cyberspace and
the environment itself can be examined in multiple ways. Simplifying cyberspace
operations into three broad categories, there are cyber attacks, cyber espionage, and
cyber theft. Despite simplification, it is important to note these categories are not
entirely discrete in process or function. Cyber attacks are those acts in cyberspace
that degrade, deny or destroy. Acts of cyber espionage steal information for state or
corporate intelligence gain. Cyber theft is the stealing of information for financial
gain with no direct state utility. Attacks, espionage, and theft occur across all levels
36
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of actors from script kiddies to the military units of states – a problem which will be
examined more below. States are most commonly concerned with cyber attacks and
espionage at the national level, and theft at lower-jurisdictions.
Because attacks, espionage, and theft are perpetrated by a variety of actors against
almost any target in cyberspace, sending an overt signal from one state to another,
while still applicable, might not deter attacks at other levels that are of equal or greater
significance. Moreover, research by Shawn Lonergan and Erica Borghard indicate
a high prevalence of proxy37 usage by states to maintain plausible deniability.38
Using proxies to engage in cyber acts against targets deflects deterrence by threats
of punishment unless sufficient evidence is present to indicate involvement by the
instigating state rather than the third-party proxy. The use of proxies to engage in
attacks, espionage and theft against target states outside of cyberspace has been the
practice of states since Katulaya and Sun Tzu.39 However, unlike the difficulties
of non-repudiability within conventional conflicts, cyber attacks are frequently
repudiable. Attackers might use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), proxies or other
means by which to engage in an attack.
Additional problems in cyberspace not frequently encountered in conventional
physical domains are second and third order effects. As noted by Herbert Lin, the
results of a cyber attack itself might not be identifiable, rather it is second or third
order effects that generate an intended outcome.40 Classical deterrence and tailored
deterrence strategies used against terrorist organizations are unable to account for
disconnected action and reaction pairs commonly found in cyberspace. The time to
punish a violation can be weeks, months or years based on discovery and attribution
challenges, a problem not present in classical deterrence.
Cyber attacks are incidents occurring in or through cyberspace that degrade, deny
or destroy. Attacks in cyberspace can and are perpetrated by all levels of actors. The
differentiation between actors is most closely correlated with targets and outcomes
of attacks.41 For example, criminal actors may use phishing attacks to ingress into
a hospital’s computer systems to install Cryptolocker or a similar ransomware
malware on the hospital’s systems. Cryptolocker is an attack that degrades civilian
critical infrastructure, denies user access and has the potential to destroy critical
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information.42 Very few states have national deterrence strategies aimed at sub-state
actors, criminal organizations or individuals. State deterrence strategies aimed at nonterrorist sub-state actors are confined to criminological models of deterrence. Yet,
if a soldier or spy from an adversary state walked into the server room at the same
hospital and threatened to detonate a bomb and destroy all the files unless he was paid
a ransom, the act would align more closely with a conventional deterrence framework
of state-to-state deterrence by threats of punishment or tailored deterrence against
terrorist actors.
Most scholars and practitioners are likely to contend that it is not the responsibility of the
state to deter non-state actors (excepting terrorists), particularly criminals from cyber
attacks against non-federal infrastructure outside of a criminological framework.43
Yet, the same tool used by a criminal is available to the state and presents the same
challenges associated with attribution irrespective of the perpetrator. What actions
could a state undertake to deter an adversary state actor from engaging in this behavior
and would these actions have a measurable effect on non-state actors as well?
Examples of cyber attacks abound and include the destruction, denial or degradation
of military or civilian communications platforms. Attacks such as the Mirai (malware)
botnet attack in 2016 are capable of being directed at both critical and non-critical
infrastructure by both state and non-state actors. A botnet using Mirai was able to
generate in excess of 1Tbps of traffic and degrade dozens of websites in the United
States on 20 September 2016.44 This same form of attack could be directed towards
IP addresses of the FAA and emergency service providers or any number of Internetenabled systems found on Shodan.io or similar services.45
Although DDoS attacks are generally considered to be among the least complicated
forms of cyber attacks they still challenge state and sub-state entities both public and
private. DDoS attacks have been used against US government infrastructure, against
Estonia in 2007 and the Republic of Georgia in 2008.46 To date, DDoS attacks against
the US government or critical infrastructure have received little attention in discussions
on deterrence in cyberspace. On 21 January 2016 a grand jury in the Southern District
of New York indicted 7 Iranian Hackers in absentia for their involvement in DDoS
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attacks against US financial sector interests and a variety of other US companies
occurring from 2011-2013.47 These indictments are: (a) not deterrent threats or
denials, but criminological deterrents; (b) temporally distant from the time of attack
as to be ineffective at signaling deterrence; and (c) impose little to no costs on Iran or
the individual perpetrators or organizers of the attack.
Beyond DDoS attacks, Russian attacks against Ukrainian electric infrastructure and
US political organizations also resulted in no or weak responses that offer no indication
that deterrence is making headway in cyberspace.48 In response to massive influence
operations perpetrated by the Russian Federation against the United States and its two
major political parties during the 2016 Presidential election the United States expelled
35 suspected Russian intelligence operatives and placed sanctions on Russia’s two
leading intelligence services, the FSB and the GRU.49 The US response imposed
insignificant costs in comparison to the utility achieved by the Russian Federation.
The latter case of Russian influence and hacking during the 2016 election cycle
provides a case study for why deterrence by threat in cyberspace is so difficult to
achieve. The first indications of Russian interference in the 2016 election were
identified by the FBI in September 2015 more than a year before the election.50
The FBI phoned the DNC to try and alert them to a potential attack, but the call
was not considered credible and was subsequently ignored by DNC staffers.51 The
progression of hacking attempts against the DNC continued and President Obama
was notified in the summer of 2016. Moreover, the “attack” against the DNC was not
an attack, but espionage or theft and therefore falls outside conventionally defined
deterrence frameworks. Yet the impact of the espionage and the later release of private
DNC emails was substantial as indicated in a declassified report by the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).52 The report assessed that information
warfare conducted following the espionage campaign substantially degraded the DNC
and engendered a loss of confidence in the US electoral system.53 Cyber deterrence
has fundamental problems including the realization that the most valuable assets in
cyberspace might not be destroyed or degraded, but rather stolen and used.
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Even in instances where specific code is used to achieve damage such has Iranian
efforts to hack a spillway dam54 or malware implants in critical infrastructure such
as a German steel mill,55 there are no formal mechanisms by which to signal a threat
within cyberspace or beyond other than by referencing responses to kinetic effects.
Current deterrence by threat signaling for attacks occurring in or through cyberspace
is ambiguous. Efforts by the NATO CCD COE through the production of the Tallinn
Manuals have begun to outline the frameworks in which deterrence could legally take
place, yet the application of threats is still uncertain.56
Deterrence by threat within cyberspace is realistically only applicable to cyber
operations that result in direct physical effects that are non-repudiable and attributed
quickly. Using formal modeling in the Decision to Attack: Military and Intelligence
Cyber Decision-making I found that most cyber attacks, with the notable exception of
DDoS, operate under varying conditions of anonymity.57 The anonymity associated
with attacks is usually necessary for attacks to be successful in bypassing deterrence
by denial frameworks found in the perimeter defenses of networks such as intrusion
detection and prevention systems found in the logical or physical network layers of
cyberspace. Threats of punishment could impact the persona layer of cyberspace as
well, but as will be examined below there are some fundamental challenges unique to
cyberspace posed by anonymity.

4. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES: THREATS OF
PUNISHMENT WITHIN DOMAIN
Punishing an adversary in cyberspace is not cheap or fast outside of pre-established
botnets or damage done to physical infrastructure. Punishment in or across any of
the layers cyberspace requires what the US Department of the Army refers to as
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB):
“IPB is a systemic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and
environment in a specific geographic area. It is designed to support
staff estimates and military decision making”.58
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In response to a nuclear attack on a city in the US, the proportional response would
be a counter attack on an adversary city. The city itself is geographically fixed and
immovable both logically and physically. Threatening in-kind retaliation is both
plausible and technically feasible with ballistic missiles or air assets. The same logic
does not hold in cyberspace.
Why are in kind retaliations or other forms of punishment not viable solutions for most
retaliations in cyberspace? First, a state must fulfill the burden of proof in identifying
the perpetrator of an action. All the above IPB and potential for retaliation still depends
upon attribution of who, what, and potentially why an attack occurred.59 Retaliation
absent strong evidence is likely to lead to misidentification and unnecessary escalation.
Second, a state must retaliate within a proximate temporal range. If state X does not have
detailed intelligence on the asset it wishes to retaliate against, developing intelligence
along with a cyber weapon to target it increases the time horizon of response such
that it is days, weeks, months or even years out from the original attack for which it is
retaliating. Due to this temporal disconnect, the threat to punish in response to a given
action falls into a category of what economists refer to as hyperbolic discounting.
The risk of punishment for an attack is possible but so temporally, distant as to be
discounted to the point of irrelevance.
Third, deterrence by punishment requires proportionality. It is necessary to have
comparable assets to punish to prevent escalation or violations of international
law.60 Comparable assets are not a given within cyberspace and are often difficult
to identify.61 To punish an asset within a domain requires pre-established access or
knowledge of that asset beyond its location. Whereas a city is immovable and likely
to be as susceptible today as it will be tomorrow to a missile or bomb, a computer
system that is penetrated today for prepositioned access, might be patched, upgraded
or taken offline tomorrow.
Fourth, a state must possess a specific cyber weapon system tailored to its target.
If state X alerts state Y that it is going to punish an asset or state X uses a repeated
cyber weapon to attack state Y’s system, it is likely to be ineffectual the longer it is
used due to updated perimeter defenses, such as intrusion detection and prevention
systems (IDPS), antivirus programs or a variety of other security measures. If state X
wants to punish state Y it must have knowledge of the attributes of the asset it wishes
to retaliate against and what the status of that asset is. State X must also develop new
exploits to achieve effects or be confident that State Y has not accounted for previous
exploits that have been used.
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The challenges of signaling deterrence by punishment are numerous within cyberspace
whether the conflict is contained within domain or crosses over domains. Advances in
attribution within a timely manner and the availability and reasonable assumption that
proportional assets of an adversary can be held at risk need to be improved to credibly
threaten punishment. This is a challenge not isolated to within domain retaliation.
While proportional target selection might be slightly easier in cross-domain retaliation,
the first three issues raised above are still relevant.
Deterrence by punishment in cyberspace is possible, but it is not a reliable or credible
option under most conditions absent sufficient and sustained intelligence. This
assessment is not unique and is borne out in the analysis of Valeriano and Maness, who
find that deterrence via punishment is generally ineffective and likely more dangerous
than other means of preventing attacks.62 Moreover, sustained invasive intelligence
into adversary networks creates its own unique problems, including a security
dilemma.63 The more states engage in highly invasive intelligence via cyberspace,
the more their actions are likely to be misinterpreted. Differentiating between various
forms of cyber actions are difficult and can lead to miscalculation.64
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between attacking and defending forces and area
where both forms of deterrence function.
FIGURE 1. TIMELINE OF CYBER ATTACKS AND DEFENSE
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As seen in Figure 1, deterrence by threat of punishment and denial operate within
the same temporal ranges, yet while attribution matters a great deal for threats of
punishment they are generally unimportant for denial. In their initial stages both
denial and punishment focus on ante-impetum means of dissuasion, yet deterrence by
punishment necessarily needs post-impetum attribution for it to be used. Based on the
technical realities of cyberspace and of international relations deterrence by threat of
punishment is more complicated and difficult to effectively establish.

5. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES: DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
Both deterrence by denial and punishment require ante-impetum costs by the defender.
The allocation of resources between denial and deterrence and the efficiency with
which they deter adversaries differ. The establishment of credible deterrence by denial
often starts with the allocation of financial capital to purchase technical resources and
provide human capital sufficient to continually update, enhance, audit and manage
complex network infrastructure.65 Network-based and host-based defenses such as
intrusion detection and prevention systems, anti-virus products and similar systems are
some of the variety of overlapping expenditures that can be undertaken to increasingly
make the intrusion of adversaries into a given network more difficult.66
In cyberspace, such expenditures are regularized and often included as overhead
costs, however they are deterrent in nature.67 Although they are not glamorous, they
substantially decrease the probability of penetration. The same types of deterrence
strategies are used by stores in placing electronic tracking tags on their products and
detectors at doors, by banks in the construction of vaults, silent alarms and dyed
packets of money, by critical infrastructure in extending the perimeter of security
outward to prevent vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, increased numbers
of security guards, cameras and the use of razor wire or other physical structures.
These devices signal to adversaries both criminal and terrorist alike that the costs
of successfully perpetrating an attack are high and that the likelihood of success is
low, although both terrorist and criminal deterrence models include deterrence by
punishment through criminal proceedings and potential lethal actions against terrorist
they rely far more heavily on preventive measures that deny would be adversaries.
Sceptics might contend denial mechanisms are unlikely to deter a state, yet this is in
and of itself not accurate. The vast majority of probes by states do not translate into
successfully attacks. The US Department of Defense suffers from millions of probes
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a day. Yet nearly 99.99% of them are unsuccessful.68 Moreover, in the face of a global
onslaught of cyber attacks and espionage the United States re-architected much of its
military network infrastructure. This restructuring allows the initial point of contact
with adversaries to be chosen. In military parlance, it allowed the defenders to choose
the terrain of the battle. While it did not obviate the need for denial mechanisms within
the network infrastructure, it did signal increased cost imposition on adversaries and it
did allow for more efficient resource allocation.
Unlike in any other battlespace, whether conventional kinetic terrorism, conventional
kinetic or mass destruction military force, the opportunities for deterrence by denial
are substantial in cyberspace and unique. While denial opportunities in land, sea, air,
and even space are predicated on the control of a given geospatial area, the party
establishing deterrence by denial has limited abilities to manipulate the nature of the
domain itself. The same is not true within cyberspace. Every aspect of a defender’s
cyberspace from the structure of the network, to the hardware, firmware, and software
within a network, to the access of individuals within and external to that network is
manipulable. At every stage of an attack an adversary is always attempting to operate
on or against the defender’s cyberspace over which it has no control and has limited
visibility.
For denial, the historical literature of deterrence theory remains relevant, in particular
the second and third stages of deterrence which focused on rational game theoretic
and cognitive modeling. While in conventional deterrence the emphasis was on
punishment, here these same modeling techniques find applicability in deterrence by
denial. Although the games might be the same, the payoffs in cyberspace manipulable
and favor the defender. In few other applications of deterrence are the payoff matrices
of deterrence so favorable to the defender. Despite the favorability of conditions, the
ability to manipulate the potential payoff for attackers remains difficult. Although
possible for defenders to reduce the probability of attack success, the potential payoff
for a successful attack can remain large.
Despite conditions favoring defenders, the potential payoffs are often not affected
by deterrence by denial. Minimizing the potential payoffs from attacks on data
repositories requires disaggregation of data. These types of denial mechanisms
come with efficiency or financial costs. Although denial offers more potential than
punishment, it is not a silver bullet to the cyber deterrence problem. Denial decreases
the probability of success for attackers and is likely to reduce classes of actors focused
on certain targets. Despite efforts to signal through the purchase and implementation
of various defensive measures, the re-architecting of network infrastructure, the cyber
deterrence problem remains.
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6. BEYOND THE DETERRENCE PROBLEM
If punishment and denial are unable to fully remediate the cyber deterrence problem,
are there any meaningful solutions? The core debate remains, with no simple and
readily apparent solutions. The search for a single solution is likely to remain fruitless
for the foreseeable future. Deterrence has never been the single tool within the
toolbox of the state to dissuade or shape adversary behavior. Rather, it has always
been combined with efforts that extend beyond traditional concepts of deterrence
to include geopolitical and technical practices including norm development,
entanglement, cumulative deterrence, research and development, policies and laws,
liability structures for software and hardware, training for users and human capital
development within information technology and cybersecurity.69
Efficient and effective cyber deterrence should extend international politics and
include fields such as criminology, immunology and public health.70 The capacity
of states to punish criminals is high and the credibility of punishment actions in
developed nations is strong. Despite a capacity to punish criminal behaviors, they
still occur. Extending beyond punishment, states also focus on denying criminals
opportunities to commit crimes. Yet crime still occurs. The root causes of crime
are not simple nor isolatable to a single phenomenon. Likewise, states engage one
another in cyberspace for a variety of reasons. Some reasons fit within conventional
deterrence frameworks of denial and punishment and do not suffer from challenges
with attribution. For instance, larger and more harmful attacks increase the probability
of attribution. However, many states remain perturbed by the death by a thousand cuts
phenomena which falls below thresholds and required to provide timely attribution.
Shifting the focus away from within domain deterrence focused solely on punishment
and denial and changing the emphasis to a basket of strategies focused on reducing
incentives, availability and anonymity fosters an environment less conducive both to
hostile actions and potential malicious actors. The solution to the deterrence problem
is not abandoning it, but expanding the range of alternative strategies not presently
considered. By acknowledging the failures and inadequacies of deterrence strategies
and the potential places where novel strategies found in other fields are applicable the
intractable problem of cyber deterrence becomes more manageable.
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Abstract: There is a growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities (OCC)
among states. Despite the growing interest in these capabilities, little is still known
about the nature of OCC as a tool of the state. This research therefore aims to understand
if (and how) offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to change the role of
military power. Drawing on a wide range of cases, we argue that these capabilities can
alter the manner in which states use their military power strategically in at least four
ways. OCC are not particularly effective in deterring adversary military action, except
when threatened to be used by states with a credible reputation. However, they do
have value in compellence. Unlike conventional capabilities, the effects of offensive
cyber operations do not necessarily have to be exposed publicly, which means the
compelled party can back down post-action without losing face thus deescalating
conflict. The potential to control the reversibility of effect of an OCC by the attacker
may also encourage compliance. OCC also contribute to the use of force for defensive
purposes, as it could provide both a preemptive as well as preventive strike option.
Finally, its symbolic value as a ‘prestige weapon’ to enhance ‘swaggering’ remains
unclear, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory nature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities (OCC) among
states. A diverse group of states across the world including Belgium, Columbia,
Germany, Finland, India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Vietnam have all said
they are exploring options for cyber warfare.1 In turn, there are signs that the states
such as the United States, China, Russia, Israel, the United Kingdom, Iran and North
Korea continue to further develop their offensive cyber capabilities.2 Concurrently,
many states have adopted cyberspace as a new operational domain of warfare,
alongside land, air, space and sea.3 Also NATO, following the Warsaw Summit, has
acknowledged cyberspace as a military domain.4
Despite the growing interest in these capabilities, little is known about how states use
(or expect to use) OCC to further their national goals. In a recently published report,
former US Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, expressed his disappointment in the
‘cyber component’ of US efforts to destroy ISIS.5 The report highlights an important
1

2

3
4

5
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This is not a comprehensive list of newcomers. On Germany see: Nina Werkhäuser, “German army
launches new cyber command”, DW, (April 1, 2017). Retrieved from: http://www.dw.com/en/germanarmy-launches-new-cyber-command/a-38246517; on Finland see: Secretariat of the Security Committee,
“Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy”, (2013). Retrieved from: https://www.defmin.fi/files/2378/Finland_s_
Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf; on Vietnam see: Jim Dao, Giang The Huong Tran and Tu Ngoc Trinh, “New
Law on Cyber Security in Vietnam”, Tilleke & Gibbins (2016, June 3). Retrieved from: http://www.tilleke.
com/resources/new-law-cyber-security-vietnam; on India see: Vivek Raghuvanshi, “New Indian Cyber
Command Urged Following Recent Attacks”, Defense News, (2016, June 6). Retrieved from: https://www.
defensenews.com/2016/06/06/new-indian-cyber-command-urged-following-recent-attacks/; on United
Arab Emirates see: Bindiya Thomas, “UAE Military To Set Up Cyber Command”, (2014, September 30),
DefenseWorld. Retrieved from: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/11185/ UAE_Military_To_Set_Up_
Cyber_Command#.WW4nJYjyiUk; on Turkey see: Israel Defense, “Turkey Launched Cyber Warfare
Command”, (2014, April 13). Retrieved from: http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/turkey-launchedcyber-warfare-command; on Columbia see: Christoffer Frendesen “Colombia sends officials to Estonia for
cyber defense training”, Columbia Reports, (2014, September 2). Retrieved from: http://colombiareports.
com/colombias-govt-sends-security-forces-estonia-cyber-defense-training/.
On Russia see: Eugene Gerden, “Russia to spend $250m strengthening cyber-offensive capabilities”,
SC Magazine UK, (2016, February 4). Retrieved from: http://www.scmagazineuk.com/russia-to-spend250m-strengthening-cyber-offensive- capabilities/article/470733; on the United States see Sean Lyngaas,
“Pentagon Chief: 2017 budget includes $7Bn for cyber”, FCW (February 2, 2016). Retrieved from: https://
fcw.com/articles/2016/02/02/dod-budget-cyber.aspx; on Iran see: Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “Iran to expand
military spending, develop missiles”, Reuters, (January 9, 2017). Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-iran-military-plan/iran-to-expand-military-spending-develop-missiles-idUSKBN14T15L; on
North Korea see: David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick and Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed
at North Korean Cyberpower. No More”, The New York Times (October 15, 2017). Retrieved from: https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html.
For a critical analysis on this branding see: Chris McGuffin and Paul Mitchell, “On domains: Cyber and
the practice of warfare”, International Journal, 69:3 (2014):394-412 .
NATO CCD COE, “NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a ‘Domain of Operations’ at Warsaw Summit”,
(2016, July 21). Retrieved from: https://ccdcoe.org/nato-recognises-cyberspace-domain-operationswarsaw-summit.html.
At the inaugural US Cyber Command Symposium, a more positive view of the US cyber operations
against ISIS was provided. As one senior policymaker stated: “We are hitting every target, every time”.
Ashton Carter, “A Lasting Defeat: The Campaign to Destroy ISIS”, Report, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, (October, 2017). Retrieved from: https://www.belfercenter.
org/LastingDefeat; Max Smeets, “US Cyber Command: An Assiduous Actor, Not a Warmongering Bully”,
The Cipher Brief, (March 4, 2018). Retrieved from: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/us-cyber-commandassiduous-actor-not-warmongering-bully.

set of issues. It rings alarm bells about the current organizational efforts of US Cyber
Command.6 It confirms findings of several scholars that the development of effective
cyber capability is by no means an easy feat.7 It also reveals the importance of
contextualizing the US Cyber Command within a larger organizational structure, each
component of which has its own institutional interests. Finally, Carter’s statement
suggests that these capabilities, even though they are very malleable and refer to a
broad category of tools, may not be equally valuable in all situations against all types
of actors.
The former Secretary of Defense is of course not the first senior policy maker to note
disquiet about cyber weapons. In 2012, when Keith Alexander was still heading the
NSA and US Cyber Command, he stated that there is “much uncharted territory in the
world of cyber-policy, law and doctrine”.8 More recently, referring to Herman Kahn’s
classic 1959 text on nuclear strategic concepts, Michael Hayden states that “[n]o one
has yet begun to write the On Thermonuclear War for cyber conflict”.9
The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the following question: How and to
what extent, if any, do offensive cyber capabilities have the potential to affect the roles
of military power? We do not intend to provide a highly detailed policy prescription,
nor a detailed description of the requirements for the military to conduct a specific
operation. Instead, this paper deals with the basic principles and aims to parsimoniously
capture which goals can be realized through the use of OCC. After all, as military
theorist Charles Ardant du Picq noted in the mid-19th century, “[t]he instruments of
battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them”.10 As a starting point of our
analysis, we use the framework developed by Robert J. Art almost four decades ago
on the ends of military power. Art distinguished between four strategic roles that force
can serve: i) defense, ii) deterrence, iii) compellence and iv) ‘swaggering’.11
Our central claim is that OCC can alter the manner in which states use their military
power. Offensive cyber capabilities are not particularly effective in deterring
adversary military action, except when threatened to be used by states with a credible
6

7
8
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10
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“I was largely disappointed in Cyber Command’s effectiveness against ISIS. It never really produced any
effective cyber weapons or techniques. When CYBERCOM did produce something useful, the intelligence
community tended to delay or try to prevent its use, claiming cyber operations would hinder intelligence
collection. This would be understandable if we had been getting a steady stream of actionable intel, but
we weren’t. The State Department, for its part, was unable to cut through the thicket of diplomatic issues
involved in working through the host of foreign services that constitute the Internet. In short, none of our
agencies showed very well in the cyber fight”.
Jon Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare”, Security Studies, 22: 3 (2013)365-404.
Keith Alexander, US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, (2014, April). Retrieved from: http://www.
eweek.com/security/nsa-director-says-cyber-command-not-trying-to-militarize-cyberspace.
Michael Hayden, Playing the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror, (New York: Penguin Press:
2014).
Charles Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, trans. John Greely and Robert C.
Cotton (New York: Macmillan, 1920).
The categories selected by Art are not analytically exhaustive. The categories are described in more detail
below. Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?”, International Security, 4:4 (1980)3-35.
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reputation. However, offensive cyber capabilities do have value in compellence. Unlike
conventional capabilities, the effects of OCC do not necessarily have to be exposed
publicly, which means the compelled party can back down post-action without losing
face thus deescalating conflict. The potential opportunity for the attacker to control
the reversibility of effect of an OCC may also encourage compliance. At the same
time, the use of OCC has escalatory potential. Cyber capabilities also contribute to the
use of force for defensive purposes, as it could provide both a preemptive as well as
preventive strike option. Finally, its symbolic value as a ‘prestige weapon’ to enhance
‘swaggering’ remains unclear, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory
nature.
The remainder of this paper consists of three parts. A study on the unique value of
cyber capabilities has to start with an analysis of its distinct features. The next section
therefore briefly discusses the ‘rise’ of OCC and assesses its characteristics. Section
III, in turn, lays out the four possible functions of cyber capabilities as a tool for the
state. The final section concludes and considers the implications of these findings.

2. THE RISE OF OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES
The term ‘offensive cyber capability’ can have a host of different meanings.12 We
define OCC as “a capability designed to access a computer system or network to
damage or harm living or material entities”.13 Adopting this definition, it also means
that we exclude espionage, information warfare and information operations from our
analysis. OCC encompasses a wide range of capabilities. Indeed, the cyber means
used against the Ukrainian regional electricity distribution company in December
2015 are very different to those used in the DDoS attacks that swamped websites of
various Estonian organizations in April 2007.14 Rather than compile an exhaustive
list of purposes and examples, we have selected three categories based on the damage
12

13

14
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This is partially because the prefix ‘cyber’ acts like a sponge absorbing meaning. See: James Shires and
Max Smeets, “The Word Cyber Now Means Everything—and Nothing At All”, Slate, (December 1, 2017).
Retrieved from: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/12/01/the_word_cyber_has_lost_all_
meaning.html.
Max Smeets, “A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons”, Journal of Strategic
Studies, (2017)1-28; For alternative definitions see: Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney, “Cyberweapons”,
The RUSI Journal, 157:1 (2012):6-13, p. 7; Trey Herr, “PrEP: A Framework for Malware & Cyber
Weapons”, The Journal of Information Warfare, 13:1(2014) ; Dale Peterson. “Offensive Cyber Weapons:
Construction, Development and Employment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:1(2013).
A detailed analysis of each case goes beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent overview on Ukraine
see: Kim Zetter, “Everything We Know About Ukraine’s Power Plant Hack”, Wired, (20 January 2016).
Retrieved from: https://www.wired.com/2016/01/everything-we-know-about-ukraines-power-plant-hack/;
Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research & Analysis Team, “BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ
spearphishing with Word documents”, Securelist, (28 January 2016). Retrieved from: https://securelist.
com/blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/73440/; Kim Zetter,
“Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid”, Wired, (3 March 2016). Retrieved
from: https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/;E-ISAC,
SANS ICS. “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid” March 18, 2016, 4. http://www.
nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf.

caused by an OCC: denial of service, file damage and physical damage.15 Table 1
provides an overview of some of the most important cases reported by a reputable
cyber security firm.
TABLE 1. IMPORTANT INSTANCES OF OCC

File Damage

Denial of Service

Physical Damage

Name

Year*

Name

Year*

Name

Year*

Estonian DDoS attacks

2007

Witty Worm

2004

Stuxnet

2010

Hacking Scientology

2008

Dozer

2009

Ukraine attacks

2015

Georgian attacks

2009

Koredos

2010

Black DDoS

2010

Shamoon

2012

OPI Israel

2012

Groovemonitor

2012

Jokra / Dark Seoul

2013

Destover / Sony

2014

Shamoon 2.0

2016

NotPetya

2017

* We listed year of disclosure rather than year of compromise. **The table does not include cases of which there
is no public cyber security report available, like Sands Casino in 2014.

The deployment and use of OCCs is generally extended over multiple stages. It is
common to distinguish between the following four stages for advanced operations:
i) reconnaissance; ii) intrusion; iii) privilege escalation; and iv) payload delivery.16
These stages can be explained through a simple analogy of a burglar trying to get into
a house. The burglar first scans the neighborhood and sees which security measures
(camera system, dog, locks) the homeowner has taken (reconnaissance). The burglar
then tries to get in, normally taking the path of least resistance (intrusion). When
entering a specific room, they try to gain access to other rooms and hope to find
the cabinet with all the keys to the cars, vault etc. (privilege escalation). Finally, the
burglar decides what to do with the obtained level of access. They may not only steal
the belongings of the homeowner, but also move or destroy some of the furniture in
the house. Considering these stages reveals that there are close similarities between
OCC and cyber espionage capabilities or, in intelligence jargon, Computer Network

15

16

These categories were adopted from: Steven M. Bellovin, Susan Landau and Herbert S. Lin, “Limiting
the undesired impact of cyber weapons: technical requirements and policy implications”, Journal of
Cybersecurity, 3:1 (2017)59–68.
For example, see: FireEye, “Advanced Targeted Attacks: How to Protect Against the Next Generation of
Cyber Attacks”, WhitePaper, (2012). Retrieved from: http://www.softbox.co.uk/pub/ reeye- advancedtargeted-attacks.pdf; S. Mathew, R. Giomundo, S. Upadyaya, M. Sudit and A. Stotz, “Understanding
Multistage Attacks by Attack-Track based Visualization of Heterogeneous Event Streams,” VizSEC ‘06,
Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Visualization for Computer Security (2016)1-6.
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Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Network Attack (CNA). Indeed, it is often said
that there is no other weapon so strongly anchored in intelligence as cyber weapons.17

3. THE USES OF CYBER FORCE
Having developed a better understanding of the nature of OCC, we can now turn to
potential function of these capabilities. Numerous works in security studies have been
devoted to the use of force. We used the classic study of Robert J. Art – To What Ends
Military Power? – as a starting point for our analysis. Art distinguishes between four
categories that force can serve: defense, deterrence, compellence and ‘swaggering’.18

A. Defense

The defensive use of military force serves to do two things: avert an attack or minimize
damage of an attack. As Art states:
“[f]or defensive purposes, a state will direct its forces against
those of a potential or actual attacker, but not against his unarmed
population. For defensive purposes, a state can deploy its forces in
place prior to an attack, use them after an attack has occurred to
repel it, or strike first if it believes that an attack upon it is imminent
or inevitable”.19
We commonly distinguish between a preemptive and preventive strike. A preemptive
strike is when a state believes an attack upon it is imminent by an adversary. A
preventive strike is when an attack is perceived to be inevitable but not imminent or
known to be planned.20
Two prominent cases of preventive strikes in the late Cold War include Operation
Scorch Sword, an airstrike by the Iranian air force in September 1980 that damaged
an almost-complete nuclear reactor near Baghdad, Iraq and Operation Opera, the
more successful bombing by the Israeli air force of the same nuclear reactor, almost a

17

18

19
20
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This in turn leads to an important set of questions surrounding the organizational integration of intelligence
and military capabilities. See: Max Smeets, “Organisational Integration of Offensive Cyber Capabilities: A
Primer on the Benefits and Risks”, 9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, (Tallinn: NATO CCD
COE Publications: 2017); Hayden, Playing the Edge.
In practice, these categories are expected to overlap and may not always be easily disentangled. Also,
unlike Art, we do not explicitly distinguish between the physical and peaceful use of military power. Art,
“To What Ends Military Power?”.
Ibid. Though note that even for offensive purposes, states are prohibited from attacking unarmed
populations.
For an excellent overview on the need to legitimize preventive and pre-emptive use of force see: Tom
Sauer, “The Preventive and Pre-Emptive Use of Force: To be Legitimized or to be De-Legitimized?” The
Hoover Institution. Retrieved from: http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?TABLE=EP&ID=493.

year later. Stuxnet can be similarly described as a preventive strike.21 As Kim Zetter
notes, in the lead up to the cyber attack, technicians at Natanz had begun to install
new centrifuges again at a rapid rate and with their performance improving.22 Stuxnet
was presented as an ‘extra option’ to President George W. Bush, as Sanger notes, to
effectively deal with a seemingly escalating situation, especially in the eyes of the
Israeli government.23 Stuxnet was a masterpiece of work, “[b]ut Stuxnet might only
have been the beginning”, as Ben Buchanan notes.24 Indeed, there was also an option
developed for a large scale pre-emptive strike. In case the situation in Iran worsened,
the United States had a contingency planned, reportedly code-named NITRO ZEUS.
As The New York Times reported:
“Nitro Zeus was part of an effort to assure President Obama that he
had alternatives, short of a full-scale war, if Iran lashed out at the
United States or its allies in the region. […] [T]he plan […] was
devised to disable Iran’s air defenses, communications systems and
crucial parts of its power grid and was shelved, at least for the
foreseeable future, after the nuclear deal struck between Iran and
six other nations last summer [2016] was fulfilled”.25
Although NITRO ZEUS is the only pre-emptive cyber strike option known to date, it
is likely that military forces have considered the use of OCC in this manner for other
situations as well, albeit on a more modest scale. Indeed, the use of a cyber capability
to, for instance, neutralize the launch of an operational ballistic missile is conceivable.

B. Deterrence

The deterrent use of military force aims to dissuade an adversary from doing
something by threatening him with unacceptable punishment if he does it. Deterrence
hinges upon the credible threat of retaliation to dissuade an enemy from attacking. As
Bernard Brodie wrote in 1958, a credible deterrent, “must be always at the ready, yet
21

22
23
24
25

Ralph Langner indicates that Stuxnet is actually not one weapon, but two. The earliest version, also
referred to as Stuxnet 0.5, was in development prior to November 2005. This early version is considered
to be the most sophisticated of the two, focusing on the closing the isolation valves of the Natanz uranium
enrichment facility. The latter, better-known version followed a different modus operandi as it aimed to
change the speeds of the rotors in the centrifuges. Ralph Langner, “Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis
of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve”, (2013, November). Retrieved from: https://www.langner.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf; Operation Orchard led by the Israeli air force
could be seen as an example of a combined preventive strike with kinetic and cyber means.
Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, (New
York: Crown Publishing: 2014).
David Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, (New
York: Broadway Paperbacks: 2012).
Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Network Intrusions, Trust and Fear in the International
System, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2017).
David E. Sanger and Mark Mazetti, “US Had Cyberattack Plan if Iran Nuclear Dispute Led to Conflict”,
The New York Times, (2016, February 16). Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/
middleeast/us-had-cyberattack-planned-if-iran-nuclear-negotiations-failed.html; James Ball, “US Hacked
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never used”.26 Defense does not necessarily buy deterrence, nor deterrence defense.27
Where defense dissuades the adversary by means of presenting an unvanquishable
military force, deterrence dissuades by presenting the certainty of a retaliatory
devastation.28
Few cyber conflict topics have received more attention than cyber deterrence. For the
most part, the existing literature uses the term to refer to deterrence of cyberattacks by
an adversary, and can be grouped into three buckets. The first group of scholars argue
that cyber deterrence does not have distinctive problems and works (or occasionally
fails) like conventional deterrence. Dorothy Denning believes that cyberspace strongly
resembles traditional domains.29 According to her, cyber deterrence can therefore be
achieved through existing regimes.30 The second group of scholars believes that cyber
deterrence has its unique set of issues, but as long as we further specify the issue
area, the problems can largely be solved. Joseph Nye Jr.’s discussion of deterrence
is a prominent example.31 He notes that conventional cyber deterrence is difficult,
but we could instead focus on deterrence by economic entanglement and norms to
overcome barriers.32 Lucas Kello argues that cyber deterrence does not work as a
strategy, but we could aim for punctuated deterrence instead; we should not deter
individual actions but a series of actions.33 The last group of scholars argues that cyber
deterrence does not work and will never work. Richard Harknett argues that cyber
deterrence is impossible due to the structure of cyberspace.34 In his view, we need to
move away from the deterrence paradigm and consider different forms of strategy,
such as persistence.35 This paper does not address cyber deterrence as defined above;
instead, it focuses on the use of a cyber capability to deter a certain type of (military)
means of an adversary.
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OCC tend to be transitory in nature, meaning they only have the “temporary ability to
access a computer system or network to cause harm or damage to living and material
entities”.36 The transitory nature of a capability is determined by both technical (e.g.
type of vulnerability, access and payload used) and non-technical (e.g. the number
and type of actors the capability is used against) factors.37 This feature, combined
with their clandestine nature, makes it difficult to prove you have a specific type
of capability pre-deployment. Hence, state actors can talk about offensive cyber
capabilities whether or not they actually have them; such talk is intended to convey
to other actors the impression that the talking nation does have the talked-about
capabilities. But since the fact of possession cannot be verified by those other actors
nor demonstrated by the talking state, such talk is cheap talk.38
Cheap talk, however, is not by definition meaningless and may under certain
circumstances still have an impact. One of the key factors which is said to affect
the effectiveness of cheap talk is reputation.39 More specifically, post-hoc revelations
about an actor’s capability – either intentionally or non-intentionally – can add to
the reputation and credibility of the actor’s cheap talk on the intention and ability
to conduct an offensive cyber operation. This has led to a number of paradoxical
dynamics for cyber conflict.
The release of the classified National Security Agency (NSA) documents by Edward
Snowden has been described as the most embarrassing episode in the history of
the secretive US intelligence agency. It revealed how the NSA maintained a masssurveillance program over its own citizens, accessed data from companies, intercepted
data from global communications networks and stored information of millions of
people. Yet, it also exposed the impressive arsenal of the agency. Not least from the
Snowden disclosures, The Washington Post reported that the US government mounted
at least 231 offensive cyber operations in 2011.40 As Gompert and Libicki note, in
36
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OCC exploiting software vulnerabilities are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from
conventional weapons in their transitory nature. They are quantitatively different as the introduction
of countermeasures - that is, the remediation (patching) of vulnerabilities - occurs on a very rapid
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exploitation against one system but against any administrator uploading the patch. Even though there are
different ways in which patches can be distributed after a software vulnerability is exploited, a defense for
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this way, the leaks have ironically “helped it to broadcast how deeply the NSA can
supposedly burrow into the systems of others”.41
Overall, it is more difficult to use OCC as means to deter compared to most other forms
of military force. However, it does not mean that it is impossible at all. Especially if
an actor is able to show repeatedly what is capable and willing of doing through cyber
means it can benefit from this reputation in the future.42

C. Compellence

The term compellence in International Relations originates from Thomas Schelling,
conceptualizing it as the second form of coercion alongside deterrence.43 The
compellent use of military force serves one of two purposes: i) to stop an activity
undertaken by an adversary, or ii) to get an adversary to do something he has not yet
undertaken.
The difference between deterrence and compellence hinges upon initiative and timing.
The deterrent use of force is based on a promised reaction following an action of the
adversary, the timing of which is in principle automatic. The compellent use of force,
in turn, is based on a more active strategy of the threatener. For compellence, timing
is a critical factor: “too strict a deadline makes compliance impossible, while one too
lenient makes compliance unnecessary”.44 Deterrence is usually said to be easier to
achieve than compellence; as the deterred party need not to do anything visible, it
does not suffer from any reputational damage and can simply argue or imply that it
never intended to conduct the activity.
Cyber capabilities have a distinct advantage in this respect. Its effects do not
necessarily have to be exposed publicly, which means the compelled party can back
down post-action without losing face. More specifically, the compelled actor can deny
that the effect was caused by OCC. For example, a three-day disruption of computer
systems at an airport leading to massive financial losses and delays could be attributed
to a ‘general system failure’ (a company mistake) whilst in reality it was due to a cyber
attack.
This opens up new opportunities for the use of force, although it is dependent on a
number of conditions. Not least, the cyber attack needs to cause significant levels
of harm or damage to be perceived as a substantial enough cost to change action
and delineate the action from the ‘constant state’ of cyber activity. Whereas plausible
deniability is often an advantage to the attacker, in this case the actor should find a
41
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way – either through the design of the weapon or other means – to show that it is
conducting this cyber attack in response to the adversary’s activity.45 Finally, in case
a compelled actor does not want to reveal it has been attacked, a cyber security firm
could instead write a public report exposing the activity.46 As much of the attribution
capability lies with private companies, oftentimes having a strong incentive to publish,
this could be a serious concern for states.47
OCCs have another distinct advantage when it comes to the compellent use of military
force. Unlike kinetic weapons, the attacker can sometimes control the reversibility
of the effects of cyber capabilities. Control is based on two dimensions: i) “the
adversary’s inability to stop or revert the effects of the cyber attack”; and ii) “[the]
attacker’s ability to stop or revert the effects of the attack at any given time desired”.48
The most detailed account on how reversibility may be achieved is provided by Neil
Rowe describing four techniques: i) reversible cryptography, where data is encrypted
to prevent use, but can be decrypted after adversary complies; ii) system obfuscation,
in which a computer is obfuscated in a reversible manner; iii) data retainment and
restoration, where important data is withheld but can be restored; and iv) compromise
deception in which adversaries mistakenly think that their system is compromised, but
after compliance find out they have been deceived.49
The potential reversibility of effect of an OCC may encourage compliance. The
adversary may know that, if it backs down, the ‘old’ situation can be restored. A
simple characterization of a conventional situation may be: ‘I will keep bombing
your critical infrastructure until you stop attacking me’. In this situation, the utility
the attacker gains by ceasing the attack is that no further costs (i.e. damage to its
critical infrastructure) will be incurred. But the attacker still has to take in its earlier
infrastructure losses that were caused during the initial stages of the conflict. In the
45

46

47
48
49

See discussion on ‘loud cyber weapons’, which has primarily been about how to “possibly deter future
intrusions”. Yet, as this discussion suggests, it should also be considered for the compellent use of force.
Chris Bing, “US Cyber Command director: We want ‘loud,’ offensive cyber tools”, FedScoop, (2016,
August 3). Retrieved from: https://www.fedscoop.com/us-cyber-command-offensive-cybersecurity-nsaaugust-2016; Herb Lin, “Developing “Loud” Cyber Weapons”, Lawfare, (2016, September 1). Retrieved
from: https://www.lawfareblog.com/developing-loud-cyber-weapons; Herb Lin, “Still More on Loud
Cyber Weapons”, Lawfare, (2016, October 19). Retrieved from: https://www.lawfareblog.com/still-moreloud-cyber-weapons.
In the case of Stuxnet, for example, the Iranian government has for a long time denied its systems were
compromised. Instead, it was researchers from VirusBlokAda, Symantec and the Langner group which
initially reported on the sophisticated attacked.
Also see: Max Smeets, “The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations”, Strategic Studies
Quarterly, Forthcoming.
Ibid.
Neil Rowe, “Towards Reversible Cyberattacks”, Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on
Information Warfare and Security, ed. J. Demergis (Reading: Academic Publishing Ltd: 2010), 261-267.
Note, however, that reversibility is often a question of time scale. The kinetic destruction of a bridge can
be “reversed” by rebuilding the bridge, albeit over a time scale of weeks or months rather than minutes.
And in any case, a human death that results from a “reversible” cyberattack on a critical system will
not be resurrected when the effects of that cyberattack are reversed. That is, while the direct effects of a
cyber capability may be reversible, the consequential effects are almost never reversible. The key issue
of reversibility lies in the fact that the reversibility can be implemented by the attacker rather than the
defender.

65

case of a cyber attack, the scenario may be characterized as follows: ‘I will corrupt
data on ‘X’ amount of your critical computer systems for every day you keep attacking
me’. In this situation, the incentive structure for the attacker has changed; if the actor
backs down it will no longer incur costs in the future and retrieves earlier corrupted
data.

D. Swaggering

Whereas defense, deterrence and compellence are widely used concepts, ‘swaggering’
is not part of the common political science vocabulary.50 As Art indicates:
“[s]waggering is in part a residual category, the deployment of
military power for purposes other than defense, deterrence, or
compellence. Force is not aimed directly at dissuading another
state from attacking, at repelling attacks, nor at compelling it to
do something specific. The objectives for swaggering are more
diffuse, ill-defined and problematic than that. Swaggering almost
always involves only the peaceful use of force and is expressed
usually in one of two ways: displaying one’s military might at
military exercises and national demonstrations and buying or
building the era’s most prestigious weapons. The swagger use of
force is the most egoistic: it aims to enhance the national pride
of a people or to satisfy the personal ambitions of its ruler [...]
Swaggering is pursued because of the fundamental yearning of
states and statesmen for respect and prestige”.51
OCC seem to be less valuable for swaggering purposes.52 Cyber capabilities have a
largely non-material ontology, making it difficult to publicly showcase or ‘parade’
these capabilities. Second, the transitory nature of cyber capabilities is also a
problem for swaggering. Cyber capabilities’ transitory nature is primarily due to the
malleability of cyberspace affecting the life-cycle of a vulnerability and effectiveness
of an OCC. The life cycle of vulnerabilities is subject to three delays: i) the awareness
delay; ii) the patching delay; and iii) the adaptation delay.53 The moment actors reveal
their capability, it inevitably increases the likelihood of a vendor learning about the
vulnerability and assigning a high level of priority to developing a patch (i.e. reducing
the awareness and patching delay).54 Overall, as a document from the East West
Institute concludes:
50
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The concept has been used once before in relation to cyber attacks by Neuman and Poznansky. They
however misapplied the concept as swaggering is not a form of coercion. Craig Neuman and Michael
Poznansky, “Swaggering in Cyberspace: Busting the conventional wisdom and cyber coercion”, War
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“[m]ilitary forces will have distinct interests in keeping cyber
weapons secret. [...] Those nations that are developing the most
advanced weapons have a strong interest in being able to protect
the intelligence surrounding such capabilities”.55

4. CONCLUSION
Considering the growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities as a tool
for the state, this study assessed to what degree these capabilities have the potential
to change the role of military power. We have shown that OCCs have the potential
to significantly affect how states use their military power in several ways. First,
OCCs have downgraded the role of deterrence, except for those states with a credible
reputation for being able and willing to conduct offensive cyber operations. However,
we indicated that compellence is no longer ruled out as a function of military power
considering several features of cyber capabilities. Unlike conventional capabilities, the
effects of offensive cyber capabilities do not necessarily have to be exposed publicly,
which means the compelled party can back down post-action without losing face.
The potential to control the reversibility of effect of a cyber capability by the attacker
may also encourage compliance. As OCCs can be used as both a preemptive and a
preventive strike option, it reemphasizes the potential to use of force for defensive
purposes. Finally, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory nature, its
symbolic value as a prestige weapon to enhance swaggering remains unclear.
Major powers reap benefits from their nuclear arsenal without using them physically
and risk high costs when they are used. This in turn incentivizes the avoidance of
warlike behavior and exploitation of peaceful use. Yet, this logic breaks down for
cyber capabilities: the benefits from non-use are lower given the limits of deterrence
and swaggering; the costs of non-use are higher due to the transitory nature of these
capabilities; and the risks of using cyber capabilities are lower. Overall, it means less
powerful incentives exist for restraint.
As we have only provided a primer on the topic, there are several avenues for future
research. This paper was consciously limited to only assess the role of OCCs with
regard to state power. Given that OCCs are normally part of a broader arsenal of
capabilities, it is important to discuss the military use of OCC in relation to military
capabilities. Further research may therefore conduct a comparative analysis of other
assets (nuclear weapons, drones, covert actions) to gain a more holistic understanding
of the military contribution of each capability. Also, it has been noted that the growth
of the private sector market for OCC leads to new opportunities for states to acquire,
55

EastWest Institute, “Working Towards Rules for Governing Cyber Conflict Rendering the Geneva and
Hague Conventions in Cyberspace”, (2011). Retrieved from: https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/
ideas-files/US-Russia%20(1).pdf.
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deploy and use these capabilities. It remains unclear, however, to what degree this
trend also changes the way in which OCCs can be strategically used by states as a
function of military power.

REFERENCES
Alexander, Keith, US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, (2014, April). Retrieved from: http://www.eweek.
com/security/nsa-director-says-cyber-command-not-trying-to-militarize-cyberspace.
Anonymous, “Magnitude 4.3 – NORTH KOREA”, USGS, (2006, October 9). Retrieved from: https://web.
archive.org/web/20140427050803/http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2006/ustqab/.
Ardant du Picq, Charles, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, trans. John Greely and Robert C. Cotton
(New York: Macmillan, 1920).
Art, Robert J., “To What Ends Military Power?”, International Security, 4:4 (1980)3-35.
Ball, James, “US Hacked into Iran’s Critical Civilian Infrastructure for Massive Cyberattack, New Film Claims”,
BuzzFeed, (2016, February 16). Retrieved from: https://www.buzzfeed.com/jamesball/us-hacked-intoirans-critical-civilian-infrastructure-for-ma?utm_term=.ile5noYzJy#.kyVJaBdP87.
Bellovin, Steven M., Susan Landau and Herbert S. Lin, “Limiting the undesired impact of cyber weapons:
technical requirements and policy implications”, Journal of Cybersecurity, 3:1 (2017)59–68.
Bing, Chris, “US Cyber Command director: We want ‘loud,’ offensive cyber tools”, FedScoop, (2016, August 3).
Retrieved from: https://www.fedscoop.com/us-cyber-command-offensive-cybersecurity-nsa-august-2016.
Brodie, Bernard, “The Anatomy of Deterrence”, RAND Corporation, (1958, July 23). Retrieved from: https://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2008/RM2218.pdf.
Buchanan, Ben, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Network Intrusions, Trust and Fear in the International System,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2017).
Carter, Ashton, “A Lasting Defeat: The Campaign to Destroy ISIS”, Report, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, (October 2017). Retrieved from: https://www.belfercenter.
org/LastingDefeat.
Collier, Jamie, “State Proxies & Plausible Deniability: Challenging Conventional Wisdom”, Cybersecurity
Intelligence, (2015, September 24). Retrieved from: https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/stateproxies-and-plausible-deniability-challenging-conventional-wisdom-644.html.
Dao, Jim, Giang The Huong Tran and Tu Ngoc Trinh, “New Law on Cyber Security in Vietnam”, Tilleke &
Gibbins (2016, June 3). Retrieved from: http://www.tilleke.com/resources/new-law-cyber-securityvietnam.
Denning, Dorothy E., “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence”, JFQ, 77 (2015)8-15. Retrieved from:
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-77/jfq-77_8-15_Denning.pdf.
E-ISAC, SANS ICS, “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid” (2016, March 18). Retrieved
from: http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf.
EastWest Institute, “Working Towards Rules for Governing Cyber Conflict Rendering the Geneva and Hague
Conventions in Cyberspace”, (2011). Retrieved from: https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/ideasfiles/US-Russia%20(1).pdf.

68

Farrell, Joseph, and Matthew Rabin, “Cheap Talk”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:3 (1996):103-118.
Farrell, Joseph, and Robert Gibbons, “Cheap Talk with Two Audiences”, The American Economic Review, 79:5
(1989)1214-1223.
FireEye, “Advanced Targeted Attacks: How to Protect Against the Next Generation of Cyber Attacks”,
WhitePaper, (2012). Retrieved from: http://www.softbox.co.uk/pub/ reeye- advanced-targeted-attacks.pdf.
Frendesen, Christoffer, “Colombia sends officials to Estonia for cyber defense training”, Columbia Reports,
(2014, September 2). Retrieved from: http://colombiareports.com/colombias-govt-sends-security-forcesestonia-cyber-defense-training/.
Gellman, Barton, and Ellen Nakashima, “US spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011,
documents show”, The Washington Post, (2013, August 30). Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html.
Gerden, Eugene, “Russia to spend $250m strengthening cyber-offensive capabilities”, SC Magazine UK, (2016,
February 4). Retrieved from: http://www.scmagazineuk.com/russia-to-spend-250m-strengthening-cyberoffensive- capabilities/article/470733.
Gompert, David C., and Martin Libicki, “Waging Cyber War the American Way”, Survival, 57:4 (2015)7-28.
Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith, “Honest threats: The interaction of reputation and political institutions
in international crises”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46: (2002)175-200.
Harknett, Richard J., and Joseph S. Nye, “Is Deterrence Possible in Cyberspace?” International Security, 42:2
(2017)196-199.
Harknett, Richard J., and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Deterrence is Not a Credible Strategy for Cyberspace”,
Orbis 61:3 (2017)381-393.
Hayden, Michael, Playing the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror, (New York: Penguin Press:
2014).
Herr, Trey, “PrEP: A Framework for Malware & Cyber Weapons”, The Journal of Information Warfare,
13:1(2014).
Israel Defense, “Turkey Launched Cyber Warfare Command”, (2014, April 13). Retrieved from: http://www.
israeldefense.co.il/en/content/turkey-launched-cyber-warfare-command.
Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research & Analysis Team, “BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ
spearphishing with Word documents”, Securelist, (2016, January 28). Retrieved from: https://securelist.
com/blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/73440/.
Kello, Lucas, Virtual Weapon and International Order, (Yale: Yale University Press: 2017).
Langner, Ralph, “Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve”, (2013,
November). Retrieved from: https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.
pdf.
Libicki, Martin, Cyberspace in Peace and War, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press: 2016).
Lin, Herbert, “Developing ‘Loud’ Cyber Weapons”, Lawfare, (2016, September 1). Retrieved from: https://www.
lawfareblog.com/developing-loud-cyber-weapons.
Lin, Herbert, “Still More on Loud Cyber Weapons”, Lawfare, (2016, October 19). Retrieved from: https://www.
lawfareblog.com/still-more-loud-cyber-weapons.

69

Lindsay, Jon, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare”, Security Studies, 22:3 (2013)365-404.
Lyngaas, Sean, “Pentagon Chief: 2017 budget includes $7B for cyber”, FCW (February 2, 2016). Retrieved
from: https://fcw.com/articles/2016/02/02/dod-budget-cyber.aspx.
Mathew, S., R. Giomundo, S. Upadyaya, M. Sudit and A. Stotz, “Understanding Multistage Attacks by
Attack-Track based Visualization of Heterogeneous Event Streams”, VizSEC ‘06, Proceedings of the 3rd
International Workshop on Visualization for Computer Security (2016)1-6.
McGuffin, Chris, and Paul Mitchell, “On domains: Cyber and the practice of warfare”, International Journal,
69:3 (2014):394-412.
Michael, Melissa, “NotPetya and Wannacry: Have we seen the last?” F-Secure (2017, July 7). Retrieved from:
https://business.f-secure.com/notpetya-and-wannacry-have-we-seen-the-last.
NATO CCD COE, “NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a ‘Domain of Operations’ at Warsaw Summit”, (2016, July
21). Retrieved from: https://ccdcoe.org/nato-recognises-cyberspace-domain-operations-warsaw-summit.
html.
Neuman, Craig, and Michael Poznansky, “Swaggering in Cyberspace: Busting the conventional wisdom and
cyber coercion”, War on the Rocks, (2016, June 28). Retrieved from: https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/
swaggering-in-cyberspace-busting-the-conventional-wisdom-on-cyber-coercion/.
Nye, Joseph S., “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace”, International Security, 43:3 (Winter, 2016/2017)4471.
Peterson, Dale, “Offensive Cyber Weapons: Construction, Development and Employment”, Journal of Strategic
Studies, (2013)36:1.
Raghuvanshi, Vivek, “New Indian Cyber Command Urged Following Recent Attacks”, Defense News, (2016,
June 6). Retrieved from: https://www.defensenews.com/2016/06/06/new-indian-cyber-command-urgedfollowing-recent-attacks/.
Rid, Thomas, and Ben Buchanan, “Attributing Cyber Attacks”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38:1-2 (2015)4-37.
Rid, Thomas, and Peter McBurney, “Cyberweapons”, The RUSI Journal, 157:1 (2012):6-13.
Rowe, Neil, “Towards Reversible Cyberattacks”, Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Information
Warfare and Security, ed. J. Demergis (Reading: Academic Publishing Ltd: 2010), 261-267.
Sanger, David E., and Mark Mazetti, “US Had Cyberattack Plan if Iran Nuclear Dispute Led to Conflict”, The
New York Times, (2016, February 16). Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/
middleeast/us-had-cyberattack-planned-if-iran-nuclear-negotiations-failed.html.
Sanger, David E., David D. Kirkpatrick and Nicole Perlroth, “The World Once Laughed at North Korean
Cyberpower. No More”, The New York Times (October 15, 2017). Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cyber-sony.html.
Sanger, David, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, (New York:
Broadway Paperbacks: 2012).
Sartori, Anne, “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes”,
International Organization, 56 (2002)121-50.
Sauer, Tom, “The Preventive and Pre-Emptive Use of Force: To be Legitimized or to be De-Legitimized?”, The
Hoover Institution. Retrieved from: http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?TABLE=EP&ID=493.
Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence, (Yale: Yale University Press: 1966).

70

Secretariat of the Security Committee, “Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy”, (2013). Retrieved from: https://
www.defmin.fi/files/2378/Finland_s_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf.
Sharafedin, Bozorgmehr, “Iran to expand military spending, develop missiles”, Reuters, (2017, January 9).
Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-military-plan/iran-to-expand-military-spendingdevelop-missiles-idUSKBN14T15L.
Shires, James, and Max Smeets, “The Word Cyber Now Means Everything—and Nothing at All”, Slate, (2017,
December 1). Retrieved from: http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/12/01/the_word_cyber_has_
lost_all_meaning.html.
Smeets, Max, “A matter of time: On the transitory nature of cyberweapons”, Journal of Strategic Studies,
(2017)1-28.
Smeets, Max, “Organisational Integration of Offensive Cyber Capabilities: A Primer on the Benefits and Risks”,
9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications: 2017).
Smeets, Max, “US Cyber Command: An Assiduous Actor, Not a Warmongering Bully”, The Cipher Brief,
(March 4, 2018). Retrieved from: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/us-cyber-command-assiduous-actor-notwarmongering-bully.
Thomas, Bindiya, “UAE Military to Set Up Cyber Command”, (2014, September 30), DefenseWorld. Retrieved
from: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/11185/. UAE_Military_To_Set_Up_Cyber_Command#.
WW4nJYjyiUk.
Thyne, Clayon L., “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War”,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50:6 (2006)937-961.
Tor, Uri, “‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence”, Journal of Strategic Studies,
40:1-2(2017)92-117.
Treverton, Gregory F., “Framing Compellent Strategies”, RAND Corporation (2000). Retrieved from: http://
slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/pdf/treverton-compellence.pdf.
Weaver, Nicholas, and Dan Ellis, “Reflections on Witty: Analyzing the Attacker”, Security, 29:3 (2004) 34-37.
Werkhäuser, Nina, “German army launches new cyber command”, DW, (April 1, 2017). Retrieved from:http://
www.dw.com/en/german-army-launches-new-cyber-command/a-38246517.
William, Brad D., “Meet the scholar challenging the cyber deterrence paradigm”, (July 19, 2017) The Fifth
Domain. Retrieved from: https://www.fifthdomain.com/home/2017/07/19/meet-the-scholar-challengingthe-cyber-deterrence-paradigm/.
Zetter, Kim, “Everything We Know About Ukraine’s Power Plant Hack”, Wired, (20 January 2016). Retrieved
from: https://www.wired.com/2016/01/everything-we-know-about-ukraines-power-plant-hack/.
Zetter, Kim, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid”, Wired, (3 March 2016).
Retrieved from: https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-powergrid/.
Zetter, Kim, Countdown to Zero day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, (New York:
Crown Publishing: 2014).

71

72

2018 10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict
CyCon X: Maximising Effects
T. Minárik, R. Jakschis, L. Lindström (Eds.)
2018 © NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn

Permission to make digital or hard copies of this publication for internal
use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profit or
non-commercial purposes is granted providing that copies bear this notice
and a full citation on the first page. Any other reproduction or transmission
requires prior written permission by NATO CCD COE.

Understanding and
Countering Cyber Coercion
Quentin E. Hodgson
RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California, United States
qhodgson@rand.org

Abstract: The past decade has seen the rise of cyberspace as a topic of popular,
political and scholarly discourse, from the highest reaches of government to the movie
screen. States are grappling with how to address the rising tide of cyber threats to their
economies, to their citizens’ personal information and increasingly to political and
social cohesion. States are using cyber capabilities as a tool of statecraft to achieve
political objectives. This paper seeks to develop an understanding of how states use
cyber capabilities to coerce others for political objectives. Cyber coercion is defined
as the use of cyber capabilities to compel an opponent to undertake an action it would
not normally wish to perform and avoid an undesirable outcome. The paper seeks to
address: how a state can employ cyber capabilities to compel another state (or nonstate actor) to accommodate its ambitions; how cyber coercion might take place; and
ways that the United States and its partners can recognize, respond to and counter
attempts at cyber coercion. The paper examines the use of cyber operations by North
Korea and Russia in recent years as part of their broader strategies to exert influence
over their neighbours, showing how the context in which such operations occur is
critical.
Keywords: cyber operations, coercion, deterrence

1. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen the rise of cyberspace as a topic of popular, political and
scholarly discourse, from the highest reaches of government to the movie screen.
Military organizations from the United States to the People’s Republic of China
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have grappled with issues from how to address threats emanating from cyberspace
to how to integrate cyberspace capabilities into military doctrine (US Department of
Defense 2015; Stefan-Gady 2015). In this time, the general public has been exposed
to a growing body of reporting on cyberspace issues from the hacking of government
agencies, hospitals, public transportation systems and beyond. The US Defense
Science Board has issued several reports calling into question both the resilience of
military systems to cyber threats (Defense Science Board 2013) and outlining how
to deter cyber attacks (Defense Science Board 2017). Government authorities worry
that adversaries and others may use cyber means to attack critical infrastructure
(Rogers 2017), and more recently the prospect of adversaries undermining democratic
processes through disinformation campaigns and even outright corruption of electoral
processes has come to the fore.
At the same time, the use of cyber capabilities in a variety of contexts to further
nation state interests has grown, from the US’ purported targeted operations against
Iranian nuclear facilities and North Korea’s ballistic missile programme to Iranianattributed campaigns against Western banks and its regional neighbours. This gives
rise to questions about how states are using cyber capabilities as yet another tool of
statecraft, including to intimidate, coerce and compel others to do their bidding. This
paper seeks to address the question of how states have used cyber capabilities to
coerce other states or non-state actors either to pursue courses of action they might
not otherwise pursue or to refrain from such actions.1 More importantly, it compares
two actors – Russia and North Korea – which have used cyber operations against their
neighbours and others to understand the dynamics of cyber coercion and attempt to
isolate factors that indicate when cyber coercion may occur.2 The paper begins with
a discussion of cyber coercion and how it fits into broader deterrence and coercion
strategies, followed by an examination of examples from Russia and North Korea.
The paper will then suggest some ways that countries can seek to prevent or lessen the
impact of cyber coercion.

2. WHAT IS CYBER COERCION?
Any discussion of coercion naturally begins with Thomas Schelling’s classic writing
on the topic, particularly his seminal work Arms and Influence. Schelling described
two forms of coercion: active coercion, or compellence, and passive coercion, or
deterrence (Schelling 1966). The former involves the active use of force in some form
to compel action by another, while the latter involves the threatened use of force to
motivate an action or restraint from an action. In reality, the distinction is more of a
1

2
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The focus of this paper will be on state-to-state interactions, but the author acknowledges Travis Sharp’s
valuable contribution to the literature that a state may seek to coerce a non-state actor and vice versa. See
Sharp 2017.
These case studies are intended to inform a broader research project to develop a framework for cyber
coercion that ties into response and defensive actions to thwart attempts to coerce through cyber means.

continuum, as some states may combine compellence actions with the threat of more
devastating consequences to accomplish their ends. The literature has often focused
on the use of force by states, not necessarily because these concepts do not apply to
other actors, but rather because the motivation for examining these concepts in the
20th century was to understand the nature of state-to-state relations. As one author
recently noted, scholars have often used analogies to more localized conflicts, such as
Schelling’s reference to teenager hot-rodding and Robert Jervis’s reference to village
stag-hunting (Sharp 2017).
In recent years, popular, political and academic discourse has tried to find appropriate
analogies or comparable historical instances from other domains to explain cyberspace
operations, to clarify the concepts of deterrence, or to distinguish cyberspace from
everything else (Nye 2011). This paper begins with the premise that, although
cyberspace is indeed a man-made domain, its characteristics are more a matter of
distinction rather than fundamental difference from other domains when it comes
to international relations. States will seek to use cyber capabilities as one tool of
statecraft, just as they seek to use other forms of military force, economic power or
social and humanitarian influence to further their interests. The same applies to the
use of cyber capabilities as a means to exert influence or pressure on others to shape
behaviour, deter adverse actions and even compel another actor (either another state,
a multinational organization, or even a single individual). As one scholar has noted,
coercion is “the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to
back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise
would” (Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2003). This definition does not require a certain
level of force, so cyber weapons do not have to have the same potential impact as
nuclear or even conventional weapons to be credibly used to exert influence, nor does
the threatened use of cyber capabilities need to be explicit to have a coercive effect.
Coercion in international relations is not the same as it is with, for example, an
abduction, although some of the literature uses formulations that more closely
resemble abduction than the dynamics of inter-state relations. This is important for
two reasons: 1) context is critical to understanding whether coercion is occurring;
and 2) the potential for miscommunication between the coercer and the coerced can
be significant, even if there is a long-standing relationship between states, as we shall
see in the two case studies in this paper. In an abduction, there is usually an explicit
demand for action, whether it is demanding a monetary ransom or some other form
of compensation such as the release of political prisoners. The scholarly literature
describes a logic for the dynamic between coercer and coerced: “if you do not do X, I
will do Y” (Borghard and Lonergan 2017). Another form this takes is when a coercive
action or threat “demands clarity in the expected result… [and] be accompanied by
some signal of urgency” (Whyte 2016). But in reality, the demands are not always
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so clear. The threat actor may not make a clear threat or identify itself explicitly. To
express this difference, we can articulate the theoretical ideal and observed practice
as follows:
Theory: coercion = ƒ (clear threat + actor claims responsibility + explicit desired
behaviour)
Observed practice: = ƒ (vague threats + implied actor + implicit desired behaviour)
The observed practice is not always a combination of all three; it could involve a clear
attribution and explicit desired behaviour, but the threat could be vague. This reality
complicates the ability to understand when a state is seeking to coerce another and
take steps to counteract or blunt the threat. This paper will return to the differences
between theory and observed practice shortly to address whether cyber coercion is
successful.
The coercer and coerced may not perceive the messages in the same way (Jervis
1976). Some scholars have noted that cyber coercion is less likely to achieve
objectives because the coercive message will signal the threat and allow the coerced
to respond or to defend itself, reducing the effectiveness of the coercive measure
(Gartzke 2013), but these conclusions are based on a couple of assumptions that do
not hold up under scrutiny. Their first assumption is that the coercive measure will be
explicit and specific enough to provide the coerced the opportunity to pre-empt the
action or prepare its defences. But this is rarely the case, and growing vulnerability
to cyber attacks, particularly in more technologically advanced societies, means that
the prospective attack surface is so large that adequate preparation is unlikely. The US
government, for example, has focused on the protection of critical infrastructure from
cyber attack for more than 20 years, starting when President Bill Clinton’s Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection issued its report in 1997 (President’s Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1997). The insecurity of critical infrastructure has
grown, not diminished, since then.
Their second assumption is that the coercer will signal the means they will use to
threaten an opponent. Coercion, however, does not have to state the exact means that
will be employed to be credible. The coerced merely has to believe that the coercer
has the capability to inflict harm; they do not need to specify “and I will do so with my
cyber armies”. States are aware of their opponents’ capabilities, or they become aware
of them over time, and can intuit the potential outcomes. For example, it is highly
likely that most states and relevant non-state actors have very little real insight into
US cyber capabilities, and in fact may have an inflated picture based on Hollywood
movies and the stature of the US civilian technology sector. Couple that with the public
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belief that the United States probably employed these capabilities to attack both the
Iranian nuclear programme and the North Korean ballistic missile programme, and we
can see that the actual capabilities that the United States possesses are less important
than the perception of them3 (Sanger and Broad 2017).
This paper is not advancing an argument about the likely success of cyber coercion;
several scholars have addressed its apparently low rate of success (Jensen, Valeriano
and Maness n.d.; Borghard and Lonergan 2017). A successful attempt at cyber coercion
should result from a combination of a successful cyber operation, in which the targeted
system or network was disrupted, with a change in behaviour by the coerced. Even in
cases where the operation itself achieves its aims, it appears that behavioural changes
are few, whether because the actor carrying out the operation overestimated the impact
or underestimated the capacity of the adversary to withstand pain. Despite this poor
track record, however, states persist in developing cyber capabilities and appear to
believe, rightly or wrongly, that the promise of cyber coercion exists. Therefore, we
can expect states to continue to pursue coercive actions through cyberspace.

3. NORTH KOREA
Of any state, North Korea is arguably the most likely to employ cyber capabilities as
part of a coercive strategy. Despite broad consensus about the country’s technological
backwardness,4 the North Korean regime has shown a remarkable astuteness and
dedication in investing in militarily relevant technologies, most prominently in
its nuclear and ballistic missile programme, but also in recent years in its cyber
capabilities (Ball 2017). North Korea has a long history of coercive action, from
shooting down a US spy-plane in the 1960s to shelling off-shore islands and sinking
a South Korean naval vessel in 2010 (Terry 2013). For North Korea, these actions
have largely paid off, resulting in concessions and economic aid from South Korea
and the United States as often as more economic sanctions. Sharp (2017) has argued
that the North Korean attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014 was a form of
cyber coercion aimed at destabilizing Sony’s leadership, imposing costs and seeking
to retaliate for perceived insults to the regime with the impending release of a comedy
film, The Interview, the plot of which is focused on an attempt to assassinate the Dear
Leader (Sharp 2017).
The case of North Korea’s reaction to the film has been the subject of several analyses,
but it is worth briefly reviewing the timeline of events and the broader context in
which this case occurred. The proximate cause of the events was the impending
release of the film and the North Koreans’ strong objections to it. As early as June
3

4

One could argue that this is one area where cyber weapons and nuclear weapons are more alike. The
United States has not used a nuclear weapon in conflict since 1945 and has not conducted a nuclear test
since 1992, but few states if any are likely to doubt the US nuclear arsenal’s size or capabilities.
Including reportedly only 28 registered websites. See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37426725.
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2014, the North Korean government condemned The Interview in a Foreign Ministry
statement and subsequently sent a letter to the UN Secretary General accusing the
United States of terrorism and an act of war (Brzeski 2014). After postponing release
of the film until December, Sony received emailed demands for money from a group
calling itself God’sApstls, followed by a malware attack that resulted in corruption of
the master boot records of numerous computers, rendering them inoperable. A group
called Guardians of Peace claimed responsibility for the attack and began releasing
embarrassing emails and yet-to-be released films in the Sony library (Roman 2014).
This was followed by threats of violence against movie theatres and “doxing” of Sony
executives through release of internal documents that showed them in a bad light.
The North Korean government denied responsibility for the attacks or the threats
but referred to the acts as “righteous deed[s]” and speculated that “supporters and
sympathizers” of the North Korean regime were involved (Reuters 2014). Sony pulled
the movie from theatres, but later reversed its decision after coming under criticism,
including from the President of the United States, for appearing to capitulate to threats.
It is important to take a moment to reflect on this point, since if we take the critiques of
cyber coercion to heart, the fact that the North denied its involvement would appear to
undermine the argument that it was intended as a coercive measure. But the timing of
this case is important, as is the context. North Korea clearly indicated its displeasure
with the film for several months prior to the events. In the summer, the North Korean
Foreign Ministry said “[if] the US administration connives at and patronizes the
screening of the film, it will invite a strong and merciless countermeasure” (Brzeski
2014). Totalitarian regimes often fail to understand how western countries operate
and conduct their own mirror-imaging. North Korea could very well have believed
that The Interview was part of an official US government propaganda campaign
against the regime. North Korea has a long history of strong rhetoric, but it has also
shown itself willing to use force of various kinds with little compunction, whether
through directly attacking military targets like soldiers along the Demilitarized Zone
and South Korean naval vessels, or civilian targets in the South. From North Korea’s
perspective, it possibly felt it had conveyed its message clearly and publicly through
official channels. The fact that it chose to then follow up on its (failed) coercive
rhetoric with cyber attacks through proxies does not detract from the original intent of
the threats. The first phase of coercion, which did not explicitly state the form in which
subsequent pain would be inflicted, simply failed to achieve the desired outcome of
stopping the film, so the North had to escalate from threats to action. At that point,
the North Koreans were transitioning from the threat of consequences to seeking to
impose those consequences, and who delivered the effects is less important. At the
same time, US officials noted that they were not clear on how the threat against the
movie theatres was intended to be carried out, which nevertheless did not deter them
from treating it as a serious threat (Sharp 2017).
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Whether the North Koreans truly believed that the use of proxy fronts (likely for the
Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Korean People’s Army) would obfuscate the
origins of the threats is an interesting question, but currently unanswerable. If the
North Koreans had sought to hide their direct involvement, then it is questionable
whether it would contribute to the credibility of future coercive threats. That said,
North Korean has routinely denied physical attacks, such as the sinking of the South
Korean naval vessel Cheonan in 2010, when no other credible perpetrators have
presented themselves (Terry 2013). It is conceivable that North Korean denies its
involvement as a pro forma matter as opposed to truly seeking to avoid blame. It also
plays to their domestic audience, for whom the regime has to portray itself constantly
as the victim rather than the aggressor. Sharp concludes that, while not necessarily
achieving all of its aims, the Sony case shows a successful use of cyber capabilities,
coupling cyber exploitation (stealing data) with offensive cyber capability to disable
computers, coerce Sony’s leadership and even lead to the downfall of several senior
leaders there (Sharp 2017). Whether the coercive actions were intended to shape
other actors is unclear, but North Korea has not limited itself to using cyber to attack
private companies. In recent years, it has also employed cyber operations as part of
its coercive campaign against the Republic of Korea. Suspected North Korean cyber
operations against the South have included targeting the financial, media and energy
sectors, as well as government agencies. In some cases, including the attack on a
virtual currency exchange in Seoul in May 2017, financial interests may have been the
stronger motivation (Perper 2017). The 2013 attacks against South Korean television
stations, a bank and bank machines, however, may have been part of an escalatory
exchange following a two-day Internet outage in the North (Branigan 2013). These
cases are less clearly overt acts of attempted coercion, but they show a willingness to
engage in a cyber tit-for-tat and to inflict damage on the South.
North Korea’s cyber capabilities are not exclusively retaliatory, nor does the regime
likely see them as a replacement for other forms of coercion (Jun, LaFoy and Sohn
December 2015). The nuclear and missile programmes are probably still seen as
guarantors of regime survival, but cyber capabilities provide a flexible new tool to
achieve a variety of ends: theft to improve the regime’s finances, espionage and the
ability to threaten and inflict pain and damage on its adversaries. The recent cyber
events also establish a track record of use that could play a role in future coercive
scenarios. Returning to the theoretical construct for coercion (coercion = ƒ (clear
threat + attribution + explicit desired behaviour)) we can code the cases as follows:
Case

Threat

Threat Actor Responsible

Desired Behaviour

Sony

Ambiguous

Disputed attribution, but likely
North Korea

Clear

South Korea
television and banks

Ambiguous

Disputed attribution, but likely
North Korea

Unclear
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4. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE
Russian cyber activity has gained in prominence, beginning with the denial of service
attacks against large segments of the Estonian economy and government in 2007 and
as part of the conflict with Georgia in 2008, which some sources have attributed to the
Russian government or to patriotic hackers acting on the government’s behalf (Davis
2008; Hollis 2010). More recently, the focus has turned to Russian disinformation
campaigns and alleged interference in elections in the United States, Germany and
France, among others (FireEye January 2017). Russian actors, some more closely
affiliated with the government and others playing a more ambiguous role, have
established online personas on multiple Internet platforms, including Twitter and
Facebook, to disseminate falsified news stories and develop narratives sympathetic to
Russia’s views (Coats 2017). In the midst of such campaigns, it appears that Russia has
also started to use cyber capabilities as a coercive tool. Here we will focus on Russian
activity in Ukraine, but this is not intended to downplay or diminish Russian activity
in other countries. It is also important to acknowledge that Russian disinformation
campaigns, although not the focus of this analysis, could very well be coercive
measures intended to destabilize its neighbours and seek to either promote more proRussian parties and social movements or motivate current elites to accommodate
Russian demands.
The dynamics of Russian-Ukrainian relations are complex and long-standing, which
underscores the importance of understanding the context in which the events of recent
years have occurred. The Russians have historically seen Ukraine as a part of the border
region of Russian territory, rather than as a separate geographic and political entity
(in Russian, Ukraine roughly means “on the border”). The Russian military campaign
in 2014 to seize Crimea was seen domestically more as a means to correct a quirk of
history than an invasion, as Crimea was a gift to Ukraine during Nikita Khrushchev’s
tenure as leader of the Soviet Union (McCauley 1993). The Crimea also serves as
the home port for the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, which makes it strategically
important for Russia. Russia’s apparent actions to destabilize Ukraine through various
means, including cyber operations, supporting proxy fighters and sending military
forces into Eastern Ukraine, stem from a desire to maintain Ukraine in Russia’s orbit
and prevent further integration with the West (Treisman 2016). Ukraine’s negotiations
in 2013 to conclude a political and trade deal with the European Union also threatened
to put Ukraine more squarely in the West’s camp.
After then-President Viktor Yanukovich reversed course, protests erupted in Kiev.
Police moved in to confront the protesters and violence ensued, resulting in dozens
of deaths (Applebaum 2017). In the aftermath of these protests, pro-Russian groups
in Eastern Ukraine began to seize control of government institutions, prompting the
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government to respond militarily. Following the change of President in May 2014,
fighting continued and, despite a negotiated ceasefire in February 2015, the conflict
continued throughout the year.
In the midst of the horrific fighting and civilian suffering, particularly in Eastern
Ukraine, the country suffered the first significant cyber attack on its electric grid
in December 2015. The attack affected approximately 250,000 customers for some
hours, but appeared to cause no lasting damage despite targeting the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) controllers in addition to business system
workstations and servers (SANS Institute 2016). The malware employed was a set of
tools including the BlackEnergy Trojan and the KillDisk eraser and targeted at least
three geographically dispersed regional power sub-stations (Greenberg 2017). The
impact on the energy sector received the most attention, particularly coming during the
winter, but the cyber attacks against Ukraine had also impacted other sectors including
media, finance and transportation in the preceding months. Security researchers
have attributed the BlackEnergy tool and the actions in Ukraine to the Sandworm
intrusion set, which many believe is a Russian hacker group (Hultquist 2016). The
Ukrainian government has been more explicit in tying this activity to Russian security
services. Attacks on various sectors continued in 2016, including another attack on the
energy sector almost exactly a year after the December 2015 attacks that hit the Kiev
transmission station; this time the outage lasted barely an hour.
The Russian government has not claimed responsibility for these cyber attacks
and routinely denies involvement in cyber operations against other countries,
reminding audiences of evidence that the United States in particular has engaged in
the widespread use of cyber operations (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).
The Russian government did not appear to make explicit demands of the Ukrainian
government or public, either in advance of the attacks or afterwards. In the context
of the broader conflict, however, the Russian strategy appears to include: establishing
facts on the ground through the manoeuvre of military forces and the use of proxies;
spreading disinformation to portray the West and pro-western Ukrainians as enemies
of the Ukrainian people; and using cyber operations to reinforce that messaging. Cyber
operations in this context appear to be intended to broadly destabilize the political and
social cohesion in Ukraine.5 The ultimate outcome, therefore, is predicated on the
Ukrainian government acquiescing to Russian influence on the country and halting its
integration with the West. In that sense, the coercion appears focused less on seeking
to promote specific actions and more towards shaping Ukrainian behaviour for the
long term.

5

There is also speculation that the Russians are using the conflict with Ukraine to ‘test’ its cyber capabilities
in a real-world laboratory as a prelude to potential use against other countries such as the United States.
Although this may be a collateral benefit, there is little public evidence to support this as the primary
reason.
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Russian cyber operations against Ukraine show the importance of understanding the
context in which conflict occurs. Analysis that examines cyber operations in isolation
will fail to identify the implicit outcomes that the instigator seeks, which often go
unstated because the parties already know what they are. It is also evident that the
Russians are not looking for the Ukrainians to undertake a single, specific action to
forestall future cyber coercion, but that it is conducting a broader campaign to prevent
Ukraine’s integration with the West. The theoretical framework would therefore
appear in this case to be as follows:
Case

Threat

Threat Actor Responsible

Desired Behaviour

Russia-Ukraine

Ambiguous

Disputed attribution,
but likely Russia

Somewhat clear

5. WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT?
The North Korean and Russian cases demonstrate that states may indeed be using
cyber capabilities to attempt to coerce others, but that the ambiguous nature of these
campaigns, with their unclear threats, ambiguous attribution and lack of clarity of
desired behaviour, makes it less likely that the coercion will succeed, although that
has not appeared to diminish their occurrence. That said, these coercive campaigns
are not without cost to the victims, which would indicate that some work is needed to
counter or mitigate them. Traditional deterrence theory postulates two primary means
for response: a threat of punishment for an action that is credible and (one presumes)
unacceptable to the opponent, and denial of gains from an action. Professor Joseph
Nye (2016/7) has added to these two by postulating that entanglement and normative
taboos can play a role. Addressing the threat of cyber coercion will have to account for
these mechanisms, but there are practical difficulties in implementing them that need
to be addressed. Before addressing these means, however, we should examine how to
recognize that cyber coercion is occurring.
The two case studies presented in this paper highlight two key points when seeking to
assess whether cyber coercion is occurring. The first is to recognize that the instigator
will not always present explicit demands; there may not be the equivalent of a ransom
demand. In many cases of state-on-state conflict, the relationship is long-standing and
complex, and therefore the nature of the demands may be more implied than explicitly
stated. The Sony Pictures case shows a counter-example, where it appears that the
demand was clearly stated: do not release the film. But in that case the second point
comes to the fore, that the demand will not state explicitly in all cases the form in
which threatened consequences will come. In fact, the Sony case included threats of
physical harm to movie theatres that never materialised and may have been intended
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to instil fear with no prospect of the threat ever being carried out; of course, US law
enforcement authorities could not take that chance and treated the threat seriously.
North Korea may have used the subsequent cyber operations as a means to destabilize
Sony Pictures’ leadership, as one scholar claimed, but it is just as likely that it presented
a tangible way for North Korea to inflict pain when other options were not open to it
or would have proved too costly.
These considerations give rise to a set of questions to consider in similar circumstances:
• Does a state’s adversary have demonstrated or emerging cyber capabilities
that it should track seriously? This has implications not only in terms of
intelligence collection and analysis, but also in challenging basic assumptions.
Both Iran’s and North Korea’s cyber capabilities took Western governments
off-guard because they had simply assumed that these countries did not have
the technological capabilities.
• What is the broader context in which conflict is developing? Thinking about
a country’s cyber capabilities in isolation risks missing emerging signals that
a coercive campaign is beginning or potentially entering a new phase where
cyber operations could occur.
• Does the coercer have long-standing demands? Identifying these contributes
to understanding what potential outcomes the coercer may seek and could
assist in anticipating potential cyber coercive actions.
The threat to impose costs on others for using cyber capabilities has not prevented
state use of cyber, though it is impossible to prove an assertion that perhaps current
US and Western policies have prevented more egregious actions. It is far more likely
that countries such as Russia or North Korea see little reason to fear retaliation at
apparently low thresholds of cyber use because the consequences have been spread
out over time and have not resulted in loss of life or significant damage to property
that would normally invite such a response. The case studies in this paper indicate,
however, that there is significant ambiguity around coercive actions using cyber
capabilities, which complicates a state’s response. States that may be subject to cyber
coercion will have to carefully examine the circumstances in which they perceive
threats and determine whether a lower threshold for response or even pre-emption
may be required. This carries escalation risks, of course, and could even lead to action
against an entirely innocent state (at least in the particular situation evaluated).
Given the broad attack surface and the thousands, if not millions, of targets that present
themselves in cyberspace, denial of an adversaries’ objectives seems an impossible
task. The US government identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors (with “elections”
being an ambiguous addition in 2016) that encompass some 1,000,000 owners and
operators. Even if a small portion of these are truly critical, such as the list of entities
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deemed at greatest risk and potentially causing greatest harm (the so-called “section
9” list, referring to the Obama administration’s cyber security executive order which
was adopted by the Trump administration in its first cyber security executive order),
adequately defending them against a vast array of threats is no easy task. That being
said, there is evidence that states seeking to coerce others underestimate their capacity
to endure pain, and therefore improving resiliency (as opposed to simple defence) is
likely a vital component of a counter-coercion strategy (Jensen, Valeriano and Maness
n.d.).
In Nye’s formulation, entanglement “refers to the existence of various interdependences
that make a successful attack simultaneously impose serious costs on the attacker
as well as the victim” (Nye 2016, p. 58). It is possible that this consideration has
influenced states such as Russia and China to pursue a less integrated Internet; indeed,
Russia has announced plans to create its own form of domain name system to undo its
entanglement with the United States (Tucker 2017). Given that, this approach may be
useful as a supporting line of effort but is unlikely to prove decisive.
Finally, norms of state behaviour were a central thrust of the Obama administration’s
work in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and in its bilateral
discussions with the Russian and Chinese governments (Finnemore 2017). For
a period of time, this path seemed to have achieved some success, with consensus
reports emerging over several years. However, the 2016-2017 UN GGE group
failed to achieve consensus and concluded its work without a report on which the
25 participating countries could agree (Korzak 2017). Of course, the establishment
of norms as statements of principle are only the first step. Much like customary law,
norms gain stature as nations demonstrate through their actions that they are adhering
to these norms. The failure of the UN GGE does not in itself signal the death of cyber
norms; it simply highlights the challenge of gaining consensus on these issues in a
diverse group of countries that do not all necessarily trust each other to negotiate in
good faith.
Each of these four proposed approaches has a role to play, but clearly there is no
miracle cure that addresses the potential for states to use cyber capabilities to threaten
and coerce those whom they seek to bend to their will. The first step is to develop
the ability to recognize when cyber coercion could come to pass and seek to head it
off, including with explicit warnings and leveraging the four methods Professor Nye
identified, with particular focus on improving resiliency in the face of cyber threats.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that cyber capabilities can indeed be used as coercive tools of
statecraft, but recognizing when they may be used and how a state can reduce their
impact is no easy task. The context in which cyber coercion may occur is important,
as are the capabilities that a state may develop. The increasing commodification of
cyber attack tools, the growing legitimate, grey and black markets for these tools and
the increasing attack surface all make cyber coercion an increasingly attractive tool
for states.
The case studies presented here demonstrate that cyber coercion often occurs in
contexts of significant ambiguity. The threat actor may not make an explicit threat,
may choose to work through proxies or deny involvement outright, or the desired
behaviour may not be clearly stated. In the case of North Korea’s attack on Sony, there
were vague threats at the beginning from the North Korean government, followed by
more specific threats from an apparent proxy. The desired outcome was clear from the
beginning, although the coercive campaign ultimately failed to prevent the release of
the film. In the denial of service attacks on South Korean television and banking, there
was no specific threat, nor a clear claim of responsibility in the immediate aftermath.
Indeed, the North Korean government never made a specific demand of the South,
but a broader examination of North Korean behaviour over decades indicates that
the threats and desired response are long-standing and understood. Similarly, in the
Russia-Ukraine context, Russian cyber actors are not explicitly tied to the Russian
government, although many observers believe they are at least loosely linked. The
desired outcome – Ukraine’s drawing back from Western integration and remaining in
Russia’s orbit – is long-standing. In each of these examples, cyber capabilities appear
to have played a role in a broader strategy. Examining them as stand-alone cases
misses the broader context in which cyber capabilities are used. More work is needed
to develop this context for states of concern to detect, respond and mitigate the effects
of cyber coercion.
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Abstract: State-sponsored network intrusions are publicly and frequently exposed
but assessing how militaries conduct offensive network operations remains difficult.
Data can be transmitted near-instantaneously, yet cyber-attacks can take months or
even years to mature, complicating attempts to integrate them into joint operations.
What challenges, risks, opportunities and advantages are associated with attacking
networks? This paper argues that military offensive network operations can be usefully
cast into a two-part taxonomy: event-based attacks and presence-based attacks. These
are then applied to practical use-cases drawn from existing strategies, case studies
and current military platforms. Event-based operations include all instances in which
the target is directly and in real time attacked by compromise of its software and may
appear roughly analogous to physical weapons. Presence-based operations include
all network intrusions in which the attackers traverse compromised networks until
targets are located, assessed, and weaponized for later activation, more analogous to
a clandestine sabotage operation. Distinguishing between these two types is crucial;
they offer different solutions, encompass varying risks, and may require different
resources to accomplish. Event-based attacks can offer a tactical advantage against
a single adversary platform or network. A successful presence-based operation may
result in a strategic advantage against a stronger force. Each of the two operation types
is broken into phases as defined by the US Department of Defense Common Cyber
Threat Framework. The model envisions four steps in the network operation lifecycle: preparation, engagement, presence and effect. By anchoring the assessment
using the framework, the unique characteristics of both operation types become easier
to analyze.
Keywords: cyber warfare, network operations, cyber attacks, offensive cyber
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1. INTRODUCTION
Military use of offensive network operations (MONOs) epitomizes the desire for
cleaner, quicker, and less violent conflict. If strategic adversary coercion can be
achieved by targeting the digital infrastructure used for both national security needs
and daily life, enemy resolve should theoretically decrease to the point of surrender.
This is an understandably appealing concept, but not entirely accurate. Network
operations can assist both tactical and strategic combat efforts if all their particular
advantages and disadvantages are accounted for. While nations occasionally release
slivers of information on how they employ offensive network capabilities, doctrine
and strategy remain understandably murky on how operational success is achieved in
and through networks.
At the core of this work is the argument that MONOs can broadly be grouped into two
classes; presence-based and event-based. Presence-based operations are offensive
network activities which include a lengthy intrusion component meant to establish
a persistent presence within adversary assets, and then traverse networks and locate
objectives. Event-based operations primarily include direct attacks intended to cause
immediate effect against a targeted platform. Many of the currently known statesponsored network attacks would fall into the former category, while many network
attacks against military hardware and software in the battlefield would fit the latter.
All can be carried out for military objectives.
A typology for network warfare matters. When all offensive operations are assessed
together, the results often seem muddled and difficult to translate to military doctrine.1
Examined separately, presence- and event-based operations are shown to have
distinctive characteristics embodying unique advantages and disadvantages. They
require different manpower, resources and operational approaches, and can be applied
against different targets for different effects. Some may be more easily relegated
to battlefield use, while others are best kept for strategic maneuvers. Activating a
presence-based operation may entail losing a crucial source of intelligence, while
event-based attacks are inherently suitable for recurring military use. By identifying
the parameters under which an operation or capability can be relegated to each of the
categories, it empowers decision-makers to “release” some capabilities to battlefield
commanders, while retaining sensitive measures within the higher echelons.
Event-based operations are roughly analogous to firing a weapon. When such an attack
is launched, virtual ordnance traverses one or more networks, where it connects with
the adversary’s defenses. Impact on the target – if successful – is immediate or nearimmediate. They are meant to be reusable, and the attack may be launched by a local
fire team, a warfighting platform or from remote territory. These types of attacks – like
1
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For an example of the deliberations around these challenges, see Atkin, McLaughlin, and Moore (2016).

their kinetic counterparts – often have localized effects meant to augment or support
kinetic strikes (US Army 2014, 31). They may disrupt an aircraft’s onboard systems,
degrade radar functionality or impair a regional network by way of a destructive worm
that wipes endpoints and servers. As a corollary, such tactical network warfare works
well in a combined arms package, jointly deployed alongside kinetic capabilities.
Presence-based operations are roughly analogous to clandestine sabotage operations.
A precursor successful intelligence operation results in sustained remote access to an
adversary’s networks. From that point, attacker assets are maneuvered to enumerate
servers and endpoints, gathering information and identifying weak points that may
subsequently be attacked for effect. Specialized implants are fielded where needed,
with the intent to activate when the order to do so arrives. This can manifest as a
multi-year intrusion campaign into an adversary’s command and control network,
logistics framework or critical infrastructure. The potential risks to friendly weapons
and capabilities of discovery are far greater due to the extended presence “behind
enemy lines”, as is the chance of failure. But the potential benefit is commensurately
immense, possibly resulting in an advantage of strategic proportions. These operations
may serve as the surprise prelude to an offensive campaign or as a means of exerting
pressure on adversary governments.
This article offers an in-depth analysis of MONOs for both event-based and presencebased attacks. The model chosen as the theoretical scaffolding is the US Department
of Defense’s Common Cyber Threat Framework (US DNI 2013), which capably
aggregates different industry and public-sector models to provide a useful approach
towards assessing wider network campaigns rather than focusing on individual
intrusions. The four primary phases presented in the Common Cyber Threat
Framework – preparation, engagement, presence, and effect – are assessed for both
presence and event-based operations.
While official information on MONOs is scarce, this does not imply a dearth of
sources. The increasing tenacity of the information security industry in unravelling
nation-state cyber capabilities provides a useful window into well-resourced network
operations. Industry network defenders working to deconstruct organized adversaries
have generated useful analytical models such as Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill
Chain (Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin 2011) and the Diamond Model (Caltagirone,
Pendergast, and Betz 2013). Official publications do indeed exist, and include tactical
accounts of how units operate on the field (Kimmons 2017), joint publications
on doctrine (US Joint Chief of Staff 2013), strategic guidelines (Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006), oversight reports (US DoD 2017) and even operational
integration roadmaps (US DoD 2003). Although employed cautiously, even leaks
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of highly-classified materials from network operations units such as the NSA2 can
contribute information on context and capabilities.
Military network operations do not exist in a vacuum. In contrast to some existing
models, they do not begin with target reconnaissance and do not end after activating
offensive payloads (Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin 2011, 4–5). There are several
strategic and tactical phases predicating the operation itself, and several that follow
it. Similarly, there are processes that run concurrently to the network intrusion,
interacting with work carried out by network operators to facilitate their success and
feeding off it. These additional components are not peripheral; they are instrumental
to an operation’s success and are an integral part of understanding offensive military
capabilities in cyberspace.
Some limitations accompany the scope of this work. Firstly, while the sources and
case studies below are not limited to the US, they do favor them significantly due
to their relative availability. Secondly, the proposed distinction is meant as a useful
generalization for the allocation of resources and division of forces rather than a
catch-all classification. Some niche cases may not fall neatly within one category or
the other, and some attacks may present elements of both, such as a presence-based
intrusion which is then used to launch subsequent event-based attacks.

2. PREPARATION
Preparation encompasses all efforts preceding contact with the enemy. The Cyber
Threat Framework defines preparation as all collective efforts to identify targets,
develop capabilities, assess victim vulnerability and define the scope of the operation
(US DNI 2013, 2). Each of these processes reflects months and perhaps years of
investment in resources, both material and operational. Thus, while it is the least
discussed, the preparation phase of any offensive network operation may often be its
longest.
Before operators first interact with adversary networks, planners must first initiate
a targeting cycle. This may seem deceptively trivial; an actor seeking to target an
adversary will simply pursue its networks. In reality, locating, identifying and
enumerating relevant networks for attack can be difficult (Monte 2015, 20). Modern
militaries employ dozens of disparate networks even within a single organizational
entity (Burbank et al. 2006, 39–42). Identifying which to attack is no negligible
feat. It requires in-depth intelligence and an understanding of the adversary’s order
of battle. In many cases, sensitive or operational networks do not interface directly
2
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with the Internet or perhaps even with any other networks.3 This makes the notion of
identifying them and securing access that much harder. The force commander will
choose to pursue a target through networks only if it is deemed to be the most effective
means of attaining the objective (Ducheine and van Haaster 2014, 313–14).
Targeting cycles are decidedly different for presence and event-based operations.
Targeting for presence-based operations is most commonly conducted by the
strategic intelligence entities that have network intrusion capabilities. Traditionally,
it is within the remit of signals intelligence (SIGINT) organizations, which in
varying jurisdictions are either civilian or military.4 As such, it is often a derivative
component of those entities’ prioritized intelligence requirements (PIRs). PIRs form a
fundamental national security agenda towards which agencies are expected to work,
whether by collecting intelligence or preparing for eventual network attacks (US DoD
2013, 24–25). Targeting is therefore a long-term process in which intelligence on the
adversary is accumulated, increasingly providing information required to properly
prioritize between networks by balancing feasibility and relevance to the objectives at
hand. The result is a highly curated list of specific targets.
Targeting for event-based operations would reasonably take place in proximity to
the attack itself (Conti and Raymond 2017, 181–82). As a result, this cycle could
commonly be conducted by the theatre force commander, or perhaps even a tactical
unit lead against a limited objective. This, alongside the employment of pre-packaged
network capabilities, entails that the decision-making process is both faster and
conducted with far available resources. In order to identify which networks should
be selected for subsequent engagement, the commander must identify the adversary’s
local centers of gravity which, if compromised, would reduce enemy effectiveness. To
accomplish this, reconnaissance assets conducting spectrum analysis and automated
network mapping procedures may identify adversary networks in the region, possibly
even auto-assigning ordnance against them.
Some targets may be chosen for both event and presence-based operations, reflecting
varying goals and opportunities. Over the last two decades, the United States has
gradually modernized battlefield connectivity for its deployed forces. A part of
this process, titled Warfighter Information Network – Tactical, or WIN-T, is a
prime example of how saturated the network landscape can be. A combination of
dedicated line-of-sight radios and satellite-communication terminals (Coile 2009, 5)
services a host of networks including the general-purpose NIPRNet, SIPRNet5, and
local compartmentalized data and voice networks (Epperson 2014). Many of these
3
4
5

The idea of separating a network from all other networks is called “air-gapping” and is a widely accepted
methodology of reducing a network’s potential attack surface.
In the United States, the NSA is a civilian agency. In the Israeli example, it is military unit 8200.
Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet): US Department of Defense networks used for unclassified and classified communications
between and within partner organizations.

93

networks enable unclassified, ancillary functions that are not mission critical. Others
carry sensitive targeting information, communications or intelligence data. Some of
these networks may be inaccessible as they are transmitted over a medium to which
the attacker has little hope of gaining access. Others rely on commercial satellites and
even the Internet as their transmission medium. Completing the targeting process by
successfully classifying which networks both matter and are pragmatically reachable
is therefore a challenge. In some cases, these networks may be subjected to longterm compromise in the form of a presence-based operation. In other cases, locally
accessible datalinks such as a regional network cell might be the target of an eventbased attack. Interestingly, the WIN-T project has now been officially terminated by
the US military, citing concerns that the project’s architecture is indeed too vulnerable
to a determined, well-resourced adversary (Crawford, Mingus, and Martin 2017, 6–8).
One crucial pre-operation process is capability acquisition and development.
Capabilities in network warfare include all hardware and software used to affect
enemy platforms. There is some limited merit in downplaying the complexities of this
process; unlike actual weapons, network intrusion tools can ostensibly be developed
by anyone. Similarly, the development cycle for a potent so-called “cyber-weapon”
is also typically deemed to be much shorter (Rattray 2001, 171), easier and cheaper
(Nye 2010, 5). Again, there is some reason to this assertion. However, the unique
circumstances of developing capabilities to attack networks are well worth examining.
Each supposed advantage is mirrored by an equal or greater disadvantage.
Presence-based attack tools must be stealthy, agile, and modular. They must be stealthy
as the majority of their life-cycle will be spent clandestinely embedded in adversary
networks. They must be agile to enable operators to use them creatively to traverse
adversary networks, collect intelligence and weaponize valuable targets. Finally, they
must often be modular to allow operators to only deploy necessary capabilities at any
given moment, thereby reducing the footprint of the tool, a further operational security
mechanism (Monte 2015, 124). Each deployment of a highly engineered network
attack tool must be carefully managed to include only the components currently
needed to facilitate success. The expectation that presence-based operational tools
must be stealthy introduces a significant weakness: these tools become quite brittle
in use. The pervasive notion that offensive network tools are single-use stems from
this very issue (Libicki 2009, 83). The defensive cycle for a network adversary is
demonstrably shorter, as detected malware can result in detection signature within
days of its discovery by a capable defender. It is not just the particular deployment
that is threatened; detection of an offensive platform risks its compromise against all
targets against which it is currently employed. That is a momentous risk of capabilities,
which explains in part why intelligence agencies often guard them so carefully.
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It is almost inconceivable that network attack tools could enjoy the same operational
longevity as their kinetic counterparts. One of the longest known offensive network
operations platforms – codenamed Regin by its private-sector discoverers – was
ostensibly operating from at least 2003 (Kaspersky Lab 2014, 3) and widely attributed
to the NSA (Rosenbach, Schmundt, and Stöcker 2015). At the time of its discovery in
2014, security company Kaspersky claimed that it was “…one of the most sophisticated
attack platforms we have ever analyzed” (Kaspersky Lab 2014, 23). Once publicized
and with its various mechanisms for communication and stealth thoroughly mapped
and defended against, NSA operators would have had to immediately cease all
intrusion activity until sufficient changes could be made and new evasion mechanisms
deployed. Such an event is both an enormous investment in time and resources and
also potentially a major operational compromise.
Conversely, event-based attack tools must be robust, aggressive, fool-proof and
intuitive to operate. As they would likely be deployed by frontline units, no expertise
must be needed to wield them effectively. They must be able to operate against a wide
range of targets in a slew of contingencies, while generating similarly predictable
effects. Battlefield operators will not have time to dynamically redeploy modules
or carefully orchestrate network traversal. The weapon must therefore be capable
of autonomously completing its objectives without further assistance. Resource
exhaustion attacks, such as the often-seen denial of service attack or generic destructive
payloads, are common examples of event-based capabilities.
Both presence and event-based capabilities require investment in vulnerability
research. This entails all efforts to locate exploitable flaws in software and hardware
used by the adversary: flaws that can be subverted to compromise the target and get
it to either behave unexpectedly or preferably to run arbitrary code. Vulnerability
research runs the gamut from generic-use software such as Microsoft Windows to
dedicated software used by military hardware and other niche platforms. It is a crucial
component in most network attack tools.
Software vulnerabilities are difficult to find both for attackers and defenders. From the
offensive perspective, effectively exploiting critical software in a manner conducive
to intrusions is increasingly difficult (Symantec 2017, 16). At the same time, there
is no shortage of vulnerabilities, as data indicates that publicly disclosed, high
severity submissions have nearly doubled in 2017 (NIST 2017). From the defender’s
perspective – as a RAND report indicated in 2017 – unless the tool weaponizing them
is somehow discovered, vulnerabilities last an average of almost seven years without
being exposed (Ablon 2017, 11). Thus, maintaining an expert workforce entrusted
with continuously hunting for new useful vulnerabilities is paramount.
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For event-based operations, the final component of preparation is integrating
capabilities for use with forward-deployed warfighting platforms. Presence-based
operations are often handled by remote operators, much like drones. However, in
many cases, especially those involving segregated networks used to communicate
sensitive data, proximity or line-of-sight access is required. In these cases, military
forces may find themselves delivering fire directly in the field, be it by aircraft, naval
vessel, ground vehicle or actual boots on the ground.
There are recent examples of event-based attacks in which network capabilities were
supposedly integrated into battlefield platforms. The United States military operates
infantry cyber teams to work alongside electronic warfare assets to map out enemy
networks and identify targets (Kimmons 2017). The Russian military has, allegedly,
disrupted Royal Air Force sorties over Syria by way of a network attack launched
from a deployed electronic warfare vehicle (Giannangeli 2017). Developing a reliable,
robust, battlefield-deployable offensive cyber capability is increasingly becoming
viable, albeit expensive. Thus, while attacking networks may seem to be low-cost,
attaining battlefield readiness and conducting event-based offensive operations may
include hefty development, targeting and intelligence cycles.

3. ENGAGEMENT
The Cyber Threat Framework defines the initial engagement phase as: “Threat
actor activities taken prior to gaining access but with the intent to gain unauthorized
access to the intended victim’s physical or virtual computer or information system(s),
network(s), and/or data stores” (DNI US 2013, 4). Put simply, this phase embodies
the attempts to intrude upon the enemy; it is the first active contact with its networks,
intent on establishing a digital beach-head. What the framework obfuscates is the
characteristics of this phase. Adopted from the operational typology used by Buchanan,
the engagement phase may occur months in advance for presence-based operations or
adjacent to the desired effect for event-based attacks (Buchanan 2017, 76–84). Not all
cases are created equal, but all share one notable commonality; the engagement phase
starts the operational clock.
A ubiquitous approach to network intrusion is compromising an internet-facing server
or device. Identifying and compromising these may be easier than directly penetrating
segregated networks, but not all such targets are inherently useful. Operations may
also commence by interacting with an individual rather than a machine. Strategic
network operations intended to gain entry to sensitive networks may first need to
compromise those who routinely use them and hold trusted access to their assets.
The reason for this is two-fold: first, there may not be a viable technological intrusion
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vector, as many sensitive networks are cut off from external inputs; and second, the
users are often the most vulnerable element in an otherwise secure network (Barrett
2003). They are prime targets for social engineering as an intrusion vector, but that
does not mean it is always a trivial endeavor. Successfully getting individuals to
usefully compromise their own security without arousing suspicion often requires
expertise, preferably provided by dedicated personnel.
In event-based operations, the engagement phase can occur in seconds. As the
targeting cycle is similarly shortened, there is no time to craft phishing emails tailored
to human targets or set up elaborate honeypots. Instead, the engagement phase will
focus on compromising accessible targets by exploiting remote software and hardware
vulnerabilities. Particularly when using automated capabilities to target warfighters or
other connected devices, it is sometimes possible to directly attack the software to
gain entry. The engagement phase for event-based operations may not always result
in full access to the target, but depending on what the desired effect is, that may
not be necessary. For example, simply attempting to exhaust available resources or
corrupt a target’s means of communication may be possible without ever being able
to execute code directly on the target and if the goal is to prevent the target from
functioning as intended, that may be sufficient. Such scenarios are more easily placed
within a military context; see for example denial of service attacks, which bear some
similarities to conventional electromagnetic jamming.6
The potential perpetrators for event-based operations are far more varied than their
presence-based counterparts. In many cases, these could be forward-deployed
offensive cyber units, such as both the US and the UK are increasingly using (US
Army 2014, 30–32). In other instances, field staff such as human intelligence assets or
specific warfighters may be required to facilitate the actual engagement. As Edward
Snowden revealed in a leaked top-secret document in 2013, the NSA’s GENIE program
to facilitate semi-automated network operations would at times rely on such assets.
When necessary, field operators would physically infect adversary devices, plant
hardware, or conduct short-range offensive SIGINT (NSA 2013). SIGINT agencies
with global or regional reach could also deliver payloads from remote facilities.

4. PRESENCE
The presence phase is where most of the friction occurs between intruder and target.
It is where persistent malicious software is continuously employed to understand,
dissect, and establish a hold within the targeted network or networks, gradually
extending the intruder’s access until it locates servers or devices suitable to achieve
the task at hand (US DNI 2013, 5). It is the process of extending and cementing
6

This aligns nicely with US military doctrine that situates Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) as
a unified operational function, see US Army (2014).
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the reach into the adversary’s networks, two processes respectively called lateral
movement and persistence.
The presence phase embodies the biggest discrepancy between the two operational
categories – time spent on target. Where presence-based operations unsurprisingly
spend most of their lifecycle in the presence phase, event-based operations may have
an inconsequential or even non-existent presence phase. When nation-state intrusion
campaigns are analyzed and reported to take months prior to detection, this primarily
refers to the presence phase. The key difference in timespan reflects applicability to
two wholly different operational tempos. For presence-based operations, the presence
phase is essentially a cyclical process of expanding micro-intrusions in which
additional nodes in the network are scanned, breached and subsequently assessed for
mission relevance. This is represented well in the Kill Chain model, which threads
multiple compromises on targeted networks into a single campaign with shared
features (Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin 2011, 7–8). Each intrusion must be handled
with care to avoid tripping any alarms or informing network defenders of an active
intrusion against them.
Presence-based offensive operations are first intelligence operations. Until such a time
as a more active measure is needed, malicious software is tasked with either remaining
dormant or collecting information, identical to the behavior in an intelligence mission
(Lin 2010, 64). As a corollary, operators in the presence phase must rely extensively
on the assistance of intelligence analysts to assist in further targeting and dissection of
materials exfiltrated from the target (Malone 2010, 16). In some cases, the offensive
is carried out entirely by the intelligence agency (GCHQ 2012). The presence phase is
thus both assessing the independent intelligence value of the target, and simultaneously
gathering information needed to help steer the operators towards the server or servers
where attacking would result in achieving the desired objective.
When Russian operators initially infiltrated the Ukrainian power grid in 2015, they did
not immediately wreak havoc on all they encountered. Instead, earlier intrusion efforts
cleverly used the specialized protocols unique to these industrial networks to traverse
the network, map its layout and glean the information required to develop robust
offensive capabilities (Dragos 2017, 9). In a subsequent operation, the presence phase
included pivoting from the power company’s corporate network onto its industrial
network, leveraging an attack against both to simultaneously cripple the grid and
prevent operators from fixing it (Dragos 2017, 10). Finally, advancements eventually
allowed the operators to “…de-energize a transmission substation on December 17,
2016” (Dragos 2017, 4) by way of the CRASHOVERRIDE malware tailored to affect
even relatively well-defended energy grids. The Russians had achieved a malwareinduced blackout, but they had done so after a considerable amount of time from the
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initial engagement phase. Success would not have been possible without expertise and
accrued experience.
For event-based offensive operations, the presence phase is nearly imperceptible.
This is intrinsic to the attack vector; capabilities employed in an event-based attack
are meant to impact the target directly and then disappear, leaving as few lingering
artefacts as possible. Were tell-tale indicators to remain, such as residual code left
running or files persisting in the target’s file system, it would simplify subsequent
efforts by the adversary to develop future countermeasures. Thus, it is significant for
an event-based capability to be only minimally present on enemy assets.
A cascading effect – intentional or otherwise – may result in an event-based attack
having a limited period of network presence. For example, an automated network
attack tool designed to propagate through networks and rapidly destroy all infected
endpoints and servers would require a limited presence to ensure subsequent infections
of additional targets. A good example of such an attack is the NotPetya destructive
malware, which in 2017 heavily affected Ukrainian networks before cascading
beyond its scope to adversely affect various other entities globally (Perlroth, Scott, and
Frenkel 2017). The attack, which resulted in extensive damage to victims worldwide,
was unusually publicly attributed by numerous Western intelligence agencies to the
Russian military.7
The potential cost incurred in discovery is arguably the most meaningful deterrent to
attacking via cyberspace. In recent years, a growing trend amongst large vendors in
the information security market has been to uncover massive nation-state surveillance
efforts, often facilitated by highly sophisticated malicious software. The immediate
result of this compromise is an attempted rollback of all deployed assets, both by the
original offender attempting to effect damage control and the victims who enjoy updated
configurations for their defensive products. The product of this is a partial collapse
of the aggressor’s intrusion infrastructure and, more importantly, the defender’s nearimmediate inoculation against future attempts to use the same tool in an offensive
capacity. The presence phase is thus the most sensitive component in many offensive
network operations. The continuous friction with different adversary networks and the
need to collect intelligence means that discovery and eventual inoculation are a big
risk to attackers. Presence operators must therefore continuously work to conceal their
moves, clean up evidence and establish stable, covert communication channels that
would reliably allow decision-makers to activate positioned offensive payloads when
necessary (Peterson 2013, 123).

7

See, for example, US Press Secretary (2018).
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5. EFFECT
The final effect phase is where triggers are pulled. Ordnance is activated, disabling,
disrupting or manipulating targets. Effects either translate into objectives, fizzle
uselessly, or have unintended and potentially disastrous collateral effects. For
presence-based operations, the effect phase is the culmination of possibly months
of planning, targeting, intelligence collection, infection attempts and dedicated
development (Rattray and Healey 2010, 79). For event-based operations, the effect
phase represents the primary thrust of the attack. When Richard Clarke declared in
2009 that “strikes in cyber war move at a rate approaching the speed of light” (Clarke
2009, 32), he was not referring to the entire span of an operation, but rather to the
period of time between the activation of the ordnance and its detonation on the target,
the manifestation of the effect phase. Even so, ordnance may be instantly triggered but
may still take time to deliver its intended effect.
Distilling various official definitions, there are three “attack” types when targeting
networks – disruptive, manipulative, and destructive.8 Disruptive, or suppressing,
attacks inflict “temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the
performance of a weapon system below the level needed to fulfil its mission objectives”
(US DoD 2017, 229). Their utility increased with the rise of electronic warfare, where
electromagnetic transmissions could be jammed to produce a temporary but potent
effect (Army Headquarters 2003, 7). The concept of disruptive attacks has made a
natural transition to cyberspace, where temporarily degrading the capacity of military
resources can adversely affect the efficacy of an adversary force (US Army 2014, 9).
Disruptive network attacks are commonplace even outside military scenarios. Socalled denial-of-service attacks capable of levying massive throughput of network
traffic routinely disrupt the functionality of online services, big and small. The targets
range from global gaming communities such as the Sony PlayStation Network
(Samit 2016) to major banks (Hamill 2014). Typically, these attacks either exploit
an implementation flaw in the targeted technology or simply attempt to overwhelm
its available resources. No legitimate connections can interact with the platform as
intended, rendering it temporarily disabled for its original purpose. Similar approaches
may be applied to military technology, platforms and protocols.
Manipulation effects attempt to alter information or functionality in the adversary
networks, thereby deceiving operators or preventing intended system functionality.
Such attacks attempt to alter perception, preventing an adversary from acting
properly to further its own objectives. A scenario could include introducing a nearly
imperceptible deviation to a weapon’s targeting process, causing strikes to miss due
8
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Adapted from the US Military’s taxonomy of “…deceive, degrade, deny, destroy, or manipulate…”, see
US Army (2014, 17). Libicki similarly speaks of attacks aimed at eruption (target illumination), disruption,
and corruption. See Libicki (2009, 145).

to what could appear to be a technical glitch. Kinetically, this is hard to accomplish
but could be roughly analogized to physically tampering with a missile’s warhead to
secretly render it inert. When the missile fires, it seemingly behaves as normal until
impact, when the warhead does not detonate. During the heat of conflict and until it
happens repeatedly and consistently, it would be difficult to identify the fault as an
attack. By the time it is discovered, it would likely already be too late. As the Stuxnet
campaign demonstrated (Falliere, Murchu, and Chien 2011; Farwell and Rohozinski
2011), masking a manipulative effect to increase its longevity can cause an effect to be
repeatedly successful over time. Hiding an effect does, however, require incrementally
introducing it; an immediate and blunt change of circumstance markedly increases the
probability of detection.
Destructive attacks are intended to inflict damage on adversary networks, either on
hardware, software or both. These types of attacks are firmly rooted in conventional
warfare, where destruction of enemy assets and personnel is often seen as the
primary method of reducing its combat effectiveness.9 When applied to network
operations, a destructive attack could cause permanent software damage, such as in
the case of malware which completely erases all critical files on target servers,10 or
even permanent hardware damage, such as the previously mentioned Stuxnet worm
targeting the Iranian nuclear project (Langner 2011).

6. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Delineating between event-based and presence-based operations allows a discussion
on how militaries are integrating these capabilities into doctrine and strategy. They
are markedly different in characteristics, duration, challenges, and opportunities and
thus must not be lumped together, but fundamental similarities exist between the
two categories and are certainly helpful in understanding networks as a medium for
warfare; but useful observation of military capabilities will remain limited unless we
recognize that not all capabilities must be treated the same.
Event-based operations represent the instances in which network attacks are somewhat
analogous to the kinetic. Like firing a weapon, an event-based operation entails sending
a payload from attacker to target in the hope of immediately reducing its integrity or
capacity to operate. As a result, these capabilities are often more tactical in nature,
easier to integrate with existing military OODA loops,11 and are promising candidates
for joint warfare. They are, however, limited in scope, may require extensive research
9

10
11

The classic approach to warfare - most commonly codified by Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz
– favours destruction as the sole means of achieving military coercion. See Clausewitz (1873) for the
original school of thought.
See, for example, the 2012 Shamoon attack, in which a presumably Iranian attacker wiped thousands of
computers at Saudi’s national gas company, Aramco (Bronk and Tikk-Ringas 2013).
OODA loop – A process in which combatants Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. Military vernacular for
conceptualising decision-making process in combat. See Boyd (1995).
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and development, and could be limited to a specific subset of adversary equipment.
A weapon suitable for disabling a US Navy destroyer may exploit hardwarespecific vulnerabilities,12 rendering it unsuitable against other targets. Consequently,
battlefield operators deploying such weapons must have immaculate understanding of
their adversary and a firm control of their own options.
Presence-based operations are intelligence missions with an offensive finisher; a form
of digital sabotage. They may initially appear indistinguishable as operators infect
networks and gather information necessary to craft an attack. In these phases, even if
the target detects the malware present in its assets, it is very difficult to assess motive
and intent. Only once offensive modules are deployed can confidence in hostile intent
increase. This adds an unfortunate layer of political nuance, as overly successful
network intrusions may be misconstrued by the target as unduly aggressive. The risk of
potentially undesired escalation has been aptly covered by Buchanan when discussing
the “cybersecurity dilemma” (Buchanan 2017), an application of the classic security
dilemma to network intrusions between nations.
Presence-based operations can potentially be high-risk, high-reward capabilities.
Successfully pre-positioning assets in military or otherwise critical networks may
potentially have meaningful impact on the course of conflict if used to facilitate
strategic surprise or large-scale reduction in enemy capacity to operate. At the same
time, presence-based operations are notoriously brittle, and their discovery can undo
years of focused labor. By nature, such operations require tight, intensive, unyielding
support of friendly intelligence assets to map the threat, generate initial persistent
access, and successfully maneuver through complex tangles of military networks until
the right targets are found. It is therefore understandable why these campaigns are
often spearheaded by intelligence agencies with core expertise on network intrusions
rather than deployed military forces.
The Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft is a fascinating example of
a platform potentially vulnerable to both presence-based and event-based attacks.
After two decades of development, the aircraft had started active deployment
accompanied by a host of issues with its onboard software. These included major inflight failures of the radar system (Gallagher 2016), issues with its onboard avionics
(US DoD 2016, 35), and “…276 deficiencies in combat performance [designated] as
‘critical to correct’…” (US DoD 2017, 48). Additionally, both the onboard systems
and the logistical software used to manage the F-35 have demonstrated numerous
vulnerabilities during security testing procedures, many yet to be addressed as of 2017
(US DoD 2017, 103–4). While onboard systems are unlikely to be directly connected
to the internet (Lin 2010, 66), targeting one or more of the F-35’s prized array of
sensory inputs and communication methods is possible for a knowledgeable adversary.
12
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These vulnerabilities do indeed exist, see for example US DoD (2017, 3).

An event-based attack might try to overwhelm or otherwise compromise some of the
F-35’s tactical data links, used to share data with allied assets in the air and on the
ground. For compatibility purposes, this communication commonly occurs via the
Link-16 protocol, an encrypted legacy protocol used by NATO forces since 1975.
While it has undoubtedly undergone improvements over its lifecycle, the limitations
in encrypting reliable airborne tactical traffic and the vast array of opportunities for
US adversaries to intercept, analyze and exploit Link-16 protocol vulnerabilities raise
the option that it may be compromised during an attack. Link-16 includes targeting
information, location of friendly forces and directives from command forces (Hura
et al. 2000). Interestingly, even oversight reports have indicated some issues with the
Link-16 data that forced pilots to revert to voice communication (US DoD 2017, 70).
Others have indicated intermittent problems with the Multifunction Advanced Data
Link (MADL) system used to communicate between fifth generation stealth aircraft,13
causing pilots to ‘lose tactical battlefield awareness’ (US DoD 2017, 71). Successfully
compromising the F-35’s data links is thus not unfeasible and may severely degrade
aircraft battlefield performance.
The effects phase in this particular instance could include one of several options. As
an example, a manipulation attack could alter the pilot’s perception of the battlefield
by adding, removing, or moving specific targeting points fed to the radar subsystem
by external channels. A disruptive attack could try to overwhelm sensory input or
prevent the aircraft from awareness of being acquired by a ground-based air-defense
battery. The effects would thus be nearly instantaneous, limited in scope to the targeted
aircraft, and tactical in nature.
A presence-based attack against the F-35 could take months to prepare, culminating in
an elaborate effects phase saved for evoking strategic surprise or in dire need. Rather
than targeting a single aircraft or sortie, attackers would instead target the peripheral
networks that interface with the F-35 during its operational life cycle. These could
be on-base networks, maintenance forces or third-party software providers. By doing
so, an adversary may temporarily degrade or completely disable a large number of
aircraft.
One supposed innovation in the F-35’s software is the Autonomic Logistic Information
System, or ALIS. With one ALIS station present at each unit operating F-35s, it allows
semi-automated fleet management, mission management, logistics, and maintenance
(Lockheed Martin 2009). As with other parts of the Joint Strike Fighter program, ALIS
has been plagued with critical faults which are instructive in two relevant aspects: how
ALIS might be vulnerable to presence-based operations; and how exploiting these
vulnerabilities could lead to a strategic advantage when triggered in the effects phase.

13

Currently for the US, the F-22 and the F-35.
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The issues in ALIS are varied. Attempts to deploy it in test environments have forced
support personnel to lower network security settings to allow users to log on (US
DoD 2017, 96). Incorrectly handled maintenance data has resulted in one instance
in “major damage to a weapons bay door” (US DoD 2017, 96) from an incorrectly
loaded bomb that got loose and struck the aircraft. In June 2017, a software error
in ALIS grounded an entire F-35 unit until the issue was addressed (Freedberg Jr.
2017). It would therefore seem that the system can both be a boon to aircraft operators
and an attack vector for offensive network operators. A single warfighting platform
now presents a diverse, varied attack surface that can potentially be exploited during
wartime.
All military offensive network operations can be a tremendous boon to military
objectives across all levels of operation. Each type has unique characteristics, requires
different support staff, and may weave into doctrine at varying locations. Where
event-based operations may assist in crippling a local adversary network to facilitate
joint strikes, a well-placed presence-based capability may sufficiently delay adversary
decision-making and resource martialing to strategically diminish the capacity for
effective response. From sowing tactical chaos to deceiving a carrier strike group,
the potential is vast – if each category is understood, respected, and contextually
integrated.
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Abstract: To survive a confrontation, it helps to understand other side’s capabilities
and intensions. Estimates of opposing capabilities rest on an empirical basis but
understanding the other side’s intentions is inferred from words and deeds.
Therein lies a dilemma common across all military domains: acts to alter the balance
of a confrontation can also shape the inferences that the other side draws about one’s
intentions. The dilemma also operates in cyberspace, but in unique ways.
First, efforts by one side to acquire information on the other can be read by the other
side as preparations for a cyber attack prefatory to a military attack.
Second, others may draw inferences from the fact of cyber espionage alone, even
though the basis for believing in a cyber security dilemma is weak.
Third, there are ways of carrying out cyber espionage that can mitigate inferences
that others draw about the imminence of cyber attack by, for example, limiting which
components within a network are targeted for eavesdropping or by using penetration
methods that do not leave arbitrary code behind.
Fourth, defenders themselves can also modulate their reactions in ways that limit
drawing unnecessary inferences.
Fifth, expectations of how well modulating cyber espionage can convey peaceful
intentions should be very modest.
All these are complicated by difficulties in the target’s ascertaining a penetration’s
date, characterization, and authorship. We conclude with a call for those who would
penetrate military-related systems to think about the inferences that the other side may
draw if such penetrations are discovered.
Keywords: cyber espionage, cyber attack, signaling
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1. INTRODUCTION
To survive a confrontation, it helps to be mindful of the other side’s capabilities and
intentions. Estimates of opposing capabilities often take painstaking work, but at least
rest on an empirical basis. But understanding the other side’s intentions is something
that needs to be inferred from words and deeds.1
Therein lies a dilemma present across conflict domains. Acting can alter the terms of
a confrontation to the actor’s advantage, but it can also shape the inferences that the
other side draws about one’s intentions. Some inferences can both help and harm.
One side may want to signal its resolve to attain and defend some objective. It does
so by demonstrating capability, readiness, and a willingness to put people and assets
in harm’s way. It hopes that the other side backs off. But the other side may infer not
only that its potential foe is prepared and willing, but also that it is facing a now higher
level of aggression. Perhaps the objective has grown or the willingness to take risks
to achieve it has risen. So, the other side sees a growing threat – one that forces it to
do something to recover its former level of security. Therefore, it decides to bolster
its own capability, readiness, and willingness to fight.2 The advantages that one side
reaps from its actions can be thereby nullified by the indirect disadvantages because
the other side is drawing unhelpful inferences about its adversary’s intensions.
We contend that the dilemma operates in cyberspace, but in a unique way – efforts
by one side to acquire information on the other can be read by that other side as
preparations for a cyber attack prefatory to a military attack.3 It hardly helps stability
when the high degree of ambiguity present in cyberspace combines with the thin
experience base of cyber attacks and its non-physical (hence non-intuitive) nature.
Perhaps needless to add, what happens in cyberspace matters to conventional military
affairs more than it used to.
This essay walks through the problems and issues that may arise when inferences
are drawn from activity in cyberspace, particularly those that take place during a
crisis or confrontation. One might imagine, for reference purposes, that China and
the United States are at odds over the South China Sea; neither is certain what the
other side wants or how far it is willing to go, even if each has a good idea of what
physical assets are to hand. So, what considerations should go into each side’s rules
of engagement in cyberspace?
1
2
3
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The classic treatment being Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics,
Princeton NJ (Princeton University Press), 1978.
Elsa Kania, “Cyber Deterrence in Times of Cyber Anarchy: Evaluating the Divergences in U.S. and
Chinese Strategic Thinking,” November 11, 2016; unpublished paper.
The logic that links a cyber attack to a kinetic attack is that because many of the effects of a cyber attack
are temporary and reversible, carrying one out is pointless unless the intent is to exploit a temporary
interruption or degradation of the other side’s information services by using kinetic forces to make
permanent changes in the military balance or outcomes.

In addressing this question, this paper distinguishes cyber espionage, which is
unauthorized access to systems in order to acquire information, from cyber attack,
which entails accessing systems in order to disrupt their operations or corrupt their
information. To put this in the language of the CIA triad: cyber espionage affects only
confidentiality while cyber attacks affect integrity and availability. Unfortunately,
popular use generally applies “cyber attack” to a broad array of mischief in cyberspace,
including the manipulation of social media. Cyber attack, in this paper, is also
distinguished from “attack,” which is used to mean kinetic attack using physical force.

2. INFERRING CYBER ATTACKS
FROM CYBER ESPIONAGE
Cyber espionage can create knowledge and help set up cyber attacks; yet, if discovered,
it may alter the target’s assessment of the intruder’s capabilities and intentions. The
first is generally helpful. The second is generally harmful, in that the target may
conclude that the intruder is preparing to fight and to do so soon.
Although caution is therefore advised in penetrating systems whose disturbance
may enflame the other side, in a crisis a country may want to carry out more cyber
espionage in order to determine the status, readiness, and intentions of the other side’s
armed forces. Indeed, as with spy satellites in the 1960s whose imagery persuaded
U.S. leaders not to panic over the size of Soviet ICBM arsenals, or as former British
intelligence officials would argue,4 better intelligence tends to foster stability. It
substitutes fact for doubt in situations in which leaders believe they must assume
the worst, and hence gird for conflict. Some risk is inescapable. Even if traditional
espionage uses tools clearly different from those used in warfighting, the heightened
effort to collect intelligence prefatory to bolstering defense is nearly indistinguishable
from efforts to collect intelligence prefatory to offense. Thus, any discovery of
heightened intelligence efforts may lead the target to react badly.
Moreover, because a malware implant designed for cyber espionage is often identical
to one designed for cyber attack, discovering and attributing5 one in a critical system
could easily be viewed as a direct precursor to attack. This normally would lead the
target to raise its alert levels, which, in and of itself may exacerbate tensions.6 In a
crisis, not only are alert levels high to begin with, but so is suspicion of the other side’s
motives.
4

5

6

Based on remarks by Nigel Inkster (personal communications) and Sir David Osmand (http://
carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/concurrent-session-i-cyber-weapons-and-strategic-stabilitypub-67884).
Although attribution can be uncertain, the paper focusses on two countries in a confrontation at the time of
discovery. Thus, the target is probably more apt to blame the intrusion on the other side (because it is easier
to impute a motive) than if there were no confrontation.
Paul Bracken described how ominous signs could make the other side raise its alert level in his “Strategic
War Termination,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing
Nuclear Operations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 197–214.
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One important facet in drawing inferences from an implant is that its implantation
would reflect conditions true at the time of its implantation rather than at the time of its
discovery. Good forensic teams working on well-monitored networks can often figure
out when an intrusion took place, and hence shed light on why.7 If the penetration
predated the crisis, it may be deemed not to be part of a dynamic of escalating alert
levels. Nothing, of course, prevents one country from implanting malware against the
day it might be needed for attack, but discovery alone cannot support the supposition
that any such attack will take place imminently.
However, because many countries lack access to good forensics or fail to monitor
their networks assiduously, the age of the intrusion may not be obvious to them. And
until the other side figures out when the first penetration that resulted in a system’s
compromise took place, it may, in fear, conclude that the penetration was recent
enough to have been motivated by the crisis itself.
The target need not be not forced into one conclusion. Perhaps what looks like cyber
espionage was just fact-finding. Yet even cyber espionage unrelated to any possible
cyber attack is not necessarily innocent. If the compromised system tracks military
units in real time, an implant into it is still cyber espionage, but can also be used for
later adversary targeting. Discovering that such a system was compromised regardless
of how long ago, should raise concerns, just not ones that require going onto a war
footing.
Now, what if the target infers that the intrusion was meant to be seen?8 Granted it is
difficult to distinguish between: (1) the desire to be seen; (2) an indifference to being
seen which leads to a relaxation of operational security, thereby raising the likelihood
of being seen; and (3) simple bad luck on the intruder’s part. The target, in drawing
inferences from what it has discovered, may also forget that the characteristics of
discovered intrusions are not necessarily characteristics of undiscovered ones.9

7

8

9
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The fact, for instance, that intrusions against the DNC started in the summer of 2015 strongly suggests
that their motivation was more anti-Clinton than pro-Trump, whose nomination was hardly assured at that
point.
The DNC had been penetrated for roughly a year before discovery (Dmitri Alperovitch, “Bears in the
Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee”, June 15, 2016: At the DNC, COZY BEAR
intrusion had been identified going back to summer of 2015, while FANCY BEAR separately breached
the network in April 2016). Yet the FBI still argued, “The most startling exchange at this week’s hearing
involved questions about why Russian hackers were so indiscreet when they stole e-mails from the
Democratic National Committee and from the head of the Clinton campaign. That ‘loudness’ looks
deliberate, Mr Comey replied.” (source: “The FBI says it is investigating the president’s campaign,”
March 23, 2017; http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21719491-slice-country-hears-presidentvictim-government). See also Julian Borger, “Trump-Russia collusion is being investigated by FBI, Comey
confirms”, March 20, 2017; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/20/fbi-director-comeyconfirms-investigation-trump-russia: “The Russian intervention in the election was ‘unusually loud’, as if
Moscow did not care about being caught.”
Presumably, intrusions that are discovered are those that are easiest to discover. Their discoverability may
not characterize the discoverability of the average intrusion (unless all of them are eventually discovered).

Still, the target’s perception that the intruder was brandishing its capabilities by
allowing its implants to be discovered – when spies normally go to great lengths to
hide theirs – may persuade it to see coercion taking place. It could then ask: for what
purpose? And why now? This could have been a periodic reminder and hence not
indicative of an imminent threat. Logically, it should not indicate an imminent attack,
since the attacker should be at pains to mask its intentions until they are suddenly
revealed. But it could be a warning to back down, by containing the implicit message
that failure to do so would be dangerous.
Another complicating factor with cyberspace operations arises from the question: how
can countries underscore the credibility of deterrence instruments (such as retaliatory
cyber attacks) without revealing the particulars of such capabilities and thereby
inducing countermeasures?10 Because countermeasures do not emerge immediately
when systems prove broadly vulnerable, the target may infer that the other side is
signaling its urgency by revealing what it can do and that it will not be needing such
capabilities for long. If the target concludes from the intruder’s presumed willingness
to burn exploits that the intruder needed to make a quick impression, the target may
then ask what the occasion is or will be.
The target may also conclude that the intrusion was undertaken to test the efficacy of
and reaction to a cyber attack to be launched at some later date. This conclusion would
be reinforced if it was a cyber attack, albeit a small one, that had taken place. Evidence
for that may include the location of the intrusion, the identity of the affected systems,
or the presence of attack code within the implant. Its placement or characteristics
may persuade the target that the attacker has little confidence of being able to access
the implant once the system goes to war.11 But even such a discovery would not
be particularly good evidence of an imminent attack, especially if the characteristics
of the implant suggested the attacker’s confidence that it could persist indefinitely
without discovery.
Conversely, if the target concludes that a nominal cyber attack was carried out primarily
as a final test prior to deployment, it may expect that use to be imminent. Its fears may
rise if the implant’s placement, characteristics and, especially, its implantation date
suggest that the attacker was risking a high likelihood of discovery to validate or
characterize a particular type of cyber attack. It is but a short step for the target to infer
that discovery is evidence of discoverability, and thereby conclude that detonation is
coming sooner rather than later. Further evidence of imminent use may be an implant’s
fragility, in that it is not robust against the run of changes that systems undergo. Other
indications are recent rises in the frequency or scale of communications between the
10
11

See, for instance, Austin Long, Brendan Green, “Clandestine Capabilities and Deterrence in World
Politics”, unpublished.
This raises the question of how to activate the cyber attack if the implant is unreachable, but the answer
may be that activation – a one-bit decision – can be triggered on the malware’s assessment of network
events in cases where malware cannot build attack code on the fly.
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implant and its controller, or tests of the ability of the implant to support a certain
payload. The latter can sometimes be inferred from reading logs.
Finally, any particular intrusion may serve several purposes. Concluding that one
purpose may have been relatively benign hardly proves that more malign purposes
are absent.

3. INFERENCES FROM THE FACT
OF CYBER ESPIONAGE ALONE
A country’s reaction to having simply been spied on may reflect its take on the security
dilemma. Countries that believe that someone else’s gain is automatically their loss
are apt to interpret intrusions more darkly than those that believe that both sides can
simultaneously be more secure. Those inclined to believe that the other is implacably
hostile will read events as proof of dark design; those inclined to impute a mix of
motives to the other side will hold many differing interpretations and delay imputing
malevolence to system intruders pending further evidence. Some will see Munich
in 1938; others, Sarajevo in 1914. The usual caveats apply: countries with different
political cultures may draw inferences differently, the various bureaucracies within
a single country may disagree with one another, and members of the public, elite
opinion, and private organizations may each have their own opinion.
Furthermore, what seems innocent after the crisis has passed may seem otherwise
during the crisis. The human tendency to impute intent to random circumstance may
lead to conclusions that because the discovery of implants happened to produce fear,
they were meant to induce fear and their discovery was part of that plan.
That noted, the technical basis for imagining a security dilemma in cyberspace is weak,
particularly compared to contests such as nuclear missiles versus nuclear missiles
or WWI-era land forces versus similar land forces. There are several reasons why.
First, the contest in cyberspace is asymmetric: the best measures against cyber attack
are cyber defenses, not an opposing cyber attack capability used for counterforce
purposes.12 Most measures that increase defense do not allow one’s own attackers
to enjoy greater success.13 Second, because the element of surprise is intrinsic to the
12

13
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In other words, the cost-effectiveness of carrying out cyber attacks on the attackers themselves would be
low, in large part because the primary assets used in cyber attacks, computer code and intelligence, are
essentially indestructible, and the hardware used is easily replaced. This consideration has nothing to do
with the relative cost-effectiveness of offense versus defense, or with deterrence in cyberspace.
Ben Buchanan (in The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations, Oxford 2017)
has argued that NSA intrusions have provided information on adversary intrusion (and hence attack)
capabilities that have permitted stronger defenses. Thus, stronger defenses by potential attackers against
penetration would have yielded weaker defenses on the part of defenders allied with the penetrators. But
even if true, information is available only on some actors not all, such information is only part of what it
takes for defense, and networks that benefit from NSA-acquired information are only a fraction of the total
networks in the United States (albeit perhaps disproportionately important ones).

success of a cyber attack, it would take great confidence in such defenses before one
side is sufficiently emboldened by the prospect of impunity to launch its own cyber
attacks. Third, even if all system defenses were perfect, the logic that in cyberspace
impunity emboldens aggression must also presume that the other side will not escalate
into physical combat. This presumption is valid only if the stakes involved are too
small to merit violence. Fourth, the strong commercial consensus on the need for
better cyber security in general means that actions that improve cyber security for one
(e.g., the discovery of a vulnerability that leads to a patch, an improved understanding
of cost-effective practices) often improve cyber security for all.
Cyber espionage, like espionage in general, also permits information to be transmitted
in particularly credible ways. If one side in a confrontation were to aver that it
lacked active planning for aggression, the other side may well dismiss its avowals
as motivated. But if one were to steal corroborating information from potential foes,
one would have to be very suspicious indeed to conclude that such information was
deliberately planted there, particularly if finding it was hard.
Such deception could happen,14 but carrying on ostensibly confidential communications
under the assumption they were wiretapped and would therefore be transmitted to the
other side’s leadership requires either giving up all confidential channels or knowing
in advance which channels would stay confidential and which would be penetrated.
The same holds with even more weight if the deception involved physical evidence,
such as the disposition of military forces. Thus, however irritated one side may be
at being penetrated, a salve on this irritation is the presumption that one’s peaceful
intentions have been more credibly communicated than mere narrative would allow.

4. HOW TO KEEP ON WITH CYBER
ESPIONAGE WITHOUT SO MUCH RISK
How might cyberspace spies suppress unhelpful inference-making? One way is to
loosen the correlation between being spied on and being attacked. Presumably, countries
will not credibly promise never to attack in cyberspace; doing so forgoes a potentially
significant military advantage and anyway would not be believed. Nevertheless, the
correlation between espionage and attack can be weakened by copious acts of cyber
espionage not correlated with a cyber attack. But this may backfire if the other side
thinks that this is being done deliberately – that is, to inhibit the target from raising its
guard after discovering intrusions that really were prefatory to cyber attack. Besides,
being caught spying a lot tends to make one look unfriendly to begin with.
14

A great deal depends on how widely system owners start using deception. One case is France’s thencandidate Emmanuel Macron suspecting that Russia would penetrate his campaign’s networks and lacing
false documents in his networks. See Adam Nossiter, David Sanger, and Nicole Perlroth, “Hackers Came
but the French were Prepared,” May 9, 2017; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/europe/hackerscame-but-the-french-were-prepared.html.
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Another possible way to reduce the risk is to ensure that one’s cyber espionage
implants lack the characteristics that would permit leveraging them for cyber attack.
The implant may be placed, say, in a router for the purpose of capturing messages
from an internal office system; a cyber attack launched against a router would, at
worst, be an inconvenience that lasted no longer than it takes to round up and install a
replacement. So, no reasonable inference about a future cyber attack could be made.
In practice, making such fine distinctions requires: (1) that the target has systems
worth eavesdropping on that can be distinguished from those worth attacking; (2)
that the intruder knows which are which; (3) that the target (the network owner) also
knows which are which and believes the intruder may want to make that distinction;
and (4) that such differences can and will be communicated correctly to the target’s
leadership. The first condition is clearly not up to the penetrators. The second is an
assumption that requires a great deal of prefatory cyber espionage in the first place,
reintroducing the very risks of discovery that the strategy was attempting to modulate.
The third may require insight into the intruder, since the point is to understand whether
the intruder meant simply to spy or to also set up a cyber attack. As for the fourth, one
can only guess.
The target’s technical experts may point out that a penetration in, say, a well-guarded
albeit Internet-linked network is no indication of how well the more critical and hence
often air-gapped (i.e., electronically isolated) military systems can survive attack. This
is particularly true for a cyber attack whose effectiveness depends on good timing,
hence on an ability to exercise real-time command and control over the implants.
But might such leaders also remember the same technical experts arguing that these
dearly-acquired guards would protect their conversations? And while technical experts
may remind leaders of the many caveats that follow all assessments of cyber security,
lay-folk often disregarded them or view them as attempts to evade responsibility for
being wrong. Leaders may therefore be skeptical of arguments that a penetration here
does not mean an attack there. Again, the essential role played by surprise in cyber
operations erodes assurances of all sorts.
Lastly, is it in one country’s interest to improve another country’s confidence in the
resilience of its armed forces in the face of cyber attack? Success at calming the other
side would reduce the risks of overreaction that might follow penetrations into the
networks of its military. Confidence makes it easier to dismiss the implications of
having found the implants, because the target will conclude that they cannot affect
a military force resilient to cyber attack. But feeding such confidence also obviates
the value of brandishing one’s weapons in cyberspace and vitiates the corresponding
deterrence value of one’s cyberspace capabilities. Furthermore, unless the argument
is generic – we are resilient to such attacks, so you probably are also resilient –
demonstrating the resilience of another side’s military systems with any credibility
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would have to show a level of insight into the details of their systems which would be
anything but reassuring.
So, increases in cyber espionage unavoidably create risks if getting caught raises fears.

5. THE DEFENDER’S OPTIONS
Although the target of a discovered intrusion may well infer an imminent attack and
raise its alert levels in ways that lead to mutual escalation which culminates in war,
nothing compels defenders to act that way. Wars are costly and risky and actions such
as raising alert levels are not risk-free. The questionable value of running these risks
because intrusions might be precursors to attack and pre-emption might improve the
odds of surviving an attack suggests a place for alternative reactions.
A great deal depends on whether such intrusions are an indicator of future aggression
(specifically, evidence that the odds of physical aggression need to be revised upward)
or just an enabler. If an indicator, then countries need to attend to what happens on the
ground, so to speak. If an enabler, then policies to stop intrusions merit consideration,
as they always should.
Warning against further intrusions may bolster deterrence; it signals discovery,
displeasure, and, most importantly, that the target takes these intrusions as indicators
of potential attack. Although the standard cyber deterrence challenges apply, such as
what constitutes an infraction that merits a response and what the response should
be, the issue of grandfathering also merits note. Contrast cyber attacks with cyber
espionage; if you warn the other side to stop immediately, then later attacks can be
assumed to reflect acts of volition that took place after the warning; attacks tend to
announce themselves at the time. Intrusions, however, do not announce themselves.
An intrusion discovered tomorrow may have been carried out yesterday. Thus, being
able to time-stamp the last hostile volitional activity (not simply the first intrusion) is
important in a coherent deterrence posture.
Unfortunately, correct characterization of the intruder’s post-warning activity is not
trivial, and the problem is worse if the intrusion leaves behind an autonomous implant,
one that takes some actions on its own. The intruder can try to erase or deactivate the
implant, but then imagine a target’s ire in discovering the intruder’s post-warning
footprints. Even if discovery does not activate reprisals, it could provide a clue as to
how the intruder penetrated otherwise inaccessible systems. After all, if the intruder
was confident that, even in wartime, it could command and control the intrusion in
real-time, then the implanted code would not need autonomous capabilities. Thus,
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the existence of such capabilities suggests that the system is hard to access. Telling
the target about the intrusion so that the target can de-activate it runs into similar
problems and connotes an obeisance that one rival may not wish to convey to another.
So, unless the target wants to build a narrative that would justify fighting the intruder,
it needs to exercise forbearance or even forgiveness when it catches what look like
violations following a warning.

6. DELIBERATING SIGNALING
Similar issues bedevil using cyber espionage to signal broader intent, in contrast to
using it to brandish capabilities. A 2016 study15 suggests that, if given what they think
is the opportunity, policy-makers will try to signal their intentions through cyberspace.
In the words of then-CIA-director John Deutsch, they may believe that the “electron is
the ultimate precision-guided munition”,16 allowing precision signaling. Or, they may
conclude that signaling in cyberspace is far cheaper than moving, say, warships. In
one war game examined by the study:
Strict rules of engagement—to include no network exploitation
of strategic command and control and limited military command
and control—were placed on computer network exploitation with
the assumption that these activities would be detected and would
be interpreted as signals of the United States’ [lack of] desire to
escalate the crisis.
There are two reasons for being skeptical that such signaling would have the desired
effects.
One is general to all signaling: there is no guarantee that they will correctly infer
what you imply.17 Some inferences are contrary to fact; for example, that you have
forces hidden when in fact you do not. Other inferences are contrary to what you
were signaling: you brandish cyber attack capabilities to show how prepared you
are, but they think you emphasized non-lethal capabilities because you are afraid to
use lethal capabilities. A litany of fairly prosaic reasons can be adduced to explain
inaccurate inference, but the simplest is that people make mistakes: they do not see
all the evidence or they do not know how to evaluate everything they see. Being busy,
as decision-makers typically are, they fail to pay the requisite attention to what they
15
16
17
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Jacquelyn Schneider, U.S. Naval War College, Cyber and Crisis Escalation: Insights from Wargaming,
unpublished paper, January 2017.
U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs on the subject of “Foreign Information Warfare Programs
and Capabilities.” June 25, 1996.
See, for instance, Max Fisher, “Do U.S. Strikes Send a ‘Message’ to Rivals? There’s No Evidence”, April
21, 2017; www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/do-us-strikes-send-a-message-to-rivals-theres-no-evidence.
html.

do see. Being people, they have confirmation bias: they see what they want to see and
when evidence comes along they emphasize their prior perceptions and discard what
contradicts it. They themselves may be good evaluators but work for organizations
that, collectively, exercise confirmation bias. People also tend to mirror-image: if they
see you doing something that they could have done, they may well infer that you
are doing it for the same reasons they would have. Leaders with a high regard for
their own personal perspicacity (which is reinforced by sycophantic assistants) may
rely on their intuition over the painstakingly-generated insights of their intelligence
community. Finally, the signal’s receivers may be aware of things that signalers are
not – and they, in turn, may be aware of things that they think the receivers should
have been aware of but were never exposed to. What you see as a signal of yours, they
interpret as arising from internal machinations at their end.
Unfortunately for clarity, signalers may have too little idea of what things look like
from the perspective of receivers (who, themselves, often take pains to keep others
in the dark). Signalers have too little idea of why recipients would think the signal
should be read in a certain way. In the end, the signaler may be wrong, but error is
beside the point. The reactions of those receiving the signal are entirely determined
by facts and circumstances as they see them. Neither reality nor what the signaler
intended to signal count, if the point is to influence their thinking.
The other set of reasons is specific to cyberspace. Even though cyber espionage
may be misinterpreted as preparations for cyber attack, the failure to discover cyber
espionage may not necessarily be correctly interpreted as a lack of desire to carry out
a cyber attack. Such an interpretation would require that the other side expects to find
evidence of cyber espionage and then concludes that an absence of a discovery means
the absence of activity. It also assumes that they do not find cyber espionage from
third parties and erroneously conclude that it came from their potential foes, the most
likely guess under the circumstances. They may easily conclude that penetrations
carried out because of the crisis would not be discovered, because advanced persistent
threats even from countries as casual about operational security as China has been can
linger undiscovered for several months. Those from more careful penetrators such as
Russia or the United States may linger undetected far longer. Even if the penetrators
made themselves easy to find in the more benign parts of the other side’s network and
scarce in the more sensitive areas, the more likely conclusion may be that they took
greater pains to be stealthy in the latter case.
Hostile signals – look at us in your system – should have a greater fidelity than nonsignals. At least there is something to work with. And penetrators should want to take
more pains going in than going out, lest they be blocked prematurely. But, to reverse
all the cautions noted above, unless the penetration was found where it would clearly
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be prefatory to a cyber attack, the other side could interpret their finding as evidence
of mere cyber espionage, which may imply nothing out of the ordinary.
Perhaps the difficulty of drawing the correct inferences from discoveries of penetrations
in general, or implants in particular, may be eased as cyberwar examples accrete. But
would they? While cyberspace is a very dynamic place, few cyber attacks have taken
place at nation-state scale, as distinct from cyber espionage and cybercrimes.18 Thus,
by the time enough incidents have accumulated to support conclusions, years may
have passed and, more importantly, the world that such incidents describe may have
changed so much that earlier evidence is immaterial. The problem is not that the
technological basis of computation and communication is so fluid – with the possible
exception of what artificial intelligence might bring, there is a fair degree of yearto-year stability – but that the interaction between people and markets and between
attackers and defenders is constantly evolving. Consider the many ways of creating
flooding attacks: volunteers on their own computers, large botnets (involuntarily
recruited zombie computers), medium-sized botnets amplified by packet reflection,
web servers (e.g., those that support WordPress), cloud servers, and networked
devices (e.g., video cameras) – with no guarantee that novel techniques may not be
added to the list. The technology behind ransomware was largely available twenty
years ago, but did not take off19 until someone showed that it could work; then many
others jumped into the business aided, in part, by the emergence of digital currencies
such as Bitcoin. Because measures beget countermeasures which beget countercountermeasures, techniques may morph rapidly in the hothouse environment that
is cyberspace. Meanwhile, other tricks die off. Spam is no longer the problem for
consumers that it once was,20 and changes in Microsoft Windows over the last ten
years have complicated any strategy that relies on USB sticks as an infection vector.
Correctly interpreting any one penetration against such a dynamic background is
difficult.
Speculatively, future years may see a shift from first-order attack methods (the
insertion of arbitrary executable code into target systems) to second-order (shaping
inputs to yield unexpected outputs in the target system). This could arise because
preserving the integrity of a system’s code base is a workable problem (e.g., by
burning instructions into hardware, if nothing else) while ever-increasing system
complexity leads to an exponential increase in the interaction space. Furthermore, the
NSA at least (according to the former head of its Tailored Access Office, Rob Joyce21)
tends to rely on hijacking credentials as much as or more than inserting malware into
18

19
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21
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Notably, system intrusions for the ultimate purpose of getting money, the best example of which was
the theft of $81 million from the Bank of Bangladesh, putatively by North Korea (which has also been
associated with bitcoin-related theft).
For instance, Dan Bilefsky and Yonette Joseph, “Cyberattack in U.K. Hits 16 Health Institutions,” May 12,
2017; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-national-health-service-cyberattack.html.
“Spam email levels at 12-year low,” July 17, 2015; http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33564016.
See his address to the USENEX Enigma 2016 conference: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=bDJb8WOJYdA.

systems, and hijacked credentials are less useful for cyber attack because the damage
you can do with them is limited to the damage that the credential’s true owner can
carry out. So, credentials may be good enough for tapping the flow of information but
not for altering it. If so, the methods used for cyber espionage and cyber attack may
diverge, making the world free for cyber espionage.

7. CONCLUSIONS
In a crisis, countries will be looking at indicators of all sorts, not just from within
their network. But, as with all things cyberspace, intrusions into networks are likely
to garner greater importance over time. As long as the methods of cyber espionage
– notably implants – look like the methods of cyber attack, the discovery of one will
raise fears about the imminence of the other. Unfortunately for stability, the link
between the two is unpredictable. Discovery may or may not happen, but it is more
likely to happen in a crisis when systems are being scrubbed more diligently. Figuring
out when the intrusion took place (the earlier, the more benign) is a forensic art not
possessed by all, and without such information the target may assume the worst.
The target’s reaction, in turn, may be colored by its understanding of the security
dilemma in cyberspace. If so, the course of wisdom may be to counter with one’s own
signals, perhaps deterrent signals. Conversely, signaling through the manipulation of
cyber espionage traces likely offers less fidelity than other signaling methods, which
themselves have often been misread.
The lesson is to consider what message you want your cyber espionage to carry if
and when it is discovered. If you do not want to inflame tensions, double down on
operational security, but do not assume success. Thus, also avoid adding military
targets to spy on when in crisis, or at least approach them with techniques that
look very different from those used to set up cyber attacks. If you are brandishing
capabilities or signaling intent, generate a narrative that anticipates discovery. But
think this through beforehand.
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Abstract: For all the focus on cyberspace as a source of security threats and a domain
of military operations, there has been little progress on establishing a consistent
approach to describing what constitutes cyberspace. Dozens of definitions of the term
“cyberspace” have been developed, but consensus on its essential attributes has yet
to be achieved. Similarly, a number of different models have been offered to describe
cyberspace in terms of layers, such as the physical, logical and cyber persona layers
used in US Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations. This paper argues that
cyberspace as a label for a domain should not be confused with the individual networks
– some interconnected (“open”) and some relatively isolated (“closed”) – involved in
military operations. As illustrated by the STEADFAST COBALT exercise, military
operations often involve a complex set of networks. The paper then uses the example of
the Internet to illustrate the need to take a topographical approach – one that identifies
the features of the objects or entities and their structural relationships – to enable
effective military operations. This more detailed topographical view of the Internet is
used to illustrate how cyberspace considerations relate to existing operational doctrine
such as concepts from the operational environment (Joint Operational Area and Area
of Interest). Some considerations fit well within this framework. Others require some
adaptation, such as shifting some responsibilities to a centralized and persistent
function such as the Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC) being established by
NATO. Others fall outside military control and are better addressed through civilmilitary cooperation. This example also illustrates how precision in describing the
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composition of cyberspace is essential if military operations in and through cyberspace
are to develop into a mature discipline with a solid base of concepts, terminology,
techniques, tactics and procedures.
Keywords: cyberspace, cyberspace operations, cyberspace topography

1. INTRODUCTION
For all the words that have been written about cyberspace, the lack of a consistent
definition and approach to describing it remains one of the biggest obstacles to
achieving an effective foundation upon which to advance the state of theory and
practice. When the NATO heads of state and government recognized cyberspace as a
domain of military operations at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, they managed to do so
without actually defining what cyberspace constitutes. While constructive ambiguity
might be a useful tool in political negotiations, it becomes an impediment when trying
to develop techniques, tactics and procedures for military operations.
The lack of precision in defining what cyberspace comprises undermines the
development of effective military responses to its threats and risks because it leads
to generalizations that are inaccurate at best and misleading at worst. In a 2015 paper
titled “On Cyberwarfare”, for example, Fred Schreier postulates five characteristics
that make cyberspace unique, including that “the cost of entry into cyberspace is
relatively cheap.” Because of this, he argues: “The resources and expertise required
to enter, exist in, and exploit cyberspace are modest compared to those required for
exploiting the land, sea, air, and space domains” (Scheier, 2015). This point about
the low cost of entry is often repeated in discussions of cyberspace and its security.
For example, the US Army’s most recent edition of one of its most basic doctrine
publications, Field Manual 3-1, Operations, states that:
Cyberspace is highly vulnerable for several reasons, including
ease of access, network and software complexity, lack of security
considerations in network design and software development, and
inappropriate user activity (US Army, 2017).
The official NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) does not yet offer
a definition of the term “cyberspace”. The US Department of Defense issued at
least twelve different definitions over the years before issuing its joint doctrine on
cyberspace operations in 2013 (Singer, 2014). In its list of cyber definitions, the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) has collected
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29 examples for “cyberspace”– some identical, some similar, some very different
(CCD COE, 2017). It is not surprising, then, that as significant a figure as General
Michael Hayden, who as Director of the National Security Agency and Director of
Central Intelligence was at the center of the initial development of US cyberspace
operational capabilities, has written that: “Rarely has something been so important
and so talked about with less clarity and less apparent understanding….” (Hayden,
2011).

2. CYBERSPACE, NETWORKS AND
CYBERSPACE LITTORALS
One of the basic misunderstandings of cyberspace is the assumption that it is
synonymous with the “global grid” of the Internet and public telecommunications
networks. By at least three orders of magnitude, the Internet is certainly the largest
instance of cyberspace. The Internet Protocol version 6 address space has the capacity
to encompass 2128 addresses, or something on the order of ten million trillion times
the total number of grains of sand on all the beaches in the world. It has also reached
many more users than any other network ever developed. It is estimated that, as of
mid-2017, over 50% of the world’s population are able to access the Internet (World
Internet Users and 2017 Population Stats, 2017).
While the Internet is certainly the largest network in cyberspace, it is not the only one.
There are still many networks that do not interconnect with the Internet. Closed networks
such as classified intelligence, law enforcement and military networks are perhaps the
most obvious examples. Others include such closed networks as that operated by the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to provide
secure messaging to support international financial transactions. In discussions of
the application of international law to military operations in cyberspace, such as the
Tallinn Manual 2.0, “public, internationally and openly accessible” networks, such
as the Internet, are explicitly distinguished from “closed military” networks, in part
because this distinction can be important, for example, in determining the appropriate
rules of engagement (Schmitt, 2016). Further, as Dror Kenett and his colleagues have
written, “In most real-world systems an individual network is one component within a
much larger complex multi-level network”– a network within a network of networks
(Kenett, et al., 2014).
Each of these networks of networks is an instance of cyberspace. Within a single
network there is, at least in principle, the possibility of end-to-end connections: the
ability to transfer data, enable transactions, disseminate information, or, from the
standpoint of cyberspace operations, create effects. The sum of all the networks that
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exist equates to what is referred to as cyberspace in conceptual discussions, but it
quickly becomes problematic to make assertions that there are characteristics – such
as ease of access – that apply universally across all known networks. Ease of access
may be a characteristic of the Internet, but it is certainly not a characteristic of a highly
secure network and largely isolated network such as SWIFT.
This distinction between cyberspace as a label for a domain of military operations and
individual networks as particular instances of cyberspace is no different from how
the term domain has been applied in the context of air, land and maritime operations.
While the Earth is wrapped in an atmospheric blanket we refer to as air or aerospace,
much of it is divided into airspaces (plural) that are under some level of control –
usually national – for such purposes as air safety and national security. Armies concern
themselves with land operations, but these must always be tailored to the conditions
of a particular location (desert, mountain or jungle). And even the simple distinction
between surface and subsurface has profound implications for maritime operations.
Indeed, the term “waterspace management” is specifically used for the coordination
between submarine and anti-submarine operations.
The need to recognize that cyberspace is more than just the Internet is of critical
importance when it comes to planning, organizing and carrying out military operations.
In a complex, communications-intensive coalition operation such as that simulated in
STEADFAST COBALT – NATO’s annual command and control (C2) interoperability
exercise – myriad networks, information systems and communications transmission
systems are employed. These networks include NATO’s unclassified Intranet and
its classified network as well as the national equivalents for most of the coalition.
The classified networks are then federated through a mission network as a primary
interoperability and C2 environment. In addition, the operation will often employ
other classified networks handling intelligence or other sensitive data.
The information systems for these operations range from what are termed “core
services” – electronic mail, websites, collaboration and office automation – to
functional services such as Common Operational Picture and Order of Battle
managers. Numerous support applications, such as logistics, movement and spectrum
management and external communications tools, such as public affairs, strategic
communications and social media, will also be involved. These information systems,
along with voice and video traffic, are connected through transmission systems that
include both wired and wireless media. Wireless communications span radio frequency
bands reaching from VLF (Very Low Frequency) through HF (High Frequency)
and VHF (Very High Frequency) to UHF (Ultra High Frequency) and SHF (Super
High Frequency). And no military operation today can be carried out without heavy
reliance on Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services such as the Global
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Positioning System (GPS), almost entirely carried over portions of a very crowded
radio spectrum.
If one looks at the networks at static military facilities, this complexity only increases.
The number of networks and information systems in static facilities, as well as the
variety of classifications and handling controls of the information they support,
typically exceeds that in deployed operations, if only because of the much wider
range of functions supported. Some of these are directly connected to the Internet
and some are “air-gapped” – isolated from the Internet and other networks through
a combination of physical separation, personnel clearances, classification, handling
restrictions and encryption. Fewer and fewer military organizations, however, are
finding it possible to operate effectively with completely isolated networks, and
the pressure to share information is driving them to close the “air gaps” by means
of security mechanisms such as guards, gateways, diodes, or encryption, thereby
introducing potential vulnerabilities.
Many of the networks, information systems and transmission systems used in deployed
operations are anchored through reachback links to these static facilities, which are
themselves linked through numerous wide area networks, operating at different levels
of classification. Here again, some of these wide area networks are connected to the
Internet, directly or indirectly, and some operate over dedicated transmission systems.
Because dedicated radio and cable transmission systems tend to play a much smaller
role in the interconnection of static facilities than they do in deployed operations, most
wide area network connections between static facilities are reliant on commercial
leased circuits or tunneled IP services.
Every network also connects to what Paul Withers has termed “cyberspace littorals”
– the places where individual instances of cyberspace meet other domains (Withers,
2015). These cyberspace littorals include: the physical infrastructure, including fences,
buildings, gates and transportation networks, within which any equipment providing
the cyberspace resides; the radio frequency spectrum through which the cyberspace
transmissions are carried; the critical infrastructures such as electrical power and water
that support the equipment and its supporting personnel; the cyber-physical systems
used to control critical infrastructures, force protection systems, industrial systems
and even cars and trucks; and finally, the cognitive dimension of decision-making,
doctrine, perceptions and even the attitudes shaped through mass and social media.
The term “littoral” should be familiar to military personnel from its use in describing
the zone in which the responsibilities of land and maritime forces converge in such
operations as amphibious assaults. Applying this term to cyberspace helps to identify
those areas in which the responsibilities of cyberspace operators converge with
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those of existing military disciplines such as physical security, force protection, area
defense, electronic warfare and psychological operations (PSYOPS). It can be useful
in better understanding the roles a particular network plays in a military operation
and in determining how it can be defended. Indeed, protection of the electromagnetic
littoral through spectrum management and electronic countermeasures, for example,
can be more critical to the success of a deployed operation that is heavily dependent on
radio and satellite communications than any combination of cyber security measures.
In the same way, understanding an adversary’s cyberspace littorals can help identify
effective ways to exploit or disrupt an adversary’s use of cyberspace (although this
paper does not address offensive considerations).

3. THE TOPOGRAPHY OF ONE INSTANCE OF
CYBERSPACE: THE INTERNET
Accurately identifying and understanding the characteristics of any particular network
as an instance of cyberspace requires a closer look at its topography – the features
of its objects or entities and their structural relationships (Merriam-Webster, 2018).
What networks connect to it? Where and how do they connect? How big is it? What
types of communications and transactions does it support? And what are the specific
features of its littorals? Although the Internet is just one of the networks involved in
a military operation, an overview of its topography provides useful insights into how
it can be approached in the context of a military operation. It also reveals aspects that
military operations are ill-prepared – and arguably ill-suited – to address.
Let us consider, then, the Internet as it might be employed in support of an operation
in which a NATO command element and a coalition of forces from NATO and
partner nations deploy to an operational theater under the mandate of an operational
plan approved by the North Atlantic Council. As with the STEADFAST COBALT
exercise, classified networks are still the primary networks employed to support
NATO operations. Indeed, for these operations, the reliance on classified networks
remains perhaps the single most effective protection against not only conventional
military threats, but also threats from the Internet. As standard practice, however, the
NATO Unclassified network, which is connected to the Internet through managed
gateways hosted in static NATO command structure facilities, is extended to support
the NATO command element and eligible parts of national forces. Many nations do
much the same, deploying equipment forward to enable access to one or more national
networks that are also connected to the Internet.
So, the Internet, the direct and indirect dependencies of his mission on it, and
the resulting risks are all considerations for the operational commander. From a
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topographical standpoint, every device that can connect to the Internet – directly or
indirectly – shares access to a common space defined by an Internet Protocol address
(whether version 4 or version 6) and the core Internet link, internet, transport and
application protocols (IETF, 1989; IETF, 1989). This is the common plane or elevation
(to use a topographical term) on which all Internet-connected devices converge.
This is the part of the Internet for which ease of access is indeed its most salient
characteristic, and it is understandably the space in which vulnerabilities and attacks
that exploit them are most frequently experienced.
As has often been noted, these protocols were designed primarily for fault tolerance
and not for trustworthiness or the presence of malicious actors. Consequently, it
is also the space where most cyber security efforts are focused. With the growing
sophistication of the threats (as one recent Cisco (2016) report puts it: “the time of
amateur hackers is long over, and hacking is now an organized crime or state-sponsored
event”), however, some in the field of cyber security are arguing that their goal must
shift from intrusion prevention to intrusion tolerance – to what has been called the
“assume breach” paradigm (Cisco, 2016; Pompon, 2016). While this approach may
be new to the Internet, military personnel will recognize it as an example of operating
in a contested environment.
Every point of interconnection between information systems supporting military
operations and the Internet is a point of exposure to such attacks. Even if such
interconnections are minimized or eliminated, these measures do not address the extent
to which the Internet has become embedded into most individuals and organizations in
the developed world – any of which can, directly or indirectly, represent a dependency
for the operation. As Dan Geer has put it, “If […] you are dependent on those who are
dependent on the Internet, then so are you” (Geer, 2013).
The risks arising from the use of the Internet in industrial control systems (ICS) and
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to manage critical national
infrastructure such as electrical power generation and distribution is of growing
concern for military operations. Combat and direct support units typically bring their
own critical infrastructure in the form of power generation, water treatment, field
medical units and other support functions when they deploy. However, this level of
autonomy is rare at the reachback command and support facilities to which they are
connected, and even the autonomy of deployed units is constrained if this reachback
support is disrupted for more than a short time.
If one digs into the Internet below the link layer and looks at the next layers down –
what in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model are referred to as the data link
layer and the physical layer – ease of access can no longer be taken for granted. Access

129

to traffic at these layers requires access to the physical transport medium, meaning the
radio frequency signal or telecommunication cable carrying the data. It requires the
attacker to be within the range of the WiFi access points or to have physical access to
the actual cable plant of a local area network or to the cabling carrying traffic across
the wide area network through the services of telecommunications providers. The first
two – access to WiFi networks and local cable plants – are well within the control of
most military commanders. While WiFi vulnerabilities are well known and frequently
exploited, so are relatively cheap and effective methods to defend against common
threats. However, WiFi availability remains problematic, as WiFi jammers can be
easily purchased or manufactured, unless the commander can assure the physical
security of all space within jamming range.
Most of the physical transport media carrying Internet wide area traffic, on the
other hand, lies outside a commander’s control. For short-term deployed operations
this is not an issue, because any extension of Internet access to the theater is likely
carried over military radio or satellite communications links rather than leased lines.
These links are typically protected against a wide range of threats through the use of
encryption and anti-jamming mechanisms.
For static facilities, however, the risks arising from dependence on external
telecommunications infrastructure are a fact of life, frequently demonstrated
through the phenomenon known as “backhoe fade” – damage to underground
telecommunications cabling caused by construction equipment. In its 2016 Damage
Incident Reporting Tool (DIRT) Analysis and Recommendations Report, for example,
the Common Ground Alliance (2017) reported that nearly 130,000 events (breaks or
damage to telecommunications cabling) occurred in the United States and Canada.
The potential to exploit or disrupt submarine telecommunications cables is one that
has long been known to, and used by, nation states with sufficient technical and
operational means (Khazan, 2013).
The Internet also depends on the whole infrastructure of intermediaries involved
in any end-to-end communication: foremost, the applications, equipment, facilities
and personnel of the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Tier 1 (settlement-free
interconnection) network providers. The days of the “ISP in the garage” are long
past and the vast majority of Internet traffic is carried by a small number of Tier 1
providers. According to the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis, the top 10 Tier
1 providers support interconnections for over 4.8 billion IPv4 addresses (CAIDA,
2016). In addition, commercial data centers, including those supporting cloud services,
have already overtaken the size and capacity of private enterprise on-premise server
rooms and data centers, and an increasing number of public and military organizations
are shifting applications and services to external data centers and cloud providers.
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Finally, this infrastructure also provides much of the intermediary transport media for
long-distance telecommunications, which have largely been migrated from circuitswitched to IP transport services.
These providers operate the core physical infrastructure of the Internet that a Belfer
Center report recently described as “too connected to fail” – in other words, whose
failures could have widespread and potentially global impacts (Snyder, 2017),
although these providers have also recognized that high availability and effective
physical and personnel security are integral to a viable business model in a highly
competitive market. Top-end hyperscale data centers feature security and resiliency
measures that equal or exceed those of the most secure military command posts
(Branscombe, 2016). These data centers illustrate one of the paradoxes of security on
the Internet: while they are protected by many layers of physical security and maintain
low profiles to avoid drawing attention to themselves – that is, they fit the profile of
a “closed” network facility – many of the services they host are available to anyone
with an email address, a valid credit card and access to a device running the essential
IP protocol stack – in other words, they host “open” services.
Moving up from the core IP protocol layers of the Internet, one encounters the diverse
set of software applications – core and functional services – that play a role in a
military operation. Here again, ease of access varies widely and should not be taken
as a “one size fits all” measure. For those applications that are available as open source
or commercial off-the-shelf, the attack surface and the potential threats tend to be
closely related: the more people using an application, the better the chance that attacks
have been developed to exploit their vulnerabilities. For the many custom-developed
applications employed in military operations, on the other hand, access to source or
executable code, development and test documentation, and especially operationally
relevant data, is much more limited. However, the simple cost of developing custom
military software applications tends to prevent rigorous vulnerability testing.
Finally, moving up from the applications layer in the Internet, one leaves the manmade technical environment and enters what Withers calls the cognitive dimension:
decision-making, doctrine, norms, perceptions and attitudes. This is easily the most
complex dimension, but it is also not a new consideration for military operations. What
is new is the role the Internet plays in enabling access to the cognitive dimension,
both through new applications such as social media and streaming video and through
new outlets for old applications such as electronic mail, chat, news reporting and
psychological operations.
Even in the complex cognitive dimension, however, ease of access is neither universal
nor something that can safely be taken for granted. At the simplest level, language is
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still an effective barrier to entry. English might be the predominant language on the
Internet, but it still ranks behind Mandarin and Spanish in number of native speakers.
Context is another: although spearphishing still succeeds in fooling some users to
click on links in untrustworthy emails, it would be much more difficult to convince a
military operator to trust an email pretending to be a fragmentary order (FRAGO), if
only because such communications are usually confined to military message handling
systems. Finally, just because there is content on the Internet, it does not mean that
anyone is looking at it. With over 1.3 billion websites alone, let alone social media
services aimed at mobile users, there are a lot of opportunities to miss the audience.
Revelations about Russian manipulation of social media and its role in the 2016 US
presidential election have certainly demonstrated how effective social media can be
in advancing state aims. A recent report from Freedom House stated that: “Online
manipulation and disinformation tactics played an important role in elections in at
least 18 countries over the past year” (Freedom House, 2017). Skillfully positioned
and executed, social media can be highly effective. Just six Facebook pages intended
by Russian operators to sway US voter perceptions stimulated over 18 million
interactions with other Facebook users before being shut down (McCarthy, 2017). As
Michael Schmitt, editor of the Tallinn Manual and Tallinn Manual 2.0, has written,
the Russian example illustrates the potential for states to exploit “grey zones” – areas
where “international law principles and rules… are poorly demarcated or are subject
to competing interpretations” (Schmitt, 2017).

4. THE INTERNET AND THE
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Part of the task of integrating cyberspace as a domain of military operations is that of
fitting into an existing framework of operational doctrine. One aspect of this doctrine
is that of the operational environment. NATO’s basic doctrine for military operations,
AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, sets out the operational
environment in terms of areas and boundaries. In particular, the Joint Operational Area
(JOA) is defined as the “temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR), in which a designated joint force commander plans and executes
a specific mission at the operational level” (NATO, 2011 p. 1-23). While AJP-3(B)
recognizes that “the operational environment is expanding, becoming more dispersed
and non-linear”, the intent of the definition of the JOA remains to ensure that all
elements of a joint force “have a common understanding of its principal boundaries”
(NATO, 2011 p. 1-22).
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AJP-3(B) also establishes the concept of an Area of Interest (AOI), which it defines
as “the area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or
planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility,
and areas adjacent thereto” (NATO, 2011 p. 1-23). These operational environment
constructs have traditionally been defined in geographic terms and are intended to
help the commander and operational planners to bound the area within which forces
are employed and effects achieved. The operational environment also helps delineate
the boundaries of command and control authorities and the rules of engagement.
Taking the topographical overview of the Internet as it relates to a NATO operation
as above, there are aspects that fit well within the existing concept of the operational
environment. The actual equipment used to access these Internet-connected networks
and the troops supporting it in the operational theater – the cyber boots on the ground
– clearly fall within the JOA. The equipment is an asset that must be protected as any
other physical asset belonging to the forces in theater, and the troops are under the
joint force commander’s force protection responsibilities. In the same manner, the
joint force commander would be expected to exercise operational control to ensure the
availability, confidentiality and integrity of the information processed by these assets,
whether against kinetic weapons, electronic warfare capabilities or cyber effects. This
responsibility also extends to the data link and physical layers described above, so
cabling and WiFi signals must be protected as well.
Interconnection to the Internet, however, is a primary reason for deploying this
equipment to the theatre, and the gateways in the reachback facilities that provide
those interconnections likely fall outside the geographical boundaries of the JOA.
These anchor points and gateways may also fall outside the joint force commander’s
direct operational control. NATO is not alone in assigning the responsibility to run
the information systems and networks supporting static military facilities to a civilian
organization outside a direct military chain of command. For these reasons, the
command and control (C2) arrangements between the joint force commander and the
organization(s) providing his reachback support can be complicated and problematic.
The commercial service providers responsible for the interconnections between these
gateways are certainly both outside the JOA and outside the commander’s operational
control, as are the vast number of Internet users, devices, applications, data and
services and the physical infrastructure supporting them that lie on the other side of
the NATO and national static gateways. This also applies to most, if not all, of the
Internet-connected critical infrastructures that might be supporting the operation of
the static command and support facilities.
Given the prevalence of threats against the Internet and the networks that interconnect
with it, it should also be clear that all of these aspects fall within what NATO doctrine
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would consider the joint force commander’s AOI. Each presents a greater or lesser
risk to the success of the operation. Understanding and managing such risks, however,
presents a significant challenge for a deployed commander. The already difficult
task of situational awareness in cyberspace is further complicated by limitations on
bandwidth to the theater and on the tools and expertise of the analysts in theater.
This is one reason why NATO, following the example of numerous nations, is
centralizing its support for cyberspace situational awareness and operational planning
support in the Cyberspace Operations Center (CyOC). It is far more effective to
concentrate the technical, intelligence and operational expertise required for a credible
cyberspace situational awareness capability than to attempt to replicate them in one
or more operational theaters. However it is organized, this capability – even given
the limitations of existing tools, models and data sources – is essential for effective
military operations. Another reason is that Internet threats and their risks to operations
often arise outside the JOA, not just in terms of geographical boundaries but also
in terms of timeframe. Indeed, some of the most significant risks arising from the
Internet are those we refer to as advanced persistent threats. Establishing a centralized
and persistent situational awareness, planning and coordination capability is perhaps
the single most important way in which existing NATO operational doctrine is being
adapted to accommodate the unique aspects of cyberspace as a domain.
The delineation of the operational environment geometry also needs to extend to the
littorals of the Internet-connected networks supporting an operation. Protection against
physical and electronic threats has already been mentioned and is generally within the
scope of established capabilities. Likewise, long-standing military practices developed
well before the rise of the Internet, such as the use of radio silence, minimize, visual
signaling and operational security (OPSEC), can still be of use to mitigate or avoid
risks presented by Internet-based threats.
The cognitive dimension, however, still presents challenges. Clearly within the JOA
and the commander’s operational control are the troops in theater: their decisions,
perceptions and actions, and how they communicate them, including over the Internet,
are his responsibility. In the same way, he is responsible for how the joint force
influences the perceptions of the adversary and affected populations, which is why
psychological operations, information operations and strategic communications are
integral to military operations. The Internet represents both a medium for conveying
his messages and for assessing perceptions among targeted audiences.
As the examples of state-sponsored manipulation of social media demonstrate,
however, Internet-based threats are emerging that are difficult to fit into the
traditional concept of the operational environment geometry. Indeed, it could be
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argued that military operations are not the appropriate mechanisms to target what
are purely civilian objects (Harrison-Dinniss, 2015); but the key problem in applying
the operational environment geometry is that these threats currently fall into what
Schmitt calls the “grey zone,” where boundaries of operational control are informed
and guided by international law. As Schmitt has put it: “The brighter the redlines of
international law as applied to cyber activities, the less opportunity states will have to
exploit grey zones in ways that create instability.” (Schmitt, 2017) And the easier it
will be to delineate how to draw the lines of military responsibility and interest.
The closed networks required to support an operation tend to have far fewer cyber
defence considerations for a commander than the Internet. The example of the
Internet’s topography is offered, however, to illustrate that it is certainly possible
to sort these considerations into three rough categories: those within the JOA and
under operational control; those within the AOI and within some level of control, if
indirect; and those that fall well outside both military authority and the means of any
commander to control. By sorting the cyberspace considerations for an operation into
these three categories, commanders can begin to identify where effective military
response options exist and where they do not.
Those considerations that are within the JOA and within the commander’s operational
control are those for which existing doctrine is most suitable. Considerations in
this category must clearly take first priority for operational planning and situational
awareness. This is the area where planners need most to be informed by intelligence
about the physical, electronic and cyber threats to be expected in theater. This is also
where the commander needs to assess the value of such tried and true practices as the
use of radio silence, alternate communications and minimize to mitigate or avoid the
risks these threats might present. Finally, this is where the protection – or vulnerability
– of cyberspace littorals can have the greatest direct impact on the operation.
The next category covers those considerations that are within the commander’s AOI
and within some type of C2 arrangement, however problematic. From a planning
standpoint, considerations in this category are better addressed by a central and
strategically-placed function such as the CyOC for the reasons noted above: theaterbased limitations (bandwidth, tools and personnel) and the fact that many of these
considerations derive from conditions that are persistent and not tightly coupled to the
specifics of the operation, and which likely span multiple operations.
The third category covers those that are within the AOI but outside operational control,
even via C2 arrangements. Most of these considerations, such as the protection of
critical infrastructures, the security of Tier 1 Internet providers and hyperscale data
centers, and state manipulation of social media and other examples of what Schmitt
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terms the “grey zone” are wholly outside the military span of control. These challenges
can only be addressed through political, diplomatic, legal or regulatory channels.
Such liaison falls well outside the current scope of Civil-Military Co-operation
(CIMIC), which is typically focused on liaison between the joint force commander
and civilian authorities in theater. Another important adaptation of existing doctrine
to accommodate cyberspace may be in developing persistent versions of CIMIC
between centralized military capabilities like the CyOC and their civil counterparts.

5. CONCLUSIONS
There has been no shortage of sweeping generalizations in much that has been written
on cyberspace operations and cyber security. As NATO and national militaries work
to establish cyberspace as an operational domain, precision is essential to developing
a mature discipline with a solid base of concepts, terminology, techniques, tactics
and procedures. One such precision is to recognize that operations in the domain of
cyberspace always involve specific networks of networks, of which the Internet is
only one. Another is to recognize that the characteristics, threats and risks associated
with any particular network vary depending on which aspect of its topography
is considered. The ease of access that exists on one plane or elevation, such as the
common core set of Internet Protocols, might not characterize another, such as that of
submarine telecommunications cables.
This precision is also important to integrating cyberspace into existing doctrine.
Cyberspace considerations that fit well within existing constructs such as the JOA and
operational control can, for the most part, be addressed by the operational commander
in theater. Others are better addressed by a central cyberspace operational planning and
situational awareness function such as the CyOC being established in NATO. Finally,
there are considerations that either fall clearly outside the scope of military control, or
for which such demarcation is still difficult. For these, effective mechanisms for civilmilitary co-operation need to be established. Such a framework can channel efforts
in a practical way and help speed the process not only of implementing cyberspace as
an operational domain but of better defending the Alliance against the threats arising
from the Internet and the other networks it depends upon.
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Abstract: Real or potential connections between infrastructure of different security
levels, from relatively unprotected individual users up to interfaces with critical
national infrastructure, have made cyberspace a highly contested and congested
domain. But operating conditions within this domain strongly favour malicious
actors over legitimate operators seeking to provide security and protect systems and
information. Technical capabilities to establish dominance and cause damage in this
domain are widely distributed, but legal and ethical constraints prevent legitimate
actors from using them to their full potential.
Within this context, net neutrality presents a limiting factor on the capability of legitimate
actors to respond to harmful activity in cyberspace whose common aim is to install and
uphold a technical imbalance. Under the principle of net neutrality, each data packet
must be transmitted with equal priority, irrespective of its source, destination, content
or purpose. This is disadvantageous to cyber defence. Comparisons to jungle or arctic
warfare, where operating conditions are neutral and degrade the performance of each
combatant side equally, are invalid, as malicious operators are capable of technically
manipulating data traffic to their favour. While both malicious and legitimate actors
may have comparable capabilities, legitimate actors are bound to legal and political
restrictions, making them immobile in several cyber warfare scenarios. Transferring
the principles of net neutrality to real life scenarios corresponds to depriving military,
police and emergency operators from any privilege that allows them to respond to an
incident – in effect, depriving them of their blue lights and emergency powers even in
severe incidents targeting critical infrastructure that may threaten civilian lives.
This paper investigates the potential opportunities and challenges of an adjustment
to the principle of net neutrality to facilitate defensive action by legitimate actors;
how this adjustment could contribute to regaining control in congested cyber domains
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in the case of national or international cyber incidents; and the risks associated.
The different ways of dealing with net neutrality in cyber defence situations in the
EU, UK and Russia are compared. Particular focus is put on the organisations and
capabilities needed to establish technical sovereignty in multi-domain networks,
including consideration of the acceptability of outsourcing the task of upholding
cyber sovereignty to external institutions.
Keywords: net neutrality, cyber defence, cyber security, net regulation

1. INTRODUCTION
The long-running debate over net neutrality gained unprecedented prominence
in public attention during the autumn of 2017 as United States Communications
Commission (FCC) chairman Ajit Pai proposed the repeal of policies dating from 2015
that safeguarded net neutrality in the US. The public discussion on net neutrality was
primarily concerned with potential abuse and the prospect of forming and protecting
positions within specific markets such as the telecommunications sector; a situation
exacerbated in the United States in particular by limited consumer choice resulting
from a small number of major telecommunications companies already enjoying
near-monopoly status.1 This threat would not only affect the telecommunications
market and its service providers, but also any other market or services depending
on communication through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) – in effect, any area of
modern business. The most prominent and intensively discussed examples of services
which faced severe disruption were social media and streaming platforms, both of
which derive clear benefits from neutral treatment of Internet traffic because of their
data-heavy nature and vulnerability to any increase in the cost of data transfer.
It is likely that the involvement of these platforms in the debate, augmented by their
substantial presence in everyday civil life, ignited the mainly emotion-driven debate
on the ‘freedom of the Internet’. This topic rapidly eclipsed the technical aspects of
net neutrality overhaul. Comparisons were often made to regulations on water and
electricity prices. The suggestion that Internet access is an essential service, and
therefore should be protected from open market forces, illustrated how net neutrality
discussions focus on matters of principle while neglecting technical aspects that
challenge a universally connected, digital society.
The concept of net neutrality has predominantly been associated with constraining ISPs
from throttling transmission rates and limiting Internet access for end-users. However,
1
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this article will consider how net neutrality influences the way data is transferred in
cyberspace in a number of other ways. The abolition of net neutrality principles in one
country or more provides both opportunities and challenges, affecting the nature of
both offensive and defensive computer network operations (CNO) during peacetime
as well as overt hostilities.
Real or potential connections between infrastructures of different security levels are
established through networking devices and the individuals or organisations that own
them. Security levels ranging from relatively unprotected Internet of Things (IoT)
appliances, through individual user devices and interfaces up to critical national
infrastructure may easily and unnoticeably become interconnected, rendering
cyberspace a highly contested and congested domain. But operating conditions within
this domain strongly favour malicious actors over legitimate operators, especially
as security standards may be legally binding but not technically enforced. This is
also observable for net neutrality principles: it is common practice to provide an
equal level of Internet service availability to end-users by ISPs and legislation may
require compliance with according policies, but there is no technical enforcement.
Consequently, malicious actors can abuse net neutrality principles through different
attack vectors and use it to hide their actions. While the technical capabilities to
establish dominance in the cyber domain are widely distributed, legal and ethical
constraints prevent legitimate actors from utilising them to their full potential.
A key common aspect to many CNO attacks is establishing, maintaining and protecting
privileged access to systems or processes. Cyber attacks can seek to establish an
imbalance between the attacker and the defenders in terms of prioritised access to
data, components or networks. As such, net neutrality presents a limiting factor on
the capability of legitimate actors to respond to harmful activity in cyberspace. Under
the principle of net neutrality, each data packet should be transmitted with equal
priority, irrespective of its source, destination, content or purpose. This means that
cyber defence, or responses to critical incidents, will not receive any prioritisation
over ‘normal’ traffic, and consequently present an advantage to an attacker seeking to
isolate the target of the attack. However, the ability to respond to cyber attacks from
any location is crucial to efforts by NATO member states to set up cyber defence units
capable of cooperating in live cyber operations.2 Officials must be aware that net
neutrality principles may compromise this effort unless other methods are established
to uphold cyber dominance among allies. Examples of such alternative methods
may range from dedicated private networks, through hidden network entry points, to
organisational and administrative measures.
In effect, interdiction of remote cyber defence efforts by an attacker poses an analogous
problem in cyberspace to hostile actors seeking to isolate areas of planned operations
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by means of advanced anti-access and area denial (A2AD) systems, preventing
access by NATO reinforcements seeking to defend them. But while in air, sea or land
operations, friendly forces can take advance steps to ensure privileged access in time
of crisis,3 in cyberspace the principles of net neutrality prevent any such pre-emption.
While communications transferred through separate networks independent of civilian
ISPs are unlikely to be affected (such as would be expected in military operations),
CNO against critical infrastructure and cyber espionage have already been conducted
through the public Internet, open for access to all.4 With critical infrastructure a likely
target in cyber warfare, legitimate cyber actors must be capable of effectively and
remotely counteracting sophisticated cyber attacks.5 This remote access to attacked
network components could be enabled by physically separate communication lines
as physical backdoors to the network (economically unfeasible in almost all cases)
or allowing data traffic to be tunnelled. However, the latter does not guarantee that
communication is possible in a congested domain as components and routes may be
inoperative or compromised. Prioritising traffic through ISPs, by contrast, could allow
network administrators to identify the tunnelled communication and install in advance
packet-based rules that enable critical communication even during attacks.
Comparisons to jungle or arctic warfare, where operating conditions are neutral
and degrade the performance of each combatant side equally, are invalid since the
operating conditions in cyberspace can be adapted by one side or the other. Skilled
cyber actors are capable of ensuring that their data traffic is prioritised or that the
opponent’s traffic is downgraded or blocked. Additionally, the opponent in a cyber
warfare scenario may not only target military components but also potentially attack
civilian critical infrastructures, forcing governments to respond immediately to
ensure the safety of their citizens and prevention of crippling or catastrophic damage.
Therefore, transferring the principles of net neutrality to real life scenarios would rather
correspond to depriving military, police and emergency operators of any privilege that
allows them to respond promptly to an incident – in effect, taking away their blue
lights and emergency powers even in military operations or severe incidents targeting
critical infrastructure that may threaten civilian lives. A more appropriate analogy
would be a car chase where criminals can run red lights and set up roadblocks, but the
police must still observe traffic rules and speed limits.
Net neutrality is currently not technically enforced, nor has it ever been. There are
no central authorities capable of monitoring and enforcing net neutrality on global
networks. Additionally, even when legislation demands the enforcement of net
neutrality policies, no guarantees can be given once traffic is routed outside national
3
4
5
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borders. The management of data traffic has always been the responsibility of
telecommunication organisations and network administrators. Routing rules based on
packet origins, content, frequency and general network load are common practice in
most networks. This has not been a problem as long as fast communication appeared
cheap and unlimited, and large-scale cyber attacks remained the preserve of sciencefiction novels or far-fetched ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’ predictions. While some corporate
entities may very plausibly have the intention of abusing the new regulatory situation
in the United States for financial benefit, there is also a need for a rational and problemoriented discussion on how to handle network traffic management in the future with
the rising challenges of cyber warfare in mind.
Hence the remainder of this paper investigates the potential opportunities and
challenges of an adjustment to the principle of net neutrality to facilitate defensive
action by legitimate actors; how adjustments may allow actors to gain control in
congested cyber domains in the case of national or international cyber incidents; and
risks associated with weakening of net neutrality principles. The different ways of
dealing with net neutrality in the EU, UK and Russia are considered. Particular focus
is put on the organisations and capabilities needed to establish technical sovereignty
in multi-domain networks, including consideration of the acceptability of outsourcing
the task of upholding cyber sovereignty to external institutions.

2. NET NEUTRALITY IN THE EU, UK AND RUSSIA
This section explores principles under which ISPs may legitimately interfere with
network traffic by technical means in order to illustrate the opportunities and challenges
of weakening net neutrality overall. Three different regulatory environments (the EU,
UK and Russia) are compared to illustrate the wide variations in philosophy and
enforcement between different jurisdictions.

A. Net Neutrality

In simplistic terms, net neutrality means that network providers must treat all
network traffic equally and may not interfere with data traffic in a way that affects
the traffic of selected parties only. Net neutrality is a set of principles, not a technical
implementation. In fact, due to the need of modern networks to be able to cope with
data transmission errors and delays, most communication protocols are designed to
deal with limitations without end-users noticing. In other words, their design renders
them capable of hiding net neutrality violations. This is part of what opens network
communications to abuse in hidden cyber operations and creates the huge imbalance
between legitimate actors bound to net neutrality on the one hand, and malicious
actors with no effective constraint by the rule of law on the other.
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Computer networks consist of components, which in turn have physical and logical
entities, all of which can communicate between themselves. In order to be able to
connect components of completely different architectures, purposes, languages and
communication types, the ISO OSI standard was developed.6 This is a conceptual
model that defines how ‘data’ is organised and communicated on different abstraction
layers, moving from physical representations to logical units. An ISP provides the core
physical components within a network7 and as a result has access to the complete OSI
stack. ISPs are capable of interfering with traffic on any layer: cutting the physical
connection, dropping packets, filtering for services and (unencrypted) content in data,
and more.
Net neutrality advocates have been concerned with ISPs throttling down transmission
rates, while their opponents put forward counter-arguments of innovation of better
bandwidth distribution techniques and networking technologies that are incompatible
with net neutrality principles. It is currently impossible to predict how ISPs will
handle traffic in the future if net neutrality principles are weakened, but the status quo
leads to educated guesses on future network management techniques, such as:
•

•

The pure ‘throttling’ of data traffic based on origin or destination is commonly
associated with dropping packets. By dropping packets, the quality of the
single connection may go down, while the overall bandwidth is improved:
the ISP regains some of its bandwidth by not servicing one of its customers.
Another way of gaining bandwidth is by queuing packets. Packets are not
‘lost’ but take longer to be delivered as they are not forwarded immediately.
Again, the ISP gains bandwidth by reducing processing time.

Selection of which traffic to interfere with may be based on packet, service or
content information. Depending on the type of information chosen, the interference
is performed on different layers of the network stack and may require additional
methods such as deep packet inspection (DPI). DPI has been associated particularly
with Internet censorship,8 but is also a common tool for cyber forensics and network
administration.
However, methods that alter bandwidth distribution merely by dropping or queuing
are not suitable to guarantee privileged data transmissions for selected customers or
services, as solutions exist to avoid dropping, queuing and DPI. The most prominent
example known to be adopted to avoid censorship (which is usually also based on
these methods) is the use of virtual private networks in combination with so-called
6
7
8
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‘onion routing’ networks such as the Tor network.9 It is therefore more than likely that
alternative methods will be used.
The relevance to cyber warfare lies in the fact that, in addition to simple destructive
potential, cyber attacks commonly serve the purpose either of gathering information or
of exerting power through the medium of the Internet. This can be through achieving
and demonstrating interdiction or malfunctioning of networks and their associated
services. While current attacks tend to aim at specific network components, it is likely
that future attacks will be directed against bandwidth distribution technologies.
Several already-common attack types include methods that abuse net neutrality
principles to ensure a larger portion of bandwidth is available to the attacker. This
provides a number of secondary effects for any botnet or distributed attack. It allows
an attacker to undertake further activities in parallel, unaffected by the ongoing attack
itself; it demonstrates power in the domain; it creates an impression of omnipresence
of the attacker; it hijacks the bandwidth of legitimate actors; it disables the attacked
components; and finally, and most significantly for the current discussion, it hampers
external interference by legitimate cyber defence actors as the attacked components
may become inaccessible.

B. EU

In September 2013, the European Commission published a draft set of regulations
for the telecommunications single market. This draft was heavily criticised for not
sufficiently addressing net neutrality regulations and for introducing differentiation
between ‘communications access’ and ‘specialised services access’ without specifying
these services adequately. The draft was adjusted and approved by the EU parliament
in April 2014.10
The adjusted draft specifically declares that Internet service access:
‘means a publicly available electronic communications service that provides
connectivity to the Internet in accordance with the principle of net neutrality,
and thereby connectivity between virtually all end points of the Internet,
irrespective of the network technology or terminal equipment used’.11
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Net neutrality is defined as the:
‘principle according to which all Internet traffic is treated equally, without
discrimination, restriction or interference, independently of its sender,
recipient, type, content, device, service or application’.12
Specialised services are allowed for that are:
‘provided over logically distinct capacity, relying on strict admission control,
offering functionality requiring enhanced quality from end to end, and that is
not marketed or usable as a substitute for Internet access service’.13
In other words, specialised services are considered as supplementary offers to Internet
access services. Examples of such services could be real time applications, sensory
data aggregations or distributed computing services.
Following heated discussion, the 2014 draft was further adjusted and approved in
November 2015 as EU Regulation 2015/2120.14 The guidelines for implementation
of the April 2014 draft no longer included the term ‘net neutrality’. ISPs are still
required to follow the ‘best effort’ principle, requiring all packets to be treated equally
(in other words, a core aspect of net neutrality). However, permission for ‘zero rating’
and a specification of ‘sufficient data traffic management’ methods have both been
criticised. Although violations of net neutrality principles through the use of DPI is
possible, several ISPs in EU states are known to use DPI in varying contexts. DPI is
known to be carried out by governments and their legitimate actors. The inspection
results are used for further processing, prosecution and surveillance.
Zero rating refers to the practice of not imposing additional costs for access to
selected online services, while all others incur such charges. The application of this
approach varies widely across Europe. The Netherlands enforced a strict net neutrality
policy, but at the other extreme, in Portugal ISPs offer a strictly limited connection
service with additional charges for access to a wide range of common applications.15
These charges are usually in the form of purchasing specific packages, named for
example ‘social’ or ‘music’, which include services selected by the ISP; the criteria
12

13
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for selection include the profitability of each service, since the service providers pay
a sum to the ISP for inclusion. The ‘social’ package can, therefore, include Facebook
and WhatsApp, while all other social media platforms are not available. The less
profitable services cannot be blocked by the ISP, since this would clearly violate net
neutrality principles, but they can be de facto excluded by pricing policies. This could,
for example, take the form of imposing an indirect cost penalty on users of Telegram
by ensuring that data transferred via that app counts against the user’s strictly limited
‘free’ quota, while WhatsApp data has a much higher limit as part of a package.
The ‘traffic management’ stipulation means that ISPs may adjust data flow rates,
for instance to avoid service disruption due to traffic overload. ISPs are reported
to have throttled throughput during evening hours (when most customers use their
streaming services) to ‘encourage’ users to stagger demand. Consequently, instead
of all customers starting to stream video at, for example, 8 p.m. they do so earlier or
later. This allows the ISP to avoid specific traffic peaks, and therefore economise on
investment in new hardware that would otherwise be necessary only during a oncea-day data throughput peak. However, this form of management has been criticised
as potentially offering a back door to abandoning net neutrality by preferring specific
services or traffic.

C. UK

In direct contrast to current developments in the US, the UK government has taken
a regulatory approach to ensuring that all UK homes and businesses should have a
minimum standard of access to high-speed Internet by 2020.16 This in itself, however,
does not currently prevent the UK’s leading ISPs from filtering and blocking Internet
content.
In 2014, the Enemies of the Internet annual report published by Reporters Without
Borders (RSF) listed the UK among the top 14 states where data traffic is monitored,
blocked or manipulated.17 Yet in its 2017 report to the European Commission on
compliance with net neutrality regulations, the UK communications regulator Ofcom
claimed that ‘there are no major concerns regarding the openness of the Internet in the
UK.’18 Those areas identified were minor concerns related primarily to choice of endusers’ terminal equipment and zero rating. This apparent contradiction derives from
limitations in the EU regulations. In addition to introducing ‘sufficient data traffic
16
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management’ and ‘specialised services’, the EU also leaves decisions on whether
actions are compliant with the regulations with national courts. As a result, while the
Commission may have drafted a regulation on the telecommunications single market
that seems to prohibit general filtering, blocking and monitoring of data packets due to
net neutrality considerations, in practice implementation of these regulations depends
on national jurisdiction. In other words, varying standards of net neutrality can be
applied that are still compliant with the EU Regulation and with national law. While
Ofcom followed the Commission’s regulatory guidelines, RSF applied an ideal image
of net neutrality not defined by the EU.
The fact that the landing points of several of the submarine cables that form the
backbone of the Internet, especially between Europe and the US, are in the UK is
particularly noteworthy. If European net neutrality standards are not carried across
into UK law on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, this will mean that the UK
is free to apply its own standards to a substantial proportion of the data that passes
between the United States and the EU. Unlike internal developments in the US, this
could have a direct effect on the uninterrupted throughput of packets intended for
delivery to Europe.

D. Russia

Russia has taken a significantly different approach to net neutrality and to privileging
defensive measures compared to the UK, Europe or the US.19 Most Russian ISPs
provide clients with cost-free access to certain websites and services, such as
Facebook, Vkontakte, Odnoklassniki, LiveJournal and Yandex Maps.20 But in
addition, governmental privilege is a significant factor in determining access. Many
government websites are free to access by law,21 and by contrast the government
has the legal and technical power to disrupt or entirely block access to other Internet
resources. According to Russian prosecutor-general Yuriy Chaika, by 2017 around
1,200 websites had been officially blocked under this legislation.22
In March 2017 legislation was reported to be under preparation under which Russian
courts would be able to punish both domestic and foreign corporations for failing
to comply with Russian law by ordering that access to their websites be slowed
down.23 The storage of Russian users’ data on Russian servers by foreign Internet
companies has been required by law since September 2015, when Law No. 242-FZ,
19
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adopted in 2014, came into force. Compliance with this localisation requirement by
Twitter24 and Snapchat25 has been claimed by the Russian communications regulator
Roskomnadzor but denied by the companies themselves, while Facebook is not yet
compliant and consequently is regularly threatened with a nationwide ban.26 According
to a November 2017 survey, Google, Apple, Alibaba, Viber, Gett, Uber and Microsoft
all rent Russian data centre space for the purpose of compliance.27
All of these measures are in accordance with a predominant view among Russian
government agencies, especially those concerned with national security, that the
Internet presents more of a threat than an opportunity. In April 2014, President
Vladimir Putin remarked that the Internet ‘came about as a special project of the CIA’
and implied that it continued to be a tool of the US government, and consequently
dangerous for Russia.28 In contrast with Western assumptions, Russian information
security preoccupations focus on the role not only of hostile code such as cyber
attacks, but also hostile content such as opinions or information which are detrimental
to the Russian state.29 President Putin has personally praised Chinese-style censorship
and defended it against criticism from digital rights advocates.30
But Russia’s plans to protect itself from the Internet go even further, and extend to
consideration of operating without access to global Internet services at all.31 This
scenario is variously presented by Russian government officials as either a voluntary
withdrawal by Russia – ‘pulling the plug’ – or being disconnected by the hostile West,
which according to one persistent Russian view, controls the Internet.32 President
Putin’s adviser on Internet affairs, German Klimenko, is a particular advocate of
Chinese-style Internet restrictions and preparing for possible total net withdrawal.33
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In March 2018, Klimenko announced that, after lengthy preparations, Russia was now
technically capable of removing itself from the global Internet.34
Russia’s security-driven approach to managing the Internet stands in stark contrast
to the Euro-Atlantic community, and the difference is instructive. We argue in this
paper that net neutrality as currently understood by the West is a potential handicap
for ensuring security and responding to cyber warfare actions. In Russia, this
challenge is well recognised and bound up with the perceived threat of free flow of
information across national borders, which for the West is an inalienable element of
how the Internet works. The result is that Russia has circumvented the net neutrality
challenge by changing the entire basis for Internet access, and making it conditional
on state interest. Any solution this extreme would be unpalatable and unworkable in
Western liberal democracies, being incompatible both with principles of freedom of
expression and with the greater independence of commercial entities including ISPs
outside Russia.

3. NET NEUTRALITY AND CYBER WARFARE
Recent net neutrality discussions have centred on censorship, Internet access and
traffic limitations. However, these discussions are too narrow and must be expanded
to more general considerations on data traffic management, which should be perceived
as a core element in future cyber warfare.

A. Net Neutrality in Attack Vectors

Malicious actors can abuse net neutrality to establish dominance through different
attack vectors, including DDoS, DrDoS and SYN-flood attacks.
DDoS-attacks use the fact that all incoming traffic is treated equally to create an
advantage for the attacker. All IT components have a limit to their processing
capabilities, and when legitimate requests to a component compete on an equal
basis with a flood of malicious traffic from bots, the component is overloaded and
becomes unable to reply. While this principle is a standard tactic, there are many
different ways of carrying out a DDoS-attack. In a distributed reflected DoS-attack
(DrDoS), the attacker hijacks (spoofs) the IP-address of its target and sends service
requests to servers (such as the DNS), asking them to reply to the spoofed IP. What
follows is a DDoS-attack with no attribution being possible and, depending on the
servers involved, that is impossible to block without self-inflicted damage. One of
the largest DDoS-attacks recorded to date was observed during March 2018 against
Github, causing a record-breaking data transfer rate of 1.35 Terabits per second using
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a modified DrDoS.35 In this scenario the attacker also relies on the fact that the target
will treat all data packets equally, even when not useful, not requested or identified as
potentially harmful.
One of the most basic, yet highly imbalanced methods to attack a network component
is a SYN flood attack. SYN flood attacks belong to the group of DoS-attacks that
abuse both the equal treatment of packets at the target’s side and the TCP handshake
protocol. To establish a TCP connection to the target (server-side) from the attacker
(client-side), a three-way handshake is initiated. The client sends a SYN-request
(synchronise) to the server, the server replies with a SYN-ACK (SYN-acknowledge)
and allocates resources for the awaited TCP connection. Usually, the client replies
with another ACK, which establishes the TCP connection, however, a malicious client
can withhold the final ACK. This leads to the server keeping the resources allocated
blocked until a timeout is reached. Depending on the servers’ configuration, the
allocated resources may make up a considerable proportion of the resources available
and the timeout may be excessively long. If this attack is combined with a distributed
approach, or if many SYN requests are started in parallel, the result is a DoS.

B. Imbalance of actors

Techniques for malicious actors to circumvent the legitimate control and regulation
of data are publicly available and used. Legitimate actors, by contrast, cannot demand
more bandwidth or privileged access from ISPs to create a power balance between
themselves and sophisticated attackers. In fact, even direct responses to an ongoing
attack may be problematic as in many cases attribution has to be examined and verified
by juridical institutions to make any actions against the source legitimate. Legitimate
actions therefore often focus on re-routing mechanisms or involve large redundancy
set-ups to cope with outages. However, these fail-safe environments are necessarily
limited and bound to the number of fall-back components integrated.
Currently, net neutrality places still further constraints on the technical capabilities
of legitimate cyber actors. When considered strictly, net neutrality principles prevent
live monitoring of suspicious traffic and hinder any attempts of attribution through
the ISP, even though the ISP is often the first to notice unusual cyber activities. Traffic
blocking is also against net neutrality standards, even if it is obvious to the technical
expert that the traffic is involved in an ongoing attack. To resolve this issue, ISPs
have begun to attempt to contact the initiators of such traffic; a tedious, costly and
potentially fruitless venture.36
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Discussing net neutrality in terms of traffic management and control inevitably
leads to the insight that net neutrality protects both ordinary users and actors with
hostile intent. While the rights and protection of innocent users should not be reduced
unnecessarily, methods should be developed to empower legitimate over malicious
actors.

C. Cyber Actions

The effects net neutrality has on cyber warfare scenarios can be divided into three
distinct categories, based on the type of cyber action: cyber defence, proactive cyber
defence and offensive cyber operations.
While cyber defence generally describes actions taken in the aftermath of cyber
attacks and passive methods to deter or prevent the attack, proactive cyber defence
allows an active response during and, to a degree, prior to cyber attacks taking place.
Offensive cyber operations may range from aggressive, conflict-initiating operations,
to supportive actions among allies during defensive cyber scenarios, but are generally
directed against the attacker or its associated components.
Long-term defensive measures include log analysis, system hardening, redesigning
of networks, training of personnel and developing incident response strategies.
Immediate defensive techniques are especially those that are used to prevent further
damage and neutralise the ongoing attack by measures taken at the victim’s end
only. Typical examples are the shutdown of servers, network components or infected
devices and the blocking of traffic and services associated with the attack. These
methods generally do not conflict with net neutrality principles if coordinated through
legitimate law enforcement units or if immediate action is needed to prevent further
damage to the ISP. However, immediate action through cyber units or proactive
approaches through ISPs to prevent damage in foreign networks are currently limited.
One possible resolution of this conflict of interest would be that legitimate actors
should be limited to defensive techniques to minimise contravention of net neutrality
principles. However, purely defensive techniques are often of limited utility if the
attacker’s motivation is to cause the unavailability of services or devices. This is
commonly seen in the various forms of denial-of-service attacks (DDoS). Furthermore,
defensive strategies may also be considered too insecure if more sophisticated attacks
are expected that may remain unnoticed for longer periods of time. These types of
attacks are typically associated with espionage or information warfare, and it is these
cyber activities in particular that are protected by current net neutrality standards.
Although ISPs may be able to deduce that traffic is suspicious based on heuristics (i.e.
without violating net neutrality), net neutrality would prevent further investigation
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and action against the initiator unless authorised by law enforcement and judicial
authorities.
Proactive cyber defence allows defensive methods to be combined with more
aggressive monitoring and filtering rules. The line between defence and proactive
defence is often blurred and depends on the specific technologies used. Firewall rules
may be proactive and not compatible with net neutrality standards and DPI, which
allows analysis on the content of the data packet passing and is often used to enforce
Internet censorship. DPI is not compatible with net neutrality principles when applied
to certain packets only.
Offensive cyber actions may vary greatly depending on the assets and technologies
used. Any type of offensive strategy that aims at limiting, blocking, monitoring or
manipulating specific traffic has to be considered as violating net neutrality principles.
Whether legitimation can be given and under which circumstances has to be considered
by the judiciary. It appears questionable whether it can be demanded of ISPs that they
participate in military or governmental operations violating agreed telecommunication
standards, such as net neutrality. But if they do not, this would imply a need for
legitimate cyber actors to reroute traffic to their own network components to bypass
ISPs in the context of offensive cyber activities to avoid limitations introduced by
those ISPs during the operation.
If applied strictly to all traffic, demanding and enforcing the equal treatment of all data
packets would prohibit the use of several cyber defence techniques. Those considered
proactive would be particularly affected, since they rely on traffic being monitored
based on origin, destination or content. If carried out by ISPs, these measures are
not in line with net neutrality principles. Offensive cyber actions too may need the
permission or active involvement of ISPs, which raises questions of legitimacy,
particularly if this includes violations of agreed telecommunication standards.

D. Cyber Power

Actors in cyberspace are represented by their data and traffic. Controlling either data
or traffic corresponds to controlling the actor. Limiting the capabilities of legitimate
actors to legally interfere with malicious traffic is a digital form of unilateral
disarmament, and as a consequence has the capability to destabilise cyber sovereignty.
As described above, net neutrality places limits on the whole range of legitimate
actions in cyberspace, reducing both offensive and preventive measures. However,
these limitations again only apply to actors bound by restrictions, while illegitimate
actors can choose to circumvent or disregard them. The limitation of preventive
measures plays a major role not only in constraining defence against future attacks,
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but also in helping attackers conceal their activities and avoid prosecution. This is
because net neutrality prevents ISPs from collecting only selected data from the traffic
they forward. Paradoxically, this has often been a contributory factor to the adoption
of general telecommunications data retention (e.g. in Germany). The irony is that
from the point of view of net neutrality, if you collect data on everybody this is legal
and acceptable, but only collecting data on traffic that appears suspicious is not.
Overall, strict application of net neutrality principles contributes to an unbalanced
cyberspace. Legitimate actors are being deprived of rights granted in non-digital
circumstances, while the community is unable technically to enforce net neutrality on
the attackers’ side as well. This gives rise to a substantial mismatch in the distribution
of cyber power among actors.

4. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
If net neutrality principles are weakened, ISPs will need to reserve bandwidth and
develop reliable methods to identify privileged customers and services without
introducing additional physical media in order to guarantee high transmission rates
for these customers and services; the mere throttling of ‘unprivileged traffic’ is
insufficient. It is likely that both channelling and protocol developments will take
place. Additional hardening of access to these channels may help to ensure that only
legitimate users have access to the channel. Creating privileged channels contributes
to restoring a balance between legitimate cyber actors and attackers in cyberspace.
Currently, attackers have the ability to simply allocate bandwidth and to technically
enforce prioritised processing, while the options of legitimate actors are severely
limited.
Cyber defence support among allies could be affected positively by weakening net
neutrality principles and installing prioritised channels. Establishing privileged highspeed connections may prove valuable in scenarios where remote access to networks
under attack is needed. This occurs when network administration personnel are
faced with sophisticated cyber attacks for which they are insufficiently prepared. In
such cases, remote access could be established, even in scenarios including a denial
of service, by technically enforcing processing of data received by the prioritised
channels through networking rules and interrupt handling strategies. Such methods
could be implemented easily in Software Defined Networks (SDNs), however,
standards should be defined that ensure these measures conform to our democratic
norms. This would in turn not only allow remote support during cyber incidents but
facilitate forensic activities during and after the attack.
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Prioritised channels could also be used to uphold a minimal service availability if,
for example, critical infrastructure is being targeted. The use of prioritised channels
allows the separation of critical traffic from common or public traffic. While a smaller
number of sophisticated attacks should be expected to target the prioritised channels,
the larger portion of less sophisticated and limited attacks will target the public traffic
channels, which in turn may be processed on less prioritised components with limited
device access. Although this may appear unfair at first, current security standards
attempt to enforce precisely this by network virtualisation and service encapsulation.
However, due to their high abstraction layer, several vulnerabilities arise within
solutions based on virtualisation and the attack surface is even enlarged.37 These
vulnerabilities are not to be expected on lower abstraction layers, which is why we
would envision low layer solutions.
Although several benefits could be expected from weakening net neutrality principles
and establishing prioritised traffic through ISPs, new attack vectors must also be
expected. As bandwidth and transmission rates are high-value assets in cyberspace,
attackers are likely to work on ways to obtain access to prioritised traffic. Therefore,
the development of such technologies and the definition of adequate standards should
not be left to the free market only. It must also be guaranteed that democratic values
and standards are not being undermined. However, this is an obligation of Western
democracies that should not only apply for legitimate actors, but must also be enforced
for malicious actors threatening the cyber domain.

5. OUTLOOK
This article has explored net neutrality and networking principles from both strategic
and technical views. The handling of net neutrality and traffic equality within the EU,
UK and Russia were compared and discussed. Particular attention was given to the
influence the different approaches have in the uprising congested and contested cyber
domains as expected in cyber warfare scenarios.
Russia’s distinct approach to net neutrality and network regulations in general
was explored, highlighting the measurements taken and scheduled to prevent the
destabilising effect net neutrality has on cyber power and sovereignty. While several
of the technologies and regulations established within Russia are not acceptable by
Western standards due to their limitation of individual rights, the deployed methods
show Russia’s sensibility to the arising threats and an awareness of the cyber power
imbalance.
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The EU is currently struggling with enforcement of the approved Regulation on
the telecommunications single market. The Regulation allows national judicial
interpretation which leads to different implementations of net neutrality within the
EU. This condition is unsatisfactory as it creates an imbalance between EU members
both in terms of market regulations and cyber power. This limits joint cyber operations,
as cyberspace is not limited by national borders, but data traffic is treated according
to national jurisdiction, possibly hindering prosecution depending on the national
networking regulations.
The UK has made a step forward in terms of providing broadband access to all
consumers, however, it has also been considered as one of the ‘enemies of the Internet’
by the RSF since 2014. The UK is known for its surveillance capabilities, which can
also be applied through local ISPs. It is noteworthy that the UK plays a major role
in building the transatlantic backbone of the Internet, especially between the United
States and EU. Severe limitations of net neutrality must be expected to follow the
withdrawal of the UK from the EU unless regulatory and technical enforcement are
developed.
Discussions on net neutrality are discussions on traffic management. There is a
requirement to define standards and policies that regulate when and how legitimate
actors may demand assistance by ISPs to either prioritise their own traffic or limit
the traffic of potentially malicious actors. As blocking or reducing malicious traffic
may result in unjust penalisation of unaware end-users, this paper advocates the
prioritisation of governmental (or governmentally legitimated) cyber actors. The
aim of any legitimate action in cyberspace must be to protect civilian users while
defending networks and services and to establish cyber sovereignty and power.
While there are good reasons to weaken net neutrality principles, this should be done
in a controlled manner and monitored by independent authorities. As demonstrated in
the case of the United States both before and immediately following the 2017 easing
of net neutrality constraints, uncontrolled outsourcing to private companies bears the
risk of abusive methods that not only influence the end users of telecommunication
services but may also limit free market growth and lead to monopolies.
Net neutrality regulations should consider the protection of individual rights and
equality among civilian end-users but must also ensure stability in cyberspace and
equality among actors. This is of particular importance in cyber war scenarios where
some states are less constrained in their legitimate cyber activities than others. There
are two possible choices: either to technically enforce net neutrality (which has
already been proven impractical in the face of botnets or distributed cyber attacks as
the attribution of cyber actions remains an unsolved task) or to define regulations that
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allow legitimate actors to rebalance cyber power and regain control over congested
networks during cyber incidents to uphold sovereignty in cyberspace.
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Abstract: As a consequence of the numerous cyber attacks over the last decade,
both the consideration and use of cyberspace has fundamentally changed, and will
continue to evolve. Military forces all over the world have come to value the new
role of cyberspace in warfare, building up cyber commands, and establishing new
capabilities. Integral to such capabilities is that military forces fundamentally depend
on the rapid exchange of information in order for their decision-making processes
to gain superiority on the battlefield; this compounds the need to develop networkenabled capabilities to realize network-centric warfare. This triangle of cyber offense,
cyber defence, and cyber dependence creates a challenging and complex system of
interdependencies. Alongside, while numerous technologies have not improved cyber
security significantly, this may change with upcoming new concepts and systems, like
decentralized ledger technologies (Blockchains) or quantum-secured communication.
Following these thoughts, the paper analyses the development of both cyber threats
and defence capabilities during the past 10 years, evaluates the current situation
and gives recommendations for improvements. To this end, the paper is structured
as follows: first, general conditions for military forces with respect to “cyber” are
described, including an analysis of the most likely courses of action of the West and
their seemingly traditional adversary in the East, Russia. The overview includes a
discussion of the usefulness of the measures and an overview of upcoming technologies
critical for cyber security. Finally, requirements and recommendations for the further
development of cyber defence are briefly covered.
Keywords: cyber war review, cyber defence implications, cyber defence recommendations, cyber defence requirements, future technologies, cyber war
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a consequence of the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, both the consideration
and use of cyberspace by the military has fundamentally changed and will continue
to do so. Over the years, such attacks have effectively demonstrated how significant
impacts can be wrought by supposedly trivial and low-key means. On the other
hand, military forces also depend strongly on the rapid exchange of information for
their decision-making process so their forces can gain battlefield superiority, which
enforces the need for network-enabled capabilities (NEC) [1] to realize networkcentric warfare (NCW) [2]. This creates a challenging and complex system of
interdependencies, opening a broad spectrum of possible attack vectors. Therefore,
operations in cyberspace can be used to generate effects not only in cyberspace itself,
but also in the physical environment, which is an attractive new capability for military
commanders. Indeed, armed forces worldwide now highly value the new role of cyber,
and are building cyber commands and establishing new operational capabilities,
and the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare can give the advantage to armed forces
otherwise in possession of comparatively smaller weaponry. However, the complexity
of sophisticated cyber attacks like Stuxnet can also imply the opposite. Thus, cyber
defence is also of enormous importance. And while numerous technologies proposed
over recent years have not improved cyber security significantly, this may change with
upcoming new concepts and systems. Blockchains, quantum-secured communication,
mathematically verified software microkernels, and trusted hardware platforms are
likely to be key elements for new, more secure systems. Along with the armaments
industry itself developing a better understanding of cyber threats, this should lead to
better and more resilient weapon systems.
In light of these thoughts, the paper analyses the development of both cyber threats
and defence capabilities over the past 10 years from 2007 to 2017, evaluates the
current situation and gives recommendations for further development. The paper
is structured as follows: first, general conditions for military forces with respect to
“cyber” are described and dependencies and requirements are highlighted. Second,
a brief overview of the development of cyber threats and defence capabilities during
the past ten years is given, including a discussion of the usefulness of the measures.
Upcoming technologies which are important for cyber security are briefly discussed
to analyse opportunities for more secure systems. Finally, the conclusions of the paper
are summarized and requirements for the further development of cyber defence are
derived.
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2. DETERMINING FACTORS
For all the millennia of warfare that have passed, the tools and tactics of how armies
fight have evolved as military technologies have evolved [2]. However, recent years
have seen fundamental changes come to affect the very character of war [2]. Military
forces worldwide are increasingly capitalizing on the advances and advantages of
information technology to facilitate radical changes in the way they structure and
deliver offensive and defensive capabilities [1]. The US Navy was among the first to
investigate how to use Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to increase
the efficiency and efficacy of their forces on the 21st Century battlefield [3], the main
consequence being the increased integration of individual, hitherto autonomously
acting systems, thus a fundamental shift from what is called platform-centric warfare
to network-centric warfare (NCW). NCW harnesses network technology to facilitate
radical improvements in the shared awareness of disposition and intent, together with
a capability for rapid reconfiguration, and synchronization of operations [1] and thus
improves both the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations [4].
As such, NCW creates superiority in war by harvesting information from a network
of reconnaissance systems and enabling its analysis and use by command and control
centres, as well as use in weapons systems. Hence military superiority across the
entire range of military operations, i.e. full spectrum dominance, is achieved. The
vision for NCW is to provide seamless access to timely information at every echelon
in the military hierarchy and enable all elements to share information within a single,
coherent, complete, and dynamically accurate picture of the battlefield. It is intended
that NCW will produce an improved understanding both of the intent of higher
command and of the operational situation at all levels of command, with every element
better able to tap into the collective knowledge and reduce the “fog and friction”
[4] of war, and enable the optimal use of resources. Although the transformation
towards NCW is not finalized completely, even not by the United States [1, 4], NCW
is anticipated to be one of the greatest revolutions in military operations in the past
200 years (see Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1. NCW ROUTE MAP [5, 6]

However, within such an integrated system lies a greater vulnerability: attacking
the weakest link could compromise the entire system and lead to catastrophic
consequences, in the worst case rendering an entire military force incapable of action.

A. On Multinational Coalitions

In addition to the increased use of information technology, the aspect of cooperative,
multinational participation in conflicts is of great importance. Military operations
today are almost always multilateral in complexion. With regard to NATO, since 1990,
there has been a significant increase in the number of military operations requiring
NATO member states to contribute forces to some multinational coalition or alliance
[7]. Moreover, the range of mission types has broadened to include peacekeeping,
peace support, and humanitarian operations [7]. Corresponding challenges with
such a force are, for example, what the agreed operational concepts are, different
intelligence requirements and structures, the diverse capabilities and qualities of the
various formations as well as command, control, communication, and intelligence
(C4I)/cyber interfaces that have to be developed and integrated [8, 7].
Increased defence cooperation, such as “Smart Defence” (NATO), “Pooling &
Sharing” (European Union), or the “Framework Nations Concept”, in theory increases
sustainability and helps to preserve key military capabilities [9]. Smaller armies can
plug their remaining capabilities into an organizational backbone provided by a larger,
“framework” nation [9]. In practice, however, this theory has yet to fully prove itself,
and the extent to which those well-understood obstacles to defence cooperation can
be overcome remains to be seen [9, 10]. Deeper cooperation also calls for reliability
among the different partners [9]. In terms of ICT, cyber is always a potential risk.
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Therefore, it can be said that despite the undisputed advantages of multi-national
coalitions, a military force made up of numerous divergent parts can see the overall
system’s cyber defences be compromised, which can easily play into the hands of the
attacker and hamper one’s own defence.

B. On Russia – Analysis of Russia’s Course of Action

Western countries follow the assumption that economically prosperous democracies
are less likely to wage war against each other. Therefore, the EU operates a
“Europeanization policy” aimed at democratization and economic liberalization,
particularly in its eastern domain [11]. This basic principle of foreign policy, however,
is by no means a priori transferable to all states. In light of Russia’s annexation of
the Crimea in Ukraine and the war in the Donbas, unresolved territorial conflicts on
the eastern borders of the EU have gained international attention and concern. From
Russia’s perspective, the West’s approach is flawed on several fronts. In context,
shortly after World War Two, the Kremlin sought to protect the USSR by establishing
a cordon sanitaire between itself and its major nemeses, the Western powers [13],
with the occupation and coercive support of eastern European states under the Warsaw
Pact. Although this buffer zone disintegrated over 1989-1991, as did the USSR itself,
with the Kremlin believing its borderlands could slip under the aegis and control of
the West, Moscow created the concept of “Frozen Conflicts” to weaken, divide, and
ultimately prevent these countries (Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, for example)
from drifting far from their eastern orbit of Russia [13]. Russia did so through the
manipulation of nationalist impulses among border populations [13], encouraging
minorities to think of themselves as distinct from the majority population [13].
Unwilling to risk more than limited open military intervention, the Russians enhanced
hybrid warfare (which has its origins in 1938), using the presence of its peacekeepers
and its diplomatic powers to keep these conflicts in a “no war, no peace” situation (i.e.,
Frozen Conflicts) that perpetuates a Russian role in its borderlands [13].
As much as Russia profits more from enabling if not inciting temporary and regionallylimited “skirmishes” to justify its own intervention, it is important to prevent the
West from being drawn into these conflicts. Hence the importance of the concept of
“Escalation Dominance” within every domain, including cyber, which imparts the
ability to create a credible deterrence to outside forces involving themselves. Like any
offensive or defensive capability, this will only work as a deterrent if the host nation
shows it has the appropriate means, and the will to use them. As a conclusion, it can
be stated that Russia – unlike the West – benefits more from regionally limited Frozen
Conflicts and, for reasons of Escalation Dominance, also in terms of cyber, might
feel the need to demonstrate Cyber Dominance to hamper other nations engaged or
seeking to engage in those conflicts. Correspondingly, this increases the likelihood of
cyber attacks.
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3. A DECADE OF CYBER THREATS AND DEFENCE
Making hard decisions in the area of cyber security requires a comprehensive
understanding of cyber security threats and developments. What follows then is an
analysis of the last 10 years in the evolution of cyber threats and defence from 2007
to 2017, the starting point being the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on
Estonia, which marked a step-change in the onset of cyber warfare.

A. Development of Security Incidents

CyCon X signifies 10 years of conferences dealing with legal, strategic, conceptual,
and technical challenges of cyber conflict. Motivated by the consequences of the
DDoS attacks on Estonia [14], which affected broad parts of everyday life in a
country that had already highly digitized systems of infrastructure and governance,
the conferences sought to explore and discuss numerous aspects of cyber security.
2007-2009: The DDoS attacks on Estonia were not the only remarkable event in 2007.
DDoS attacks are themselves a relatively simple method of attack, where vast amounts
of data requests are directed towards a target with the aim of exhausting the target’s
means of providing data, and legitimate traffic is blocked out in a simple but effective
method. But this is just one case and while any number of digital assaults may be
ostensibly quite primitive in format, it is the failure to anticipate them that enables
their effectiveness, and significant, material impacts can be delivered. For example,
the US Department of Energy ran the so-called Aurora experiment in their Idaho Labs
in 2007 [15], showing how an attack on a power generator’s control system could led
to the generator’s destruction. These incidences, both actual and theoretical, brought
the issue of vulnerabilities in modern critical infrastructures into the public domain
for the first time.
Meanwhile, a remarkable military operation was undertaken by the Israeli Air Force
(IAF). During Operation Orchard, the IAF executed a pre-emptive strike against
Syria’s plutonium-powered nuclear reactor Al Kibar shortly before it became active
[16]. Highly successful, no plane was lost, with not a single Syrian missile fired. Some
reports said this was because Syria’s air-defence systems were blinded by standard
electronic scrambling tools [16], but some analyses highlighted the use of either
special software or a backdoor in the adversary’s systems as more likely explanations
for their failure to fire [17].
The notorious worm Downadup (also known as Conficker) appeared in October 2008.
While worm attacks had already been declining for some years, Downadup manifest
itself as one of the most widespread threats seen in some time [18]. It combined
several techniques to spread itself and hide within systems, and defend itself against
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attacks. Even by 2014, over a million machines were still infected, highlighting the
difficulties of removing this malware [19]. The ability to observe the defenders and
adapt the code underlined the sophistication of the hackers [20]. While attribution
of the precise origins of the attack is still not clear, with the creators of Downadup
remaining unknown, sources were traced to Ukraine and China. Only the last version
of the worm carried a malicious payload and it was a version that deleted itself after
a month. This may indicate that Downadup was more of a test run by a still unknown
source rather than a directed attack by cyber criminals.
Also in 2008, manipulated credit-card readers were found in UK supermarkets. The
devices were fitted with wireless equipment and could transmit stolen data once a day
or go dormant to avoid detection [21]. This was a remarkable attack on the country’s
retail supply chain and its customers.
The rising threat towards critical infrastructures was seen when the US Federal
Aviation Administration’s computer systems were hacked in 2009 [22], endangering
not only commercial air traffic but military operations as well. In February, the (in-)
famous Downadup malware together with poor cyber hygiene grounded French naval
aircraft [23], and in December, the US military realized that Iraqi insurgents had used
the $26 software “SkyGrabber” to capture video feeds from US drones that had been
transmitted via satellite links [24]. Despite what newspapers reported at the time,
there was no “hacking” involved, only installing the software, aligning the antenna,
and starting the record: the transmissions themselves were unencrypted.
2010: Some serious incidents affected the Internet in early 2010. Apparently, a
configuration error made the I-root instance of the Domain Name System (DNS) root
servers visible outside of China. I-root does not give correct address resolutions for all
queries because of online censorship in China. Suddenly it was being used by computers
outside of China, which unintentionally fell into this censorship [25]. Only two weeks
later, a small Chinese ISP called IDC China Telecommunications Corporation, that
had normally sourced about 40 prefixes, announced nearly 37,000 unique prefixes
for about 15 minutes. Because of that, approximately 10 per cent of Internet traffic
was rerouted through China, including traffic from providers like Deutsche Telekom
and AT&T [26]. The incident highlighted how a good understanding of structures and
protocols can be used to generate simple and effective attacks.
An important incident was discovered in October 2010 by the Belarusian company
VirusBlokAda: Stuxnet. While the complexity of the malware sample challenged the
security companies (resulting in some incorrect analysis), eventually it was determined
that the malware attacked the Iranian enrichment facility in Natanz, interfering with
the enrichment process and finally destroying centrifuges [27]. While it was not, as
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reported at the time, the first cyber attack to result in physical damage, it definitely
was a game changer, clearly demonstrating the new opportunities thrown up by a
globalized, interconnected world. Even more, it marked the start of a new area of
cyber ambitions from numerous countries around the world.
2011-2012: A sophisticated spear-phishing attack in 2011 obtained data used to
compromise network security company RSA’s SecureID technology, which was then
used to attack Lockheed Martin [28].
In 2012, the media reported on Chinese hackers stealing classified information about
Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as revealed by documents obtained
by the NSA whistle-blower Edward Snowden (whose own story is a testament to
how vast, top-security IT systems can be compromised by one person with a USBstick, see below) [29]. Comparing Lockheed Martin’s JSF and China’s Shenyang J-31
fighter, David Majumdar has said: “On the surface, the J-31 looks very much like a
twin-engine F-35 clone – and there are plenty of reasons to believe that the Chinese
jet was based on stolen JSF technology – and could eventually be more or less a match
for the American jet” [30].
Another controversial discussion was about a hardware backdoor in the Microsemi
ProASIC3 processor – a chip used in numerous high performance aircraft, ranging
from USAF fighters to the Boeing 777 Dreamliner, as well as military applications
like encryption devices. While the researchers found some processor commands onboard the chip which could be used as a backdoor [31], industry argued that these
functions were only undocumented debugging functionality to be used by the chip
developers for testing purposes. On the one hand this may be true, especially as
modern processors contain thousands of undocumented commands and features
[32], but on the other hand, for a sensitive or classified military application, it was a
dangerous attack vector.
2013-2014: The power of relatively simple hacks when executed by an agent with a
strong understanding of a system and its dependencies was once again demonstrated
in April 2013, when a fake Tweet sent by the Syrian Electronic Army via the Associate
Press’s Twitter feed caused a temporary crash of the New York Stock Exchange,
costing US $136 billion. The content of the tweet said “Breaking: Two Explosions in
the White House and Barack Obama is injured” [33]. Of course, it was quickly realized
that there had not been an attack and the index recovered quickly; nevertheless,
knowing (or executing) such a ploy can result in a lot of money being lost, or at least,
changing hands when otherwise it might not.
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Another major event that should profoundly change the importance with which cyber
security is viewed was the Snowden Leaks. The whistle-blower Edward Snowden
worked as a system administrator for the NSA until May 2013. He passed on top
secret, classified information about surveillance projects to the world’s press. The
range of the revelations was vast, from the eavesdropping of Internet links, the
introduction of hardware as well as algorithmic backdoors, to techniques for bridging
the air-gap [34].
The Snowden Leaks came as part of a growing tide of stories about incidents of high
level breaches of data and hacking. Even so, another breach in 2014 is of particular
note, with the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) targeted [35]. The severity
of the breach stemmed from the business engaged in by the companies concerned,
namely KeyPoint Government Solutions, the contractor for OPM, doing security
clearance background investigations. Thus, the nature of the data was highly critical,
not only because of personally identifiable information like Social Security numbers
and addresses, but because of the risk of interference with and blackmailing potential
of actual employees, with information heisted from such background checks.
In October 2012, NATO identified a comprehensive espionage campaign [36] that
was attributed to Russia, and was found to have been going for five years already,
additionally targeting institutions of the EU and the Ukrainian government. As is often
the case, it was very difficult to give a close estimate as to quantity of data stolen. For
example, logging data is often available only for short periods of time and is limited
by legal regulations, which confounds the chances of getting a complete picture of
what has happened. Hence, identifying the extent of the damage, and by that the scale
and detail of potential hazards thereafter faced, is highly challenging.
There were also breaches identified and intensified in the energy sectors in the United
States and across Europe. Hackers from the “Dragonfly” group, also known as
“Energetic Bear”, and traced to Eastern Europe, successfully hacked IT systems run
by energy grid providers, electricity generation firms, petroleum pipeline operators,
and industrial equipment providers in the US, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Turkey,
and Poland [37]. While the primary objectives were espionage and persistent access,
there also remained the capability to carry out acts of sabotage [37].
2015: A highly “visible” attack occurred in April 2015, when 12 channels of the
broadcasting station TV5 Monde went off air. While a defacement displayed IS
propaganda online, an investigation identified the Russian hacker group APT28 as the
source of the attack. It was a well-prepared assault and possibly sought to destroy the
television station, but greater damage was prevented by the serendipitous presence
on site of many more technicians than usual due to a new channel going on air the
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same day of the attack [38]. Another attack resulting in actual physical consequences
was demonstrated in western Ukraine in December. A long-prepared cyber attack
on multiple electricity distribution stations caused power outages that affected
approximately 225,000 customers. In parallel, phone DoS attacks were carried out on
call centres to prevent customers from contacting the power company under assault
[39].
2016: Early 2016 saw the beginning of the end for old-school methods of bank
robbing, i.e. masked men with guns telling everyone to get on the floor, as new hightech methods introduced themselves to the world stage [40]. An attacker group named
“Lazarus”, traced to North Korea, stole a total of over US $100 million, mainly from
the Bangladesh Bank, among others, by penetrating the Alliance Access software
used by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)
networks, which carries worldwide financial transactions in a (up to that point) secure
and standardized way. In the same year, North Korean hackers also looted 235 GB
of sensitive documents from South Korea’s defence data centre, including blueprints
for a joint-US plans for war on the peninsula and scenarios for removing the North
Korean leader, Kim Jong-un [41].
During the breach of the Philippines Commission on Elections, personal information
from all of the country’s 55 million registered voters, including fingerprint data,
passport numbers, and expiry dates, was exposed online and fully searchable [42],
while the designs of India’s Scorpion submarines was leaked from the French
shipbuilder DCNS [43]. Other data breaches that came to the public’s attention
involved the casual dating website AdultFriendFinder, with the details of 412 million
users exposed to the world [44], and even the NSA’s own hacking tools were stolen
by the hacker group “The Shadow Brokers” [45].
But while such incidents have grown in number and severity, the methods deployed
in the attacks techniques are still often quite simple, with DDoS attacks achieving
disruption of services ranging from Amazon and Netflix to the PlayStation Network –
nearly one decade after the attacks on Estonia.
2017: Numerous cyber security incidents were seen in 2017. In May, the WannaCry
ransomware campaign hit enterprises and institutions all over the world [47], with
impacts including the taking offline of 61 National Health Service hospitals in the
UK and leading to production at numerous Renault factories in France stopping. By
using the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability stolen from the NSA in 2016 and published
by the Shadow Brokers in April 2017, the malware was very virulent. While patches
had been made available by Microsoft for supported systems in March 2017, the run
affected especially older Windows XP/8/Server 2003 systems for which no patch
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had been published. In light of the outbreak, Microsoft took the “extraordinary” and
“unusual” step of providing an emergency update for the aforementioned systems
[48]. While the attacks elicited little by way of ransom, the financial impact can be
enormous. An attack by the NotPetya ransomware later in 2017 on Maersk cost the
Danish shipping giant up to US $300 million [49].
Some details about stolen data from the NSA were also published. A contractor for
the organization had without authorization copied data and stored it on his computer
at home. Russian hackers then compromised that computer and raided the files.
According to The Wall Street Journal, the files had been identified by the Russian
attackers through the contractor’s use of a popular antivirus software made by the
Russia-based company Kaspersky Lab [50]. In addition that year, a new series of
classified documents was leaked, this time from the CIA [51]. The material called
Vault 7 and 8 showed the activities of the CIA in detail, including compromising cars,
Smart TVs, and smartphones, and the CIA’s capability to conduct cyber warfare [52].
Already by this selection of cyber security incidents of the past 10 years, it seems that
the situation has not been improving. To better understand the underlying problems,
as well as new opportunities for cyber defence, a quick look at security-related
developments during the decade in question follows.
Technological Development
Looking back to 2007, the Canadian company D-Wave Systems, Inc. presented their
first commercial 16-qubit quantum annealing processor. Annealing is not universal
quantum computing (the most powerful form of quantum computing), and is really
only able to solve optimization problems. But D-Wave was the first company using
quantum effects for building new kinds of processors. A publication in 2015 [53] led
to heated debates over the statement that a calculation by an annealing-based system
was carried out “100 million times faster than [that of a] PC”, but the comparison
was not fair; the problem was greatly optimized for that demonstration and only
slightly reflected real-world problems. Moreover, it was easy solvable by certain
cluster-detecting algorithms, which were not used for comparison in the paper [54].
Anyway, while no application has been found yet where quantum annealing notably
outperforms classical simulation approaches, the benefits of quantum annealing are
becoming better understood and speed advantages have been demonstrated [55].
Further steps towards a universal quantum computer have been made, e.g., IBM
presented a 50-qubit quantum processor in late 2017 [56]. While quantum key
distribution (QKD) enables mathematically provable secure connections, and for
which commercial systems have been offered since 2003, there have also been attacks
on these systems that target weaknesses in their implementation. For example, Liu
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and Sauge demonstrated a hack of QKD back in 2009, while the following year Xu et
al. demonstrated the “phase remapping” attack.
In 2008, a paper by an author who called himself Satoshi Nakamoto was published,
describing a peer-to-peer electronic cash system [57]. While the elements of the
concept, cryptographic signatures, Merkle Chains, and P2P-networks, had already
been known, the author was able to solve the double-spending problem by combining
them within a distributed, trustless consensus system. The further success of Bitcoin
is well-known, but the underlying concept of Blockchains is much more powerful, as
it is able to guarantee the integrity of arbitrary data and enable different applications
in the area of cyber security [58].
In 2009, a search engine well-known among security researchers was founded:
Shodan [59]. Unlike previous systems, Shodan scans the Internet for connected
devices, looking at services and collecting all provided information [60]. Different
techniques for handling data evolved, especially in the area of big data and cognitive
systems. For example, IBM celebrated a great success for cognitive systems in 2011,
when IBM’s Watson computer won the Jeopardy! challenge [61]. Since then, Watson
has been deployed in more and more areas, e.g., cancer treatment, financial planning,
or advanced cyber threats and defence.
Much progress has also been observed in the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI).
Going beyond the search in problem spaces or behaviour-based approaches, AI is
opening up more and more fields, in creativity and even in consciousness [62]. For
example, AI is already able to paint new art based on original drawings [63], or
compose new music [64]. Of course, there have also been hurdles. Microsoft’s Twitter
chatbot “Tay” had to be shut down in 2016 after less than 24 hours because it began
using racist language [65], while a team from MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory tricked Google’s AI into misidentifying pictures of turtles
as weapons [66]. Nevertheless, the well-disposed AI program Sophia was granted
citizenship in Saudi Arabia in 2017. Now, Sophia is calling for women’s rights [67].
Also, Google’s already well-known AlphaGo AI system was enhanced even further
in a very interesting and powerful away, being no longer constrained by the limits of
human knowledge, but learning tabula rasa from itself and outperforming all previous
systems [68].
From a military perspective, in 2013 the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, published an article highlighting
the asymmetrical possibilities offered by cyberspace and the necessity of perfecting
activities in this information space [69]. In summary, the approach is guerrilla, and
waged on all fronts with a range of actors and tools – for example, hackers, media,
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businessmen, leaks and, yes, fake news, as well as conventional and asymmetric
military means. Chaos is the strategy the Kremlin pursues, Gerasimov specifies that
the objective is to achieve an environment of permanent unrest and conflict within
an enemy state [70]. In November 2014, the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
announced the “Defense Innovation Initiative” [71], with the aim being to “pursue
innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority for the 21st Century”
[71]. To stop the erosion of American dominance in key domains in waging war, it
is necessary, he argued, to find “new and creative ways to sustain and in some areas
expand our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources” [71]. While
this sounds quite challenging, it is historically motivated: “The US changed the
security landscape in the 1970s and 1980s with networked precision strike, stealth,
and surveillance for conventional forces. We will identify a third offset strategy that
puts the competitive advantage firmly in the hands of American power projection over
the coming decades” [71].
As new and challenging technologies are emerging with increasing pace, many of
which are part and parcel of cyber security, a closer look at the root causes of the
incidents between 2007-2017 incidents is necessary.

B. Attacker vs. Defender

Today, hundreds of cyber security systems are available on the market. Already back
in 2004, the market research company International Data Corporation (IDC) coined
the term “Unified Threat Management” (UTM). Basically, UTM is the evolution
of firewall techniques into a comprehensive security solution, containing areas like
control usage and policy enforcement, and therefore, combining techniques like
content filtering, intrusion detection, and prevention, DDoS mitigation and antivirus
applications. However, in spite of so broad and extensive an approach to cyber
security, cyber security incidents are on the rise in number and gravity. Indeed, as with
antivirus software being the conduit for hackers being able to expose data on a NSA
contractor’s laptop, we are repeatedly seeing how products intended to protect the
system have become the gateway for attackers (e.g., see [72]). It is not unsurprising
then that in 2015 Netflix chose to discard its antivirus systems [73].
As a definition of an “incident” we should exclude any “ping” or an attempted
connection from an unknown machine, as they generate huge numbers, but for the
most part are of no greater significance. An attempt was made but failed. Far better
then to concentrate on events where huge amounts of personal data or confidential
files or even money have been stolen, or where physical damage has been wrought.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has recorded incidents [74],
with Figure 2 charting occurrence since 2007.
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FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT CYBER INCIDENTS SINCE 2007 AS RECORDED BY CSIS [74]

It is particularly noticeable how the number of significant cyber security incidents has
risen since 2015. However, a major variable is the efficacy of protective measures,
which can be affected by numerous factors, including falling investment in cyber
security. Hence figures for investment in cyber security are included in Figure 3,
which shows investment in cyber security has consistently risen [75–77], even in the
years of global economic crises when overall GDP has contracted [78].
FIGURE 3. EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL GDP, THE CYBER SECURITY MARKET REVENUE AND
THE AVERAGE COST OF A CYBER INCIDENT BASED ON [75-78]

Estimating the net loss generated by cybercrime is a challenging task. Official numbers
published by government or non-governmental bodies are a weak indicator, as only
those cases filed with them are included. Additional data can be harvested from
companies engaging in surveys on the matter, but this may still only be scratching
the surface. Various public and private sources produce reports on a regular basis, but
even when comparing the same periods under review, there is no consistent picture
regarding cyber-attack statistics. For example, IDG’s summary of PwC’s Global State
of Information Security Survey 2018 [79], published on October 18th, 2017, states
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that “The number of security incidents detected continues to drop, along with the
average financial loss due to cyber security attacks. However, the financial loss per
incident continues to climb” [80]. In contrast, the 2017 Cost of Cyber Crime Study
published by Accenture on September 26th, 2017, highlights a 27.4% increase in the
average annual number of security breaches [81]. This underlines how the presented
numbers cannot be generalized and how difficult it is to estimate the total damage,
with the lack of reliable data being a core issue [82]. Recent studies by McAfee and
CSIS throw some light on the subject by estimating the economic impact [83] and the
global cost of cybercrime [84]. The most recent report suggests that the global cost
of cybercrime is now US $600 billion, which includes gains to criminals and costs to
companies for recovery and defence [84]. Within the studies, McAfee highlights the
importance to include certain additional indirect costs, such as reputational damage,
and this is also emphasized by Anderson et al. [85].
Thus, the global damage has increased sharply since the calculations for the period
2013-2014 where the estimation was US $400 billion [86]. The data is on a par
with calculations from the British insurance company Lloyd’s. Anderson ultimately
concluded, “that we should perhaps spend less in anticipation of computer crime (on
antivirus, firewalls etc.) but we should certainly spend an awful lot more on catching
and punishing the perpetrators” [85].
While there are only a few studies dealing with net losses, a large number of cyber
security reports are released. For example, Verizon’s Data Breach Investigations
Report (DBIR) 2017 indicates that 75% of data breaches are perpetrated by outsiders
and 25% involved internal actors [87]. For the tactics used, Verizon surmised that
62% of breaches featured hacking, 51% included malware, and 43% had been social
engineering attacks [87]. Still, such numbers are too abstract to identify underlying
problems. For example, Figure 4 shows the evolution of known vulnerabilities, as seen
by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [88], Open Sourced Vulnerability
Database OSVDB [89], and Vulnerability Database VulnDB respectively [90]
(OSVDB was discontinued in 2012, the same year VulnDB started). The range of
very different identified vulnerabilities per year is striking. This may be due to some
databases also including additional, non-publicly available information in their
statistics. As vulnerabilities are the gateway for attackers, one would assume that
an evaluation of this data brings light into the cyber security darkness. However, an
in-depth analysis by Rory McCune showed that the technical evaluations of various
reports are “built on faulty data at best” [91, 92]. As the used data is heavily biased,
evaluations are not representative of real-world challenges and by that, are not the
strongest of foundations upon which to base any counter action or cyber defence
strategies.
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FIGURE 4. DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITIES AS SEEN BY CVE AND OSVDB/
VULNDB [88-90]

The publicly known vulnerabilities may also be biased [93]: publications strongly
depend on the interest and knowledge of some researchers, e.g., the pattern of “local
privilege escalation”, where vulnerability numbers followed an expected pattern
based on the knowledge of researchers and their activities [94]. Therefore, analysing
the vulnerability databases is not enough to obtain a comprehensive and accurate
picture of the scale of hazards and events encountered.
Overall, then, one can see that neither the array of figures and cases of cyber security
breaching incidents, nor the evaluation of vulnerabilities or malign programs, can
suffice to comprehensively address all the challenges posed by cyber security issues.
Even as investment in cyber security constantly rises, so too are overall net losses
growing, and strongly so. An analysis of the root causes is challenging, due to the
inherent limits of available data, how it is collated, how incidents are defined, and other
flaws and biases innate to any study. All these factors complicate the question then of
what is to be done, what kind of effective measures can be deployed in defence. For all
of that, efforts need to be made to construct a macro-level investigation of the global
situation involving all actors and agents, to best identify the scale of the problems and
what can be done about them.

C. Conclusions from 10 Years of Cyber (In)security

Looking back at 10 years of cyber security incidents and technical circumstances and
development, a number of trends can be identified:
Trivial vs. Sophisticated Attacks: Although the techniques of attackers are becoming
more advanced, it is often the more relatively trivial attacks that the media hypes
up. As highlighted, the “hacking” of military drones in Iraq was nothing more than
recording and displaying what was arguably accessible information. Still, it is the
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technically simple assaults that can generate the most extensive effects, as seen by the
DDoS attacks on Dyn. Despite infecting more than 300,000 systems in 150 countries
and having dramatic consequences, WannaCry was also, at a technical level, rather
rudimentary, in that it only exploited already known vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, it can be seen how there is a growing number of ever more
sophisticated attacks. Stuxnet marked the beginning of a new class of cyber attacks,
in that a cyber weapon was deployed that led to significant material damage. The
same can be seen in the attacks on the power grid in Ukraine, which were long in
preparation and affected various kinds of software and systems, including the
manipulation of firmware of Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Also, our partial
knowledge of the surveillance structures and tools of the NSA and CIA shows they
are highly sophisticated, as revealed by the respective leaks.
The trend towards more sophisticated attacks and their development on the timeline
leads to the next findings:
Preparation of the Battlefield: A variety of actions in recent years reveals how ever
more comprehensively engagement on the cyber battlefield is being prepared. The
number as well as the quality of attacks on critical infrastructures is rising, as are
infiltration campaigns aimed at installing backdoor access. The preparation of access
opportunities also can be seen by different attacks on the supply chain, introducing
malevolent hardware that can manipulate whatever software is installed upon it. At
the same time, comprehensive cyber espionage activities can be identified, focusing
on military systems and developments, as well as blueprints for the development and
testing of new cyber weapons being used in the field, e.g., like in the cases of TV5
Monde or the Ukrainian power grid.
Glassy Humanity: The amount and quality of breached data reaches a level that can
severely affect many areas of life, but especially people in security-critical tasks and
functions. The OPM breaches presented a very severe incident, including data relating
to personnel security background checks, while the breaches of the casual dating
platforms Ashley Madison and AdultFriendFinder contained very detailed, personal
data. Also, medical and personal devices and trackers are collecting more and more
data and are often poorly secured, putting them well within the range of hostile online
forces.
Further, newly available services like satellite surveillance offered by the company
Planet Labs Inc. [95] will make surveillance capabilities previously reserved for the
military and states available for almost everybody.
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Theoretical vs. Practical Security: Another aspect already visible in the real world and
growing in importance is the tension between theoretical and practical security. While
having new systems based on mathematically provable security systems like QKD,
complex technical implementations open up almost inestimable possibilities for side
channel attacks. Being a very powerful and evolving instrument, AI can support
cyber security, but at the same time such systems may also produce unpredictable and
unwanted results, based on their complexity and “black box” character.
Demonstration of Cyber Power: Finally, some cases of the demonstration of cyber
power can already be identified. Eventually, Stuxnet turned out in the demonstration
of cyber power, based on the change of the code and attacker behaviour, as well as the
too intense public discussions and statements. In part the attack on TV5 Monde and
the activities of The Shadow Brokers can be seen as demonstrations of cyber power.
Figure 5 highlights the coherences between cyber security incidents and the derived
characteristics.

D. The next 10 Years: A look into the Crystal Ball

Technological evolution is exponential, and IT improvements grow at an even superexponential rate over long time spans [96]. This is something hard to cope with for
human beings in daily life, and often decisions are taken based on a “linear feeling”.
Having a look at current research programs and activities coupled with various
developments and announcements over the last few years provides glimpse of a
picture of what we may expect.
The “Defense Innovation Initiative” already mentioned earlier is a good starting point
to figure out how tomorrows technical world may look like. By having a look at related
programs setup by DARPA, and state-of-the-art research, the following aspects can
be identified:

176

FIGURE 5. COHERENCES OF IMPORTANT CYBER SECURITY INCIDENTS FROM 2007 TO 2017

First, the wide use of practically unlimited storage like 5d Glass discs and DNA
storage [97] will challenge encryption security systems. Being able to store everything
until one can decrypt it requires stronger encryption methods, and renders traditional
concepts of proposed key lengths for certain periods of time as insufficient.
Second, Quantum supremacy will be achieved. While applications like QKD are
already available, new techniques for secure communications will become ready
for use. More so, universal quantum computers will open new opportunities for
simulation, prediction, and security of systems, in the process supplanting and
surpassing traditional security concepts. Recent research published by the University
of Cambridge [98], IBM, and Intel shows tremendous progress in this area.
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Robots and the “Soldier 4.0” concept (technical and bio enhancements to soldiers)
will be much more powerful, but to the same degree, much more dependent on IT –
ranging from the use of exoskeletons [99] to smart bandages for the faster healing of
wounds or selectively erasing memories of trauma from the brain [100]. Of course,
technology in \itself is morally inert – there is as much scope for misuse and abuse as
there is for beneficent impacts benefiting all mankind.
Self-X technologies will find their way into products used in the real-world. While
DARPA’s Cyber Grand Challenge in 2016 demonstrated the potential for selfdefending systems to analyse attacks and patch themselves up, the setup was based on
tiny, very limited operating systems. Anyway, it shows the future of cyber security, and
related programs like “System Security Integrated Through Hardware and Firmware”
(SSITH) [101] will raise the bar for attackers.
Finally, AI will only increase in power and come to pervade all areas of life, with
algorithms achieving ever more superior performance with no human input.
Together with more and more powerful and specialized hardware, e.g., self-learning
neuromorphic chips that mimic brain functions [102], this will enable completely
autonomous systems to operate independently in hostile environments, and much
faster than any system reliant on human input in their loop.
Summing up these aspects highlights key elements of tomorrow’s forces: autonomous
and collectively mission-executing systems that are produced cheaply and mobile via
3D-printing, that can self-destruct or dissolve in air so the technology will not fall into
the hands of the adversary. While this can enable future supremacy on the battlefield
even in denied environments (A2AD), the core requirement remains the same – strong
cyber security, not only to protect the systems of tomorrow, but also to protect the
research, design, and production that led to them.

4. CONCLUSION
Looking back on 10 years of cyber security, the situation seems to be becoming more
and more challenging. Cyber is a popular tool for numerous reasons and many players.
Upcoming technologies enforce hard and timely decisions, but the opportunities exist
for a sustained improvement in cyber security. Figure 6 summarizes the paper and
thus visually establishes a relationship between the Sections 2 and 3.
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FIGURE 6. MAPPING OF THE IDENTIFIED COHERENCES AND DEDUCTIONS IN CYBERSPACE TO A
RISK ASSESSMENT

Basically, risk can be seen as a mathematical product of the factors “probability of
occurrence” and “impact of the damage”. With respect to cyber, this equation is often
extended to a three-factor equation:
Cyber Risk = Cyber Offense x Cyber Defence x Cyber Dependence
Section 2 has outlined how Russia’s political will to use cyber weapons has increased.
On that point, we have used examples of (i) economic subversion, and (ii) use of cyber
attacks in Ukraine and Georgia. Technical developments are manifold and can be
subdivided into the categories outlined. As per the actual realization of political will
and technical capabilities in conducting cyber warfare, we have seen only the tip of
the iceberg and, in the future, we will see cyber powers demonstrated far more often.
Many of the attacks thus far could be ascribed to the notion of the “Preparation of
the Battlefield”. To be able to survive in a cyber war tomorrow, you have to do your
homework today, and thus “prepare your opponent”. It has to be assumed that countries
such as Russia or China have quite different weapons at their disposal. Anyone
who believes that these nations find cyber vulnerabilities “by accident” is wrong.
Systematic preparation means deliberately finding and exploiting vulnerabilities on
your opponent’s side, if not indeed actively installing them in the soft- or hardware
they may have sourced from you, and not waiting for “luck” to lean in your favour.
For the West, this means we have to think about cyber security more holistically and
system-wide, especially in our military forces, and we need more innovative concepts
with shorter procurement cycles. The topic of whether or not Western nations need a
“critical security industry” is also an issue that needs to be discussed.
For the military, the power of future assertiveness means using NCW and autonomous
systems. Fast decision-making requires information superiority and that in turn requires
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ICT. Nonetheless, parallel to networking, greater autonomy and decentralization must
be given greater consideration. To realize this complex task, sometimes less is more:
in order not to end up in the “complexity trap”, we should rather stick to the keep-itsimple approach, instead of looking for a vast, single, super solution. This means, in
particular, the use of cost-effective systems, which are built to be mission-specific and
on time using additive production methods and which are able to fulfil their missions
on the basis of AI and swarm behaviour, even under A2AD conditions. Multi-billion
dollar, high-value systems intended for use over decades, are only needed to a small
extent as part of an overall strategy.
Furthermore, critical systems like weapon or crypto systems need verifiably secure
designs. Trusted hardware for selected and highly-critical components as well as
verified microkernels like seL4 are ways to realize this.
It is important to realize that the preparation of tomorrow’s battlefield is happening
now, resulting in backdoors in today’s design and production. Therefore, better
security along the supply line is required quickly and can be pushed by, for example,
the use of Blockchain technologies.
Finally, disruptive technologies can have a huge impact on cyber security. For example,
quantum computers will have a huge and immediate impact on cyber security when
they are finally realized and deployed on a wholesale, real-world scale. Therefore,
preparation is essential, even in the unlikely case that quantum computing does not
get beyond the experimental lab stage. Thus, systems must be highly adaptive; for
example, algorithms must be exchangeable quickly and comprehensively, but also
structures and organizations must be flexible, being able to control and implement the
required administrative processes.
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Abstract: Global superpowers do not have a monopoly on cyber warfare. Software
thieves can steal malware written by more advanced coders and hackers, modify it,
and reuse it for their own purposes. Smaller nations and even non-state actors can
bypass the most technically challenging aspects of a computer network operation –
vulnerability discovery and exploit development – to quickly acquire world-class
cyber weapons. This paper is in two parts. First, it describes the technical aspects of
malware re-weaponization, specifically the replacement of an existing payload and/or
command-and-control (C2) architecture. Second, it explores the implications of this
phenomenon and its ramifications for a range of strategic concerns including weapons
proliferation, attack attribution, the fog of war, false flag operations, international
diplomacy, and strategic miscalculation. And as with Aladdin’s magic lamp, many
malware thieves discover that obtaining a powerful new weapon carries with it risks
as well as rewards.
Keywords: malware, cyberwar, re-weaponization, false flag, attribution

1. INTRODUCTION: STEALING CYBER WEAPONS
In Arabian Nights, a poor but clever Aladdin finds a magic lamp offering power,
wealth, and love. However, the acquisition of these benefits also carried a burden
of risk and responsibility. This parable offers lessons for aspiring cyber armies. The
theft of advanced malware facilitates a similar shortcut to increased power on digital
national security terrain. Computer code written by the Great Powers, including the
United States, Russia, China, and Israel, can be acquired, reverse-engineered, and reweaponized by small nations and even non-state actors.
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Malware is a weapon unlike old-fashioned tanks and planes, and it is not necessary to
break into a top-secret malware vault to steal it. Rather, compiled and fully-functioning
cyber weapons can be found every day, by a careful observer, within network traffic
and even on most email servers. And just as with Aladdin’s magic lamp, these tools
can be quickly repurposed for new operations, entirely distinct from what the malware
was originally intended to do. Such malware theft can save thousands of hours of time
and effort.
When Sir Isaac Newton said, “if I have seen further, it is by standing on ye shoulders
of giants,” [1] he was also presaging this phenomenon. Indeed, not just malware but
all of today’s software benefits from the millions of coders and hackers who came
before. Precious little code today is written entirely from scratch. Instead, existing
code is customized and/or has new features added to it. And this is only one example
of the way in which IT has changed both the nature of power and the way in which
power is transferred between people, organizations, and nations. This is true not
only for source code, but also in the case of malware samples, where only access to
executable code is available.
We know for a fact that malware re-weaponization is possible because we often see it
within academic research1 [2] [3] and in capture-the-flag (CTF) hacker competitions
[4]. However, we have also seen reflections of it in real-world computer network
operations by nation-states [5] [6]. Cyber actors and campaigns with names like
DarkHotel, Lazarus, and TigerMilk have been seen throughout Asia, reusing attack
code such as NetTraveler and Decafett in ways that also appear to incorporate false
flags intended to cast blame on others during cyber operations [7].
One of the most prominent recent cases of malware source code theft involved the
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), from which code was allegedly stolen and
released by the “Shadow Brokers” via the website Wikileaks in 2016. Reportedly,
an NSA exploit named EternalBlue was leveraged in May 2017 to facilitate the
WannaCry ransomware attack that targeted Windows computers and demanded
Bitcoin payments. A month later, EternalBlue was used again to propagate the Petya
ransomware, primarily against Ukraine. In March 2017, the Shadow Brokers also
released malware allegedly developed by the CIA, again via Wikileaks [8].
What is a “cyber weapon”? To be sure, this term has been abused and exaggerated
by analysts, journalists, and politicians, even when describing some well-known case
studies [9]. And strangely, in some long-standing international conflicts, there seem
to have been no known examples of cyber-attacks at all [10]. Part of the challenge
in defining cyber-attacks and “cyber war” is the novelty of this new conflict domain.
1
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The Bao paper cited here discusses an “automatic system” for identifying and replacing outer shellcode.
Our discussion in this paper goes deeper and examines the escalation of privilege exploits, as well as a C2
replacement technique that appears perfect for false flag attacks.

On March 23, 2018, noted security researcher “The Grugq” explored this question
in depth during a Black Hat conference keynote entitled, “A Short Course in Cyber
Warfare.” The Grugq referred to “Cyber” as the “5th Domain” of warfare, which is
“literally a new dimension” and “much more complicated than anything we know.”
He explained that cyber-attacks comprise “Active,” “Passive,” “Physical,” and
“Cognitive” elements that can be employed in unique ways every time, making the
next cyber-attack painfully hard to predict – and sometimes even to understand.2
For the purposes of this paper, the authors consider that a cyber-attack can be any
information-based or kinetic operation designed to compromise the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of an IT system. In a national security context, such an
operation must cause sufficient harm that it rises to the attention of national decision
makers. It is this latter criterion that contributes to the definition controversy, as a
final determination is subjective and open to political or business opportunism;
however, this is a problem that certainly predates the Internet. Finally, the authors
share the opinion that the malware sample analysed in this paper more than meets
the requirement for a cyber weapon, as it contains two rare “zero-day” exploits and is
specifically designed to give an attacker full remote-access to a target computer.
Here is what current U.S. policy states about “computer network operations”:
“Cyberspace is the most affordable domain through which to attack the United States.
Viruses, malicious code, and training are readily available over the Internet at no cost.
Adversaries can develop, edit, and reuse current tools for network attacks.” [11].
The concept of malware theft via executable code manipulation (i.e. no access to
source code) has also been addressed directly. In an August 2017 speech to a U.S.
Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems (DoDIIS) conference,
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lt Gen Vincent Stewart said, “Once
we’ve isolated malware, I want to reengineer it and prep to use it against the same
adversary who sought to use it against us.” [12].
Within the context of NATO, there is ample evidence that computer network operations
have already risen to the highest level of importance. In 2016, NATO promised to
defend allied cyberspace as it has land, sea, and air since the end of World War II.
Further, it is now officially integrating cyber operations into its military plans [13]
with the explicit goal of trying to deter cyber-attacks like those that have occurred in
Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the United States [14] [15].
The theft and re-weaponization of malware samples, in which hackers steal each
other’s executable code, swap existing payloads for custom munitions, and/or
2

As an example of an “Active” cyber-attack, The Grugq cited Israel’s manipulation of the Palestine
Liberation Organization’s online financial resources; for “Passive” he cited China’s “Operation Aurora”
vs. Google in 2009; for “Physical” he cited Stuxnet; and “Cognitive” includes the doxing of the U.S.
Democratic National Committee in 2016.
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replace its command-and-control (C2) functionality, will increase the number of
actors, attacks, and complexities on the cyber battlefield, and will negatively impact
deterrence, diplomacy, and arms control in cyberspace.
This paper is divided into two primary sections: 1) a description of the technical aspects
of malware re-weaponization, and 2) an exploration of its strategic implications.

2. MALWARE RE-WEAPONIZATION:
TECHNICAL ASPECTS
In this section, the authors will examine the first part of their argument: that malware
analysis is not “rocket science” and that executable code of any type can be captured,
reverse-engineered, and repurposed with relative speed and ease. We will look at a
genuine malware sample that was detected on a live network in 2017.3 We believe that
this malicious program was used by a nation-state with the specific intent of breaching
a well-defended computer network. By any measure, it is advanced code, in part due
to the fact that the program leverages no fewer than two “zero-day” exploits.4
The key takeaway from this short analysis is that the most technically challenging part
of a cyber-attack’s lifecycle – its vulnerability discovery and exploit development –
can simply be stolen from another cyber actor. A malware thief (or cyber army) can
then reconfigure and repurpose the code, adding unique functionality and/or control
data, and then launch a high-grade cyber weapon in any direction they choose.
FIGURE 1. RUSSIAN DOLL [16]

3
4
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The authors do not go into sufficient detail to allow the reader to create a live weapon. Specific technical
details such as exact byte offsets are omitted.
“Zero-day” exploits target computer vulnerabilities that are yet unknown to software makers and security
researchers; an exploit ceases to be a zero-day once specific patches are available.

A. Malware and its Russian doll design

Computer programs, including malware, are characterized by a layered structure that
can be compared to a Russian matryoshka doll. With malware, most of the layers form
a benign skeletal structure, while others (some of which can be hidden or encrypted)
are designed to subvert computer security, hijack communications, or steal data.
1. Human layer
• The outermost layer is that which humans see and understand, such as a
Microsoft (MS) Office document. Our sample was an MS Word file sent via
email. For an infection to begin, the email recipient simply had to open the
attached file which had been expertly crafted by a phishing specialist.
2. Image file
• Once opened, the MS file loaded an Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) image
file that contained hidden, encrypted computer instructions in hexadecimal
format5 [17].
3. Shellcode
• The decrypted code exploited a vulnerability in the Office EPS engine CVE2017-0261 and executed shellcode that was embedded within the EPS file
in order to open a command window through which an attacker could try to
access the target computer.
4. Dropper
• The shellcode was obfuscated (packed) and contained a Portable Executable
(PE) file to be launched on the victim’s computer. The executable file
performed privilege escalation (CVE-2017-0263, individual exploits for 32or 64-bit OS) and wrote a payload executable to disk.6
5. Payload
• Once sufficient privileges were gained on the target computer, a “payload”
was run, which was a fully-fledged remote administration tool that could
perform a range of malicious actions such as stealing, blocking, and/
or manipulating data. In our sample, the payload had been encrypted and
compressed as an additional way to delay and complicate malware analysis.
6. Command-and-Control (C2)
• After successful installation, the malware tried to “phone home” to a
malicious C2 domain somewhere on the Internet in an attempt to report for
duty, seek updates, and await further instructions. These communications
were encrypted to help protect them from the prying eyes of network
defenders.
This level of malware analysis is not difficult and is available to any nation. Powerful
tools such as code disassemblers and debuggers can perform decryption, de5
6

Researchers recently reported that multiple online threat actors, including Russian cyber espionage groups,
have been leveraging EPS files and zero-days against European diplomatic and military entities.
These exploits took advantage of Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) 2017-0263.
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obfuscation, and unpacking of malware samples. In our case study, we employed
numerous techniques. Some aspects of the design, such as the “.zip” algorithm and the
“XOR cipher”, are well-known to most malware researchers. Others, such as a string
obfuscation algorithm for the C2, were custom-made by the malware’s author, and
required in-depth reverse-engineering.7
FIGURE 2. MALWARE SAMPLE ARCHITECTURE

B. Re-weaponization

Malware dissection at this level of detail already yields sufficient understanding
for redesign and re-weaponization purposes. This section describes two ways to reweaponize malware: 1) C2 replacement, and 2) payload replacement. Once either
modification is performed, the malware thief simply reverses the steps taken in
the malware’s analysis, layer-by-layer, for the entire software package – just like a
Russian doll.
The authors successfully tested both C2 replacement and payload replacement on this
sample. They also wrote user-friendly command-line-interface scripts whereby even
non-technical personnel, without any reverse-engineering knowledge, could perform
the entire process.
1) Command and Control (C2) replacement
The quickest way to re-weaponize a malware sample is simply to replace its C2
components, such as by giving it a new domain that is under the malware thief’s
control. In fact, malware authors often reuse C2 architectures over time, even for
7
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This effort required knowledge of the C programming language, as well as some luck. For example, one
algorithm was symmetric, i.e. encrypt = decrypt. Asymmetric encryption could be defeated as well, but we
would need to use a new encryption key and therefore the re-weaponized sample would be different from
the original.

different exploits and malware campaigns. This typically serves to simplify ongoing
operations which can grow in complexity over time. However, this characteristic also
helps cyber defenders and malware thieves to analyse and reverse engineer how an
attacker’s C2 architecture works, both tactically and strategically.
Replacing the C2 requires an intermediate level of technical expertise in software
coding, reverse engineering, and network communications. But with the aid of
disassembler software, this task can be accomplished relatively quickly, even by a
small team or a lone expert. There can be technical limitations, such as with the length
of the domain name. However, in practice, such limitations are easily overcome with
some level of flexibility and creativity on the part of the malware thief.8
Finally, C2 replacement offers malware thieves an additional, tantalizing opportunity:
the possibility of running easy false-flag operations. First, a re-weaponized malware
sample is virtually indistinguishable from the original. Second, the malware thief can
use the same service providers (including certificate issuers, hosters, DNS registrars,
etc.) to make a new operation simply blend in with the campaign that the original
attacker was already running, providing instant anonymity, or at least plausible
deniability.
In Figure 3, below, the authors have written a small (120 lines of code) script to
demonstrate the simplicity of C2 replacement. Here, there is just one command line
parameter: the new C2 domain (cycon.org). All the necessary steps to replace the
C2 domain in the malicious EPS file have been automated in an easy-to-use script.
Running “python changeCnC.py cycon\.org [epsOutputFile” produces a malicious
EPS file that can be included in a Word document. Once the malicious Word document
is opened, malware infects the computer and connects to the modified C2 domain
(cycon.org, as seen in the example screenshot). The primary challenge regarding C2
replacement is that one needs to reverse-engineer the C2 communication protocol and
write server-side software to support this protocol.

8

For example, there are many ways to generate a short domain name, and to verify that it works, before an
attack is launched.
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FIGURE 3. C2 REPLACEMENT TO CYCON.ORG

2) Payload replacement
A second option for a would-be malware thief is to replace the payload with a tailored
munition of their choice. For many scenarios, this is in fact the preferred option for a
malware thief, such as:
1.
2.
3.

when the thief already possesses custom agent and server software;
time constraints do not allow for C2 reverse-engineering; or
a proposed operation has easily achievable objectives such as wiping all data
on the victim’s machines.

Payload replacement is more invasive than C2 replacement and requires more
malware expertise. As with C2 replacement, there can be some technical limitations,
such as payload size. However, these can also be overcome with some flexibility and
creativity after which the attacker can download additional malware modules via the
Internet.
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3. STRATEGIC IMPACT
In the previous section, the authors established that, even with limited time and
expertise, a malware thief can reverse-engineer advanced malware, replace its C2
architecture, or replace its payload with a tailored munition, and launch an entirely
new attack. In this section, we will explore the ramifications of this phenomenon for
cyber defenders and for national security decision-makers9 [18]. We will cover six
strategic consequences in order from the logically most urgent and compelling to
address to the least:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Proliferation
Attribution
Fog of War
False Flags
Diplomacy
Miscalculation

A. Proliferation

The first and most obvious challenge posed by malware re-weaponization is
proliferation. Arms control, as a discipline, seeks to reduce the size of military arsenals
that are capable of inflicting harm on humanity. But recycling malware means that
the same vulnerabilities and exploits can be used by Country A against Country B,
Country C against Country D, Country E against Country F, and so on. Furthermore,
smaller nations and even non-state actors will sometimes be able to employ truly
world-class digital weapons that would have been almost impossible for them to
develop on their own.
So far, the cyber battlefield has seemingly been dominated by the Great Powers, such
as the United States, Russia, and China, as well as regional powers with ongoing
conflicts like Israel, Iran, and North Korea. Further, one experienced national security
and cyber security specialist, James Lewis, recently argued that non-state actors are
simply incapable of launching “massive and damaging” cyber-attacks [19]. But we
suspect that most governments are, at the very least, leveraging computer network
operations for cyber espionage in support of their core national security interests. We
contend that malware theft and re-weaponization will only make this more common.

9

The Leitzel paper cited here, “Cyber Ricochet: Risk Management and Cyberspace Operations,” uses
the phrase “cyber ricochet” to denote denial-of-service attacks where the attacker does not directly
communicate with the target but instead sends packets to intermediate nodes with spoofed source/
destination addresses. The authors of this paper feel that the term “cyber ricochet”, along with the label
“reflection attack” which is used to describe a common hacker technique, imply that the malware thief
is not directly controlling the operation and that an attack with unexpected consequences could result.
However, when the payload or C2 infrastructure is wholly replaced, as we describe here, the attacker is in
full control.
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Above all, re-weaponization can save an aspiring cyber power significant time and
money. IT and hacker talent are expensive. A credible cyber-attack program requires
software developers, vulnerability analysts, exploit developers, malware testers, bot
herders, and much more. In 2010, noted hacker and former NSA employee Charlie
Miller told a CyCon audience that an effective cyber army would cost about $45
million per year with almost one-quarter of that sum spent on vulnerability analysts
and exploit developers [20]. Thus, malware reuse offers a substantial reduction in cost
for the most technically challenging parts of any operation: vulnerability discovery
and exploit development.

B. Attribution

Increased cyber weapons proliferation means that there will be more armies on the
cyber battlefield which in turn will increase the challenge of attribution. The digital
battlefield has always been difficult for humans to see, understand, and contextualize.
And three of the primary goals of a cyber-attacker are stealth, anonymity, or plausible
deniability. Most cyber-attacks are closer to a covert operation than a traditional
military operation. The laws of war state that soldiers should wear national uniforms
with proper insignia, in part to bolster accountability for actions taken. However,
hackers take advantage of the labyrinthine architecture of the Internet to obscure their
true location.
The question of finding who is sitting at a remote keyboard is therefore fundamental
to enhancing not only cyber security but also national security including deterrence,
diplomacy, arms control, prosecution, and/or retaliation.10 For computer network
operations, this has been true since at least the mid-1980s.11 Following the Cold War, and
especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, law enforcement and counterintelligence
agencies have invested considerable resources in cyber-attack attribution, but the
size of the Internet and the dynamic nature of cyberspace have ensured that this will
remain a vexing challenge for the foreseeable future.12 Attribution is an art as well as
a science, and a cyber-attack must usually cross a high threshold in terms of damages
before sufficient resources will be allocated to its success [21].
Today, cyber defense is a professional discipline, and attribution is typically based on
a wide range of observable tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).13 However, in
many cyber-attack investigations, there has been a singular, most valuable attribution
10
11

12

13
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For example, in the 1990s, there were numerous cases in which the U.S. Government believed that a
cyber-attack had been launched by a nation-state only to discover that it was a teenage student.
In the 1980s, Cliff Stoll, a system administrator at the University of California, Berkeley, spent a year
tracking likely Russia-backed hackers who were targeting U.S. national laboratories, a tale recounted in
The Cuckoo’s Egg.
More recently, commercial firms have gotten into the attribution game. However, without the benefit of
other sources of intelligence available to nation-states, such as human (HUMINT) and signals intelligence
(SIGINT), they remain at higher risk of making mistakes in attribution.
Robust attribution relies on many pieces of evidence, including MD5 hashes, “diff” results, payloads, IP
addresses, C2 infrastructure, domain names, digital certificates, network searches, exfiltrated data, source
code, time zones, algorithms, encryption, current events, and more.

indicator: the malware “signature”. Cyber actors have traditionally been associated
with particular “families” of malware. Malware theft and re-weaponization therefore
threatens to wreak havoc on the attribution process as we know it if an increasing
number of players are simply using the same hacker tools that tend to be tightly
controlled by their creator, and only accessible to others by malware reuse.

C. Fog of War

If already-challenging attribution becomes harder, national security decision-making
will suffer from a thicker “fog of war”. Sun Tzu famously wrote that “all warfare is
based on deception” [22], but in the age of cyberwar, this dictum has never been more
true. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that so many cyber-attacks take place
during peacetime, either as cyber espionage or preparation of the battlespace for some
future war that may never take place. Thus, in many ways, what we call “cyberwar”
has no beginning – and no end.
The risks that cyber-attacks pose to our national critical infrastructures is high.
Their integrity rests on the proper functioning of IT. This is true for everything from
electricity to elections. Examples abound: in 2007, Syrian air defense personnel were
apparently blinded by a cyber-attack that preceded an assault by Israeli warplanes; in
2015, foreign hackers are believed to have turned out the lights in Western Ukraine;
and in 2016, Russian hackers were blamed for interfering in the U.S. Presidential
election.
Malware theft and re-weaponization will increase the fog of war precisely because
it increases weapons proliferation and hinders attack attribution. If all nations have
access to roughly the same arsenal of vulnerabilities and exploits, who is to say
that a third party is not playing agent provocateur in an ongoing conflict between
two other nations? And how does any nation know when its cybersecurity has been
compromised to the point that a traditional military invasion – or a coup d’état – is
imminent? The chances for misunderstanding and miscalculation in cyberspace loom
large indeed, especially in a conflict domain where time is of the essence.14

D. False Flags

Potential cyber-attackers know that the fog of war is thicker than ever. This fact will
tempt many of them to engage in “false flag” operations that involve an effort to pin
the blame on a third party. Such tactics long preceded the Internet, as pirate ships used
to hoist false flags in an effort to prevent their targets from readying their defenses or
evading the threat [23]. Modern spies also carry counterfeit passports, wear disguises,
and lie about their true intentions.

14

Especially considering that the latest craze in both cyber-attack and defense is artificial intelligence (AI).
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Malware theft and re-weaponization will tempt national-level decision-makers to
engage in this type of behavior across the open Internet. False flag operations can be
tricky to run as there are so many details to get right and so many ways that an operation
can go wrong. But in cyberspace, the chances of success are higher, and the penalty
for getting caught less severe than for a traditional military or intelligence operation.
For most cyber operations, anonymity is not required, as plausible deniability will
suffice.
Cyberspace is vast, and growing more crowded by the day, with students, soldiers,
spies, and statesmen all living and working in the same space. There are 193 sovereign
member states of the U.N., but there are 255 Internet country code top-level domains
(ccTLD)15. This gives cyber-attackers the chance to be whomever they want, and
suggests that malware reuse will increase the number of false flag political and
military operations we see.

E. Diplomacy

If malware reuse is so helpful from an attacker’s perspective, those who would seek
to counter these advantages – law enforcement, counterintelligence, and diplomats
– will have a more arduous road before them. Within the realm of international
relations, the management of negotiations, treaties, and tension fall under the rubric
of diplomacy. However, the rise of the Internet and cyberspace has complicated our
understanding of both national security and diplomacy. There is only one Internet, and
one cyberspace, and all nations are struggling to retain their traditional concepts of
national sovereignty and law enforcement jurisdiction within it.
In 2018, diplomatic tensions over information security could hardly be higher. In
cyber espionage, there are continuing reverberations over the Snowden revelations.16
In propaganda, Russian interference in the U.S. electoral process has led to efforts
throughout Europe to protect social media from information operations emanating
from Moscow. And in nuclear diplomacy, cyber-attacks have been used by both sides
on the Korean peninsula to improve their odds of victory in a real war.
Cyberwar is of special significance to diplomats for four reasons. First, cyber-attacks
typically fall below the threshold of the use of force, so will be publicly addressed by
diplomats more often than by soldiers. Second, most cyberwar occurs in peacetime
when diplomacy takes priority over military operations. Third, diplomats are prime
targets of an adversary’s cyber espionage and influence operations. Fourth, alliance
members risk getting dragged into a cyber conflict which they did not approve or even
know about.

15
16
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Internet country code top-level domains (ccTLD) encompass not only countries but also dependent
territories.
For example, governments in Europe and South America have discussed building a new undersea cable in
the Atlantic Ocean that could avoid direct digital contact with the United States.

Success or failure in diplomacy can have life-or-death consequences. Malware
theft and re-weaponization will complicate cyber-related diplomacy, because of the
expected rise in the number of actors, frequency of attacks, and the level of complexity
of many cyber operations.

F. Miscalculation

History is littered with national security-related mistakes, from invading Russia to
bombing Pearl Harbor, made by those who trusted in hope. It is human nature to be
overly optimistic. And the theft of world-class malware is no different, carrying as it
does risks for any malware thief. Attribution is difficult, but ultimately not impossible.
It is easy to imagine that smaller nations, without sufficient political and military
strength, will use such a weapon rashly and prematurely, and suffer disproportionate
retaliation, in what could be a miscalculation of strategic proportions.
The fact that computer network operations are often time-sensitive only adds to this
risk. When an attacker is able to pair an exploit (even a zero-day) with a discovered
vulnerability, it is understood that the window of opportunity will not be open forever.
A system administrator or software company can update, patch, or harden the target
network, operating system, or application at any time. Malware signatures are
constantly updated. And a malware thief has the added pressure of knowing that at
least one other party knows about the exploit and vulnerability.
Even the possession of powerful malware does not mean that an attacker can
properly execute all facets of a complex computer network operation. Part of it they
may get right and others wrong. Hackers are routinely caught during any phase of a
cyber-attack, from reconnaissance, to lateral movement on a network, during data
exfiltration, and so on – sometimes even long after an attack is over. Incident response
is always improving, and if done correctly, it will incorporate traditional intelligence
analysis sources and methods as part of its attribution determination.
A final consideration involves stolen malware that has been backdoored, trojaned, or
watermarked (potentially with malware theft in mind). Unless a hacker has written a
computer program from scratch, it is hard to know whether it contains undiscovered,
hidden functionality. For example, in 2013, the Syrian government allegedly targeted
non-governmental organizations in Syria by encouraging them via social media
to download Freegate, a common Virtual Private Network (VPN) client used to
circumvent censorship. The Syrian government had reportedly trojaned this version
of Freegate, precisely to target domestic opposition [24]. Thus, the desire for a quick,
cheap cyber-attack can lead a malware thief into a trap.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
For Aladdin, the acquisition of a magic lamp brought both benefits and risks. The theft
and re-weaponization of malware is no different. Smaller nations, and even non-state
actors, can obtain powerful digital weapons almost for free. As a result, there will be
more armies on the cyber battlefield, more cyber-attacks, and a higher overall level of
complexity for cyber defense. This phenomenon will have ramifications for weapons
proliferation, attack attribution, the fog of war, false flag operations, international
diplomacy, and strategic miscalculation.
If a malware thief asks too much of the magic lamp, however, there may be serious
repercussions and unintended consequences. All cyber thieves must ask themselves
whether they have the traditional political and military might to absorb a potential
response. In this light, reliable attribution might still tend toward traditionally strong
military powers – states that in any case may be less concerned with unforeseen
consequences.
In terms of mitigating the potential impact of malware theft and re-weaponization,
governments are likely to consider a wide range of options, including enhanced
vulnerability disclosure,17 watermarking digital weapons to keep closer track of them,
the use of blockchain to enhance attribution, and even the signing of non-aggression
pacts for cyberspace.18 More research is needed on mitigation strategies.
In the longer term, it is possible that an increased awareness of this phenomenon
will slow down the current pace of cyber operations worldwide, so that nations can
better safeguard their code and operations. Potentially, this will serve to decelerate
the prevailing level of conflict and instability in cyberspace, since every nation is
now home to an abundance of cyber vulnerabilities. Advanced cyber powers might be
wise to consider more carefully the potential fallout from approving reckless digital
operations so that they do not lose control of the magic lamp.
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Abstract: Existing legal literature would have us assume that espionage operations
and “below-the-threshold” cyber operations are doctrinally distinct. Whereas one is
subject to the scant, amorphous, and under-developed legal framework of espionage
law, the other is subject to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known
cumulatively as cyber law. This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading.
In practice, espionage and cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are
better conceived as two elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW).
This paper therefore first draws attention to the similarities between the practices – the
fact that the actors, technologies, and targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk
legal reactions of the international community. In light of the convergence between
peacetime Low-Intensity Cyber Operations (LICOs) and peacetime Espionage
Operations (EOs) the two should be subjected to a single regulatory framework, one
which recognizes the role intelligence plays in our public world order and which
adopts a contextual and consequential method of inquiry. The paper proceeds in
the following order: Part 2 provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic
relationship between espionage and cyber law, and further explains the reasons for this
dynamic. Part 3 places the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader
discourse on IW, making the claim that the convergence between EOs and LICOs, as
described in Part 2, could further be explained by an even larger convergence across
all the various elements of the informational environment. Parts 2 and 3 then serve
as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt of the drafters of the Tallinn
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Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber law, and the deficits of their
approach. The paper concludes by proposing an alternative holistic understanding
of espionage law, grounded in general principles of law, which is more practically
transferable to the cyber realm.
Keywords: international law, information warfare, espionage, cyber law, Tallinn
Manual 2.0, sovereignty, diplomatic law, consular law, general principles of law

1. INTRODUCTION
Here is a story in two parts. In Part I, the Defense Minister for the Republic of
Scamdinavia is honey-trapped by an attractive showgirl. During the course of their
secret affair, the showgirl introduces the Minister to a senior naval attaché from the
Embassy of Cyberia. The Minister, who quickly befriends the attaché, invites the
latter to visit his home. Upon arrival, the attaché creates a diversion and seizes the
opportunity to enter the Minister’s private office, placing a pen-shaped recording
device on his desk and photographing top-secret documents pertaining to the
Department’s security contracts and research spending. As a result, a number of topsecret Department of Defense projects are jeopardized, and the Minister is forced to
resign.1
The second part begins with a series of phishing emails, sent to a number of major
corporations across Scamdinavia, by a private hacking group with support and
direction from Cyberia’s central intelligence agency. The emails contain a trojan
downloader. Within an eight-month period, roughly 50,000 computers are infected
by the malicious code. Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft XML Core
Services, the malware begins modifying Windows registries, poisoning local DNS
caches, disabling antivirus programs, and sequencing certain information harvesting
and hard disk wiping processes. As a result of the attack, a number of financial
institutions in Scamdinavia are unable to provide services and take weeks to fully
restore functionality, causing significant economic losses. To make matters worse, the
1
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This hypothetical is loosely based on one of the biggest spy scandals and political controversies of the
Cold War era, the 1961 Profumo Affair. At the centre of the public blunder stood John Profumo, then
Secretary of State for War, who was discovered to have had a sexual affair with model and showgirl
Christine Keeler. Keeler was also romantically involved with Evgenii Ivanov, a senior naval attaché at
the Soviet Embassy and an officer of the Soviets’ Main Intelligence Directorate. At Keeler’s invitation,
Profumo and Ivanov met and soon became friends. Relying on his intimate access to Profumo’s home and
office, Ivanov was able to photograph highly classified documents pertaining to allied contingency plans
for the Cold War defense of Berlin, as well top-secret specifications of US spy planes and nuclear weapons.
Secretary Profumo initially denied the allegations of impropriety raised against him, but he eventually was
forced to resign from his post, a fact that played a role in hastening the end of Harold Macmillan’s term as
Prime Minister. For further reading see JONATHAN HASLAM, NEAR AND DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A
NEW HISTORY OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE, 207-209 (2015); Leon Watson, I Did Betray My Country:
Fifty Years After Profumo’s Resignation, Christine Keeler Confesses She Passed Secrets to Russians,
DAILY MAIL (9 June 2013), available at http://goo.gl/kPyXQT.

secret data of major government contractors is breached, and a number of top-secret
Department of Defense projects are jeopardized.2
Existing legal literature would have us assume that these two hypothetical scenarios
are doctrinally distinct. The first scenario is a textbook example of interstate spying,
and insofar as it is regulated at all, it is only subject to the scant, amorphous, and underdeveloped legal framework of espionage law.3 The second scenario, on the other hand,
involves an example of what is colloquially termed a “cyber attack”, which is subject
to an emerging, ever-evolving body of legal rules, known cumulatively as cyber law.4
This dichotomy, however, is erroneous and misleading. In practice, espionage and
cyber law function as communicating vessels, and so are better conceived as two
elements of a complex system, Information Warfare (IW). The paper draws attention
to the similarities between the practices – the fact that the actors, technologies, and
targets are interchangeable, as are the knee-jerk legal reactions of the international
community. In light of the convergence between peacetime low-intensity cyber
operations and peacetime espionage operations, the two should be subjected to a
2

3

4

This hypothetical is inspired by the events that transpired in South Korea on 20 March 2013 and are
commonly known as the “Dark Seoul” incident. The attack, which occurred at approximately 2:15pm,
hit television broadcasters YNT and MBC, as well as banks KBS, Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jetu. South
Korea’s communicating regulator, Park Jae-Moon, released a statement suggesting that: “unidentified
hackers used Chinese IP addresses to contact servers of the six affected organizations and plant malware
which attacked their computers.” Based on previous practice of North Korea to spoof Chinese IP address, a
number of high-ranking officials from South Korea pointed their finger to Pyongyang. For further reading
see Jonathan A.P. Marpaung & HoonJae Lee, Dark Seoul Cyber Attack: Could it Be Worse, 6th Conference
of Indonesian Students Association in Korea (7 July 2013), available at http://goo.gl/MgCI9u; China
IP Address link to South Korea Cyber-Attack, BBC News (21 March 2013), available at http://goo.gl/
wm43kQ.
As Prof. Chesterman has argued, intelligence exists “in a legal penumbra, lying at the margins of diverse
legal regimes and at the edge of international legitimacy.” Elsewhere he noted that: “despite its relative
importance in the conduct of international affairs, there are few treaties that deal with it directly. Academic
literature typically omits the subject entirely or includes a paragraph or two defining espionage and
describing the unhappy fate of captured spies. For the most part, only special regimes such as the laws
of war address intelligence explicitly. Beyond this, it looms large but almost silently in the legal regimes
dealing with diplomatic protection and arms control.” See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came In From
the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 1071, at 1072, 1130 (2006);
Richard Falk, foreword, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW v, v (Roland J.
Stranger ed., 1962) (“traditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice of
espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines
a spy and describes his hapless fate upon capture”); Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International
Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV.1091, 1091 (2004) (“Espionage is
curiously ill-defined under international law, even though all developed nations, as well as many lesserdeveloped ones, conduct spying and eavesdropping operations against their neighbors”); Gary D. Brown
& Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 115, 116 (2014) (“there is a long-standing (and cynically named) ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between
nations to ignore espionage in international law”).
See e.g., MICHAEL N. SCHMITT (ED.), TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (2nd ed., 2017); UN General Assembly Resolution on an
International Code of Conduct for Information Security, UN Doc. A/66/359 (14 September 2011); Elaine
Korzak, UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of an Era?, THE DIPLOMAT (31 July 2017), available at
http://goo.gl/BSWfnm; Louise Arimatsu, A Treaty for Governing Cyber-Weapons: Potential Benefits and
Practical Limitations, in 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT (Czosseck
& Ziolkowski eds., 2012); Joseph S. Nye Jr., The World Needs New Norms on Cyberwarfare, THE
WASHINGTON POST (1 October 2015), available at http://goo.gl/NuC4z7; Brad Smith, The Need for
a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (14 February 2017), available at goo.
gl/4xPN7F.
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single regulatory framework, one which recognizes the role that intelligence plays in
our public world order and which adopts a contextual and consequential method of
inquiry.
Part 2 of this paper provides a descriptive account of the unique symbiotic relationship
between espionage and cyber law. It further explains the reasons for this dynamic and
applies its findings to the two hypothetical scenarios introduced above. Part 3 then
situates the discussion surrounding this relationship within the broader discourse on IW,
making the claim that the convergence identified in Part 2 could further be explained
by an even larger convergence across all the various elements of the informational
environment. Parts 2 and 3 serve as the backdrop for Part 4, which details the attempt
of the drafters of Tallinn Manual 2.0 to compartmentalize espionage law and cyber
law, and the deficits of their approach. The paper concludes by proposing in Part 5 an
alternative holistic understanding of espionage law, grounded in general principles of
law, which is more practically transferable to the cyber realm.

2. LAW OF COMMUNICATING VESSELS
“If you had a bent tube, one arm of which was the size of a pipestem and the other big enough to hold the ocean, water would stand
at the same height in one as in the other. Thus discussion equalizes
fools and wise men in the same way, and the fools know it.”
					
-Oliver Wendell Holmes5
The experiment described in the quote, what Justice Holmes called the “hydrostatic
paradox of controversy”, is merely the Justice’s cynical take on a classic principle
of fluid mechanics, according to which the levels of homogenous liquid in a system
of connected containers will always aspire to be equal, since the pressures on
those levels are equal. Thus, if additional liquid is added to one vessel, the liquid
will immediately find a new equal level in all connected vessels. This image of the
“communicating vessels” experiment carries with it a powerful metaphor, which
has been used across the humanities and social sciences, from construing surrealist
thought,6 to characterizing international policies on torture.7 In this paper, I argue
that the trite principle could also be helpful in describing the dialectical relationship
between espionage law and cyber law.
What do I mean by “espionage” and “cyber”? It is worth recalling that: “no
5
6
7
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2 JOHN T. MORSE, LIFE AND LETTERS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOMES 40 (1896). The statement
was made by Holmes in response to an article in The Nation which harshly criticized his philosophy.
ANDRÉ BRETON, COMMUNICATING VESSELS (Translated by Mary Ann Caws & Geoffrey Harris,
1990).
STEVEN DEWULF, THE SIGNATURE OF EVIL: (RE)DEFINING TORTURE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 535-551 (2011).

internationally recognized and workable definition of ‘intelligence collection’
exists.”8 Similarly “there are no common definitions for Cyber terms – they are
understood to mean different things by different nations/organizations”.9 Given these
innate ambiguities, it is important that I provide working definitions for both terms
at the outset of this paper. To begin with, I am only interested in those cyber and
espionage operations that occur in peacetime, given that wartime spying and cyber
warfare are more constrained by the rules of international humanitarian law, and in
any event occur at a far lesser rate than their peacetime equivalents. Limiting myself
to peacetime cyber operations further narrows the scope of cyber activities to be
examined, as it excludes from review those operations that by their scale and effect
are likely to trigger an international armed conflict or to provoke responses in selfdefense. Our attention thus automatically shifts to Low-Intensity Cyber Operations
(LICOs). These are “below-the-threshold” operations which have not only proven
to be significantly costly in recent years, but are in fact commonplace, as Michael
Schmitt notes: “Few, if any, cyber operations have [ever] crossed the armed attack
threshold”.10
With Espionage Operations (EOs), I tend to cast the net quite wide, using the
terms “espionage”, “intelligence collection”, “surveillance”, and “reconnaissance”
interchangeably, thus rejecting method-based definitional distinctions. Instead, I
use the term EOs to mean a peacetime operation which encompasses the following
four elements: (1) the operation involves the gathering, analysis, verification, and
dissemination of information of relevance to the decision-making process of a State
or States or otherwise serves some State interests; (2) the operation is launched by
agents of a State or States, or those with a sufficient nexus to the State or States in
question; (3) the operation targets a foreign State or States, their subjects, associations,
corporations, or agents, without the knowledge or consent of that State or those States;
and (4) the operation involves some degree of secrecy and confidentiality, as to the
needs behind the operation and/or the methods of collection and analysis employed,

8
9
10

Sulmasy and Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L.
L. 625, 637 (2007).
Cyber Definitions, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, available at http://goo.gl/
wtAkWP.
Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option
and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 698 (2014). For further reading on the nature of LICOs
see: Beatrice Waldon, Note, Duties Owed: Low-Intensity Cyber Attacks and Liability for Transboundary
Torts in International Law, 126(5) YALE L. J. 1242 (2017). See also James R. Clapper, Statement of the
Record, US Cybersecurity and Policy, Senate Armed Services Committee (29 September 2015), available
at goo.gl/aWSgKH (where Clapper makes an alarming prediction: “we foresee an ongoing series of lowto-moderate level cyber-attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on
US economic competitiveness and national security”).
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so to ensure its effectiveness.11 Notice that I exclude from review various forms
of unconcealed open-source intelligence gathering, such as reading a newspaper,
visiting a social media website, or gathering information in the course of routine
diplomatic relations (element 4). I further exclude from my analysis domestic forms
of surveillance focusing solely on interstate activities, launched by one State and its
proxies (element 2) against another State and its proxies (element 3).
Already visible is the close proximity in nature between EOs and LICOs, for our
definition of LICOs could also be limited only to interstate interactions (especially if
we are to distinguish between LICOs and more local forms of domestic cyber crime).
The only difference, therefore, between EOs and LICOs rests on the first element.
Unlike EOs, LICOs can only be employed against electronic information (as opposed
to non-electronic physical properties, e.g. a passport kept in a dresser or printed
bank records stored in a cabinet). Moreover, LICOs are different as they may extend
beyond the mere passive copying and storing of data to other more aggressive and
coercive forms of electronic intrusion (e.g. altering, removing, disrupting, degrading,
or destroying certain information, programs, systems, or networks).12
Therefore, if we put EOs and LICOs in a Venn diagram (see below in Figure 1),
not only will the circle-circle overlap be significant (encompassing different types
of cyber espionage and electronic surveillance operations), but the remaining sets
will share profound similarities. I provide below a list of hypothetical examples of
operations which are either exclusively EOs, exclusively LICOs, or in between, to
exemplify those similarities.
It is this affinity between EOs and LICOs that creates the “communicating vessels”
phenomenon. Any attempt to modify or extend existing bodies of international law
to better regulate LICOs will inevitably result in tidal waves that will engulf EOs.
11

12
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This definition mirrors in some respects, and departs from in others, the definition put forward by
Dermarest: “espionage can be defined as the consciously deceitful collection of information, ordered by
a government or organization hostile to or suspicious of those the information concerns, accomplished by
humans unauthorized by the target to do the collecting” (Geoffrey Dermarest, Espionage in International
Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 326). Note that as highlighted in Dermarest’s definition, and
as a general rule, intelligence operations involve some degree of secrecy and confidentiality to ensure their
effectiveness (operations de cape et d’épée, coupled with some degree of deceitful intent). That said such
is not always mandated (e.g. open source intelligence collection).
Note that my definition of EOs excludes “covert action” operations. These types of activities have a
different primary purpose than the acquisition of intelligence. They seek the “purposive attenuation
of the options of the target”, influencing economic, ideological, political, diplomatic, and military
conditions abroad. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN AND JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT
ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN
INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW 10-12 (1992) (Reisman and Baker provide a useful list
of examples of covert activities ranging from psychological operations and disinformation to political
assassinations). If I were to include covert action into the definition of EOs, additional similarities between
EOs and LICOs will surface (consider, for example, Russian interferences in elections as reflecting both
covert action and a “below the threshold” cyber intrusion). In other words, expanding the definition of
EOs to include covert action will entail extending its purpose beyond “mere passive copying and storing
of information to other more aggressive types” of intrusions (namely the disruptive, degrading, and
destructive kind).

Conversely, any attempt at normative compartmentalization or regulatory insulation
could be equated to challenging a law of physics and would not pass the smile test.
FIGURE 1: VENN DIAGRAM OF EOS AND LICOS INTERSECTION

Exclusively EOs:
• Launching a spy satellite into space to engage in geo-spatial monitoring of a
rogue country.
• Placing human agents in a major oil company, gathering information about
its strategic plans.
• Gathering information about a government ministry relying on diplomatic
engagements and open source materials.
• Placing cameras and microphones in the apartment of cyber criminals and
monitoring their business dealings.
• Entering a training camp for a terrorist organization and seizing certain
documents relating to an impending attack.
Exclusively LICOs:
• Jamming the communications links of a commercial satellite and sending it
false GPS coordinates.
• Launching a ransomware attack against a major oil company, shutting down
its operations for a short period.
• Launching a DDoS operation against a non-essential government service
website.
• Hacking the devices of cyber criminals and blocking their access to a certain
cryptocurrency.
• Installing malware on laptop computers at a terrorist training camp,
circumventing a terrorist plot by altering certain data stored therein.
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EOs-LICOs Overlap:
• Hacking a spy satellite for the purpose of gathering information about its
technical specifications.
• Installing malware on the tablet of an oil company’s CEO to gather
information about the company’s strategic plans.
• Hacking the DNS server of a government ministry and monitoring the
internet activities of the ministry’s staff.
• Hacking the devices of cyber-criminals and monitoring their business
dealings by remotely activating certain sensors.
• Installing spyware on laptop computers at a terrorist training camp, and
seizing certain documents relating to an impending attack.
To further my point, let us examine some areas of convergence between peacetime
EOs and LICOs. First, both passive intelligence collection and mildly more aggressive
cyber intrusions are launched by the same primary actors – State intelligence and
security agencies and/or their proxies – and using the same advanced technological
tools. Unit 8200 of Israel provides one good example,13 and APT33 with its ties
to Iran’s Cyber Army offers another.14 This reality is owed in part to the fact that
traditional EOs now rely heavily on cyber techniques to increase their likelihood of
success and broaden their scope of impact. For 16th century Sir Francis Walsingham,
the father of modern intelligence agencies, “a global mass surveillance program
involved paying off travellers in the ports of Lyon and merchant adventurers in the
bazars of Hamburg”.15 Today, we cannot imagine an intelligence agency that would be
satisfied with such low-tech techniques. SIGINT-based tools, such as the hacking of
connected devices and the interception of electronic communications (either targeted
or in bulk) have now significantly overshadowed the old historical techniques. The
rise to predominance of Cyber-HUMINT, as its own distinct discipline, proves that
even the most traditional of spying methodologies is not immune from this wave of
digitalization.16 Once an agency controls a band of cyberspies, calibrating between
passive collection and moderately more offensive intrusions is left to its discretion
and capacity limitations. So it is not surprising that the NSA is hoarding zero-day
13
14

15
16
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John Reed, Unit 8200: Israel’s Cyber Spy Agency, FINANCIAL TIMES (10 July 2015), available at goo.
gl/951paE.
Eric Auchard, Once ‘Kittens’ in cyber spy world, Iran gains prowess: security experts, REUTERS (20
September 2017), available at https://goo.gl/DCmDkf; Jaqueline O’Leary et al., Insight into Iranian Cyber
Espionage, FIREEYE (20 September 2017), available at https://goo.gl/vcS6Wc.
Asaf Lubin, A Principled Defence of the International Human Right to Privacy: A Response to Frédéric
Sourgens, 42(2) YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 2 (2017).
Andy Greenberg, Cyberespionage is a Top Priority for CIA’s New Directorate, WIRED (9 March 2015),
available at goo.gl/YWp5Zx (discussing the CIA’s “digital overhaul” and quoting Jim Lewis from the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, who notes: “Those ‘humint’ operations, as the intelligence
community calls them, typically involve real spies on the ground, unlike the NSA’s remote cyber espionage
or the cyberwarfare activities of the Pentagon’s Cyber Command. ‘This kind of cyber activity has become
increasingly important to them’ … That combination of humint and digital operations could mean a spy
infiltrating an organization to plant spyware by hand, for instance, or a digital investigation to check the
bona fides of a source or agent. ‘If you think of NSA operations as a vacuum cleaner and Cyber Command
as a hammer, this is a little more precise, and it’s about supporting human operations’”).

vulnerabilities,17 that the CIA controls a whole vault of cyber tools,18 or that the FBI
hacks thousands of foreign computers in the dark web with a trove of malware.19
Second, both EOs and LICOs thrive on “plausible deniability” and demand increased
levels of deception and secrecy, intrinsically resisting mechanisms of accountability.
Think of an undercover agent who is masquerading one day as a 30-year-old Danish
female protester at a reproductive rights rally and the next day as a 55-year-old
German wheelchair-bound male social worker. Now think of the Chinese hacker who
is spoofing his way through the Tor network, one day hijacking the computer of a real
Danish protester and the next adopting the online identity of an actual German social
worker. Both operations, due to their unique nature, create similar and significant
evidentiary hurdles for assigning individual and State responsibility under traditional
international legal frameworks.20
Finally, both EOs and LICOs target information in ways that are non-kinetic and
below-the-threshold, triggering the same knee-jerk international legal reactions. The
victims of spying and cyber operations have a limited basket of potential claims that
they might raise for a violation of international law, namely: violations of sovereignty,
territorial integrity, the principle of non-intervention, the prohibition on extraterritorial
enforcement, certain human rights abuses (such as the rights to privacy and freedom
of expression), certain property rights abuses (including IP rights), and other potential
State and individual immunities and privileges, depending on the subject matter of
the operation.21 What is more, common to both EOs and LICOs is the fact that the
international norms enumerated in the above list are sufficiently under-defined to
leave ambiguity as to whether an actual violation of a primary rule of international
law had occurred. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 was in this regard an attempt to clarify
(if not codify) the “key aspects of the public international law governing ‘cyber
operations’ during peacetime”.22 Put differently, the experts in Tallinn 2.0 sought to
elucidate the law of LICOs in isolation from the law on EOs. As I will show later,
this unfortunate compartmentalized approach adopted by the Manual’s authors
proves counterproductive at offering effective regulation. For now, let me conclude
this section by showing in Table 1 how the two hypotheticals that opened this paper
exemplify the convergence between EOs and LICOs.
17
18

19
20

21
22

See e.g., Andy Greenberg, The Shadow Brokers Mess is What Happens when the NSA Hoards Zero-Days,
WIRED (17 August 2016), available at goo.gl/zUdceh.
See e.g., Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, The secret-spilling organization launches a new series where it
will release the source code of alleged CIA tools from the Vault 7 series, MOTHERBOARD (9 November
2017), available at goo.gl/5C8eyN.
See e.g., Joseph Cox, The FBI Hacked over 8,000 Computers in 120 Countries Based on One Warrant,
MOTHERBOARD (22 November 2016), available at goo.gl/wWRtm2.
See e.g. John S. Davis et al., Stateless Attribution: International Accountability in Cyberspace, RAND
CORPORATION (2017), available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2081.html; Dieter
Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence Gathering, 28 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 687 (2007).
For potential violations from EOs, see generally Chesterman, n. 3. For potential violations from LICOs see
Waldon, n. 10, at 1469-1477.
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT (ED.), TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (2nd ed., 2017) 3.
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TABLE 1: AREAS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN EOS AND
LICOS AS REFLECTED IN THE HYPOTHETICALS
Part I: Classic EO

Part II: Classic LICO

Instigator

Private Hackers with Support
from Cyberia’s Intelligence

Tech Employed

Malware Capable of Both
Copying Data and More
Disruptive Functions

Accountability Thwarting
Mechanism

Untraceable Phishing Emails
and Hard-To-Detect Trojan
Downloader

Goal of Operation

Information on DOD R&D
Projects, Economic Disruption
and Losses

Potential International
Law Violations

Sovereignty, Non-Intervention,
Privileges and Immunities,
Property Rights, Privacy Rights

3. INFORMATION WARFARE: COMMUNICATING
VESSELS WITHIN A UNIFIED SYSTEM
Dr Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation gave one of the keynote addresses in
the 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict. In his remarks, he made the
claim that the old 1990s DoD catch-phrase “Information Warfare” (IW) was making
a comeback.23 IW as a unified theory suggests that “competition over information
would be the high ground of warfare,”24 and that such competitions would involve
“the protection, manipulation, degradation and denial of information”.25 It employs
the following litmus test: “If information is used to perpetrate an act that was done
to influence another to take or not take actions beneficial to the attacker then it can
be considered IW”.26 Due to this broad test, different scholars at different times have
introduced different elements that form part of IW. Libicki, for example, in his 1995
short monograph What Is Information Warfare, introduced it as a heptagon of methods
of varying maturity, encompassing:

23

24
25
26
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Martin C. Libicki, The Convergence of Information Warfare, STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 49, 50 (2017)
(“given today’s circumstances, in contrast to those that existed when information warfare was first mooted,
the various elements of IW should now increasingly be considered elements of a larger whole rather than
separate specialties that individually support kinetic military operations”).
Id., at 49.
MARTIN C. LIBICKI, WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? X (1995).
A. JONES AND G. KOVACICH, GLOBAL INFORMATION WARFARE: THE NEW DIGITAL
BATTLEFIELD 5 (2nd ed., 2016).

“(i) command-and-control warfare (which strikes against the
enemy’s head and neck); (ii) intelligence based warfare (which
consists of design, protection, and denial of systems that seek
sufficient knowledge to dominate the battle space); (iii) electronic
warfare (radio-electronic or cryptographic techniques); (iv)
psychological warfare (in which information is used to change
the minds of friends, neutrals, and foes); (v) ‘hacker’ warfare (in
which computer systems are attacked); (vi) economic information
warfare (blocking information or channelling it to pursue economic
dominance); and (vii) cyberwarfare (a grab bag of futuristic
scenarios)”.27
Jones and Kovacich go even further, arguing that IW covers a whole spectrum of
elements including, inter alia: lawfare, business continuity, knowledge management,
information security, computer network exploitation, and intelligence.28

27

28

Libicki, n. 25, at X. Note that today Libicki seems to take a far more condensed approach to the elements
encompassing IW, suggesting it covers ISR operations (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance),
electronic warfare (EW0, psychological operations (PSYOP), and Cyber Operations. See Libicki, n. 23,
at 49. Directive 3600.1 of the US DoD similarly adopted this multi-dimensional approach in defining
IW’s core and supporting capabilities. The original directive was adopted in 1996 but has since been
amended twice in 2006 and 2013. In its latest iteration it defines “Information Operations” as “the
integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities (IRC) in concert
with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries
and potential adversaries while protecting our own” (DODD O-3600.01, Information Operations (IO) 12
(2 May 2013), available at goo.gl/wJJX6T). The directive proceeds to note that IRCs constitute “tools,
techniques, or activities” employed within a dimension of the information environment. These can include,
but are not limited to, “a variety of technical and non-technical activities that intersect the traditional areas
of electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, military information support operations (MISO), military
deception (MILDEC), influence activities, operations security (OPSEC), and intelligence.” Id., at 1.
See Jones and Kovacich, n. 26, at 6.
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FIGURE 2: JONES AND KOVACICH’S ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Regardless of which model of IW you adopt, all seem to include both certain EOs and
LICOs as components of the broader theater of informational conflict. Libicki argues
that the recent convergence of the IW’s various elements, and the theory’s broader
resurgence as a unified doctrine, can be explained by three emerging circumstances:
“First, the various elements can use many of the same techniques,
starting with the subversion of computers, systems, and
networks, to allow them to work. Second, as a partial result of
the first circumstance, the strategic aspects of these elements are
converging. This makes it more likely that in circumstances where
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one element of IW can be used, other elements can also be used.
Hence, they can be used together. Third, as a partial result of the
second circumstance, countries – notably Russia, but, to a lesser
extent, North Korea, Iran and China – are starting to combine IW
elements, with each element used as part of a broader whole.”29
I highlight the discourse on IW because I feel it is important that we place the unique
dialectical relationship between EOs and LICOs within a broader informational
enviornment. These are two communicating vessels which form part of an even
larger machine and the operating logic of that machine, as laid down in the above
quote by Libicki, helps further explain the special relationship of EOs and LICOs.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Eric Rosenbach once referred to cyber operations
as filling the gap between diplomacy and economic sanctions on the one hand, and
military action on the other. He called this gap, “the space between” and claimed that
cyber operations within this space assist policy-makers in achieving their national
interest.30 The imagery of the space between is useful, but unlike Rosenbach’s
depiction, it encompasses much more than just cyber operations. A far larger spectrum
of informational action, both cyber and non-cyber, occupies this “space between”,
with intelligence gathering and covert action constituting a significant and historical
component. Any attempt at regulating some aspects of this space, in isolation from
others, would be ill-fated.

4. THE COMPARTMENTALIZATION APPROACH
AND THE TALLINN MANUAL 2.0
Against this backdrop, I want to begin portraying what was attempted in the Tallinn
Manual 2.0. Rule 32 on “peacetime cyber espionage” is located in Section 5 of
the Manual, which covers those cyber operations that the Group of Experts (GoE)
deemed to be “not per se regulated by international law”. According to the GoE,
customary international law “does not prohibit espionage per se”,31 and therefore
29
30
31

See Libicki, n. 23, at 50.
For further reading see Thomas E. Ricks, The Future of War: Cyber is Expanding the Clausewitzian
Spectrum of Conflict, FOREIGN POLICY (13 November 2014), available at goo.gl/1Nrsmi.
Note that the Experts rely on a single source to make this claim, basing themselves on the Office of
General Counsel, Department of Defense Law of War Manual. However, paragraph 16.3.2, to which they
cite, makes no reference to a lack of customary regulation of espionage under international law, quite
the opposite is speaks clearly of “long-standing and well-established considerations” and “long-standing
international norms” which govern this practice. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR
MANUAL 990 (2016) (“international law and long-standing international norms are applicable to State
behavior in cyberspace, and the question of the legality of peacetime intelligence and counterintelligence
activities must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Generally, to the extent that cyber operations
resemble traditional intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, such as unauthorized intrusions into
computer networks solely to acquire information, then such cyber operations would likely be treated
similarly under international law. The United States conducts such activities via cyberspace, and such
operations are governed by long-standing and well-established considerations, including the possibility
that those operations could be interpreted as a hostile act.”)
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determinations of lawfulness should be made on a case-by-case basis taking into
account the particular methods employed in the conduct of the specific EO.32 This
allowed the GoE to avoid the need to address the hot potato of comprehensively
explaining the law and practice of government espionage. What is more, it furthered
the GoE’s desire to compartmentalize spying, in its traditional sense, from the more
specific cyber espionage and LICOs which regulation the Manual sought to elucidate.
But as Chesterman has taught us, claiming that espionage is not per se regulated under
international law is nothing more than a straw man: “Intelligence is less a lacuna in
the legal order than it is the elephant in the room”.33 Well, the elephant was alive and
well during the Tallinn Manual plenary sessions. It swayed its trunk and stomped its
feet; but was nonetheless ignored.
Tossing to the side the question of the lawfulness of peacetime intelligence gathering,
the GoE dodged the need to speak in higher granularity as to the conduct of interstate
spying. Instead, the way was paved for the experts to engage in more general and
casuistic reasoning. Throughout their commentary, the experts extract and extend
legal rules from a series of tailored hypothetical scenarios, of their own design, which
they then analyse in isolation from one another and in accordance with predominantly
treaty norms. This “divide-and-conquer” approach is far from harmonious and results
in a series of fragmented statements made throughout the Manual, each with varying
degrees of consensus behind it. Every one of these statements can be compared to
liquid being added to one of the vessels. Due to the communicative nature of cyber
law and espionage law, as discussed above, any regulation of cyber espionage put
forward by the experts – that is to say any regulation of the EOs-LICOs overlap area
in our original Venn diagram – automatically sends equilibrium-adjusting tidal waves
across the entire system. The experts did not acknowledge these tidal waves, nor did
they address the impractical legal realities that they would inevitably create. Let us
take up only two examples within the limits of this paper.
The GoE took a territorially protectionist approach to sovereignty violations.
According to them:
“[I]n the cyber context [...] it is a violation of territorial sovereignty
for an organ of a State, or others whose conduct may be attributed
to the State, to conduct cyber operations while physically present
on another State’s territory against that State or entities or persons
located there.”34
32

33
34
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Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 169-170 (“while the International Group of Experts agreed that there is
no prohibition of espionage per se, they likewise concurred that cyber espionage may be conducted in
a manner that violates international law due to the fact that certain methods employed to conduct cyber
espionage are unlawful”).
Chesterman, n. 3, at 1072.
Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 19. This rule is then extended to the territorial sea (Rule 48) and the
territorial airspace (Rule 55). The GoE is most explicit in the context of the physical tapping of submarine
communication cables for the purpose of collecting data. The GoE agreed that “doing so in the territorial
or archipelagic waters of another State constitutes a violation of that State’s sovereignty”. Id., at 257.

The GoE provide the example of an agent of one State who uses a USB flash drive
to introduce malware into cyber infrastructures in another State and claim that
this would result in a sovereignty violation.35 The caveats provided (“in the cyber
context”, “cyber operations”, etc.) are an attempt at compartmentalization, and have
little meaning. If spies cannot clandestinely use a USB flash drive in the territory of
a foreign country without it resulting in a sovereignty violation, it follows that they
cannot also take photographs, handle HUMINT sources, or steal physical documents
in that territory. Especially not in an age where all of these activities de facto require
some form of cyber enabling. Going down this rabbit-hole, under basic rules of
syllogistic logic, if every act of territorial spying results in a sovereignty violation,
and every sovereignty violation is a violation of international law,36 then territorial
spying violates international law. Lo and behold, the same experts that concluded that
espionage was not “prohibited per se”, have just per se prohibited espionage in its
most elementary form.37 Their approach would seem to suggest that the only lawful
way to conduct espionage in the 21st century is either by remote means,38 or with
consent (from the targeted State) or authorization (from the UN Security Council).
A second example comes in the form of the applicability of diplomatic and consular
law to cyber espionage. The GoE argues that if a sending State launches spyware from
within its diplomatic mission against the cyber infrastructures of another State that
would constitute “an abuse of the diplomatic function and therefore an internationally
wrongful act.”39 Similarly, if the receiving State or third States intercepted the
electronic communications of diplomatic missions and consular posts, they would
be violating “the confidentiality of diplomatic and consular communications”,
35

36

37

38

39

Ibid. Note that the GoE later backtrack this definitive statement, arguing that they could not agree “on
the lawfulness of close access cyber espionage operations, such as the insertion of USB flash drive into a
computer located on one State’s territory by an individual acting under the direction or control of another
State”. Id., at 171.
AJIL Unbound has recently held an online symposium titled “sovereignty, cyberspace, and Tallinn Manual
2.0” which focused on whether sovereignty constitutes a stand-alone binding international legal norm that
may be violated. In this debate, I second the view put forward by Phil Spector that there is ample evidence
to assert that sovereignty is in fact a binding rule. See Phil Spector, In Defense of Sovereignty, In The Wake
of Tallinn 2.0, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 219 (2017).
Not only that, but the experts also claim that certain LICOs employed to enable spying operations, e.g.
using cyber intrusions to ‘herd’ the target’s communications to a platform more susceptible to surveillance,
might itself trigger separate grounds for sovereignty violations. Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 172.
Id., at 19 (“the mere interception of wireless signals from outside the target state’s territory does not
constitute a violation of that State’s sovereignty”). Though even on the point of remote surveillance,
there was those experts who argued that a severity test should be employed and that if the consequences
suffered from the remote surveillance were so severe, they might too result in a sovereignty violation (Id.,
at 171). Put differently, for certain members of the GoE even spying from outer space, the high seas, or
international airspace, might violate sovereignty if they reach a certain degree of severity. This echoes
to me the Soviet concept of “danger theory” pushed, and rejected, in the 1960s following the U2 Spy
Plane incident. The crux of the Soviet position was that sovereignty might be violated without incursions
into national territory, so long as certain national rights were endangered due to a particular surveillance
practice. For further reading see Joseph R. Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites: Legal Characterization
and Possible Utilization for Peacekeeping, 13(3) McGill L. J. 458, 471-472 (1967) (quoting the work of
Ronald Christensen, he notes that Soviet Russia regarded “her sovereignty rights as going beyond her
territorial borders, ceasing, it seems, not even at the borders of another state, and, perhaps pervading the
entire universe. No one anywhere, she says, has the right to endanger the Soviet Union”).
Id., at 211-212, 229.
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which is central to their function, and therefore will also result in an internationally
wrongful act.40 Once again, note that the repeated references to cyber technologies
are inconsequential. The GoE, in essence, is banning espionage from within or
against diplomatic missions, regardless of the method employed. If you cannot do
it with a malware, there is nothing to justify doing it with your bare hands. The fact
that “diplomacy and intelligence gathering have always gone hand in hand,”41 and
that the practice of spying from and on diplomatic missions is as historical as it is
commonplace,42 was not even mentioned in Tallinn Manual 2.0, let alone addressed
or resolved. Consider the following three reported allegations from the past two
decades: (1) In the lead-up to the UN Security Council vote authorizing the use of
force against Iraq in 2003, the US and the UK spied on every single delegation to the
Security Council;43 (2) During the G20 talks in Toronto in 2010, the US and Canada
spied on large numbers of heads of states and other diplomats in attendance;44 (3)
Between 2012-2017 Chinese agencies used backdoors into computer networks at the
African Union Headquarters (networks which they had paid for and installed as a gift)
in order to spy on the various delegations.45 If one wanted to apply Tallinn Manual 2.0
rules to these three operations, one would have to conclude that all of them violated
international law. The same experts who sought to isolate intelligence gathering – to
not per se address its lawfulness – ended up banning some of the most basic methods
through which it is acquired and thereby the practice as a whole. Attempting to only
regulate LICOs resulted in tidal waves that inadequately constrained EOs.
In attempting to cage the espionage elephant (by limiting their analysis to specific and
self-selected cases of cyber espionage), the GoE found themselves engaging in textual
treaty derivation which regurgitated the myth system while ignoring the operational
code.46 The experts did not appreciate fully what CIA analyst James Jesus Angleton
40
41
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44
45
46
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Id., at 221.
Chesterman, n. 3, at 1072.
Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. NAT’L SEC’Y
L. & POL’Y 179, 197 (2011); Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55(2)
VIRG. J. INT’L L. 291, 313 (2015) (citing Antonin Scalia who at the time of working for the DOJ
OLC drafted a memorandum which concluded that “the practice of spying on foreign missions was so
widespread that the “inviolability” provision of the VCDR should not be read to prohibit such activities).
See e.g. Martin Bright and Peter Beaumont, Britain spied on UN allies over war vote, THE GUARDIAN
(7 February 2004), available at http://goo.gl/fXhd8U.
See e.g. Paul Owen, Canada ‘allowed NSA to spy on G8 and G20 summits’, THE GUARDIAN (28
November 2013), available at http://goo.gl/HJB6mD.
See e.g. Reuters, China rejects claim it bugged headquarters it built for African Union, THE GUARDIAN
(29 January 2018), available at http://goo.gl/i5yt2g.
As Professor W. Michael Reisman noted “in law things are not always what they seem,” and one needs
to be particularly mindful of the existence of “two ‘relevant’ normative systems: one which is supposed
to apply and which continues to enjoy lip service among elites and one which is actually applied”.
Reisman describes the tension between the myth and the code as a “dynamic process” and a “symbiotic
relationship”. Acknowledging that the international law governing EOs and LICOs does not exist solely in
the myth or solely in the code, but rather in the space between the two, would have benefited the quality
of Tallinn Manual 2.0’s overall analysis. For further reading see W. Michael Reisman, On the Causes of
Uncertainty and Volatility in International Law, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY
44-45 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).

described as the “wilderness of mirrors” that is part and parcel of spycraft. Explaining
the legal intricacies of espionage requires one to embrace the notion that all law
inevitably involves certain forms of lex simulata and lex imperfecta. Merely citing the
law-in-the-books, while avoiding the-law-in-action, pays a disservice to the experts’
overall courageous goal of legal elucidation and codification. The Tallinn Manual
2.0 could have (and should have) engaged in a far more deliberate, nuanced, and
comprehensive investigation into the international law of intelligence, which would
have inspired the development of more harmonious and sensible cyber norms with
practicability for both scholars and practitioners.

5. PROPOSING AN ALTERNATIVE
HARMONIOUS ACCOUNT
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 could have started by acknowledging that customary
international law recognizes a sovereign nation’s right to spy – because it does. Our
international legal order, and within it more specifically our “contemporary global
security system”, is dependent upon a “reliable and unremitting flow of intelligence to
the pinnacle elites”.47 A plethora of legal sources, enshrined in both treaty and custom,
effectively recognize the existence of a derivative liberty right of States to peacetime
intelligence gathering. These sources include:
1.

2.
3.

4.

47
48

The right of States to survival, recognized by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion48 (and the related collective right of self-determination of
peoples);
The laws on the use of force (and their recognition of both a customary and
a Charter-based right for individual and collective self-defense);
Collective monitoring obligations under UN and Treaty Law (as encompassed
for example in the fields of disarmament and counter-proliferation law,
counter-terrorism law, sanctions regimes, environmental law, disaster relief,
and the fight against illicit trafficking);
International human rights law (and the obligation of States to respect and
ensure the right to life, liberty, and security of all persons subject to their
jurisdiction, as well as the discretion of States to derogate from certain rights
in times of emergency as well as balance them off in the name of protecting
national security interests);

Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The Intelligence Function and World
Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 434 (1973).
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226, 263 (8 July 1996) (“The Court
cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival and thus its right to resort to selfdefense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake”).
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5.

6.

International humanitarian law (and the obligation of States to develop
“effective intelligence gathering systems”, already in peacetime and
in preparation for armed conflict, so to be able “to collect and evaluate
information concerning potential targets” during the war);49 and
International Accountability Regimes (certain obligations and requirements
derived from both international criminal law and the frameworks governing
State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts).

Within the scope of this paper, I cannot delve into a comprehensive analysis of each of
these sources. Instead, let me focus on the right of self-defense, as a single example.
Dating back to the Caroline incident of 1837, the right of a State to engage in preemptive self-defense in order to avert an attack that is “instant, overwhelming, leaving
no choice of means, and moment of deliberation”50 has been extensively analysed.51
Even those who still maintain, based on the wording of UN Charter Article 51, that a
right of self-defense applies only “if an armed attack occurs,” cannot ignore diverse
and robust subsequent practice by States.52 The 2004 High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change established by the UN Secretary-General thus recognized
that “a threatened State, according to long established international law, can take
military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would
deflect it, and the action is proportionate.”53 Regardless of what interpretation of
“imminence” one adopts, from a classically restrictive “Pearl Harbor”-type position
to a highly permissive “Bush doctrine”-type position,54 both ends of the spectrum, and
everything in between, will embrace a State’s derivative right to engage in peacetime
intelligence gathering. For how else will a State know when a threat reaches whatever
level of imminence is deemed sufficient to justify military action? If a State is entitled
to retaliate against imminent threats to its survival, by definition it must be allowed to
engage in peacetime espionage to gather the information necessary to reach that very
conclusion.
Even were we to adopt the formalistic and anachronistic approach that only Article
51 holds (and therefore that a State may only react to an imminent threat by seeking
49
50
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54
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Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY, ¶29 (June 2, 2000), available at http://goo.gl/btGZ6y.
See generally, R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938).
For a summary of the literature, see Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence, MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L. L. (Apr. 2011), available at http://goo.gl/zwaErV. For a more recent
review of the literature, see Monica Hakimi, North Korea and the Law on Anticipatory Self-Defense, EJIL:
TALK! (Mar. 28, 2017), available at http://goo.gl/4XPZeb.
W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense,
100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 525, 526 (2006) (noting that anticipatory self-defense was not, in their view, “in
the contemplation of drafters of the Charter, though claimed by many to have been grafted thereon by
subsequent practice,” followed by a showing of such practice through case studies).
Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility, UNITED NATIONS 63 (2004), available at http://goo.gl/JxTQKb.
For more moderate interpretations, see Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s
Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L
L. 769 (2012); Jeremy Wright, The Modern Law of Self-Defense, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 11, 2017), available
at http://goo.gl/1QCaHH.

Security Council authorization) there would still be a derivative right for States to
engage in peacetime intelligence gathering. For how else will a delegation be able to
prove to the Security Council that a threat is mounting, so to convince its members
to vote in favour of an authorization of the use of force? To the extent that the United
Nations does not have its own intelligence capacities, the Security Council must rely
on Member States in order to fulfil its mandate of maintaining peace and security. Note
in this regard that the UN Security Council has in fact acknowledged the function that
Member States’ intelligence plays in its ability to exercise this mandate. Most recently
it adopted this view in Resolution 2396, concerning threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts. Acting under Chapter VII the Council not only
called on Member States to “intensify and accelerate” their peacetime intelligence
collection efforts, it went on to suggest exactly what measures they should employ.
The Council decided that Member States “shall develop and implement systems
to collect biometric data, which could include fingerprints, photographs, facial
recognition, and other relevant identifying biometric data”. Other measures ordered
by the Council were certain capabilities for the collection, processing, and analysis
of passenger name record (PNR) and advance passenger information (API) data, the
development and implementation of watch lists and databases on suspected terrorists,
and increased cooperation with information communication technology companies
in gathering a myriad of digital records and their later sharing through bilateral and
multilateral arrangements.55
By recognizing that a right to spy exists as a matter of customary international
law, the international community inexplicitly created a caveat to the myth system
enshrined, inter alia, in Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 2(7) of the UN Charter, as well as
in certain international legal regimes (such as the ones governing diplomatic and
consular relations). Countries are willing to accept as tolerable certain assaults on
their territorial sovereignty, political independence, their jurisdiction to determine
their domestic affairs, and immunities and privileges, in the name of maintaining the
important functions that intelligence plays in our public world order.56 So long as
the surveillance serves the raison d’être of our international system, the fundamental
goals of all law – “the minimization of violence, the maintenance of minimum order,
and as approximate an achievement of the politics of human dignity as each situation
allows”57 – the practice will be stomached even by those who have been discontentedly
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UN Security Council Resolution 2396 concerning Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by
Terrorist Acts, UN Doc. S/RES/2396 (21 December 2017).
For more on this function see Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The
Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1973).
W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L
L. 82, 83 (2003).
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subjected to it.58 Note that this position was suggested, though ultimately not adopted,
by a minority of the experts in Tallinn Manual 2.0:
“A few of the experts were of the view that the extensive State
practice of conducting espionage on the target State’s territory has
created an exception to the generally accepted premise that nonconsensual activities attributable to a State while physically present
on another’s territory violate sovereignty. They emphasized,
however, that this exception is narrow and limited solely to acts
of espionage”59
Of course, acknowledging the right to spy would only be the first step in articulating
the broader law on espionage. A fundamental source of international law mostly
ignored by the GoE is that of general principles of law, which stand on the same
footing as treaties and custom.60 One of the typical uses of general principles is as
“standard clarifiers”, serving the purpose of defining “the depth and contours of broad
or amorphous legal provisions” where international conventions and customs offer
little organizational help.61 One such general principle is the principle of “Abuse of
Rights”. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht recognized that “there is no legal right, however
well established, which could not, in some circumstances, be refused recognition on
the ground that it has been abused”.62 Applying the Abuse of Rights doctrine to our
newly articulated Right to Spy creates the basis for the Jus Ad Explorationem (the law
governing the launching of EOs). When spying is launched to achieve goals other than
the ones for which it was originally intended, the particular operation will no longer
be tolerable. Spying may only serve the national security interests of a State or the
58
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Note that stomaching it from an international law point of view is different from domestically prohibiting
spying and working extensively to prevent it. This is the essence of the “liberty right” to spy, as a weaker
right, that does not create an obligation on third parties to condone or facilitate it. This GoE acknowledged
the practice of State domestic criminalization of espionage, see Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 174 (“States
are entitled to, and have, enacted domestic legislation that criminalises cyber espionage carried out against
them”).
Id., at 19. See also at 171 (“A few of the experts took the view that [territorial cyber espionage] would not
be unlawful, suggesting that acts of espionage represent an exception to the prohibitions of violations of
sovereignty and intervention”).
In the Introduction to Tallinn Manual 2.0, Professor Schmitt addresses which “rules and commentary”
guided the GoE. It is quite visible from his description that the experts were solely interested in articulating
treaty and customary international rules. The third source of international law, that of general principles, is
not once mentioned by the project director in that section and is rarely brought up as such throughout the
Manual. Id., at 3-5.
Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
A COMMENTARY 731, 850 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2nd ed., 2012) (noting that the ICJ
“will usually only resort to [General Principles of Law] in order to fill a gap in the treaty or customary
rules available to settle a particular dispute”); CHARLES T. KOTUBY JR. AND LUKE A. SOBOTA,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS: PRINCIPLES AND
NORMS APPLICABLE IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 31-32 (2017) ()the authors cite the example
of the ICSID tribunal using general principles to determine the precise content of the “fair and equitable
treatment” standard, taking this interpretive approach due to the fact that “treaties and international
conventions. … are not of great help to this end”).
SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 164 (1958).

broader interests of maintaining peace and security for the international community
in general.63 Thus, for example, if spying is done for the purpose of advancing the
personal economic interests of a particular leader or those of specific corporations
or industries,64 or if it is conducted to facilitate a dictatorship or to commission an
internationally wrongful act,65 such spying operations are used “for an end which is
different from which the right has been created”,66 and would therefore constitute an
abuse of that very right.
Moreover, even in cases where the operation does serve a lawful purpose, but in its
choice of means or targets (the Jus In Exploratione) the State adopts certain measures
which are either customarily prohibited (e.g. torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment; or arbitrary interference with the customary human rights to
privacy or freedom of expression), or which go beyond “unexpressed but generally
accepted norms and expectations”,67 the operation might nonetheless be deemed
unlawful. Again, general principles of law such as good faith, proportionality, rule
of law, effectiveness, fairness, and comity,68 might serve as useful tools in both
interpreting existing treaty and customary norms (e.g. determining what constitutes as
torture, or other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment; determining what violates the
international human rights to privacy and freedom of expression) and clarify standards
where the law has not yet caught up with the development of new surveillance and
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See Asaf Lubin, The Dragon-Kings Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ Surveillance
Conundrum, 57 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 56 (2018).
Note that this idea was entertained to some degree by certain members of the GoE. See Tallinn Manual
2.0, n. 22, at 169, fn 386 (citing the 2015 US-Chinese commitment not to support cyber-enabled theft
of intellectual property, and to a similar commitment taken by the G20 leaders that same year, the
GoE cautioned that States may have committed themselves inter se to certain restrictions on industrial
espionage. Nonetheless the GoE stopped short of determining that such practice was unlawful).
This resembles the position of the GoE that cyber espionage operations may be unlawful if they “constitute
an integral and indispensable component of an operation that violates international law.” See Id., at 171172.
Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, para.
5 (2006).
Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. Rev.
217, 226 (1999) (“as long as unexpressed but generally accepted norms and expectations associated with
espionage are observed, international law tolerates the collection of intelligence”).
None of these general principles were sufficiently addressed in Tallinn Manual 2.0. Quite the opposite,
the GoE even challenged the customary nature of proportionality as a binding legal requirement (Tallinn
Manual 2.0, n. 22, at 204-205). For an analysis of proportionality as a general principle of international
law see Kotuby and Sobota, n. 61, at 114-119. Similarly, an array of human rights standards, common to
surveillance jurisprudence, and their applicability to both LICOs and EOs were hardly addressed by the
authors. These include inter alia the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, ex ante authorization,
minimization procedures and safeguards from abuse, ex post review, independent oversight, nondiscrimination, notification requirements, and access to remedy and justice.
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cyber technologies.69 Of course, making these determinations requires the use of
contextual and consequential methods of inquiry.70
Determining the lawfulness of a particular LICO, including specifically cyber espionage
operations, is not for the fainthearted. One should be willing to engage the Jus Ad
Explorationem and the Jus In Exploratione, in light of the function that intelligence
plays in our public world order, and in view of a contextual- and consequential-based
analysis. It is therefore the reality that in some instances foreign agents introducing
USB flash drives filled with spyware into national cyber infrastructures might indeed
violate the international law of espionage, whereas in other instances they might
not. We consider the intrusion on sovereignty or on diplomatic immunities only as
factors in a far more layered legal analysis. This type of nuanced application will
be relevant to all of the other hypotheticals introduced in the Manual: from certain
cyber intrusions that ‘herd’ a target’s communications to a platform more susceptible
to surveillance, through tapping underwater submarine cables in the territorial
sea, to spying on diplomats at the United Nations. Some of these might meet the
above standards and criteria and would therefore be tolerated and stomached by
the international community; others might not and would therefore be condemned,
potentially even triggering State obligations for reparation. Far from rushing to
provide rigid rules, Tallinn Manual 2.0 should have recognized the symbiosis that
exists across the informational domain, as manifested in the communicative nature
of cyber and espionage law and should have thus been more modest in its approach.
Instead of a rulebook, the GoE should have provided government lawyers with a map
and a compass.

6. CONCLUSION
Dr Seuss taught us that “sometimes the questions are complicated and the answers
are simple”. In the area of cyber and espionage law, however, both the questions and
the answers are complicated. This places a burden of humility on rule prescribers
and rule appliers. In this paper, I have tried to highlight how, in our liberal rush to
demonstrably regulate the cyber domain, a pursuit that we undertake for all the right
reasons and with all the right intentions, we might end up leaving scorched earth.
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law”, 11 MICH. J.
INT’L. L. 768, 777 (1989-1990) (where he suggested that general principles prevent “the static application
of anarchic norms and procedures to what is admittedly an evolving legal process designed to frame
or regulate the dynamic exigencies and needs of a community of nations with changing interests and
mutable goals and objectives. To state that international law has faced and is likely to face increasing new
challenges, if for no other reason than to meet the fast-growing and changing technological advances, is
a truism. Thus the demands on international law must be accommodated through an expanded usage of
‘General Principles’”).
Reisman and Baker take this analysis a step further by applying a similar methodology (though at a higher
level of abstraction) to the regulation of covert action. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN AND JANES E.
BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS AND POLICIES OF COVERT
COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW (1992).

When policy-makers are provided with sufficiently accurate information as to the
levels and types of threats posed by their adversaries, their intentions, and capabilities,
they are more likely to calibrate their responses properly, and are less likely to rely
on force as a means for guarding against startling attacks or strategic surprises.
Intelligence gathering, in this context, serves a stability-enhancing function in public
world order, by increasing the potential for pacific settlement of disputes and reducing
the chances for violence. As George Washington said: “To be prepared for war is one
of the most effectual means of preserving peace”.71 The communicative nature of
cyber law and espionage law entails that we need to take a degree of caution so that we
do not regulate the former to a point where we can no longer benefit from the positive
functions served by the latter.
A legal regime that tries to address LICOs without being mindful and cognizant of the
tidal waves that such regulations will inevitably create for EOs is one that is doomed
to be rejected by States. Far more troubling, however, is the fact that such a legal
regime will not even serve our initial goals of enhancing the rule of law, stability, and
the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The former President of the Republic of Estonia,
Toomas Hendrik Ilves, opens Tallinn Manual 2.0 by criticizing those who rely on
realpolitik to dismiss international law as mere “window-dressing”.72 I share his
criticism, but to adopt a set of rules that only echo the myth system while ignoring the
operational code will only give fuel to those who scoff at the power of international
law to effectively shape and bound government actions and expectations.
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President George Washington, First Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1790).
See Tallinn Manual 2.0, n. 22, at xxiii.
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Abstract: Recent years have seen increasing pressure on Internet intermediaries that
provide a platform for and curate third-party content to monitor and police, on behalf of
the State, online content generated or disseminated by users. This trend is prominently
motivated by the use of ICTs by terrorist groups as a tool for recruitment, financing,
and planning operations. States and international organizations have long called for
enhanced cooperation between the public and private sectors to aid efforts to counter
terrorism and violent extremism. However, as the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression noted in his latest report to the Human Rights Council, ‘the intersection
of State behaviour and corporate roles in the digital age remains somewhat new for
many States’.
Detailed information on the means and modalities of content control exercised by
online platforms is scarce. Terms of service and community standards are commonly
drafted in terms that do not provide sufficiently clear guidance on the circumstances
under which content may be blocked, removed or restricted, or access to a service may
be restricted or terminated. Users have limited possibilities to challenge decisions to
restrict material or access to a service. Moreover, as private bodies, such platforms
are generally subject to limited democratic or independent oversight. At the same
time, having private actors such as social media companies increasingly undertake
traditionally public interest tasks in the context of Internet governance is likely
unavoidable, as public authorities frequently lack the human or technical resources to
satisfactorily perform these tasks.
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Against this background, this paper aims to examine ways to define the contours of
the division of responsibilities in countering terrorism and violent extremism between
the public and private spheres. It addresses ways to ensure that Internet intermediaries
carry out quasi-enforcement and quasi-adjudicative tasks in a manner compliant with
international human rights norms and standards.
Keywords: terrorism, violent extremism, human rights, Internet intermediaries,
freedom of expression

1. INTRODUCTION: ONLINE PLATFORMS
AS GATEKEEPERS OF THIRD-PARTY CONTENT
It is difficult to overstate the role of the Internet intermediaries that provide a platform
for and curate online content in facilitating the public’s access to seek, receive, and
impart information, including discourse on issues of public interest. Individuals’
exercise of free speech is increasingly channelled through online platforms, which also
enable governments to communicate with their constituencies and similarly facilitate
the dissemination of messages by other actors. Many major online platforms (social
media portals and search engines being prime examples) function on the basis of
business models centred around hosting third-party content. The companies running
these platforms regularly claim that the platforms function as mere distribution
channels that exercise no or limited editorial intervention over the content published.
Some of these sites have extremely high levels of user activity and interactivity,2
allowing them to reach broad and diverse audiences in a manner that was not feasible
before.3 This, at the same time, makes meaningful real-time monitoring challenging
or even impossible and editorial intervention time- and resource-intensive.
Online platforms regulate their use through terms of service and community standards.
The private regulatory mechanisms used by these platforms generally represent an
efficient alternative to public regulation in the online space. The terms and standards
are pre-established and unilaterally imposed on all users who want access to the
services offered, providing the platform with quasi-normative power when it comes
to user behaviour. This power extends not only to the substantive aspects of use, such
2

3
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It has been reported that every 60 seconds 510,000 comments are posted on Facebook, 293,000 statuses
are updated, and 136,000 photos are uploaded. See Zephoria Digital Marketing, ‘The Top 20 Valuable
Facebook Statistics – Updated January 2018’, 8 May 2017, https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuablefacebook-statistics/, accessed 15 January 2018. The daily video content watched on YouTube has reached
1billion hours this year. See YouTube Official Blog, ‘You know what’s cool? A billion hours’ (27 February
2017) https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/02/you-know-whats-cool-billion-hours.html, accessed 15
January 2018.
See Dave Chaffey, ‘Global social media research summary 2017’ (Smart Insights, 27 April 2017) http://
www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-media-research/,
accessed 15 January 2018.

as the content that users are authorized to share or access, but also to enforcementrelated ones, such as the criteria for decision-making and the technical tools used
for the implementation of such decisions. In addition to these quasi-normative and
quasi-executive functions, platforms frequently enjoy quasi-adjudicative power by
requiring that disputes with users are settled via internal or other alternative dispute
resolution or remedy mechanisms.
Such private ‘sovereignty’ should nonetheless be subject to public scrutiny to avoid
arbitrary or abusive use of power. This is particularly important in light of some
platforms undertaking functions traditionally catered for by the State. The argument
that online platforms have become the digital age equivalent of public squares has been
gaining traction in recent years.4 Due to their reach, use, and level of interactivity, some
of these platforms arguably play a public interest role. Studies show that people have
increasingly been getting their news from social media.5 Social media platforms have
further been instrumental in disseminating information about political developments
at home and abroad, humanitarian crises, and allegations of violations and abuses
committed by States and Non-State actors.6 In some countries or provinces, certain
social media platforms are so dominant that to many inhabitants they represent the
Internet itself.7 As such, the information these inhabitants have access to online is
restricted to whatever is available on these platforms. As offline information flows
in these contexts are frequently restricted, social media platforms may constitute the
main source of information, including of public interest information.
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See Alissa Starzak, ‘When the Internet (officially) became the public square’ (Cloudfare, 21 June 2017)
https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-became-public-square/, accessed 15 January 2018; Ephrat Livni,
‘The US Supreme Court just ruled that using social media is a constitutional right’ (Quartz, 19 June 2017)
https://qz.com/1009546/the-us-supreme-court-just-decided-access-to-facebook-twitter-or-snapchat-isfundamental-to-free-speech/, accessed 15 January 2018.
See Jordan Crook, ‘62% of U.S. adults get their news from social media, says report’ (TechCrunch, 26
May 2016) https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/26/most-people-get-their-news-from-social-media-saysreport/, accessed 15 January 2018; Jane Wakefield, ‘Social media “outstrips TV” as news source for young
people’, (BBC News, 15 June 2016) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36528256, accessed 15 January 2018.
Christoph Koettl, ‘Twitter to the rescue? How social media is transforming human rights monitoring’,
(Amnesty International USA, 20 February 2013) http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middle-east/twitter-to-therescue-how-social-media-is-transforming-human-rights-monitoring/, accessed 15 January 2018; Juliette
Garside, ‘Rioters’ use of social media throws telecoms firms into spotlight’ (The Guardian, 21 August
2011) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/21/riots-throw-telecoms-firms-social-mediacontrols-into-spotlight, accessed 15 January 2018; Clay Shirky, ‘The Political Power of Social Media:
Technology, the public sphere and political change’ Foreign Affairs (January/ February 2011) Vol. 90,
No.1, 28-41.
See Megan Specia and Paul Mozur, ‘A war of words puts Facebook at the center of Myanmar’s Rohingya
crisis’ (The New York Times, 27 October 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/asia/
myanmar-government-facebook-rohingya.html?mtrref=www.google.com, accessed 12 March 2018; Casey
Hynes, ‘Internet use is on the rise in Myanmar, but better options are needed’ (Forbes, 22 September
2017) https://www.forbes.com/sites/chynes/2017/09/22/Internet-use-is-on-the-rise-in-myanmar-but-betteroptions-are-needed/#1ef96e44448e, accessed 12 March 2018; Corynne McSherry, Jeremy Malcolm, Kit
Walsh, ‘Zero Rating: What it is and why you should care’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 18 February
2016) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/zero-rating-what-it-is-why-you-should-care, accessed 12
March 2018.
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The full picture needs to be considered in light of technological developments that have
provided new means and modalities for controlling the content available online. Online
platforms and those who provide and facilitate access to them have considerable power
in shaping the information that gets disseminated; that is, they have de facto authority
when it comes to regulating online content. As offline news consumption continues to
decrease, particularly with younger demographics, these actors can exert significant
influence over individuals’ access to information, freedom of opinion, expression, and
association, and over interlinked political and public interest processes.8 The issue has
figured prominently in recent discussions centring around the role of social media in
influencing democratic, including electoral, processes.9
In addition to these regulatory functions, platforms have increasingly been undertaking
policing and law enforcement functions traditionally considered to be State tasks. At
times, such roles are delegated through law, as is the case of the German Network
Enforcement Act.10 However, platforms increasingly undertake such functions
without their being formally delegated by state authorities, in an attempt to avoid
liability or pre-empt State regulation.
This paper aims to examine the division of responsibilities between the public and
private sphere in countering terrorism and violent extremism in a context where the
‘playground’ is privately owned and operated infrastructure, with uneven levels of State
regulation. It addresses means and modalities to ensure that Internet intermediaries,
with particular focus on social media platforms, carry out quasi-enforcement and
quasi-adjudicative tasks in a manner compliant with international human rights norms
and standards. The analysis will pay particular attention to relevant developments in
European Union (EU) laws and policies and Member State practices.11

2. STATE TRENDS TO OUTSOURCE ONLINE
(CONTENT) POLICING
Recent years have seen increasing pressure on Internet intermediaries that provide a
platform for and curate third-party content to monitor and police, on behalf of the State,
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Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 114-116.
See, for example, Ryan Goodman and Justin Hendrix, ‚Facebook users have the right to know how they
were exposed to Russian Propaganda’ (Just Security, 23 October 2017) https://www.justsecurity.org/46171/
facebook-users-right-to-know-exposed-russian-propaganda/, accessed 12 March 2018; Hannes Grassegger
and Mikael Krogerus, ‘The data that turned the world upside down’ (Motherboard VICE, 27 January 2017)
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg9vvn/how-our-likes-helped-trump-win, accessed 12 March
2018.
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Netzwerksdurchsetzungsgesetz
- NetzDG] (2017).
The reasons for choosing to demonstrate related issues by reference to the EU framework are the more
detailed nature of EU regulation and its interpretation and also numerous current developments at the EU
and Member State level. Many of the concerns raised are, however, valid beyond the EU.

online content that is generated or disseminated by users. This trend is prominently
motivated by the use of ICTs and social media, in particular, by terrorist groups as
a tool for recruitment, propaganda outreach, fundraising, and planning operations.12
Discussions on the role and responsibilities of relevant online platforms in preventing
and countering terrorism and violent extremism have intensified in the wake of recent
attacks perpetrated by individuals linked to or inspired by ISIL.13 Some policy-makers
have expressed dissatisfaction with the efficiency of monitoring terrorist and violent
extremist content and have warned platforms about the need to ‘do more’ if they want
to avoid State intervention through binding regulation and sanctions.14
For its part, the tech industry has attempted to tackle the problems posed by terrorist
or extremist third-party content through coordinated initiatives aimed at bolstering the
efficiency of individually taken measures. Coordinated initiatives include the Global
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism,15 the EU Internet Forum, bringing together
EU entities, governments and technology companies,16 the Code of Conduct on
Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online,17 and the Shared Industry Hash Database,18
to name a few. Individually, companies have pledged to take further action to counter
the use of their platforms for terrorist and other unlawful purposes by employing
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See Brendan I. Koerner, ‘Why ISIS is winning the social media war’ (Wired, April 2016) https://www.
wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/, accessed 15 January 2018; David P. Fidler,
‘Countering Islamic State exploitation of the Internet’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 18 June 2015)
https://www.cfr.org/report/countering-islamic-state-exploitation-internet, accessed 15 January 2018.
Andrew Sparrow, Alex Hern, ‘Internet firms must do more to tackle online extremism, says No 10’ (The
Guardian, 24 March 2017) http://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/mar/24/internet-firms-must-do-moreto-tackle-online-extremism-no-10, accessed 15 January 2018; Jessica Elgot, ‘May and Macron plan joint
crackdown on online terror’ (The Guardian, 12 June 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/
jun/12/may-macron-online-terror-radicalisation, accessed 15 January 2018.
Amar Toor, ‘France and the UK consider fining social media companies over terrorist content’ (The Verge,
13 June 2017) https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/13/15790034/france-uk-social-media-fine-terrorismmay-macron, accessed 15 January 2018; Samuel Gibbs, ‘Facebook and YouTube face tough new laws on
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http://www.canberratimes.com.au/technology/technology-news/facebook-must-pay-to-police-internet20170430-gvvz2e.html, accessed 15 January 2018.
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artificial intelligence and ‘human expertise’ to identify ‘extremist and terrorismrelated’ content.19

3. ONLINE PLATFORMS AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
Relevant corporate obligations are included in a variety of laws adopted at the national
level, among others those tackling hate speech, cybercrime, counter-terrorism, violent
extremism, and intermediary liability. Many jurisdictions also encourage self- and
co-regulation.

A. Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Dilemmas of Definition

Despite a plethora of multilateral treaties, Security Council resolutions, and other
international and regional instruments addressing terrorism-related issues,20 an
internationally agreed definition of terrorism or an agreed list of terrorism-related
offences is lacking. As a result, relevant definitions are to be found in laws and policies
adopted at the level of States, causing considerable discrepancies between different
domestic frameworks.
Particularly pertinent to our context are preparatory and ancillary offences and, newly,
offences criminalizing the advocacy of terrorism, including ‘glorification’, ‘apology’,
‘praise’ or ‘justification’ of terrorism.21 United Nations human rights mechanisms
and other stakeholders have raised concerns over some definitions lacking precision,
stressing the potential negative human rights implications of definitions of terrorism
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See, for example, Google, ‘Four steps we’re taking today to fight terrorism online’ 18 June (2017) https://
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2017) https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/, accessed 15 January 2018;
Twitter Inc. ‘An update on our efforts to combat violent extremism’ (18 August 2016) https://blog.twitter.
com/official/en_us/a/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violent-extremism.html, accessed 15
January 2018.
See United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, International Legal Instruments,
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/international-legal-instruments, accessed 15 January 2018.
The UN Human Rights Committee has stressed that offences such as ‘praising’, ‘glorifying’, or ‘justifying’
terrorism must be clearly defined to ensure that they do not lead to unnecessary or disproportionate
interference with freedom of expression. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment
34. Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression (CCPR/C/GC/34), para. 46. Similarly, the SecretaryGeneral and the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism have expressed concerns about the
‘troubling trend’ of criminalizing the glorification of terrorism, stating that this amounts to an inappropriate
restriction on expression. See Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism. Report of the Secretary-General (A/63/337) and United Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism (A/
HRC/31/65).

and related offences that are overly-broad22 or attach criminal sanctions to conduct
that falls short of incitement to terrorism or advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred constituting incitement to violence.23
Laws and policies addressing violent extremism similarly raise definitional concerns.
While the term ‘violent extremism’ and related notions such as ‘extremism’
and ‘radicalization’ are prominently present in current political discourse at the
international, regional, and national levels, none of these terms have internationally
agreed definitions.24 Many of the relevant definitions found in domestic laws
and policies have been criticized for being vague and at times encompassing
manifestations that are lawful under international human rights law.25 In some
jurisdictions, these concepts have become dissociated from violence,26 thereby raising
the potential for abusive implementation, as such definitions risk selectively blurring
the distinction between belief and violent conduct. Such approaches, especially when
not accompanied by robust safeguards, risk leading to the suppression of views that
deviate from the social norms accepted by the majority, under the guise of preventing
extremism; and measures may target thought, belief, and opinion, rather than actual
conduct.
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laws restrict freedom of expression in Spain’ (March 2018), Index no. EUR 41/7924/2018.
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‘regular consultation’ of content deemed to be inciting or glorifying terrorism. See Nadim Houry, ‘French
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A number of countries also target ‘extremism’ that is non-violent. For example, extremism is defined in
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The potential and actual uses of the counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism
framework to stifle dissent, to persecute human rights defenders, journalists, and the
political opposition, and to criminalize the work of humanitarian organizations has
been addressed at length elsewhere.27 Online platforms having to operationalize such
laws and policies may find themselves contributing to the negative human rights
impact of these frameworks. Even in cases where related domestic legal and policy
frameworks do not present these shortcomings, the discrepancies between different
domestic frameworks inevitably raise difficulties for online platforms, in particular
those that operate worldwide (or at least in numerous jurisdictions), making it difficult
to comply with all relevant domestic laws.

B. Online Platforms as De Facto Content Regulators
1) Means and Modalities of Content Review
Many platforms rely on a combination of artificial intelligence (AI) and human
expertise to review and moderate content. The use of AI to spot terrorist or violent
extremist content is a relatively new development,28 and platforms such as Facebook
acknowledge that it is a tool that must be complemented by human review.29 Using
algorithms to assess compliance with the law and terms of service or community
standards provides for a time-efficient way for dealing with large volumes of
material. It is one advocated by bodies such as the European Commission, which
encourages online platforms to ‘step up investment in, and use of, automatic detection
technologies’.30
Algorithms, however, are not fool-proof, as they are not necessarily well-equipped to
understand context, different forms of humour and satire,31 and may not pick up on
certain subtleties.32 For example, hash-matching or even fingerprinting algorithms are
not capable of analysing meaning or context, such as whether certain content contains
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content’ (CityA.M., 29 November 2017) http://www.cityam.com/276626/facebooks-now-using-artificialintelligence-remove-terror, accessed 15 January 2018.
European Commission, ‘Communication on tackling illegal content online, towards enhanced
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See, for example Julia Reda, ‘When filters fail: These cases show we can’t trust algorithms to clean up the
Internet’ (28 September 2017) https://juliareda.eu/2017/09/when-filters-fail/, accessed 15 January 2018.

terrorist propaganda or hate speech, or reveals criminal intent.33 As a result, they
may end up removing not only videos produced by terrorist groups for recruitment
purposes, but also media analysis of these videos, or even footage uploaded by human
rights groups reporting on abuses.34 Some machine-learning algorithms, such as
natural language processing tools, are better suited for the kind of analysis required
in this context. However, even their use comes with limitations. Experts argue that
these tools cannot be applied with the same reliability across different contexts, as
language use differs across different cultural, demographic, and linguistic groups.35
An algorithm trained to parse out anti-Muslim hate speech may achieve lower levels
of accuracy when attempting to identify anti-Semitic hate speech, for example.
As with any machine learning algorithm, these tools can also amplify existing
biases (including social and other bias existing in a language). This may result in
algorithms over-censoring groups that are already marginalized.36 Dialects that are
underrepresented in mainstream text are also more likely to be misinterpreted, leading
to algorithms performing less accurately,37 and many of the existing natural language
processing tools only work for English or other high-resource languages.38
These limitations suggest that unchecked use of algorithms for content management
may lead to screening that is over- or under-inclusive. The margin of error would
prove particularly problematic in the case of large online platforms. For example,
Facebook has at some point reported that it receives one million user violation reports
a day.39 If all these reports were processed through AI tools, it would mean hundreds
of thousands of mistaken decisions per day.40 For meaningful oversight of decisions
made by AI tools, integrating the human-in-the-loop principle needs to be ensured.
Unfortunately, most social media platforms do not provide meaningful information
33
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the Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning Conference (2017) 1-2, https://arxiv.
org/pdf/1707.00061.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018.
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Constraints’, Proceedings of the Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
(2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.09457, accessed 15 January 2018.
Su Lin Blodgett and Brendan O’Connor, note 35, 1-2; Rachael Tatman, ‘Gender and Dialect Bias in
YouTube’s Automatic Captions’, Proceedings of the First Association for Computational Linguistics
Workshop on Ethics in Natural Language Processing, 53–59 (2017), http://rachaeltatman.com/sites/default/
files/papers/EthNLP06.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018. See also Natasha Duarte, Emma Llanso, Anna
Loup, ‘Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis’ (Centre for Democracy
and Technology, November 2017) 15.
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on content review procedures and the criteria that determine whether certain content
will be reviewed by AI, human moderators, or both.41
Having content reviewed by human moderators does not necessarily assuage all
concerns. Assessing what may amount to hate speech, incitement to terrorism,
‘glorification’ of terrorism or violent extremist content frequently requires a rather
complex analysis to be conducted by a highly trained, specialized, and adequately
resourced workforce. The reality, however, does not seem to fit this picture. Reports
indicate that low-paid and insufficiently trained moderators frequently end up being
the de facto gatekeepers of freedom of expression online.42 Moreover, bearing in
mind the overwhelming pace at which content is posted, relying primarily on human
monitoring, particularly in near real-time, would be next to impossible.
Many large social media platforms operate worldwide, or at least in numerous
jurisdictions. This makes it difficult or even impossible to produce a universally
suitable set of rules for their algorithms and moderators. As described above, such
rules need to take into account the differences between domestic legal systems and the
scope of prohibited content in different jurisdictions and linguistic, cultural, social,
and other contexts.
2) Safeguards, Transparency, and Accountability
Detailed information on the means and modalities of content control exercised by
online platforms is scarce. Terms of service and community standards are commonly
drafted in vague terms and do not provide sufficiently clear guidance on the
circumstances under which content may be blocked, removed or restricted, or access
to a service restricted or terminated, including the criteria used for such assessments.
Facebook’s Director of Global Policy Management, Monika Bickert, explained that
the company does not share details of its policies to avoid encouraging people ‘to find
workarounds’.43 This also means reduced transparency, including when it comes to
the internal consistency of the application of these policies, and may as a result lead
to reduced accountability.
41
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January 2018.
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Information provided ex post facto is similarly lacking. Users are frequently not
informed of the origin of removal requests, the procedure that led to removal or
rejection of removal and the criteria used.44 They also have limited possibilities
to challenge decisions to restrict content or access to a service. To tackle this
shortcoming, the recently adopted German Network Enforcement Act requires
companies to report on a biannual basis describing their means and modalities for
handling complaints and disclosing the criteria for removing or blocking content. It
similarly calls on companies to inform both the complainant and the users affected by
particular measures, including the reasoning for the decision. The law, however, does
not explicitly require companies to provide users with the option to challenge these
decisions.
As relevant measures by private companies are generally taken in enforcement of
terms of service and not on the basis of specific legislation, it is frequently not possible
to challenge them in court. Platforms may also impose internal or other alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, should disputes arise. Moreover, as private bodies,
such platforms are generally not subject to democratic or independent oversight in
the way that public authorities are, despite their effectively carrying out regulatory,
executive, and adjudicative functions.45 Removing the possibility of independent,
including judicial, review of measures that interfere with human rights is problematic
in general and particularly so having in mind recent legal and policy developments.
Businesses are potentially facing fines and sanctions imposed by States if they do not
restrict unlawful content.46 On the other hand, should they remove lawful content in
the process, affected individuals have limited avenues of redress. In case of doubt,
businesses will more likely err on the side of over-censoring.

C. The Scope of Responsibility of Online Intermediaries

Online platforms that host or store user-generated content and enable access
to and retrieval of this content by the author and other users47 qualify as Internet
intermediaries. Such intermediaries, as opposed to authors and publishers of content,
are generally protected against liability for third-party content, with certain caveats.
The scope of this exemption differs depending on jurisdiction.48 For example, under
the EU e-Commerce Directive, hosting intermediaries do not incur liability as long
44
45

46
47

48
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Center for Democracy and Technology (September 2016) 5. See also Jaani Riordan, The Liability of
Internet Intermediaries (Oxford University Press, 2016) Chapter 2.
See Article 19, ‘Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability’ (2013); Eric Goldman, ‘Facebook isn’t
liable for fake user account containing non-consensual pornography’ (Forbes, 8 March 2016) https://www.
forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/03/08/facebook-isnt-liable-for-fake-user-account-containing-nonconsensual-pornography/#40ba670379b2, accessed 15 January 2018.
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as they ‘expeditiously’ remove or disable access to illegal content once they have
‘actual knowledge’ of its existence.49 Under EU law, it is not permitted to impose
a general obligation to monitor content or to ‘actively seek facts or circumstances
indicating illegal activity’.50 Similarly, so-called ‘notice and stay-down’ injunctions,
involving an obligation to ensure that content, once removed, will not reappear on the
platform, are also problematic to the extent that their implementation requires general
monitoring.
The idea of introducing such a burden on intermediaries has emerged in current
debates, with policy-makers calling for stricter regulation of the liability of Internet
intermediaries when it comes to countering terrorism, violent extremism, and hate
speech. Proposals include imposing fines and other sanctions on social media
platforms ‘that fail to take action against terrorist propaganda and violent content’,51
and even having social media companies bear the costs of authorities policing content
online.52 The introduction of criminal liability for platforms was discussed and
ultimately rejected by the European Parliament in the context of the Directive on
Combating Terrorism. However, the European Commission, in its Communication on
Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards enhanced responsibility of online platforms,
recommended that tech companies proactively look to identify illegal content on
their platforms with the help of artificial intelligence, stressing that ‘online platforms
should also be able to take swift decisions […] without being required to do so on the
basis of a court order or administrative decision’.53 The Commission considers that
online platforms can take the recommended proactive measures without fear of losing
their liability exemption under the e-Commerce Directive.54
Other developments similarly come close to recommending or requiring proactive
monitoring by intermediaries, potentially also affecting the internal consistency of
the EU legal framework. Article 28a of the review proposal to the Audio-Visual
Media Services (AVMS) Directive55 provides that video-sharing platforms56 must
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European Commission, note 30.
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European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending
Directive 2010/13/EU: On the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services in view of
changing market realities.
It must be noted that some civil society organizations and some Member States caution against the
inclusion of video-sharing platforms, in particular social media ones, within the scope of the Directive.
See EDRi, ‘EDRi Position on AVMSD Trilogue Negotiations’ (14 September 2017) https://edri.org/files/
AVMSD/edriposition_trilogues_20170914.pdf, accessed 15 January 2018.

take measures to ‘protect all citizens’ from content containing incitement to violence,
discrimination or hate.57 In addition to providing for a rather vague definition of
such content,58 the proposed provision may be interpreted as requiring proactive
monitoring.59
As a result of such developments, the EU will have to assess the compatibility of
the e-Commerce Directive with other instruments addressing the role of Internet
intermediaries in combating hate speech and other illegal content, especially in light
of the decision not to reopen the e-Commerce Directive. It is in this vein that the
European Commission has adopted the above-mentioned Communication on Tackling
Illegal Content Online60 and is developing measures that set common requirements
across the Union for companies when it comes to removing illegal content, as a means
to avoid ‘overzealous rules that differ between EU countries’.61
What seems to be missing is the human rights-based analysis of such new obligations.
This shortcoming comes even though human rights concerns posed by far-reaching
intermediary liability and, in particular, its negative impact on freedom of speech
and interlinked rights, have repeatedly been flagged by international human rights
mechanisms62 and civil society actors.63 It is questionable whether the course of
action proposed in the Commission’s Communication can be construed in line with
human rights standards,64 including as spelled out in the EU Council’s Human Rights
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Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline,65 bearing in mind its
emphasis on protecting intermediaries from an obligation of blocking Internet content
‘without prior due process’. Indeed, the Communication seems to stress ex post facto
modalities of redress at the expense of ‘prior due process’. In this respect, it states that
platforms should be able to take ‘swift decisions’ to take action with respect to illegal
content ‘without being required to do so on the basis of a court order or administrative
decision’. This is the case in particular when such content has been flagged by a
law enforcement authority. Law enforcement authorities may be so-called ‘trusted
flaggers’, together with other ‘specialized entities with specific expertise in identifying
illegal content’. In some cases, platforms ‘may remove content upon notification from
the trusted flagger without further verifying the legality of the content themselves’.
One entity identified as a trusted flagger in the context of assessing terrorist and
violent extremist content is the Internet Referral Unit (IRU) of Europol. The IRU
flags content that contravenes the EU legal framework related to terrorism and also
content that goes against the terms of service set by platforms.66 However, terms of
service instituted by platforms commonly impose restrictions that go beyond what
could lawfully be imposed in compliance with freedom of expression standards.67
This approach creates the risk that content will be blocked, filtered or removed beyond
what would be permissible under international human rights law. It may also result in
undermining regular safeguards that protect against excessive interference, including
the right to an effective remedy, as the end decision is ultimately delegated to private
entities.68
Relevant developments have to be noted at Member State level as well. Germany has
recently adopted the controversial69 Network Enforcement Act,70 imposing onerous
obligations on social media platforms with more than two million registered users.
Platforms falling within the ambit of the law face fines of up to €50 million if they
65
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fail to remove or block access to ‘clearly illegal’ content within 24 hours71 and other
illegal content within 7 days72 after having been put on notice through a complaint.
The law includes no guidance on how to distinguish ‘clearly illegal’ entries from
merely ‘illegal’ ones. Such lack of clear guidance, when paired with a threat of hefty
fines, becomes a definite incentive to over-censor in case of doubt.
Implementation of the Act started on the 1st of January 2018 and related incidents
have already drawn attention to the limits of algorithmic moderation73 as well as the
discrepancies in the approach to moderating content demonstrated by different social
media platforms.74 In addition to cases of lawful content being removed by overeager
platforms, some argue that it also results in obstructing prosecution of related crimes,
as deletion of online content frequently results in deletion or improper retention of
evidence needed to plead the case in court.75 The Act will inevitably influence how
major social media sites approach users’ freedom of expression, with its impact in
all probability extending beyond Germany’s borders due to the cross-border nature
of information flows and also the likelihood of it influencing similar legal and policy
initiatives in other jurisdictions.
Changes in laws and policies aimed at more effectively tackling terrorist and extremist
content and hate speech have also been contemplated in other jurisdictions. In this
respect, the UK House of Commons Home Affairs Committee has recommended
that Internet intermediaries proactively identify illegal content and expressed
dissatisfaction with such platforms for only reviewing content after it has been
flagged by users or other stakeholders and for not ensuring that blocked and removed
content does not resurface.76 Similarly, the French-British Action Plan on the Use
of the Internet for Terrorism Purposes77 (also known as the Macron-May Plan) calls
on platforms to proactively identify terrorist content and prevent it from being made
available by automating the detection and suspension or removal of content, based
on both the posting person or entity and the actual content of the post. This measure
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drew criticism for advocating both far-reaching monitoring and prior restraint.78
The Plan also recommends measures that go beyond the existing ‘notice and takedown’ process, which has also been reinforced through the establishment of Europol’s
Internet Referral Unit and the UK’s own domestic referral unit, raising the possibility
of a ‘notice and stay-down’ obligation.

4. CONCLUSION
The Internet has frequently been described as a neutral tool that can be instrumentalised
in various ways.79 It is fundamental in facilitating the public’s ability to seek, receive,
and impart information and may provide a platform for persons and groups that are
less included in debates of public interest, such as women and individuals belonging
to minority groups, but it also enables terrorist groups and other criminal actors to
convey their messages and use it as a recruitment and operational planning tool.
As online content continues to be generated at a staggering rate, attempts to control its
flow encounter significant challenges and, due to the particularities of the digital space,
tech companies running these online platforms are better positioned to regulate their
functioning, while State powers in this respect may be more limited. There are clear
expectations on the part of States that online platforms take more responsibility when
it comes to illegal third-party content. Many governments view the use of automated
decision-making tools as an essential component of handling content. The choice is
understandable, having in mind the volume of the material that is being produced, the
pace of such production and the need to take swift action. However, the limitations of
existing technology are significant. If algorithms are used for regulating content, they
become the rule, the rule-maker in the case of machine learning algorithms, and the
tool for enforcement. The rules behind the algorithms become the de facto standards
for the platform and beyond.
The duty of States to protect the human rights of those within their jurisdiction,
including from undue interference by third parties such as businesses, is wellestablished. Outsourcing such tasks – whether formally or informally, through
actively encouraging corporate governance or through omission or acquiescence –
without establishing adequate safeguards and oversight systems, fails to comply with
that duty.80 The rise of automated processes without a corresponding strengthening
of users’ rights is likely to lead to undermined protection, and while ensuring ex post
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facto safeguards and modalities for redress is important, it is not sufficient, particularly
as existing studies indicate that these tools go underused.81
There are, of course, legitimate and practical justifications for stressing the role and
responsibility of social media companies in the context of countering terrorism and
violent extremism. Due to the control and influence they exercise over content on their
platforms, meaningful action could not be taken without their cooperation. Having
private actors such as social media companies increasingly undertake traditionally
public tasks in the context of Internet governance is probably unavoidable, especially
as public authorities (including the judiciary) in most States do not have the human or
technical resources to satisfactorily perform these tasks.
While it is inevitable for relevant private actors to play an increasingly significant
role, including the taking up of quasi-executive and quasi-adjudicative tasks, this
should not be done without proper guidance and safeguards. At this point, however,
the outsourcing results in lowering or removing existing human rights safeguards and
protections. Social media companies are stuck with tasks that they are not particularly
well-equipped to carry out. For example, it is questionable whether private actors are
well-placed to assess whether a particular measure is necessary and proportionate in
the interest of national security or public order.
Social media platforms should be given clear and detailed instructions and guidance
if they are to carry out such assessments. If control over elements of the right to
freedom of expression are outsourced to these outlets, independent oversight of their
conduct in this respect needs to be ensured, to guarantee transparency, accountability
and respect for the right to remedy of individuals whose rights are unjustly interfered
with in the process. The necessity for safeguards is not simply due to intermediaries
lacking the relevant legal expertise, but a basic matter of legal principle requiring that
measures impacting human rights be subjected to independent oversight by public,
preferably judicial, authorities rather than left up to private bodies.
The challenges that arise in this domain call for ways to bridge public and private
dimensions involved in promoting and protecting human rights. This in turn
would require ensuring complementarity and synergy between various systems of
regulation.82
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Abstract: The international principle of “due diligence” is well recognized under
international law, and is an outgrowth of the general obligation of States to “do no
harm”. The due diligence principle imposes an obligation on States to take affirmative
action to ensure their territory or objects over which they maintain sovereign control
are not used for internationally wrongful purposes. The due diligence principle has
been recognized by international scholars and jurists since the early 20th century, and
has been adopted as a principle of customary international law in the international
environmental law context by States and courts, including the International Court
of Justice. The International Court of Justice has specifically endorsed a procedural
aspect of due diligence – that States must conduct environmental impact assessments,
where appropriate, as a precautionary measure to ensure their territory is not used for
internationally wrongful purposes. In 2013 and 2017, the Tallinn Manual and Tallinn
Manual 2.0 confirmed the due diligence principle applies in cyberspace. However,
in both manuals, the experts could not agree on the scope of its application. And, in
2017, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that the due diligence obligation does not
include a preventive feature, as is reflected in international environmental law. This
paper examines this grey area of international law, and whether and to what extent the

245

precautionary principle, as adopted in the international environmental law context,
could be applied in cyberspace. After an examination of the precautionary principle as
applied, this paper argues its application in cyberspace would help crystallize the due
diligence principle from a grey zone in international law into customary international
law of cyberspace by introducing a procedural due diligence requirement for States to
conduct a cyber impact assessment where appropriate.
Keywords: due diligence, cyber due diligence

1. INTRODUCTION
The principle of State sovereignty is considered “the most fundamental” principle
of all international law,1 and has been defined as the “supreme authority of every
[S]tate within its territory”2 to exert “independence” over the “functions of a State”
to the “exclusion of any other State”.3 This principle, however, is not without limit.
A number of “principles and rules of conventional and customary international law
derive from the general principle of sovereignty”,4 including the “corollary”5 principle
of non-intervention, which is codified at Article 2 of the United Nations (UN) Charter
and restricts States from unlawfully interfering against the territorial integrity or
political independence of another State.6 The principle of non-intervention therefore
restricts States in their exercise of sovereignty from using their territory or objects
over which they maintain sovereign control for purposes “detrimental to the rights of
other States.”7 This specific obligation is often referred to as the duty to not commit
transboundary harm,8 and is well reflected in the writings of Oppenheim as early as
1912,9 the 1928 Island of Palmas award,10 and in the International Court of Justice’s
(ICJ or Court) 1949 Corfu Channel judgment.11
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To carry out this prohibition against transboundary harm, and by extension the
principle of non-intervention, States have agreed to carry out their activities with
“due diligence.” The due diligence obligation imposes an independent duty on States
to take affirmative action to stop or prevent their territory, or the items or persons
within their jurisdictional control, from knowingly being used to cause internationally
wrongful acts.12 This principle is well established “in the rules, and interpretation
thereof, of numerous specialised regimes of international law[,]”13 most notably
in international environmental law. In 2010, the ICJ affirmed the principle of due
diligence as reflective of customary international law in its Case Concerning Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay between Argentina and Uruguay (Pulp Mills) judgment14
wherein the Court endorsed a preventive interpretation of the principle as “a customary
rule”15 and made clear that a State is “obliged to use all the means at its disposal in
order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area under its
jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State”.16
The ICJ specifically recognized States have a procedural due diligence obligation
to conduct an environmental impact assessment (EIA) “before embarking on an
activity having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another State[.]”17
This principle, generally known as the precautionary principle in international
environmental law, requires States to take preventive measures even in the absence of
scientific certainty. The principle was further endorsed by the ICJ in its 2015 judgment
in the case concerning the Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan
River between Nicaragua and Costa Rica (Costa Rica).18
Whether and to what extent the due diligence principle, and the precautionary principle,
apply in cyberspace has been the subject of extensive debate over the past five years.19
In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD
COE) commissioned an independent group of experts (IGE) to examine whether and
to what extent general principles of international law apply in cyberspace.20 The IGE
produced two manuals in response - the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (“Tallinn Manual 1.0”) and the 2017 Tallinn Manual
2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (“Tallinn Manual
2.0”).21 In both, the IGE endorsed the application of the due diligence principle in
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cyberspace,22 but could not agree on its scope.23 In the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0, for
example, the IGE agreed the due diligence principle applies in cyberspace,24 but was
“divided as to the interpretation of the due diligence obligation”.25 Specifically, the
IGE agreed the principle generally applies when cyber operations “having serious
adverse consequences vis-à-vis a legal right of a State are mounted from another State’s
territory”,26 but could not agree that there was a preventive or precautionary element
tied to this obligation.27 The IGE also noted that because “not every State involved
in pre-publication consultations readily accepted the application of due diligence to
cyberspace as a matter of customary law”, there was a view, not shared by the IGE,
“by which the premise of applicability is lex ferenda (what the law should be), rather
than lex lata (current law)”.28 This view, according to the IGE, appears to be based
in part on the 2013 and 2015 reports of the United Nations Groups of Governmental
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of Informational Security (GGE),29 which only agreed that States “should,”
rather than must, take actions necessary to put an end to cyber operations emanating
from their territory which are harmful to other States.30
This paper examines this grey area of international law, and whether a preventive or
precautionary principle should, as the lex ferenda, apply in cyberspace. This paper
specifically explores whether applying a procedural due diligence requirement in
cyberspace, similar to the procedural due diligence obligation in environmental law,
would help crystallize the due diligence obligation in cyberspace and close the gap
recognized by the Tallinn Manual 2.0. In so doing, this paper argues that States should
agree to conduct a cyber impact assessment as a procedural due diligence requirement
that each would undertake before embarking on an activity having the potential
adversely to affect the cyber infrastructure or interests of another State. This principle,
of course, is not the lex lata. States have not agreed to this approach in cyberspace.
But because there are analogies to be drawn between significant and irreparable
environmental harm and the harm that a serious and adverse cyber operation could
impose on States, this paper argues the lex ferenda should properly consider the
application of a precautionary approach in cyberspace to further ensure States have
clear rules concerning due diligence in their cyber operations vis-à-vis one another.
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This paper is divided into four parts. Part I examines the history of the due diligence
principle as it has developed under international law. Part II examines the development
of the precautionary approach in international environmental law. Part III examines
the application of the due diligence principle in cyberspace, as reflected in the Tallinn
Manual 1.0, Tallinn Manual 2.0, and the 2013 and 2015 GGE Reports. And Part IV
explores how, if adopted, a precautionary approach may help further crystallize due
diligence in cyberspace by imposing a procedural due diligence obligation on States.

2. PART I - DEVELOPMENT OF DUE DILIGENCE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The obligation of “due diligence” is well recognized in international law, and dates
back to the writings of Grotius and Vattel.31 The principle has been applied in various
specialized regimes of international law, including international human rights,
humanitarian, trade, and environmental law.32 The ICJ expressly endorsed the due
diligence principle in its 1949 Corfu Channel judgment, stating there are “certain
general and well-recognized principles” of international law, including “every State’s
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
of other States”.33 The ICJ further endorsed the principle in the case concerning the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
In addition to these general developments, the principle of due diligence has received
considerable attention in the international environmental context. It was first endorsed
in the 1938 Trail Smelter Arbitral Award, which determined that Canada was required
to take protective measures to reduce the air pollution in the Columbia River Valley
caused by sulphur dioxide emitted by zinc and lead smelter plants in Canada, only
seven miles from the Canadian-US border:34
Under the principles of international law, no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.35
The ICJ further endorsed this principle in 2010 and 2015, and introduced the
preventive principle within the due diligence obligation in the Pulp Mills and Costa
31
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Rica judgments. In its 2010 Pulp Mills judgment, the ICJ affirmed the principle of due
diligence as reflective of customary international law, and relied on its articulation
of the principle in its 1949 Corfu Channel judgment.36 From this general principle,
the ICJ additionally recognized that within the due diligence principle there exists
a principle of prevention which is also “a customary rule”,37 and obliges States to
“use all the means at [their] disposal in order to avoid activities which take place
in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to
the environment of another State”.38 The ICJ made clear in its judgment that it may
now be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial
activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular,
on a shared resource.39
Although the Court’s judgment in Pulp Mills referred only to industrial activities, the
Court further expanded on the principle in its 2015 Costa Rica judgment and affirmed
the principle of due diligence and that the requirement of an EIA “applies generally to
proposed activities which may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary
context”.40 The Court stated that in order to “exercise due diligence in preventing
significant transboundary environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on
an activity having the potential adversely to affect the environment of another State,
ascertain if there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the
requirement to carry out an environmental impact assessment.41 This principle, the
preventive principle, is also known as the precautionary principle.

3. PART II - DEVELOPMENT
OF PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
A. 1971 - 1991

Most commentators agree that the “precautionary” principle traces back to 1971 and
the concept of Vorsorgeprinzip (foresight) under German environmental law.42 This
principle was asserted by Germany ten years later during international conferences
held to discuss the protection of the North Sea,43 and was adopted in 1987 as part
of the Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, which stated in
relevant part:
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[in] order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects
of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach
is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such
substances even before a causal link has been established by
absolute clear scientific evidence.44
The principle was also referenced in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, which provides that States must “protect the ozone layer by
taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions that deplete
it”.45
By 1990, the principle had received widespread adherence. It was applied at the
third conference on the protection of the North Sea46 and was also included in Great
Britain’s 1990 White Paper on Britain’s Environmental strategy, which provided:
We must analyze the possible benefits and costs both of action
and of inaction. Where there are significant risks of damage to the
environment, the Government will be prepared to take precautionary
action to limit the use of potentially dangerous pollutants, even
where scientific knowledge is not conclusive, if the balance of the
likely costs and benefits justifies it. This precautionary principle
applies particularly where there are good grounds for judging
either that action taken promptly at comparatively low cost may
avoid more costly damage later, or that irreversible effects may
follow if action is delayed.47
Europe further endorsed the principle in 1991 in a meeting between parties to the
1927 London Dumping Convention,48 and in the Bamako Convention of 1991 which
requires States party to prevent the “release into the environment of substances which
may cause harm to humans or the environment without waiting for scientific proof
regarding such harm”.49

B. 1992 To The Present

The precautionary principle gained momentum in 1992, and was endorsed in
multiple international instruments, including Article 2 of the 1992 Convention for the
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Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic and Article 15 of the
landmark Rio Declaration, which was signed at the UN Conference on Environment
and Development and provides that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.50
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change also endorsed the
precautionary principle:
The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate,
prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing such measure, taking into account that
policies and measure to deal with climate change should be costeffective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible
cost.51
Article 6 of the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks further
endorsed the application of the precautionary approach,52 and provided that States
party are required to use the precautionary approach to conserve, manage, and exploit
the stocks of straddling fish and highly migratory fish and “shall be more cautious
when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate”.53 Under this principle,
States cannot delay or refuse to take conservation and management measures because
of inadequate scientific information.54 States are also required to implement the
precautionary principle when developing scientific information and technology to
mitigate uncertainties relating to the size of fish stocks, and collect data to assess the
impact of certain fishing activities.55
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for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, UN Doc A/CONF.164/37, September 1995.
Id. at Art. 6.1, 6.2.
Ibid.
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The 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
also applies the precautionary principle to the control of transboundary movements
of genetically modified organisms,56 wherein the principle is reflected in paragraph
4 of its preamble57 and Articles 1, 10(6) and 11(8).58 Articles 10(6) and 11(8), both
of which track precautionary language, include language such as “lack of scientific
certainty”, “insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge”, and the
minimization of “potential adverse effects”.59
As noted above, the ICJ embraced the precautionary principle in the 2010 Pulp Mills
judgment, and made clear that the due diligence principle carries with it a procedural
element – the undertaking of an EIA in appropriate circumstances to determine if
there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the requirement
to carry out an environmental impact assessment.60 The Court further articulated that
the content of the EIA is to be made in “light of the specific circumstances of each
case”:61
it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in
the authorization process for the project, the specific content of
the environmental impact assessment required in each case, having
regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development
and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the
need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment.62
The Court further elaborated on this procedural due diligence obligation in the Costa
Rica judgment, noting that if the:
environmental impact assessment confirms that there is a risk of
significant transboundary harm, the State planning to undertake
the activity is required, in conformity with its due diligence
obligation, to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially
affected State, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate
measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.63
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4. PART III - DUE DILIGENCE IN CYBERSPACE
Whether and how the principle of due diligence and its precautionary approach apply
in cyberspace has been examined closely by scholars and jurists over the past five
years. Although there are myriad opinions on the application of due diligence in
cyberspace, this paper focuses solely on those opinions set out in the Tallinn Manual
1.0, Tallinn Manual 2.0, and the 2013 and 2015 GGE Reports.

A. Tallinn Manual 1.0

The Tallinn Manual 1.0 endorses the principle of due diligence in cyberspace by
reaffirming the principle that a State may not “allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”.64 The IGE concluded that States,
in their cyber operations, are to “take appropriate steps to protect those rights”.65
The scope of that obligation, however, was the subject of extensive debate and
disagreement. Indeed, due diligence was only dealt with in a single rule accompanied
by a brief commentary. And the IGE could not achieve consensus on the parameters of
the obligation. The IGE noted that the implementation of the due diligence principle
in cyberspace is complicated by the nature of harmful cyber acts, “especially time and
space compression, and their often-unprecedented character.”66
The IGE therefore adopted a knowledge standard when applying the due diligence
principle in cyberspace, noting that the principle of due diligence applies only if the
territorial State has “actual knowledge” of the cyber operation and/or the threat in
question.67 The IGE could not “achieve consensus” as to whether the principle of due
diligence applies if “the respective State has only constructive (‘should have known’)
knowledge”.68 In other words, the IGE agreed it was:
unclear whether a State violates [the principle of due diligence] if it
fails to use due care in policing cyber activities on its territory and
is therefore unaware of the acts in question. Even if constructive
knowledge suffices, the threshold of due care is uncertain in
the cyber context because of such factors as the difficulty of
attribution, the challenges of correlating separate sets of events as
part of a coordinated and distributed attack on one or more targets,
and the ease with which deception can be mounted through cyber
infrastructure.69
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Tallinn Manual 1.0, note 22, at 26.
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Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Ibid.
Ibid.

The IGE also could not agree on whether a State must take preventive measures to
ensure the cyber hygiene of the infrastructure on its territory or whether “States should
be required to monitor for malicious activity that might be directed at other States”.70

B. Tallinn Manual 2.0

The Tallinn Manual 2.0 further confirmed that the due diligence principle applies to
cyber operations originating from a State’s territory,71 making clear that the principle
of due diligence was reflected in international law and applied in cyberspace as the lex
lata.72 Notwithstanding, the IGE rejected the notion that due diligence in cyberspace
involves an “obligation of prevention”, stating that the group of experts was in
agreement that the “due diligence principle does not encompass an obligation to take
material preventive steps to ensure that the State’s territory is not used in violation [of
the law]”.73 In reaching this decision, the IGE stated it “carefully considered whether
the due diligence principle imposes a requirement to take preventive measures,
such as hardening one’s cyber infrastructure, to reduce general, as distinct from
particularised, risks of future cyber operations falling within the purview of the [due
diligence principle].74
Ultimately, the IGE “rejected the premise of a requirement to take purely preventive
measures of a general nature”75 based on the difficulty in mounting comprehensive
and effective defences against all possible cyber threats.76 Such a requirement,
according to the IGE, would “impose an undue burden on States, one for which there
is no current basis in either the extant law or current State practice.”77 The IGE further
noted that “States have not indicated that they believe such a legal obligation exists
with respect to cyber operations, either by taking preventive measures on this basis or
by condemning the failure of other States to adopt such measures”.78
The IGE also noted that because knowledge is a requirement under the principle of
due diligence, it would be “contradictory to expand” the principle of due diligence
to “hypothetical future cyber operations”79 because a State cannot know of a “cyber
operation that has yet to be decided upon by the actor”.80 Thus, having rejected the
duty of prevention, the IGE concurred that a State is “not required to monitor cyber
activities on its territory”.81
70
71
72

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
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The IGE, did, however, acknowledge the precautionary approach in international
law. It “acknowledged the contrary view, which none of them held, that the due
diligence obligation extends to situations in which the relevant harmful acts are
merely possible”.82 “By it, States must take reasonable measures to prevent them
from emanating from their territory.”83 The IGE notes that this view is based on the
existence of an obligation to “take preventive measures in the context of transboundary
environmental harm”.84 According to this position, a “State must take feasible
preventive measures that are proportionate to the risk of potential harm. They have
to take account of technological and scientific developments, as well as the unique
circumstances of each case”.85
The IGE rejected this principle, practically, because “if such an approach were to be
adopted, it would be unclear when the obligation would be breached”:
One possibility is that a breach takes place when a target State
is placed at the risk of harm by virtue of the territorial State not
having taken appropriate measures to prevent harmful cyber
operations being mounted from or through its territory. Another
is that although the due diligence principle requires States to take
appropriate preventive measures, they cannot be held responsible
for having failed to do so unless and until the target State actually
suffers the requisite harm.86
The IGE concluded that the “precise threshold of harm at which the due diligence
principle applies is unsettled in international law”.87

C. The 2013 and 2015 GGE Reports

In 2013, the UN GGE issued a report on the application of “norms derived from
existing international law relevant to State behavior in cyberspace”.88 Concerning the
due diligence principle, the GGE concluded that States must “meet their international
obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them”, and “should
seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for unlawful use”
of their cyber infrastructure.89 In 2015, the GGE reaffirmed this principle, and stated
that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally
wrongful acts” using their cyber infrastructure.90 The use of the word “should” instead
of “shall” or “must” has raised questions as to whether States truly understand that
82
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Id. at 8, ¶23.
2015 GGE Report, note 31, at 8, ¶13(c)

the due diligence principle is reflective of customary international law. “[As] due
diligence is purportedly a primary rule of international law, a State’s violation of
which constitutes an internationally wrongful act, such hesitancy to accord the rule
lex lata status produces a grey zone of international law.”91

5. ADOPTING THE PRECAUTIONARY
APPROACH IN CYBER
Whether the due diligence obligation reflects the lex lata in cyberspace is not the
focus of this paper. This paper instead questions the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 IGE’s
conclusion that a preventive feature of due diligence cannot apply in cyberspace.
The 2017 IGE rejected the application of the precautionary approach in cyberspace
because States cannot harden their cyber defenses against all possible cyber threats.92
The IGE also rejected its application because knowledge is a requirement to trigger
the due diligence principle, and it would be “contradictory to expand” the principle of
due diligence to “hypothetical future cyber operations” because a State cannot know
of a “cyber operation that has yet to be decided upon by the actor”.93
These are legitimate concerns. However, they would be mitigated if States adopted a
procedural due diligence obligation, similar to the standard articulated by the ICJ in
the 2010 Pulp Mills and 2015 Costa Rica judgments. In particular, a procedural due
diligence approach in cyberspace would not require States to harden their systems
against any possible cyber threat. Nor would it require States to guard against any
“hypothetical future cyber operations”. Instead, as the Court stated in Pulp Mills and
Costa Rica, States would have a procedural due diligence obligation that would be
triggered once the State embarks on any activity “having the potential adversely to
affect the [rights and interests] of another State” to “ascertain if there is a risk of
significant transboundary harm”.94 Specifically, in such circumstances, States would
be required to conduct an “impact assessment” to determine if the State’s actions in
cyberspace would have the potential to adversely affect the rights and interests of
another State.
This “impact assessment” could come in a variety of forms and would be circumscribed
in “light of the specific circumstances of each case”.95 For example, as the Court noted
in Pulp Mills, it would be for “each State to determine in its domestic legislation” the
specific content of the impact assessment required in each case, having regard to “the
nature and magnitude” of the proposed activity and its likely adverse impact on the

91
92
93
94
95

Schmitt, note 1, at 11.
Id. at 45.
Ibid.
Costa Rica, note 18, at 706-07.
Id. at 707.

257

rights and interests of other States, “as well as to the need to exercise due diligence
in conducting such an assessment”.96 Further, as the Court stated in Costa Rica, if the
impact assessment “confirms that there is a risk of significant transboundary harm,
the State planning to undertake the activity is required, in conformity with its due
diligence obligation, to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially affected
State, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or
mitigate that risk”.97
Adopting the preventive / precautionary approach in cyberspace would therefore
introduce a procedural due diligence obligation on States, and would impose two
distinct obligations on States. First, if the State plans to engage in activity having
the potential adversely to affect the rights and interests of another State, the State
would undertake a cyber impact assessment to ascertain if there is a risk of significant
transboundary harm resultant from that action. Second, if the impact assessment
confirms there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, the State planning to
undertake the activity is required, in conformity with its due diligence obligation,
to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially affected State, where that is
necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.
Adopting this obligation is not impossible for States, as many already implement the
due diligence principle in many of their cyber strategies and domestic plans. In its 2011
International Strategy for Cyberspace, for example, the United States stated that “States
should recognize and act on their responsibility to protect information infrastructures
and secure national systems from damage or misuse”.98 Germany likewise adopted
a due diligence approach in many of its national programs and strategies.99 Similar
jurisdictions have due diligence principles built into their programmes, including new
data protection regulations in the European Union.
Adopting a procedural due diligence approach in cyberspace would also be consistent
with international law. States are already bound to conduct their international relations
with other States in “good faith,”100 which has been defined as a sustained upkeep of
negotiations over a period appropriate to the circumstances and with an awareness of
the interests of the other party.101 States could apply this principle when determining
whether to enter into negotiations with other States regarding the results of their impact
96
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assessment, and whether certain systems should be hardened, or further information
should be exchanged.
Adopting a procedural due diligence approach in cyberspace would also address the
underlying concern addressed in international environmental law – the prevention
of significant and non-reversible transboundary harm. Over the past ten years alone,
from the 2007 attack in Estonia to the 2016 attack in the United States, the scope and
impact of detrimental cyber operations has been manifest. The precautionary principle
would require an impact assessment be conducted, even if technical certainty is not
conclusive to prevent transboundary harm. In this context, applying the precautionary
approach in cyberspace would not, as the IGE supposes in the Tallinn Manual 2.0,
place an unreasonable burden on States, because the obligation would not require the
State to harden systems per se but only to conduct a procedural review to determine
if there is a threat of significant harm to another State. Thus, under the formulation set
out by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills and Costa Rica cases, the precautionary approach in
cyberspace could blend procedural and substantive elements.
From a substantive perspective, it could be agreed between States that, as a general
rule, States must take steps to mitigate any potential transboundary harm resultant
from potential cyber operations using that territorial State’s cyber infrastructure, even
if there is no conclusive evidence of attribution, technical identification, or operational
certainty. To effectuate this substantive obligation, as in the environmental context, a
procedural obligation would be required by States that would place a lesser burden
on them. This requirement would not, as the 2017 IGE suggests, require a State to
anticipate every hypothetical attack. It would instead allow the territorial State to
understand the current state of its national cyber infrastructure, to measure that against
known threats within and outside its jurisdiction, and to make a determination as to
whether it should consult with other States based on a threat analysis commensurate
with the experience and resources of the territorial State. As the ICJ noted in
Costa Rica, the scope and substance of such an assessment would be subject to the
circumstances of each State.
Of course, there are certain guideposts that could be established by treaty that would
outline the scope of any such impact assessment. States could agree, for example,
that when triggered a general framework for review should be used similar to that
provided in the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Framework
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.102 This uses a common language
to address and manage cybersecurity risk for private business, focusing on a risk
management framework. Many private-sector entities understand that the standard for
private sector “due diligence” is compliance with the NIST Framework103 and several
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States are engaged in NIST collaborations, including the United Kingdom, Japan,
Korea, Estonia, Israel, and Germany.104 In any event, this paper does not endorse any
particular method of impact assessment, only that once triggered, States should agree
that conducting an impact assessment is a procedural due diligence requirement.
By segregating procedural and substantive due process, the concern raised by the
IGE in Tallinn Manual 2.0 that the due diligence principle is difficult to effectuate
in cyber space because of the “difficulty of mounting comprehensive and effective
defences against all possible cyber threats”105 would be mitigated. States would
not have to mount comprehensive and effective defenses against all possible cyber
threats. Territorial States would instead only need to conduct a procedural due
diligence impact assessment, if triggered. In Pulp Mills, the ICJ noted that the scope
and substance of EIAs would be dependent on the specific “nature and magnitude
of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment”.106
Likewise in cyber, the scope and nature of an impact assessment would be dependent
on the nature and magnitude of the particular cyber infrastructure in question. For
example, an impact assessment conducted by the United States or China would be
significantly more complex than that conducted of lesser cyber capable States. The
standards could be flexible. But the underlying principle should be clear.
By adopting the precautionary approach, as reflected in the ICJ’s jurisprudence, States
would have a clear obligation that would help better crystallize the substantive due
diligence obligation that has evaded State interest to date.

6. CONCLUSION
The IGE recognized in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 that “in light of the nature of cyber
activities, preventive measures are arguably prudent”.107 Applying the precautionary
approach to the due diligence principle in cyberspace would help to crystallize the
principle of due diligence, and encourage increased adherence, by implementing a
prudent and understandable procedural obligation. The precautionary principle in
cyberspace is, of course, not reflective of customary international law. This paper
argues that instead the approach is the lex ferenda, or where the law should go. The
benefits of the precautionary approach, especially delineating between procedural
and substantive due diligence, would have clear benefits in cyberspace by providing
more clear guideposts for States on what is required when carrying out due diligence.
By requiring States to undergo critical assessments of their cyber infrastructure to
104
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determine potential vulnerabilities, the precautionary approach would create a
baseline obligation for States that could help to crystallize the due diligence principle
in cyberspace, and help move this grey zone of international law to a principle of
customary international law.
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Abstract: Over the last few years, the international community has devoted much
attention to the topic of “international cyber norms”. However, there appears to be
a fundamental tension between these norm-development efforts and their real-world
application as effective tools to reduce cyber risk and deter or prevent malicious
state and non-state actors. Furthermore, in the current geopolitical climate, a broad
agreement on global cyber norms seems improbable, as suggested by the lack of
consensus in the course of the UN GGE 2017 process.
In the meantime, government officials tasked with developing and deploying
cybersecurity policy and law face day-to-day challenges and are operating on a
different track. Questions continuously arise with respect to the role of the state in
formulating cybersecurity standards, information sharing, active defense and privacy
protection. These questions are dealt with mostly in the “civilian” cybersecurity
sphere and are occurring largely under the radar of the global “international cyber
norms” community.
Against this backdrop, the paper suggests a shift in the approach to cyber norms.
Its central thesis is that, at this juncture, rather than attempting to create a set of
pre-defined aspirational norms aimed at achieving global stability, the international
community should pay greater attention to discussions that are already occurring
between cybersecurity regulators/authorities and should proactively support such
discussions. Incremental and “bottom-up” processes, covering technical, policy and
legal challenges at the domestic level, create fertile grounds for discussions that
1
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can be scaled up. This civilian, bottom-up approach is admittedly more mundane
than the “aspirational cyber norms” track. Both tracks can and should continue to
coexist in parallel, though the “civilian” track is more likely to result in a common
taxonomy, legal/policy interoperability or common understandings that states can
readily endorse, all of which could potentially ultimately lead to norms that enhance
cybersecurity more pragmatically.
Keywords: cyber norms, international law, cybersecurity law

1. INTRODUCTION
The subject of “cyber norms” has been discussed at length in recent years, especially
following the report on the subject issued in 2015 by a United Nations Governmental
Group of Experts (GGE), regarding the use of information and communications
technologies (ICT) by states.2 Building upon the 2013 GGE Report,3 the 2015 GGE
Report acknowledged the application of basic concepts of international law, such as
self-defense and state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, to the cyber
domain. It also recommended a series of “voluntary, non-binding norms” applicable
in peacetime, which according to the Report were intended to reflect the international
community’s expectations as to “responsible behavior by states” in order to “increase
stability and security in the global ICT environment.”4 The suggested norms covered
a range of topics, from information sharing between states, to providing assistance to
other states in dealing with cyber incidents, to protection of critical infrastructure.5
The report was considered a significant development because representatives of 20
countries holding widely divergent views had produced a consensus text on certain
topics that had previously been considered highly contentious. Another GGE was
convened in 2016, with a mandate to expand on the 2015 GGE Report.6 However,
amid reports of profound rifts among the participating countries,7 this GGE ended its
work in 2017 without a consensus text being issued. Despite this setback, the subject
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of “cyber norms” continues to draw attention, with some arguing that states should
expand this exercise.8
The working assumption in this discussion, it seems, is that norms are inherently a good
thing: broadly defined as “shared expectations about appropriate (or inappropriate)
behavior within a given community”,9 they can lay down the “rules of the road”
between states, and thus contribute to international stability.10 This has generated a
wide range of proposals and ideas in an effort to identify the “right” forum in which
a discussion can be held11 or the “right” norm that states can settle on,12 and to devise
ways in which to implement the 2015 GGE norms.13
To be sure, the general notion that norms might eventually play a positive role in
stabilizing cyberspace remains relevant, and the work of the GGE processes has
arguably advanced the global conversation.14 However, these approaches have not
yielded concrete results beyond the 2015 GGE Report. Finnemore and Hollis refer to
“fatigue” from the multiplicity of projects in this field.15
Against this backdrop, this paper argues that a moderate shift in approach is called
for, beginning with a reassessment of current norm-development efforts and their
underlying premises. The first part presents a critique of cyber norms and the global
community’s expectations of them. It argues that given the present political context
and divergences between the main players, the focus on “global stability” – arguably,
the underlying theme of the 2015 GGE Report – is, at this point in time, overly
ambitious, and that norm-development efforts should be untethered from this goal.
The second part proposes to shift the emphasis, from “global stability” to domestic
cybersecurity. Its central thesis is that, rather than the current top-down approach that
8
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has characterized norm-development efforts to date, the cybersecurity community
would be better served by focusing more on bottom-up processes emanating from
cybersecurity policies as they are developed and deployed domestically. It contains
a non-exhaustive overview of topics and issues that pose concrete challenges in this
sphere. It argues that, while some of these topics are already the subject of bilateral and
multilateral conversations to a certain extent, they could benefit from more expanded
regional and multilateral conversations. A broad roadmap for taking the discussion
forward is then submitted.
Most critically, the approach suggested herein is not focused on a specific set of norms
around which to center a global process, but on issues-based discussions between
government officials tasked with developing and implementing cybersecurity
policy and law at the domestic level. There is no predictable outcome for such an
exercise – it may or may not produce guidelines, common understandings or norms,
and the outcomes might be global or between like-minded countries only. Neither
does this approach negate the importance of maintaining existing multilateral cyber
norm diplomatic efforts. However, the paper argues that, short of achieving “global
stability”, as current norms processes set out to do, such a bottom-up, needs-driven
approach can help enhance cybersecurity for the parties involved in a concrete way.

2. A CRITIQUE OF CYBER NORMS
A. Advantage of Cyber Norms

Cyber norms have undeniable political and policy advantages for states. As defined
in the 2015 GGE Report, norms differ from international law rules in that they are
not binding on states. As such, they provide a certain flexibility, allowing states to
coalesce around a particular principle or value without compromising their official
legal positions. In the case of the 2015 GGE, this may have enabled the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, China and Russia – countries with profoundly
different approaches to the application of international law to cyberspace and what
“information security” means – to agree on a set of broad principles.16
Another argument in favor of cyber norms, for states, is signaling or deterrence. By
expressing support for or adherence to a certain norm, states are putatively indicating
to each other that they would treat the violation of such a norm as non-trivial. The 2015
GGE Report makes this goal explicit: “norms reflect the international community’s
expectations, set standards for responsible State behaviour, and allow the international
community to assess the activities and intentions of States”.17 Cyber norms can
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indicate red lines, providing states with a justification to respond, for example through
diplomacy or trade sanctions, when the line is crossed.18
The process by which norms are developed can also be seen a positive element. The
very fact that governments are speaking with one another, voicing their disagreements
and attempting to hash out a consensus, allows the discussion to move forward. The
process provides an outlet for states that hold opposing positions to interact with each
other and seek common ground. Even if the process does not necessarily generate
concrete results, it does foster dialogue between countries, which ultimately is a
stepping stone towards global stability. To paraphrase Finnemore and Hollis, the
process is the product.19
These arguments are valid and sound. However, they should be weighed against the
challenges, disadvantages and costs of current cyber norm development efforts.

B. Critical Perspective on Current Cyber Norm Development Efforts
1) Political Challenges
The question of how to achieve global stability in the use of ICTs is an intrinsically
political one. The lack of consensus at the 2017 GGE regarding the applicability of
international law to the use of ICTs, including specifically the availability of selfdefense - despite statements to that effect in previous GGE reports20 – underscores
the ideological and political gaps that remain between the positions of the US and
European states on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other.21 These gaps
have been further highlighted in recent months, as China and Russia have each
enacted laws tightening controls on Internet access.22 In parallel, Russia has been
actively promoting a new “cybercrime” treaty23 which adopts an approach to ICTs
that is fundamentally different from that found in the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime
Convention.24 It is unlikely that these gaps will be resolved in the short term via
another iteration of the GGE process or some variant thereof.
18
19
20

21

22

23

24

See for example EU Draft Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to
Malicious Cyber Activities (“Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox”), June 7, 2017.
Finnemore and Hollis, n. 15, p. 453.
2015 GGE Report, par. 28(d) and (e); Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc.
A/68/98, 24 June 2013), para. 19.
United Nations, General Assembly, Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, A/69/723 (13 January 2015).
Samm Sacks, “China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect”, Lawfare Blog, June 1, 2017,
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-what-expect>; Janet Burns, “Russian
Laws Will Ban VPNs And Force Chat Users To Register, Giving Censors An Edge”, Forbes, July 30.2017,
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/07/30/new-russian-laws-ban-vpns-and-force-chat-usersto-register-giving-censors-an-edge/#637dd7d02d7e>.
David Ignatius, “Russia is pushing to control cyberspace. We should all be worried”, Washington Post,
Oct. 24, 2017 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/russia-is-pushing-to-controlcyberspace-we-should-all-be-worried/2017/10/24/7014bcc6-b8f1-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.
html?utm_term=.30f8621ccc5c>.
Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, ETS 185 (2001).

267

Furthermore, one cannot dissociate the cyber norms debate from the broader
geopolitics at play. For example, the United States’ qualification of the Sony attacks
and of Russia’s alleged interference in the 2017 US elections was couched in terms
of core principles and values such as free speech and civil liberties.25 US interests in
those cases extended beyond questions of how ICTs are used, and touched on broader
questions of interference in another state’s internal affairs. Similarly, in a briefing
regarding the United States’ attribution of WannaCry to North Korea, Tom Bossert,
then-current Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
made a connection between North Korea’s behavior in its use of the ransomware
and its nuclear missile program.26 The difficult topics that successive GGEs wrestled
with cannot be analyzed solely from a perspective of information and communication
technologies – they are intrinsically tied to a complex web of national interests and
alliances, national and international security, international trade and diplomacy.
Finally, the norms discussion is occurring against the backdrop of a broader
debate on the future of Internet governance. As is often recalled, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) has been an unfortunate battleground for this
debate, and it remains so to date.27 The question of whether the Internet can or
should be “regulated” in any way at the ITU – a dicey question in itself – has become
intertwined with questions of sovereignty “over” the Internet,28 further complicating
the norms debate.
There are good arguments to be made that, notwithstanding the above, agreement
on core “global stability” issues is desirable and could conceivably be achieved.
Some of the proposals advanced recently include protecting the integrity of financial
data,29 dealing with “states’ responsibility arising from the actions of their citizens,” a
commitment to ensure that actions in cyberspace do not contravene their international
commitments, treatment of election processes as protected infrastructure and norms
for cybercrime.30 While it may be possible to achieve a consensus around these types
of issues in the medium or long term, the doubts raised in this paper relate to whether
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such agreements could emerge as a result of a self-styled norms process, and whether
this approach is appropriate for the near future.31
2) Practical Limitations
Several factors limit the practical utility of norms. For one, the purported effect of
a particular cyber norm cannot be gaged with certainty, since cyber operations are
not usually made public. Second, since the GGE norms of 2015 and subsequent
reiterations of those norms by the G7 in 2016 and 2017,32 the world has seen several
cyber incidents attributed to nation-states. Public testimony given by the US Director
of National Intelligence to a Senate committee in May 2017 attests to the magnitude
of cyber threats by states.33 Indeed, major incidents at least partially attributed to
states, like WannaCry, NotPetya, the DNC hack, and election hacks in France,34
occurred after the adoption of the 2015 GGE norms. Of course, since this list only
represents attacks that have been reported, definitive conclusions cannot be drawn
from these and similar data. And certainly, the occurrence of these incidents should
not be attributed to a “failure” of the norms process. What is evident, however, is that
these kinds of incidents illustrate the challenge of applying broad aspirational cyber
norms to actual scenarios.
States are also developing their doctrines and strategies at their own cautious pace,
based on actual operational needs and existing legal frameworks. The merits of
making their conclusions more transparent can be debated, but the national defense
and security community is currently on a somewhat slower and more prudent track
than the one reflected in current efforts to promote cyber norms.35 To the extent that
a given norm might impact national defense/security interests, the more conservative
approach of governmental departments and agencies entrusted with these interests
must be acknowledged.
The broader issue here is not whether a particular cyber norm is in fact being
implemented. It is that declaring the existence of a norm at a UN forum or similar
forum does not guarantee its effectiveness. Norms may provide guidance and declare
red lines, but when a country’s core interests are at stake, norms arguably play a lesser
role. As Tikk and Kerttunen noted,
31
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“[given] the premature understanding what cyber security is about
and how it can or may affect international peace and security, it is
hard to see how the necessary level of peer pressure can manifest
between 193 actors with (justifiably) sovereign interests and
authority.”36
One notable case study in the norm-development process is the norm prohibiting cyber
industrial theft, which was excluded from the 2015 GGE Report. It was embodied in
a bilateral commitment between China and the United States in 2015,37 after which
it was replicated in other international texts.38 There have been conflicting reports as
to the extent to which China has actually adhered to that commitment.39 If reports
of a partial reduction in cyber industrial theft are accurate, they reinforce the point
made above, that at present bilateral commitments based on reciprocal interests are
more likely to be effective than multilateral ones. The replication of this particular
norm, specifically in bilateral commitments between China and other countries,
also suggests that it emerged from a concrete need of states to address a specific
concern (theft of intellectual property by companies), as opposed to a broad attempt to
promote international stability. Other bilateral agreements based on a pragmatic need
to resolve specific issues might also work in similar fashion.40
3) Taxonomy and the Ambiguous Value of Constructive Ambiguity
Joseph Nye has shown that the international cyber domain is a “regime complex”,
composed of a multiplicity of sub-regimes (incident response, law enforcement,
international standards, international law, etc.), each with its own set of frameworks
and actors.41 The discussion on cyber norms can be confusing because different states
frame the issue differently. Among Western states, cybersecurity, cybercrime, and the
applicability of the laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain are distinct (though
related) concepts, each governed by its own legal or political regime. By contrast, the
concept of “information security” as understood by Russia and China is significantly
different.42
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The 2015 GGE Report attempted to bridge this divergence of views through vaguelydrafted norms. For example, the 2015 Report includes a norm against attacking a
country’s “critical infrastructure” contrary to international law but provides no
workable definitions or guidelines.43 This is also the case with the norms regarding
“due diligence”, supply chain oversight and reporting of vulnerabilities.44 One
may argue that this type of constructive ambiguity is helpful in that it conveys an
intelligible concept that states are free to define going forward.45 One may also point
to the current norm-development forums as positive efforts to infuse content to these
norms. These arguments are certainly persuasive. However, the fundamental difficulty
with this type of top-down push for achieving consensus is that it places the carriage
before the horse: it glosses over the constructs around which the norms are built,
declares a particular norm into existence, and only then seeks a way to operationalize
it. This approach is not conducive to widespread implementation by states.
Indeed, events are unfolding at a rapid pace, challenging a short or mid-term conception
of what a “stable ICT environment” might look like. The domestic policy landscape
is continuously evolving: for example, it has recently been reported that Germany is
actively exploring the possibility of enacting legal authority for state “hackbacks”,46
while China has adopted a sweeping cybersecurity law.47 Moreover, the use of cyber
tools by diverse actors – state, non-state, hacktivist groups and individuals – continues
to rise, presenting new practical and legal challenges to states.48 In short, it is difficult
to deal with long-term stability through cyber norms, when the short and mediumterm reality are filled with moving targets.
In summary, it is not argued that there is no room for a discussion on cyber norms
involving core “global stability” issues. However, there is another, potentially more
fertile ground for discourse in the field of domestic, “civilian” cybersecurity (defined
below). Given the above factors, a more promising approach to cyber norms would be
to promote and expand existing discussions in the domestic civilian sphere and allow
norms within that sphere to emerge and evolve in a more organic fashion. The next
part proposes a multi-stage analysis for how such a process might take place.
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3. REFRAMING THE GLOBAL DISCUSSION ON CYBER
NORMS: A POSSIBLE PATH FORWARD
The stated purpose of the cyber norms in the 2015 GGE Report was to “help to prevent
conflict in the ICT environment and contribute to its peaceful use.” Those objectives
were ambitious, to say the least, and the current state of play suggests that the goal of
global stability may be too much to pin on cyber norms.
Rather than attempting to tackle large, controversial issues that are fraught with
political baggage, it may be more useful to enhance and broaden existing discussions
around more mundane – yet no less important – issues of cybersecurity policy and
regulation in the domestic, civilian sphere. Put otherwise, rather than asking “which
cyber norms can enhance global stability in the cyber domain?”, it is worth asking
“what issues do cybersecurity officials have in the domestic arena, that could benefit
from a broader conversation with their counterparts around the world?” As one
commentator noted:
“Given these near-dead ends, real issues might best be taken up
bilaterally or multilaterally between countries and entities that have
mutually agreed priorities and issues. Given political sensitivities,
technical-level cooperation – be it between computer emergency
response teams, law enforcement entities or judicial authorities – is
likely more efficient than politicized formats.”49
This admittedly unassuming starting point will not in and of itself produce world
peace. However, if cybersecurity professionals engage in greater discussions of the
type described below, this could help the international community or coalitions of likeminded countries to achieve a few discrete objectives in the field of domestic policy
and law. This might contribute to greater security in the cyber domain, which could in
turn enhance global stability over time. The approach proposed below is not intended
to replace or subsume current large-scale “global stability” norm development efforts.
Rather, it is a parallel track, which at this juncture should be afforded greater attention.

A. Framing the Discussion: Cybersecurity in the Civilian Sphere

Since the 1980s and 1990s, the body of policies and laws for protecting critical networks
has matured into a full-fledged discipline. States are beginning to develop and update
comprehensive cybersecurity strategies,50 and are being increasingly active in the
legislative sphere, as exemplified by the US Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act
of 2015 and the EU NIS Directive. Furthermore, cybersecurity has percolated into the
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spectrum of regulatory issues, with regulators in the financial sector,51 energy,52 and
transportation,53 for example, developing sector-specific cybersecurity policies and
rules. In the private sector as well, insurance companies, accounting firms, law firms
and consulting firms have begun offering services in cybersecurity to their clients.54
For the most part, the topics covered by these areas do not involve complex questions
of international law or international relations. They are mainly focused on building
up robustness (sharing information about threat indicators, regulatory incentives
for the private sector to improve defense, cyber awareness campaigns, supply chain
oversight, etc.), and resilience (breach incident notification requirements, intervention
of the national CERT, etc.), at the domestic level.55 By way of illustration, on the
domestic “civilian” end are topics such as how to protect personally identifiable
information as part of an organization’s information sharing with the government,
application of the NIST framework to private entities, regulation of cybersecurity
professionals, breach incident disclosure requirements in consumer protection law
and securities law, cybersecurity regulation on the cloud, active defense in the private
sector, and labeling requirements for software. The processes for policy development
in these areas are usually unclassified and involve open consultations with the private
sector. Similarly, these measures operate mainly in the civilian sphere, and they aim
to promote domestic cybersecurity in the narrow sense of the term – reducing the risk
of cyber incidents and the damages caused when such incidents occur.
At the other end of the spectrum are measures regarding the interface with the
attacker or associated actors in the international sphere, for example deterrence tools,
permitted actions above or below the “use of force” threshold under Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter, the proposed norm about refraining from manipulating financial data,
and broad questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Such topics are inherently more
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sensitive, approaching the core of a country’s national security interests and raising
complex international relations and international law questions.
This distinction between “domestic civilian” and “international” realms does not
profess to create entrenched categories of cybersecurity policy and law, nor to suggest
that any particular area in the cybersecurity discussion belongs exclusively to either
realm. It merely highlights that certain areas of policy and law will tend to be easier
for states to discuss in an open and transparent manner than others.
It should be stressed that the proposal to focus on the domestic civilian sphere is not
meant to exclude the evolution of other norms in the field of defense and security,
such as how to apply the law of state responsibility to attacks attributable to nonstate actors, what “sovereignty” means,56 and what “responsible state behavior” could
look like in practice. Processes in both these areas can coexist and complement one
another. The thrust of the argument here is that the domestic civilian cybersecurity
sphere should garner more attention from the international community than it has to
date, and may reveal itself to be a promising path forward.

B. Bottom-up Process Led by Domestic Cybersecurity Professionals

Having broadly defined the types of issues that could be discussed, it is equally
important to describe the contours of possible discussions around these issues.
Civilian cybersecurity discussions are driven by those government officials tasked
with creating and deploying domestic policy and law. This includes officials involved
with cyber education and awareness, defense of critical and non-critical infrastructure
networks, handling of cyber events in real time within a CERT, policy development,
engagement with the private sector, regulation and oversight.
Through this dialogue, cybersecurity professionals with diverse backgrounds develop
a common language, share issues and questions of concern, learn from best practices,
and achieve informal capacity building. The dialogue is technical, legal or policyoriented or multidisciplinary. This is fundamentally a bottom-up process, which draws
from the experience and expertise of cybersecurity professionals.
To be sure, there are already formal and informal discussions under way between
different actors around these topics (within FIRST, the network of CERTs including
national CERTs, as well as between sector-specific industry regulators). Our
suggestion here is to expand upon, and refocus the international community’s efforts
around, these types of discussions.
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The process suggested above can be distinguished from the OSCE’s confidencebuilding measures of 2013 and 2016.57 Finnemore and Hollis have shown how, among
other factors, the choice of a particular type of forum to promote a particular norm
can be just as important as the content of the norm.58 For example, when a proposed
norm is developed within an existing organization (in this case, the OSCE), this has an
impact on the way the norm is understood and its reach to a particular target audience.
The OSCE’s confidence-building measures were developed primarily in a top-down
fashion, mostly through diplomatic action, and thus far, it does not appear that they
have been “adopted” by the national CERT community. By contrast, a bottom-up
process focused on “civilian cybersecurity” on the topic of confidence building,
would likely result in a more technical set of standards based on the perceived needs
of national CERT officials, which could then percolate upwards with the assistance of
cyber diplomats.
The COE Cybercrime Convention can be taken as illustrative of the ways in which
top-down and bottom-up efforts can converge. On the one hand, the Convention
constitutes a relatively successful exercise in international law development in a
different though related field. Adopted in 2001, it has been ratified by 56 countries
and remains the benchmark text in the field of cybercrime. Thus, one might view
the Convention as an example of the success of the “top-down” approach. At the
same time, the Convention is an example of how the law developed bottom-up from
a concrete specific need, namely, law enforcement cooperation to deal with crossborder cybercrime. The conference of state parties of the Convention constitutes a
useful forum which is currently tackling several important issues, such as access to
data on the cloud, and is attended by a mix of diplomats and practitioners.
An additional clarification is in order. The suggested focus on “domestic cybersecurity”
should not be seen as a negating the need for discussions on “global stability”.
Similarly, diplomatic efforts should not compete with, or come at the expense of,
bottom-up civilian-based technical efforts, or vice versa. On the contrary, these two
processes can and should complement each other. However, the point made here is
that up until now, bottom-up processes have been largely ignored in the cyber norms
discussion.59 A few concrete examples of how such processes can be amplified and
harnessed will be suggested below.
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C. Potential Areas of Discussion

As noted previously, there is no definitive list of cybersecurity topics that can neatly
fit into a “civilian” category. Similarly, not every issue is necessarily conducive to
broad multilateral discussions. Still, there are areas where common ground, or at least
shared understandings, are more realistic. We provide below a few examples of such
areas.
1) The Role of the State
The hybrid private-public nature of Internet infrastructure, coupled with the
pervasiveness of connected devices, presents new challenges for domestic
cybersecurity regulators. One of these is identifying the instances in which a national
cybersecurity agency can and should intervene in the market in order to prescribe
minimum standards. The need for government cybersecurity officials to manage risk,
prioritize and classify types of organizations and networks, balance between rulesbased and principles-based regulation making and optimize the use of deterrents and
incentives, while maintaining the core authority to intervene when national security or
public order or safety are at stake, requires difficult choices, constant engagement with
the private sector, and an adaptive modus operandi. While domestic cybersecurity
agencies might be developing this approach on their own, there could be much benefit
to an expanded discussion on regulatory choices, pitfalls and best practices. The NIST
Framework,60 the OECD Recommendations on Digital Risk Management61 and the
OECD workshop on protecting critical infrastructure62 provide useful starting points
for such discussions.
2) Information Sharing Between the Public and Private Sectors
An underlying issue of concern for cybersecurity regulators is how to generate trust
between the public and private sectors within a particular jurisdiction.63 Relevant
questions to be asked include: are current domestic policies and practices in this field
optimal? Do they lead to actionable results? How can data collection practices be
streamlined? Can and should a common information sharing standard be adopted?
What type of approach vis-à-vis the private sector is desirable? In what cases are
incentives more appropriate? How can individuals’ personal information be protected
in the course of information sharing? An expanded dialogue on how to improve
60
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information sharing between the private and public sectors could lead to real solutions
to such dilemmas.
3) Active Defense in the Private Sector
For the purposes of this paper, we define “active defense” as actions and measures
taken to:
“detect, analyse, identify and mitigate threats to and from
communications systems and networks in real-time, combined
with the capability and resources to take proactive or offensive
action against threats and threat entities including action in those
entities’ home networks”.64
The issue has been analyzed at length, leading to growing calls for a more sophisticated
discussion on active defense in the private sector.65 Possible policy discussions to be
held include whether some of the risks attendant to active defense could be mitigated
by adding elements of ex ante and ex post government oversight and entrusting the
task to reputable cybersecurity companies under an accreditation system. Another
policy issue is whether the perceived need to allow active defense could be diminished
if “internet infrastructure” entities such as ISPs were better incentivized to take a more
active role in detecting and mitigating attacks transiting through their networks.
4) Cybersecurity on the Cloud
The UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has begun grappling
with the contractual aspects of cloud services in the private sector,66 and this topic
seems ripe for further study from a cybersecurity perspective, particularly with respect
to government procurement of cloud services from third party vendors.67
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Other relevant topics include:
• cyber insurance (whether and how the market should be regulated, guidance
on how to quantify cybersecurity risks);
• cybersecurity for the Internet of Things;68
• labeling and rating of software;69
• developing a common ontology and technical standards for cybersecurity.70
At the same time, it should be borne in mind that not all civilian efforts are worth
pursuing at a global scale.71 The challenge is to identify topics that could both benefit
from and lend themselves to an international conversation.

D. The Formats of Potential Discussions

The format of an international discussion about a particular area can be as important
as the topic itself, as it sets the stage for the types of discussions that are held and the
expectations of participants.72 Accordingly, we offer the following basic principles
regarding the format for potential discussions around topics such as the ones discussed
above.
1.

2.

3.

4.

68
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70
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73
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A non-prescriptive process is more likely to enable participants to engage
in an exploratory dialogue in which they consider a range of options. A
discussion on norms should be allowed to emerge naturally as a result of the
discussions, rather than established as a goal from the outset.
As mentioned earlier, the agenda should be set by cybersecurity officials
involved with policy development and deployment. They are arguably best
placed to define and discuss the challenges they face on a day-to-day basis.
The level of engagement (multilateral, regional or like-minded) plays an
important role in expectations and outcomes. To state the obvious, the more
global the forum, the more challenging it is to achieve consensus.
One cannot ignore the place of bilateralism. Several countries have opened
lines of dialogue and entered into bilateral agreements and memorandums
of understanding in the field of cybersecurity73 and this trend will likely

Laura DeNardis & Mark Raymond, “The Internet of Things as a Global Policy Frontier”, UC Davis Law
Review, Issue 51:2 (December 2017), 475.
E.g. DHS designation of Kaspersky products as presenting security risks - DHS Statement on the Issuance
of Binding Operational Directive 17-01, Sept. 13, 2017 <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/13/dhsstatement-issuance-binding-operational-directive-17-01>; see also Cyber Independent Testing Lab,
founded by Sara and Peter Zatko (a.k.a Mudge).
Claire Vishik, Mihoko Matsubara, Audrey Plonk, “Key Concepts in Cyber Security: Towards a Common
Policy and Technology Context for Cyber Security Norms”, in International Cyber Norms Legal, Policy &
Industry Perspectives, Anna-Maria Osula and Henry Rõigas (Eds.), NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn
2016.
Columbia School of International Public Affairs New York Cyber Task Force, “Building a Defensible
Cyberspace”, Sept. 2017, <https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/3668_SIPA%20Defensible%20
Cyberspace-WEB.PDF>, p. 14.
Finnemore and Hollis, n. 15, p. 468.
See, for example, Mapping of India’s Cyber Security-Related Bilateral Agreements, <https://cis-india.org/
internet-governance/blog/india-cyber-security-bilateral-agreements-map-dec-2016> (accessed on March
11, 2018), Australia Cyber Security Strategy, n. 10, p. 43.

5.

continue in the near future. While the resulting texts may be phrased in
broad language that encourages general cooperation rather than requiring
compliance with concrete obligations, they create the framework for
engagement between states within which future cybersecurity discussions
can be held.
The creation of yet another global forum dealing with cybersecurity should
be avoided. The focus should not be on adding to the high-level discussions
that already exist, but on expanding the bottom-up, professional discussions
that are currently under-exploited.

One practical way forward was recently explored at the Internet Governance Forum
of 2017 in Geneva. There, national and private CERTs were identified as technical and
largely apolitical actors at the frontline of incident response. These attributes position
CERTs advantageously, as potentially significant actors on the global sphere. To tap
into this potential, governments could further empower CERTs to engage with one
another, broaden the scope of their discussions and cooperation, and take the lead in
“cyber diplomatic efforts”.74 That being said, any expanded role for CERTs should be
carefully crafted to avoid unduly politicizing their activities and tainting their technical
mission. Another interesting outcome of the 2017 IGF was the proposal, in one of
the panels, to leverage the multi-stakeholder model to enhance cybersecurity policy
development and deployment.75 While this panel was primarily focused on domestic
cybersecurity, examples were given of how bottom-up domestic policy development
processes can have international ripple effects. The NIST Framework was frequently
cited as a useful standard for countries and entities outside the United States.
Another example could be to expand the work of technical, policy and legal working
groups in bodies such as UNCITRAL and the OECD. These bodies enjoy broad
membership with established structures and work methods, and their work is typically
produced by subject-matter experts. As noted above, they have each undertaken work
that touches on cybersecurity issues in the past, and they could be tasked with more
such issues going forward. This requires a “bottom-up” push from cybersecurity
officials to suggest clear mandates for working groups within these organizations,
followed by a “top-down” push from capitals to promote these mandates when the
relevant organization decides on its future work program.
Finally, a more adventurous endeavor could consist of creating one or more ad hoc
topical and specialized forums, not necessarily tied to existing organizations. For
example, one might imagine a forum similar to the Financial Action Task Force
74

75

A transcript of the session can be accessed at: <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf2017-day-3-room-xi-ws38-international-cooperation-between-certs-ws38-technical-diplomacy>. See
summary here: <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/index.php?q=filedepot_download/5902/858>.
A transcript of the session can be accessed at <https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2017day-3-room-ix-of70-cybersecurity-20-leveraging-the-multistakeholder-model-to>. See summary here:
<https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/index.php?q=filedepot_download/5921/1042>.

279

(FATF), which could work on developing global cybersecurity standards in specific
areas (information sharing, professional qualifications, etc.). The FATF is a product
of high-level ministerial cooperation and it has been highly influential in setting
standards to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. Arguably,
a similar model could be adopted by cybersecurity agencies wishing to promote
concrete steps towards enhancing global cybersecurity through domestic measures.
It goes without saying that the diplomatic community has a role to play in each of
the examples provided above. Diplomatic efforts are needed to initiate, support and
sustain the contacts between technical and policy professionals between different
states, especially if some of the states will not be “like-minded”. Such efforts will
also be needed to lend visibility to the discussions taking place, so as to increase their
reach and effectiveness.

4. CONCLUSION
The analysis above conveys a few recurring themes. The first is a shift in expectations:
while acknowledging that some discussion of cyber norms might contribute to global
stability, it would be unrealistic to expect that such stability can be achieved by
declaring the existence of a norm or by attempting to operationalize a particular norm.
The second theme is the need for a bottom-up approach, driven by actual needs of,
and challenges faced by, government cybersecurity organizations. The third and most
fundamental theme is the shift in emphasis, from the current discussions focused on
global “stability”, towards the more mundane goal of domestic cybersecurity.
In their comprehensive paper on cyber norms, Tikk and Kertunen have stated:
“[...] cyber incident and risk assessments indicate more than
state-on-state hostilities. Data breaches, website defacements,
increasing cybercrime and botnet topologies, more than they speak
of the potential of cyber warfare, testify of a cyber crisis surface
where the risk of unwanted or unforeseen developments cannot
be effectively prevented due to the still low awareness or obvious
capacity gaps. Therefore, the GGE has, without necessarily
meaning to, developed at least two separate agendas of international
cybersecurity: one that can be understood and explained by way
of traditional geopolitics and where the likelihood of conflict or
no conflict does not depend significantly on ICT as such. Absent
ICTs, the relationships between the US, China, Russia, Iran and
North Korea remain largely the same. What geopolitics cannot
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exhaustively explain, is the surface of potential cyber crisis that has
emerged by way of extensive adoption of ICTs across the world,
without due acknowledgment of the accompanying risks and
ways of their mitigation. Jumping on the international information
highway has been too fast, too soon, for countries that are not able
to run sustainable information systems and services: States that
have to run on Windows XP, cannot be helped by any of the UN
GGE recommendations.”76
In very broad terms, the two agendas described above summarize the distinction
made in this paper between “global stability”, which current cyber norm efforts
have been promoting, and domestic cybersecurity, which deserves greater attention
from the international community. The effect of the suggested bottom-up, domestic
cybersecurity approach is a series of open-ended processes, the milestones of
which will likely be more incremental. Its successes will hopefully be enduring and
substantive, though they will not grab national headlines. Under this approach, the role
of civil society is crucial. Think-tanks, multinational corporations and academics can
generate valuable ideas outside conventional thinking, conduct large-scale empirical
research and provide a diversity of perspectives that can all feed in to these bottomup processes. Diplomacy, too, plays a critical role in taking the domestic civilian
cybersecurity discussion to the global arena. The challenge for the multi-stakeholder
cybersecurity community, then, is to reassess current cyber norm development efforts,
adjust expectations, refocus and leap forward with a new sense of purpose.
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Abstract: Legal discussions about combatting global cyber threats often focus
on international cybercrime arrangements or the application of the law of war to
cyberspace. While these discussions are vital, policy-makers and scholars have not
devoted adequate attention to creating a global legal framework to bolster the defenses
of public and private infrastructure. Due to the interconnected nature of cyberspace
and the cross-border impacts of attacks, inadequate security in one country could
harm another.
To build cyber strategies that rely in part on defense and deterrence by denial,
governments should also focus both on the security of their systems and those of
the private sector. Industry has been the target of some of the most destructive
cyberattacks worldwide. Guiding international principles for a cyber security legal
framework would help nations to build effective laws that reduce the likelihood of
successful attacks, and increase resilience after attacks occur. Moreover, international
collaboration on cybersecurity laws provides multinational companies with a more
coherent legal framework. A patchwork of hundreds of different international security
requirements is not only burdensome for companies, but it increases the potential for
vulnerabilities, particularly if the company operates in countries with less stringent
cybersecurity requirements.
This paper sets out the need for nations to discuss common legal principles for
promoting and regulating cybersecurity, similar to the privacy principles articulated
1
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in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Fair Information
Practices in 1980. As a starting point for discussion, this paper suggests four goals
of common international principles for cybersecurity law: (1) modernization
of cybersecurity laws; (2) uniformity of legal requirements; (3) coordination of
cooperative incentives and coercive regulations; and (4) supply chain security.
Although cybersecurity laws will always vary, international coordination could
improve their efficacy by providing some degree of consistency. A dialogue also could
help policy-makers learn from other nations’ cybersecurity successes and failures.
Keywords: cybersecurity; cooperation; principles; cybercrime; data security

1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, there has been great progress on international cooperation to
combat cybercrime and build on norms to deter and deny states that leverage the
asymmetric nature of cyber operations. All of these discussions are vital and must
continue on the international stage. However, international legal discussions also must
address cybersecurity law.
At the outset, this Paper defines “cybersecurity law,” as the term is often used
interchangeably to describe regulation of the private sector’s computer systems and
networks, federal programs that assist the private sector, cybercrime statutes and the
legal norms of cyberwar. For the purposes of this paper, I broadly define cybersecurity
law as domestic laws that seek to promote the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of public and private computer systems, networks and information.2 This expansive
definition applies equally to governmental regulations and public-private partnerships
and to incentives that have the ultimate goal of improving cybersecurity.
Improving the cybersecurity of public and private systems has two primary national
security benefits. First, hardened defenses help to reduce or eliminate harm caused
by an aggressor. Second, cybersecurity is an important part of a framework to deter
attacks, provided that the aggressor is aware of the strong defenses. While deterrence
by punishment is an important component of a cyber strategy, so too is deterrence
by denial. Cyber deterrence requires nations to ensure that their laws provide
adequate assistance and incentives for cybersecurity of both government and private
infrastructure. Too often, the security of the private sector is missing from the greater
discussion of national cybersecurity.3 Governments worldwide have recognized the
2
3
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need for private companies to protect their data and cyber infrastructure. The private
sector controls vast amounts of infrastructure that are vulnerable to cyberattacks,
making the private sector’s cybersecurity important not only to nations’ economies,
but also to their national security.4
The interconnected nature of cyber threats – in which an attack in one country could
cause harmful spill-over effects in another country – provides policy-makers with a
compelling reason to improve cybersecurity laws globally. To do so, nations should
collaborate and articulate core principles for cybersecurity, just as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) did for privacy law nearly four
decades ago when it developed its Fair Information Practices.
This paper then draws on examples of successful cybersecurity laws and partnerships
worldwide to outline some goals of a global cybersecurity legal framework:
•
•
•
•

Modernization of cybersecurity laws to address current threats;
Uniformity of legal and regulatory requirements;
Coordination of cooperative cybersecurity programs and regulatory
obligations; and
Supply chain security.

Cybersecurity often involves an alignment of public-sector and private-sector interests.
Accordingly, cybersecurity law should move from the outdated, purely punitive
model of privacy law to a collaborative and cooperative framework. I refer to this
model as “collaborative cybersecurity law,” a mixture of incentives, public-private
partnerships, and tailored regulations that is designed to improve cybersecurity as a
whole.
For this paper, collaborative cybersecurity law has two equally important applications.
First, the public and private sectors should collaborate to determine the most
effective legal frameworks to build defenses and resilience. Second, governments
should collaborate at the local, state/province, and national levels to ensure that their
requirements and incentives are aligned to the common goal of protecting global
cyber infrastructure. Cyberspace does not have clearly defined geographic or public/
private boundaries. Nor should the defense of cyberspace.
I do not suggest the creation of a single set of cybersecurity laws to apply across
all nations; such a task would be a fool’s errand, as countries have a wide range of
tort, constitutional, and administrative laws that would prevent a single law across all
jurisdictions. Jurisdictions such as the United States tend to favor cybersecurity laws
4
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that promote free expression over other interests, while jurisdictions such as those in
Europe tend to favor privacy protection. Rather than attempt a uniform set of laws,
countries should develop a set of shared core cybersecurity values to apply as they
develop laws to address cybersecurity threats via laws, regulations, and government
programs.
In short, this paper argues that nations must broaden their conception of the international
cybersecurity dialogue. While the ongoing discussions regarding cyberwarfare norms
are essential, it is only one piece of the much larger solution to improving the security
of cyberspace. Nations must also develop a cohesive strategy to secure both public
and private cyber information and infrastructure through regulations and incentives.

2. THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF INADEQUATE
CYBERSECURITY
Cyber threats are not always confined to geographic borders. Many of the most damaging
and persistent cyberattacks have targeted systems and data in multiple countries. The
attacks target not only military systems or civilian government computers, but often
also home systems that are operated by the private sector. With the private sector
controlling critical infrastructure such as logistics, telecommunications, and financial
systems globally, the cybersecurity of both the public and private sector is crucial to
adequate defense.
The pervasive global nature of cyber threats can be seen in botnets, which use infected
computers to amass power to launch devastating attacks. As botnets infect more
computers, they cause more damage, such as forcing websites offline and interrupting
critical services.5 The Internet of Things era has exponentially increased the number
of devices connected to the Internet. Botnets have commandeered these devices, in
part due to the inadequate security measures on many IoT devices.6
For instance, in October 2016, the Mirai botnet, consisting of hundreds of thousands
of infected devices, knocked some of the most popular websites in the world offline
by targeting Dyn, a domain name system management service.7
Botnets demonstrate the international impact of inadequate cybersecurity. Consider,
for example, a webcam that is manufactured in Germany with inadequate password
protections. If a consumer in the United States uses that webcam, it could be used in a
5
6
7
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botnet that shuts down a website in New Zealand. New Zealand alone cannot address
the botnet problem by regulating the security of Internet of Things devices.
Likewise, the WannaCry ransomworm demonstrates the interconnected nature of
cyber threats. WannaCry was initially found on European businesses’ computers on the
early morning of May 12, 2017. The files on infected computers were encrypted, and
the computer operators received a demand for bitcoin in exchange for the encryption
key, though paying the ransom did not always guarantee decryption of the files. The
ransomworm rapidly spread. In all, WannaCry infected more than 200,000 computers
around the world.8
WannaCry was so malicious and pervasive because it spread using EternalBlue,
an exploit that allows malware to spread in Windows operating systems. Hackers
allegedly stole EternalBlue from the U.S. National Security Agency.9 The U.S. and
UK authorities have attributed WannaCry to North Korea.10
According to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security,
once a computer was infected with WannaCry, it would scan public Internet Protocol
addresses for other external networks to infect.11 Rather than merely spreading across
a company’s internal network, WannaCry used its infected computers to find and
target other vulnerable networks.12
WannaCry and Mirai demonstrate the globally interconnected nature of harms
associated with cyberattacks. The attacks demonstrate that an attack that initially
focuses on one geographic region can have immediate and damaging spill-over
effects into other countries. Therefore, it is in a nation’s interests to secure not only
the computers within its geographic boundaries, but the systems and networks across
the globe.

3. THE NEED FOR LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO IMPROVE
GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY
Enhanced cybersecurity of a nation’s infrastructure plays two critical roles in cyber
strategy. First, it reduces or eliminates the risk of harm from an attempted attack by
bolstering defenses. Second, the known existence of the attack may deter the attacks
from ever occurring.
8
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Deterrence strategy has two components: deterrence by punishment and deterrence
by denial.13 Deterrence by denial consists of strategies that both resist attacks and
help recovery from attacks once they have occurred (known as “resilience.”).14 For
effective cyber deterrence by denial, the private sector must both secure its own
system and networks and develop secure products throughout the supply chain. As
Dorothy Denning summarized in 2016:
Cybersecurity aids deterrence primarily through the principle
of denial. It stops attacks before they can achieve their goals.
This includes beefing up login security, encrypting data and
communications, fighting viruses and other malware, and keeping
software updated to patch weaknesses when they’re found.
But even more important is developing products that have few if
any security vulnerabilities when they are shipped and installed.
The Mirai botnet, capable of generating massive data floods that
overload internet servers, takes over devices that have gaping
security holes, including default passwords hardcoded into
firmware that users can’t change. While some companies such
as Microsoft invest heavily in product security, others, including
many Internet-of-Things vendors, do not.15
Nations can promote such cybersecurity measures by enacting effective regulations
and creating public-private partnerships. Defending against attacks helps to mitigate
the overall harm.16 However, a single nation’s laws are likely to be insufficient to
adequately shore up its cybersecurity. The cyber vulnerabilities in Country A may
lead to negative consequences in Country B, and Country B has limited ability, acting
alone, to impose consequences for inadequate cybersecurity in Country A. That is
where an international dialogue on cybersecurity is vital.
Even to the extent that some cyberattacks are strictly local, an international dialogue
about cybersecurity laws can allow nations to share lessons about their experiences
with government programs, regulations, and laws. Unlike other areas of law that have
centuries of empirical evidence to support or reject their adoption, cybersecurity law
needs to address the rapidly evolving threat landscape. If, for instance, requiring a
particular safeguard is effective, nations could share these experiences in determining
best practices.

13
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In both the areas of cybercriminal law17 and cyberwarfare,18 international experts and
policy-makers have at least attempted to find areas of broad agreement. However,
criminal laws and warfare norms and guidelines often address responses to cyberattacks
(i.e., criminal prosecutions or military action). While these are absolutely vital to a
comprehensive cybersecurity framework, they are only part of the solution. Laws and
regulations also should seek to bolster defenses to prevent attacks from succeeding in
the first place.
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest Convention)
sets minimum requirements for computer crime statutes in participating nations
and provides for mutual assistance in investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes.
This cooperation and harmonization is necessary because of the global nature of
cybercrimes, and the criminal is often located in a different country from the target.19
By harmonizing cybercrime laws, the Budapest Convention reduces the likelihood of
some countries becoming “safe havens” for cybercriminals.20 However, the Budapest
Convention has been criticized for being unsuccessful and overall not helping to crack
down on cybercrime.21 It has not been adopted outside of a majority of Council of
Europe members and the United States. When Russia, North Korea, Iran, China, and
other non-members often are the sources of cyber-attacks, the Budapest Convention
provides the target countries with little recourse. Moreover, criminal law alone is not
always sufficient to prevent attacks in cyberspace due to the challenges of attributing
attacks with certainty.22 While the Budapest Convention plays an important role in
harmonizing at least some cybercrime laws in some countries, it is not a panacea.23
In some respects, there are even more benefits to coming to a consensus on international
cybersecurity law than in criminal law. The Budapest Convention is of limited utility
because many of the most pernicious attacks are perpetrated from nations that are not
parties to the Convention; laws that effectively promote the cybersecurity of public
and private systems and networks, however, provide incremental worldwide benefits,
even if they have not been adopted by the handful of nations that are the sources of
the attacks. Consider, for example, a cybersecurity regulatory framework that bolsters
resistance and reduces the spread of botnets by 75 percent in countries that have
adopted its safeguards. If half of the nations were to adopt the framework, the overall
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

ETS 185 – Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 23.XI.2001.
See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) (hereinafter, “Tallinn Manual”).
See, e.g., Jonathan Clough, A World of Difference: The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and the
Challenges of Harmonisation, 40 MONASH L.R. 699, 700 (“Although many offences are transnational
in nature – for instance trafficking in humans, weapons and drugs, money laundering and terrorism
– cybercrime presents unique challenges due to the inherently transnational nature of the underlying
technology.”).
Id. at 700.
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties, A Skeptical View, in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN
NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW (Feb. 2011).
Lily Hay Newman, Hacker Lexicon: What is the Attribution Problem? WIRED (Dec. 24, 2016).
See Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, The Cyber Threat Landscape: Challenges and Future Research
Directions, COMPUTERS & SECURITY 30:8 (Nov. 2011).

289

strength of a botnet likely would weaken because it would not be as successful in
propagating.
Similarly, the growing body of scholarship that applies jus ad bellum and jus in bello
to cyberwarfare is absolutely essential to our understanding of acceptable responses
to cyberattacks and it helps to inform deterrence strategies. Understanding the
application of jus ad bellum to cyberspace is essential in informing a deterrence by
punishment strategy. The two editions of the Tallinn Manual have provided a forum for
an International Group of Experts on the law of war to articulate both commonalities
and differences in views about how their field applies in cyberspace.24 Although
the Tallinn Manual does not represent the official views of a single organization or
state,25 it is one of the greatest steps in articulating commonalities and differences in
international cyber law.26
Likewise, from 2016-17, the United Nations Group of Government Experts attempted
to reach an agreement on norms of cyber issues such as international humanitarian law
and the right of self-defense. However, those discussions failed to lead to a consensus,
as some participants had very different views on the fundamental international
norms.27 Indeed, such consensus will be difficult or impossible for norms related
to jus ad bellum and jus in bello. But such issues should not be the only focus of
international discussions. Global norms for domestic cybersecurity issues could play
an equally vital role in securing cyberspace.
The cybersecurity of a nation’s infrastructure may play a significant role in its response
to a cyberattack, as the success or failure of cyberdefense often determines whether a
cyber act constitutes an unlawful use of force.28 Consider, for instance, a cyberattack
by Iran on a portion of the U.S. power grid that is operated by a private company. If
the utility has installed sufficient safeguards, the attack may be nothing more than a
nuisance that causes little damage. If, however, the attack succeeds, it could cause
significant economic loss, and perhaps even personal injury. Those two outcomes
would warrant very different responses under international warfare norms. Just as
24

25
26
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28
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See, e.g., Kristen Eichensehr, Review of The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare, 108 A. J. INT’L L. 585, 586 (2014) (“While the rules on which the IGE agreed are very useful
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instances in which the Tallinn Manual frankly acknowledges disagreement within the IGE.”).
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of the two International Groups of Experts as to the state of the law.”).
See Gary Korn, Tallinn Manual 2.0, Advancing the Conversation, JUSTSECURITY (Feb. 15, 2017) (“[T]
he advisory nature of Tallinn 2.0 should not detract from its immense value to legal practitioners and
their clients in both the public and private sector as a quality compendium of the general framework of
international rules and principles most pertinent to cyber operations.”).
See Remarks of Michele G. Markoff, Deputy Coordinator for Cyber Issues, U.S. Department of State (June
23, 2017) (“It is unfortunate that the reluctance of a few participants to seriously engage on the mandate on
international legal issues has prevented the Group from reaching consensus on a report that would further
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See Priyanka R. Dev, ‘Use of Force’ and ‘Armed Attack’ Thresholds in Cyber Conflict: The Looming
Definitional Gaps and the Growing Need for Formal U.N. Response, 50 TEX. INT’L L. J. 379 (2015).

the international legal community has attempted to develop common ground as to the
application of the law of war to cyber, so too should the community develop principles
that guide the protection of cyber infrastructure.
Efforts to develop transnational common ground on cybercrime law and cyberwarfare
norms will not solve all of the complex international legal problems associated
with threats, though they are necessary components of the overall approach to
cybersecurity. Moreover, both efforts provide roadmaps for international dialogues
about cybersecurity laws that deter by denial. The Budapest Convention and the
Tallinn Manual demonstrate that it is possible for nations with different values to at
least agree on some core principles for cyberspace. Both the Budapest Convention’s
formal attempts at proscribing specific cybercrime laws and the Tallinn Manual’s
attempts to narrate common, nonbinding interpretations are essential as nations
confront growing cyber threats.
Although there is not currently a universal set of cybersecurity principles outside of
the cybercrime and cyberwarfare contexts, an analogue exists in the privacy arena and
demonstrates the utility of setting forth a core set of shared legal values for technology
law. In 1980, the OECD, an economic development organization consisting of 35
nations, published the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, the centerpiece of which was the OECD Fair Information
Practices.29
Drawing on robust discussions among participating countries, OECD developed the
following eight general principles for information privacy: collection limitation; data
quality; purpose specification; use limitation; security safeguards; openness; individual
participation; and accountability.30 The Guidelines have been revised only once, in
2013. Each of the eight principles provides a broad framework under which nations
could choose how to best regulate privacy. For instance, the collection limitation
principles state that “[t]here should be limits to the collection of personal data and any
such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with
the knowledge or consent of the data subject”.31
Broad principles such as this allow for some standardization across nations; yet they
also provide countries with the flexibility to adhere to these principles within their
existing legal systems and policy preferences.32 The OECD Guidelines have helped
29
30
31
32

See Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices, World Privacy Forum, available at
https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-brief-introduction-to-fair-information-practices/.
OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA.
Ibid.
Id. at 48, Original Explanatory Memorandum to the OECD Privacy Guidelines (“On the whole, the
Guidelines constitute a general framework for concerted actions by Member countries: objectives put
forward by the Guidelines may be pursued in different ways, depending on the legal instruments and
strategies preferred by Member countries for their implementation.”).
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to shape the contours of privacy laws around the world, even beyond the 34 OECD
member nations.33
The OECD Guidelines are privacy-focused, though the document’s Security
Safeguards Principle states that personal data “should be protected by reasonable
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification or disclosure of data”. The supplemental memorandum for the
2013 revisions suggests that these safeguards include data security breach notification
requirements. Although this principle touches on a cybersecurity issue, it focuses
on personal information security and does not adequately address the full range of
cybersecurity threats, as discussed in the next section. Privacy and cybersecurity are
often lumped into the same category of law and share some common issues, but they
each present different challenges and should be individually addressed.34 While the
protection of personal information certainly is part of cybersecurity, other threats, such
as the theft of trade secrets or attacks on cyber-physical systems, are not adequately
addressed by privacy law.35 Cybersecurity law should promote not only the privacy
of personal data, but also the protection of systems and data from attacks that could
interrupt economies or threaten national security.
This is not to suggest that the OECD framework has perfectly aligned the privacy
laws and regulations of all member nations. Far from it. The European Union views
privacy as a fundamental human right, and therefore its privacy laws, including the
new General Data Protection Regulation, are often far more stringent than those of
other jurisdictions. However, the OECD Principles, at the very least, give participating
nations a basis on which to find some commonalities and a general framework for
discussing and debating privacy issues.

4. GOALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Because nations have had few robust and meaningful discussions about how to
promote and regulate cybersecurity via legal frameworks, it would be impossible to
propose a comprehensive set of principles to guide governments globally.
33

34

35
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See, e.g., Monika Kuschewsky, What Does the Revision of the OECD Privacy Guidelines Mean for
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See, e.g., Bob Siegel, What is the Difference Between Privacy and Security?, CSO (May 26, 2016) (“A
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not address the problem that this paper seeks to address. The guidelines apply equally to government
entities, businesses, and individual users, and focus more on ethical information security norms rather
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This part sets out the goals of global cybersecurity legal standards and a few areas to
begin discussions among nations as they determine how best to address cybersecurity
challenges via laws and regulations. To be clear, I do not suggest that this should serve
as the list of international cybersecurity principles. Such a framework would require
significant multilateral discussion and assessments of both the cybersecurity threats
and the legal capabilities and constraints to address those threats. Rather, these four
goals are broad topic areas that serve as a starting point for an international discussion
about common principles.

A. Modernizing Laws to Address Current Cybersecurity Threats

The laws in many nations do not adequately address some of the newer cybersecurity
threats, as the laws are outgrowths of pre-Internet legal fields such as privacy torts and
criminal law. International norms could help guide nations as they adjust their laws to
the current threat landscape.
One of the core concepts in the cybersecurity field is the CIA Triad: confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data, systems, and networks.36 Confidentiality protects
information from unauthorized access.37 Integrity ensures that the information is
accurate and systems function as intended.38 Availability guarantees uninterrupted
access to information and systems.39 An effective cybersecurity program will advance
all three goals.
Unfortunately, cybersecurity law is often conflated with data security and privacy laws
that have been on the books for many years or decades. This results in a focus on the
confidentiality of personal information, which is the primary security-related concern
of privacy law. Without a doubt, that is an important concern, but it overlooks the
confidentiality of other critical but non-personal information, such as corporate trade
secrets or classified government information. For instance, many jurisdictions require
companies to notify individuals and regulators about disclosure of certain categories
of personal information, and data security requirements often apply to particularly
sensitive types of personal information such as medical records.
Privacy law cares little about integrity or availability, nor do any data security laws
that are largely an outgrowth of privacy laws. Data security regulations, for example,
often address the unauthorized access to or acquisition of data. These laws typically
do little to address attacks on availability (such as ransomware) or attacks on integrity
(such as website defacement or modifications to database systems that cause physical
impacts, such as explosions in gas lines).40
36
37
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39
40

See U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION 199.
Id. at 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Schrodinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791 (2015).
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Laws should, of course, continue to protect confidentiality. Protecting confidentiality
and privacy is not mutually exclusive with protecting integrity and availability.
Indeed, many of the concerns regarding interference in the 2016 American election
boil down to breaches of confidentiality: the hacks of John Podesta’s email account
and the Democratic National Committee’s servers. However, confidentiality should
not be the exclusive focus, particularly in the age of cyber-physical systems and the
Internet of Things, when everyday devices are increasingly connected to the Internet
and could be vulnerable to attacks. A modern cybersecurity framework must address
these threats as well as data breaches.
In addition to promoting all three prongs of the CIA triad, cybersecurity laws should
be forward-looking and should minimize harm from future cyberattacks. Ideally, such
laws would require companies and governments to bolster defenses to a point where
the attacks do not succeed. However, it is highly unlikely that any legal system would
entirely prevent all attacks. For that reason, a modern cybersecurity legal framework
should also strive to improve resilience – the ability of a company or government to
quickly recover after an attack has occurred.41

B. Uniformity of Regulations

Regulation of the private sector plays a key role in securing cyber infrastructure.
Companies that have some of the most critical cyber infrastructure operate in many
countries. Those companies, therefore, are subject to hundreds of legal regimes at the
local, state/province, and national levels. To the greatest extent possible, cybersecurity
regulations should be standardized across governments to improve the ease and
likelihood of compliance. International norms could help to guide that uniformity.
For instance, companies are subject to dozens of data breach notification laws at the
state/province and national levels, all varying in terms of the specific requirements
that they impose as to what types of personal data trigger the notification requirements
and the forms that the notices must take.42 The breach notice laws apply based on
the residency of the individuals whose data was breached. Thus, a company that has
customers throughout the world must comply with all of these requirements in the
days following a breach. Such compliance can be time-consuming, and can divert
attention from efforts to remedy the harms caused by the breach and prevent further
intrusions.43
Policy-makers at the international level could help strive toward such uniformity
by adopting standards that could be the basis of private sector requirements, and
jurisdictions should aim for uniformity among the regulations of state, provincial,
41
42
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See Fredrik Hult & Giri Silvanesan, What Good Cyber Resilience Looks Like, J. OF BUS. CONTINUITY
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See World Law Group, GLOBAL GUIDE TO DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS (2016).
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and local governments. The European Union’s GDPR, for example, aims to improve
uniformity among European Union members by imposing a single comprehensive
set of requirements for privacy and security practices when dealing with European
residents’ personal information.44
Complete global uniformity of cybersecurity laws is impossible, as countries will
differ in their legal constraints and values regarding issues such as privacy, expression,
and security. For instance, in Europe, privacy is a fundamental human right, while
the United States is more likely to balance privacy with other interests such as
free expression.45 However, even some movements toward similar cybersecurity
regulations would be useful in providing companies with more effective pathways to
comply with the global patchwork of laws.

C. Coordination of Coercive and Cooperative Laws

Cybersecurity laws should contain a mixture of punitive regulations and incentives
to promote private sector security. Regulations will always play an important part
in bolstering companies’ cybersecurity. However, cybersecurity differs from other
regulated areas in that the government’s goals are often generally aligned with the
goals of a company. A rational chief executive does not want their company to
experience a denial of service attack or data breach, nor does a rational government
official.
For that reason, there is great room for collaboration between the public and private
sectors. Such collaboration should form part of a broader strategy for bolstering the
cybersecurity of public and private infrastructure.
For instance, governments across the world are increasingly improving and expanding
their cyber threat information sharing programs, which allow the private and public
sectors to exchange information and collaborate to reduce the spread and damage
of cyberattacks. In the European Union, the 2016 NIS Directive requires member
states to establish Computer Security Incident Response Teams that monitor, share,
and collect information about cyber threats and “establish cooperation relationships
with the private sector”.46 Likewise, in late 2015, the U.S. Congress passed the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, which provides companies with limited legal
immunity for sharing cyber threat information and defensive measures with other
companies and the federal government’s threat information sharing program. The
statute has been called “the first major piece of cybersecurity legislation enacted into
44
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See Terry Greer-King, GDPR is Coming: 5 Things to Be Aware Of, Cisco UK & Ireland Blog (Feb. 23,
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Annex I to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016
concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the
Union (“NIS Directive”).
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law that seeks to directly address the relationship between the private and public
sectors”.47 An international dialogue on such efforts could establish best practice for
such threat-sharing efforts and might also lead to more effective means of exchanging
critical threat information internationally.
Cybersecurity education also requires collaborative efforts from both the public and
private sectors. It includes general awareness campaigns to reduce the success of
phishing and other social engineering attacks, as well as more advanced collegiate and
graduate school training to build a cybersecurity workforce. For instance, the Israeli
National Cyber Bureau has developed a plan both to build cybersecurity awareness
among the general public,48 and the EU’s NIS Directive requires each member state to
adopt a strategy that addresses “education, awareness-raising and training programs
relating to the national strategy on the security of network and information systems”.49
Governments could also provide financial incentives, such as tax credits and research
and development funding, to encourage potential targets to invest large sums of
money and staffing to bolster their cybersecurity. Because many high-profile targets
are multi-national corporations, international coordination on incentives such as tax
credits would be particularly useful in developing a global strategy.
International norms to improve cybersecurity education are particularly useful with
a global information technology workforce. Nations could determine any particular
skill shortages within cybersecurity and align educational programs accordingly.
Moreover, international principles could help to guide and improve cybersecurity
awareness campaigns to reduce the likelihood of cybersecurity attacks succeeding
due to human error.

D. Secure Throughout the Supply Chain

Just as cybersecurity threats arise due to the global interconnection of networks and
systems, they also often arise because products and services rely on a number of
components developed around the world and inadequate security of a component
can make an entire product or service vulnerable. Countries have individually begun
addressing the supply chain in a thoughtful manner. For instance, in 2008, the United
States began its Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, which recognized
the need for “partnership with industry to develop and adopt supply chain and risk
management standards and best practices”.50 However, the Initiative recognized that
supply chain cybersecurity is not merely a problem that arises from U.S. companies:
47
48
49
50
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“Risks stemming from both the domestic and globalized supply chain must be
managed in a strategic and comprehensive way over the entire lifecycle of products,
systems and services.”51
International standards for supply chain cybersecurity would be particularly useful, as
products may rely on technology that is manufactured in many nations. A substantive
dialogue between governments and industry could develop best practices for supply
chain cybersecurity, which could be used as the basis for national or regional
cybersecurity laws. Such standardization could improve the overall security of
products and services while increasing the ease of compliance.

5. CONCLUSION
This paper argues that nations should broaden their cyber discussion beyond
cyberwarfare and attempt to improve the patchwork of domestic laws that seek to
improve the cybersecurity of public and private infrastructure and information. Nations
cannot address cybersecurity threats merely by developing domestic legal rules that
fail to account for the laws and programs in other nations. An international framework
for cybersecurity would help nations to align their regulations and public-private
partnerships to address threats that often know no borders. Effective cybersecurity
laws require collaboration between governments worldwide and between the public
and private sectors. Although nations will continue to carve out their own paths, a
productive international dialogue would help policy-makers to find some common
ground on effective cybersecurity laws and programs.
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Abstract: In recent times, we have witnessed a trend in which communications data
is increasingly collected and made open source by the public. A prominent example
is the tracking of aircraft movements using unencrypted air traffic control (ATC)
communication. This paper studies the implications of such new open source aircraft
datasets on the operational privacy of military and government actors. We use publicly
available aircraft metadata in conjunction with unfiltered ATC communication
gathered from the collaborative sensor network OpenSky. We show that using these
datasets, it is possible to collect, process and analyze large numbers of movements in
an automated fashion, providing insights into potentially sensitive operations.
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We use movement data collected from more than 580 identified aircraft used by
100 different governments and over 6,000 military aircraft to identify operations
and relationships in the real world. We also provide case studies which show that
potentially sensitive information appears in these open datasets in the clear from both
military and government-operated aircraft, despite attempts at encrypting some of this
information.
Considering these privacy violations, we establish which countries’ militaries and
governments take active steps in blocking the movements of their sensitive aircraft
from online tracking websites. We find that overall more than 80% of all military
aircraft and 60% of all government aircraft are filtered for reasons of privacy, with
significant variation between different countries.
Finally, we study the main mitigation methods available to state aircraft operators and
find that all currently existing options have significant downsides, which inhibit either
their usability or their effectiveness.
Keywords: OSINT, wireless security, air traffic communication, sensor networks,
privacy

1. INTRODUCTION
Nation states and military organizations have a long tradition of intelligence gathering
for purposes such as national security, counter-terrorism or counter-proliferation. The
public has often held these intelligence activities in contempt, as the associated data
collection methods tend to be intrusive to personal privacy. In recent times, however,
we have witnessed the opposite trend in which people themselves are increasingly
collecting and analyzing intelligence data concerning state and military activities.
One of the most prominent examples is the tracking of military and government
aircraft movements. As active communities surrounding affordable software-defined
radios have brought previously hard-to-access communications into the reach of lowskilled observers, effective privacy no longer exists on unencrypted radio channels.
Many avionics communications use such channels, transmitting messages for private,
military, and governmental aircraft [1], [2]. Thus far, privacy, whilst used for civil air
traffic communication, is ensured solely by means of policy.
This paper studies the implications of new open source aircraft data collection
initiatives on the privacy of military and government actors. We used publicly
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available aircraft metadata in conjunction with unfiltered air traffic communication
data gathered from the collaborative sensor network, OpenSky [3]. We collected
and examined messages sent via the ACARS and ADS-B protocols by military and
government-operated planes over the period of one year. We show that it is possible to
collect and process large amounts of data in an automated fashion, providing insights
into potentially sensitive operations conducted by military and government aircraft.
The novelty of this work is that such analysis is possible using open source data and
is not restricted to professional intelligence services, but rather can be conducted by
a wide range of actors.
In our work, we applied both large dataset analysis and case studies to illustrate the
potential impact of air traffic data for intelligence purposes in several different areas.
Our contributions in this paper are:
•

•

•

•

We use movement data collected from more than 500 identified aircraft
used by 100 different governments as well as over 6,000 military aircraft to
identify operations and relationships in the real world.
We provide evidence that potentially sensitive information is communicated
in the clear by both military and government-operated aircraft using ACARS,
despite attempts at encrypting some of this information.
We establish which countries’ militaries and governments are aware of the
existence of large commercial air traffic sensor networks and take active
steps to block the tracking of their sensitive aircraft on these websites.
Finally, we examine the technical mitigation options open to state aircraft
operators. Based on our analysis, we argue that all existing methods have
severe drawbacks, which either inhibit their usability or their effectiveness.

In the remainder of this work, we first briefly describe the ATC technologies which we
exploited in Section 2. Section 3 describes the crowdsourced system and the available
public datasets which were used. Section 4 introduces our threat model, Section 5
presents the approach and the obtained results, and Section 6 analyzes the potential
mitigations. Finally, Section 7 discusses the implication of our results and Section 8
concludes this paper.

2. BACKGROUND
Figure 1 provides an abstract overview and comparison of the wireless communication
links of the three considered technologies, which are explained in the following
sections.
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FIGURE 1: REPRESENTATION OF ADS-B, SSR, AND ACARS SYSTEMS.

A. ACARS

The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) has been
in use for over 20 years, providing a digital data link between the ground and the
air [4]. It serves two main purposes: to administer ATC in order to decongest voice
frequencies, and to improve efficiency for aircraft operations. As such, it can be used
for safety critical procedures such as negotiating ATC clearance, as well as operational
purposes including maintenance reports, engine data and weather information.
It is served over three bands: High Frequency (HF), Very High Frequency (VHF),
and Satellite Communications (SATCOM). Most aircraft are equipped for all three,
but may choose to not use one or more. VHF is further split into Plain Old ACARS
(POA) and VHF Data Link mode 2 (VDLm2); the former is older and slower than the
latter, though currently has wider coverage. SATCOM is offered by both Inmarsat and
Iridium, which offer a range of packages depending on the use. ACARS messages are
ASCII-based and are handled by a network provider, which maintains the network
infrastructure and access to it. Two main providers exist – SITA and Rockwell Collins.

B. SSR and ADS-B

Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) is a cooperative ATC technology currently
based on the so-called transponder Modes A, C, and S, which provide digital target
information unlike traditional analog primary radar (PSR) [5]. Aircraft transponders
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are interrogated on the 1030 MHz frequency and reply with the desired information on
the 1090 MHz channel, as shown in Figure 1. With the newer Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) protocol (see Figure 1), aircraft regularly broadcast
their own identity, position, velocity, and additional information such as intent, status,
or emergency codes. These broadcasts do not require interrogation; position and
velocity are automatically transmitted twice a second [6].

C. Relationship to other ATC Technologies

Both ADS-B/SSR and ACARS are digital technologies, which send aircraft
identification data (either the ICAO address, a registration, or both) with every
message, enabling surveillance and data collection on a large scale. As security was
not part of the design of these systems, neither includes any cryptography which could
provide confidentiality for their users.
A large part of civil ATC is conducted with analog technologies such as traditional
voice communication on the VHF band. It should be noted that the features used in
this work could also be obtained through analyzing such analog communication (e.g.,
using automatic speech recognition [7]). However, focusing on unencrypted digital
technologies has the key advantage of worldwide scalability, with easy manipulation
and reliable extraction of relevant information using existing crowdsourced
infrastructure.

D. Aircraft Identifiers in ATC Communication

A 24-bit address assigned by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
to every aircraft is transmitted via both ADS-B/SSR and partly on ACARS (on the
SATCOM/VDLm2 data links). This identifier is different to an aircraft squawk or
callsign. Squawks, of which there are only 4096, are allocated locally by ATC and are
not useful for continuous tracking. The callsign can be set separately through the flight
deck for every flight, and can include both letters and numbers. Callsigns of private
aircraft typically consist of the aircraft registration number, commercial airliners use
the flight number, and military and government operators often use special call signs
depending on their mission.
In contrast, the ICAO identifier is unique providing address space for 16 million
assignments, and enables the continuous tracking of the movements of particular
aircraft; while the transponder can be re-programmed by engineers, the identifier is
not easily (or legally) changed by the pilot. These characteristics make the ICAO
identifier ideal for continuous tracking over a prolonged period of time.
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E. Related Work

Open source information has been enjoying increased popularity, including by
private and public intelligence services, which use it for OSINT purposes [8]. Much
of the related OSINT literature concentrates on social media and the wider Internet
as a source for information [9], [10]. To the best of our knowledge, no academic
work has examined the true effect of wireless ATC communication for this purpose.
However, the authors in [11] recently analyzed the current state of the transponder
equipment of a sample of military and state aircraft, which is a pre-requisite for the
present work. Similarly, several works have examined the state of privacy in aviation
communication and highlighted the fundamental lack of confidentiality within the
ADS-B and ACARS protocols [2], [12]–[15].
This is not limited to aviation; ships of various size and purpose use Automatic
Identification System (AIS) to report their position in a similar way to ADS-B. AIS
also suffers from basic security problems, much like ADS-B [16]. In recent years, its
clear-text broadcast nature has been used to track illegal fishing [17] or monitor oil
movements around the world [18].

3. OVERVIEW OF PUBLICLY
AVAILABLE AVIATION DATA
In this section, we present the data collection process. We first discuss the OpenSky
Network as a representative example of a global sensor network available to passive
threat actors. Following this, we analyze the potential sources from which to obtain
metadata information about the observed aircraft. Finally, we illustrate the dataset that
we use for our analysis in this paper.

A. The OpenSky Network

OpenSky is a crowdsourced network which is used as proof-of-concept for our OSINT
collection. As of January 2018, the OpenSky Network consisted of 590 registered
and about 450 anonymous sensors streaming data to its servers. Registered sensors
are those operated by active members of the OpenSky Network community, and the
operators of anonymous sensors are unknown. The network has currently received
and stored over 4 trillion ATC messages, adding over 15 billion messages by more
than 50,000 different aircraft every day.
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FIGURE 2: A MAP OF SENSORS REGISTERED TO THE OPENSKY NETWORK (JANUARY 2018).

B. Public Metadata Sources

Besides the pure movement data, we require metadata about the aircraft to contextualize
their behavior for OSINT purposes. We discuss the available sources of aircraft and
airport metadata below.
1) Aircraft Metadata
Several public data sources exist which provide aircraft meta-information based on
different identifiers. These identifiers include aircraft registration or the unique 24-bit
ICAO Mode S transponder address. The data usually includes type and the owner
or operator, which can then be used for further in-depth analysis and stakeholder
identification. We used several of these third-party databases in our analysis of aircraft
metadata:
•
•
•

The plane spotting and aviation community actively maintains and shares
database files with spotted aircraft using the BaseStation format for this [19].
Junzi Sun maintains a database of aircraft seen on Flightradar24. The version
used in this work is of 24 months and amounting to 136,637 rows [20].
Aircraft registered in the US are logged on a daily-updated FAA database
containing owner records. This is online and available for download, but
excludes any sensitive owner information. Even so, the data set used for this
work contained 312,162 records in December 2017 [21].
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Besides these offline databases, which amounted to data of more than 2 million aircraft,
we used several online sources to identify and verify aircraft as being operated by the
government and military. These sources include the two major private flight tracking
websites FlightAware [22] and Flightradar24 [23] and the popular database website
airframes.org. Further leads and insights on more obscure aircraft identifications can
also be gained on social media (Twitter, Flickr), a Wikipedia article on the topic [24],
specialized aviation forums and aircraft photo websites such as JetPhotos [25].
2) Airport Metadata
To relate the actual destinations (countries and cities) of the tracked aircraft, we
obtained the open airport database from Openflights.org [26]. As of December 2017,
it contained 12,057 different airports around the globe, including name, ICAO and
IATA (International Air Transport Association) short codes and precise location.

C. Overview of the Analyzed Datasets

For our work, we created two ADS-B datasets for further analysis, one for government
aircraft and one for military aircraft. For government movements, we looked at a
period of one year from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, while for the significantly larger
military dataset, we considered the period of one month in April 2017 for a more
straightforward analysis. Regarding the ACARS data, we were able to obtain separate
datasets for the three data links spanning 9 months in total, which we combined to
analyze both government and military aircraft together.
1) Government Aircraft Movements
Using the public data sources described above, we created a list of 590 verified
government aircraft from 113 different states. Table 1 shows the distributions of these
aircraft and their operating governments per world region and whether OpenSky has
tracked their position using ADS-B in the observed time frame of one year.
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF KNOWN AND TRACKED GOVERNMENTS IN THE DATASET.
Europe

Americas

Africa

Asia

Oceania

Mid. East

A/C

172

78

119

79

8

134

Tracked A/C

157

73

76

66

7

113

Gov’s

33

14

33

18

3

12

Tracked Gov’s

33

13

30

16

3

11

Flights

8,915

1,775

399

706

248

2,115

2) Military Aircraft Movements
Unlike government aircraft, military aircraft are not limited to those contained in the
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public data sources. Air forces typically reserve a block in their country’s ICAO ID
range for military transponders; for example, identifiers used by the US Air Force
tend to begin with ‘AE’. Any aircraft with an ICAO ID matching this pattern can
be identified as being used for military purposes. Exploiting this information, we
can identify aircraft not in our public metadata sources – including the country and
operator – though in these instances we lack additional meta information such as
aircraft type. Overall, this approach resulted in a list of about 520,000 potential
military aircraft transponder IDs.
In order to analyze the movements of military aircraft, we combined this list with
all 1090 MHz downlink transponder transmissions recorded by OpenSky in April
2017. In this set of about 290 billion transmissions, we detected 6,024 unique military
aircraft that broadcast unencrypted Mode S or ADS-B messages within range. Figure
3 shows the distribution of countries these aircraft were registered to.
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT SEEN IN OPENSKY BY ORIGIN COUNTRIES
(APRIL 2017).

3) ACARS Collection
We further used the data from an ACARS receiver set up for the OpenSky Network in
Central Europe, which collected 2,760,141 messages from 9,924 different aircraft on
three data links (SATCOM, POA and VDLm2) over a period of 2 months for SATCOM
and 7 months for VHF and VDLm2. While this ACARS data is not currently open
source, there are existing platforms such as AVDelphi [27] which make such ACARS
data publicly available.
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In this dataset, we received 6,149 ACARS messages sent by 200 unique government
aircraft and 24,923 messages sent by 438 aircraft operated by the military. The majority
of messages from these groups were received via SATCOM (60% for the government
and 97% for the military), indicating a strong preference for this data link.

4. THREAT MODEL
We consider a purely passive attacker as described in [14]. In our model, these are
interested observers who exploit the open nature of air traffic communication protocols
to obtain open source intelligence. This threat actor does not actively interfere with
any of the observed technologies. Instead, they use public tracking services such as
FlightRadar24 or ADS-B Exchange [28] in conjunction with public metadata sources
to gather intelligence about government or military aviation movements. A more
powerful version of this threat actor uses their own network of cheap SDR receivers
to gather an unfiltered air traffic picture in real time which can be stored for historic
analysis. This enables them to listen to a wider range of technologies such as ACARS
and is within the capabilities of practically any determined attacker today [2].

5. EXPLOITING OPEN SOURCE ATC DATA
FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
In this section, we provide examples of the type and scope of intelligence that can
be gleaned from ATC data. We first discuss the government dataset, followed by the
military dataset and an exemplary case study of a government jet operated by the
military.

A. Government

We assume that governments are less secretive by nature than the military. At
least in democratic countries, the electorate should be able to hold the government
accountable, which requires an element of transparency. Whilst there are instances in
which government transport might need to be kept private momentarily, most day-today government operations may not be secret in order to provide said accountability.
However, this is evidently not true for all government missions from all countries.
Thus, in the following, we analyze the quantitative possibilities a passive observer
has with regards to the tracking of government aircraft.1 Figure 4 illustrates the
scope of our observations by showing the number and distributions of non-European
government aircraft in Europe during the observation period.

1
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Analyzing the reasons and motivations for specific relationships and government movements is out of the
scope of this paper.

FIGURE 4: AIRCRAFT USED BY NON-EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS
VISITING EUROPE DURING JULY 2016 – JUNE 2017.

1) Meetings
During the one-year observation period, we observed 164 meetings of groups of at
least three aircraft from different governments at the same destination.2 As would be
expected, the majority of these meet-ups happened at the major European capitals:
Paris (44 times), Brussels (23), Rome (10), London (9), and Berlin (8).
The largest meetings with the most participants are naturally large global summits,
such as the World Economic Forum (21 tracked governments), the Nuclear Security
Summit (20), or the Munich Security Council (13). While these gatherings are not
secret, their list of participants is not always published, and if it is, it may not be
complete. Indeed, we found several government aircraft which landed in the vicinity
of the World Economic Forum that were absent from the official list of participants
[29].
While large multinational meetings such as the EU or NATO summits are well known,
most smaller gatherings of three or four countries are not easily attributable. We
acknowledge that every such occurrence may be due to simple chance, however, they
can provide a heuristic starting point for further investigations.
2) Relationships
While there is a possibility of coincidence for every time that government aircraft
are in the same location, this becomes much less likely for the consistently high
2

We define a potential multilateral meeting as three or more aircraft, which have landed within 50 km range
within the same 48h period and not left again.
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numbers of meetings we have seen over a prolonged time frame for many government
pairs. Table 2 shows the top relationships between all tracked government aircraft in
OpenSky’s sensor range. The top three relationships have seen two governments at the
same airport for 133 times (France/Saudi Arabia), 127 times (France/Morocco), and
102 times (Dubai/Qatar), respectively. Overall, we detected 7,106 pairwise meetings
over 994 different relationships with a median of 3 meetings/relationship.
TABLE 2: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MOST SEEN GOVERNMENTS BASED ON ADS-B DATA.
Note: We counted the Emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi as separate entities due to their prevalence.
Qatar

Saudi
Arabia

US

UK

Netherlands

Morocco

Total

France

65

133

4

4

13

127

346

Germany

35

19

91

20

76

10

251

Dubai

102

23

17

71

9

2

224

Belgium

9

6

38

32

72

-

157

Bahrain

49

16

11

46

5

8

135

Abu Dhabi

28

40

33

13

2

13

129

Total

288

237

194

186

177

160

Besides looking at the spatio-temporal correlation of two or more government
aircraft, we can also investigate the most popular destinations of any single aircraft
over time to infer public or private relationships of the operator. Table 3 lists the most
visited destinations by the top eight observed governments. Considering OpenSky’s
core coverage area in Europe and the US, it is unsurprising that the most observed
government aircraft are those from European countries and the US. Their preferred
foreign destinations reflect the close diplomatic ties between these countries, or
special commitments as in the case of Slovakia’s EU presidency (Jul-Dec 2016),
which necessitated a large amount of flights to the EU’s headquarters in Brussels.
TABLE 3: MOST POPULAR NON-DOMESTIC DESTINATION COUNTRIES
AND AIRPORTS OF THE EIGHT MOST SEEN GOVERNMENTS.
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate the number of times an aircraft was observed visiting the destination. Note,
that country and airport are measured separately and can be unrelated.
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Government (seen)

Top Destination Country

Top Destination Airport

Germany (2,345)

United States (57)

Washington (44)

United States (1,221)

Germany (48)

Brussels (9)

Russia (972)

Germany (54)

Rome (16)

Italy (740)

Belgium (17)

Brussels (15)

France (717)

Germany (19)

Basel (9)

Qatar (554)

United Kingdom (148)

London (75)

Czech Republic (536)

Germany (28)

Brussels (8)

Slovakia (472)

Belgium (39)

Brussels (32)

3) ACARS Analysis
Of the government aircraft considered in this section, 29.9% were observed sending
ACARS messages. This in turn means that they often leak both their existence (their
identification) and their intent (where they are going).
In Table 4 we see the position leakage for government aircraft as a result of using
ACARS across the different subnetworks. Explicit position is simply a set of
coordinates, whereas indicated position is when the aircraft is sending messages
which reveal the area it is in. These could be airport information requests, for example.
Note that we see at least 20% of government aircraft leak indicated position leakage
on each link. Some of these aircraft were observed transmitting clear text e-mail
messages via the ACARS satellite link. The nature of these messages was mainly
flight status related, but some included names and e-mail addresses of fleet operators
or government employees.
TABLE 4: POSITION-RELATED MESSAGES SENT OVER ACARS BY GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT (AC).
PERCENTAGES ARE OF ALL GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT SEEN ON THAT SUB-NETWORK.
Subnetwork

Number of
Messages

Number of
Aircraft

Explicit
Position

Number of
Aircraft

Indicated
Position

Number of
Aircraft

POA

1,491

66

169

26 (39.4%)

47

15 (22.7%)

VDLm2

275

54

31

13 (24.1%)

11

11 (20.4%)

SATCOM

3,654

117

218

13 (11.1%)

480

41 (35.0%)

B. Military

Compared to the identified government aircraft, military aircraft are much less likely to
be equipped with ADS-B. Nonetheless, of the 6,024 unique military aircraft observed
in April 2017, 42.9% were equipped with ADS-B and broadcast their positions at
least some of the time. This varies greatly between different aircraft categories and
also between countries as previous research has shown [5], [11]. Compared to the
government aircraft, clusters of military aircraft on the ground are not as obviously
insightful to an observer, as most operational missions are normally airborne and do
not require landing. Yet, visits to foreign countries are interesting nonetheless and can
support analyzes of military strategy and troop movements.
To prove that valuable OSINT can be collected on military aircraft, we offer some
additional approaches: we analyze the ACARS messages sent by these aircraft and
also look at the prevalence of military UAV movements in the dataset.
1) ACARS Analysis
Of all military aircraft we investigated, we observed 462 or 7.7% sending ACARS
messages. Table 5 shows the distribution of these messages by subnetwork. It
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illustrates that satellite communication is by far the most popular data link, making up
about 98% of all traffic received by aircraft of this category. One might speculate that
this preference indicates concern about the operational security of the ground-based
links; however, the difficulty of eavesdropping on SATCOM with software-defined
radios is broadly similar in practice.
As can be seen, 118 of the observed 462 military aircraft explicitly sent their position
in the clear using ACARS at least once. Furthermore, 269 aircraft broadcast data that
would give away their position by, for example, requesting weather reports for their
destination airport.
TABLE 5: POSITION-RELATED MESSAGES SENT OVER ACARS BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT (AC).
PERCENTAGES ARE OF ALL MILITARY AIRCRAFT SEEN ON THAT SUB-NETWORK.
Subnetwork

Number of
Messages

Number of
Aircraft

Explicit
Position

Number of
Aircraft

Indicated
Position

Number of
Aircraft

POA

305

19

19

6 (31.6%)

26

7 (36.8%)

VDLm2

165

25

25

3 (12.0%)

9

4 (16.0%)

SATCOM

24,124

418

1,183

109 (26.1%)

2,011

258 (61.7%)

2) UAV Detection
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are fast becoming a major presence in civil airspace,
and many UAVs are operated by governments or the military. Some of these drones
carry ADS-B or Mode S transponders to cooperate with ATC and detect and avoid
other aircraft. Hence, their presence and movements are visible to flight trackers and
ATC receivers in general.
Using the metadata described in Section 3, we obtained the identifiers of 74 militaryoperated UAVs. We analyzed the complete historical data of OpenSky to find evidence
of these Mode S and ADS-B-equipped UAVs, which returned sightings for 31 or
41.9% of the complete set.
“ADS 95 Ranger Drones” operated by the Swiss Air Force to patrol borders and for
general surveillance purposes provided the most striking evidence of such UAVs.
Overall, we encountered messages from 14 of these drones, which use Mode S to
communicate their identification and altitude.
Additionally, we received ATC messages from four General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper
UAV and 10 Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawks. Some of these sightings
have also been reported in aviation and military blogs on the Internet, showing that
gathering OSINT by eavesdropping on air traffic communication is becoming more
and more widespread [30].
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C. Case Study

Figure 5 provides a case study on typical OSINT that can be gleaned from a government
flight operated by a country’s air force. It illustrates that, even with limited sensor
coverage, the pieces put together via different technologies can provide a detailed
picture of the whole flight.
FIGURE 5: A CASE STUDY OF OPEN SOURCE FLIGHT INFORMATION OBTAINABLE ABOUT A
GOVERNMENT FLIGHT.

At the time of flight in December 2016, the OpenSky Network had comprehensive
ADS-B and SSR coverage in the area within the dotted red line. A satellite ACARS
receiver was placed centrally within this area, which was able to pick up the uplink
part of the satellite communication; i.e., the one sent out by aircraft and addressed to
the ground network.
Figure 5 shows the complete flight from the departure (D) in Riyadh to the landing (L)
in Shannon. Around departure, the flight plan was sent out via ACARS by the aircraft
and picked up by the receiver in Europe, detailing the precise route and waypoints the
aircraft was planning to take. Several other ACARS messages containing potentially
sensitive information about load and passengers were also picked up within an hour
of departure (1). At (2), the aircraft reached the ground sensor coverage of OpenSky,
which received 18,348 messages, providing the altitude of the aircraft and positional
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information within the range of the receivers. At (3) it entered the range of the ground
ACARS receiver, which captured all information provided via this channel only.
While still at cruising altitude between (4) and (5), the aircraft activated its ADS-B
transponder, broadcasting its exact position, call sign and velocity. It switched off the
positional broadcasts again before leaving OpenSky’s SSR range at (6) during the
approach to Shannon (as verified by the Mode S altitude messages).
This behavior shows that ADS-B can and is turned on and off by military-operated
aircraft. Turning it on at least sometimes indicates a general willingness to use ADS-B
and, by doing so, facilitate tracking with civil surveillance technologies. However,
turning it on only at cruising altitude and turning it off again before descending most
likely aims at concealing the airport of departure and/or arrival.

6. EXISTING MITIGATION OPTIONS
There are several potential mitigation options for both government and military aircraft
to prevent the information leakages discussed in the previous section. Here, we analyze
the effectiveness of blocking information from web trackers, the use of pseudonyms,
encryption, and attempts at forgoing civil ATC communication completely.

A. Web Tracker Blocking

One approach to limiting the privacy leaks of aircraft tracking is through block lists,
which instruct the companies operating aircraft tracking websites to hide the aircraft
on the list from public view. The most popular example of such a list is the Blocked
Aircraft Registration Request (BARR) program, originally run by the National
Business Aviation Association (NBAA) but now maintained by the FAA [31]. A
BARR block places a restriction on the feed of aircraft send out by the FAA, which
is used as a source by flight trackers. Table 6 shows that in our sample 85.0% of all
military aircraft and 61.6% of all government aircraft were being filtered on the most
popular flight tracking website (FlightRadar24). This indicates a clear awareness of a
privacy impact through flight tracking by a majority of these state actors.
TABLE 6: PERCENTAGE OF IDENTIFIABLE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT BLOCKED
FROM POPULAR WEB TRACKERS. PERCENTAGES ARE OF THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TRACKED.

Gov.

Mil.

314

Europe

Americas

Africa

Asia

Oceania

Mid. East

Tracked

157

73

76

66

7

113

Blocked

93 (59.2%)

61 (83.6%)

38 (50.0%)

31 (47.0%)

6 (85.7%)

74 (65.5%)

Tracked

1,851

3,646

45

268

73

78

Blocked

1,359 (73.4%)

3,418 (93.7%)

36 (80.0%)

157 (58.6%)

38 (52.1%)

56 (71.8%)

Despite the popularity of the blocking approach, it is wholly ineffective against our
threat model. As illustrated in the previous section, any passive actor with control over
the raw data obtained from ATC sensors has full access to an unfiltered view of the
airspace, including any government and military aircraft. Yet, for unknown reasons,
18 of all 106 tracked governments (17%) do not ask any of their aircraft to be blocked,
forgoing even these basic mitigations.

B. Pseudonyms

A more comprehensive solution to the described tracking problem consists of
pseudonymous identifiers that thwart an attacker’s ability to correlate flight tracks
with each other and with a specific aircraft.
For aircraft call signs, this is generally feasible for all considered technologies;
changing a call sign before or during a flight is technically straightforward and often
legally possible. For example, there are online services such as FltPlan.com [32],
which offer randomized call signs to private operators, and both commercial and
military operators are known to change their call signs regularly depending on an
aircraft’s mission. For the ICAO 24-bit identifier, the case is very different, as the pilot
or operator cannot easily change it. The ICAO allows for a manual change in case of
sensitive missions [33], yet we do not see this option in wide operation by government
or military aircraft as our results in the previous section show.
ADS-B can alternatively be served over a newly developed data link, the Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT), which offers a built-in privacy mechanism that generates
a non-conflicting, random, temporary ICAO 24-bit identifier to avoid third-party
tracking. However, it has been shown that this implementation is flawed and does not
successfully disable aircraft tracking over time [34]. Furthermore, it is only in use by
general aviation aircraft within the US airspace and as such not a quick fix for any
other operator.
Finally, regardless of identifier, it has been shown that it is possible to fingerprint
ADS-B transponders on the physical and link layer levels, which, in sufficient
granularity, would circumvent even properly implemented pseudonyms [35].

C. Encryption

As mentioned previously, the use of encrypted communication would be the most
effective countermeasure to the described data leakages. Unauthorized access to both
movement data and other information can be stopped through the use of symmetric
or asymmetric encryption as it is in current use in many wireless communication
technologies.
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As with any distributed security solution, implementing a public-key infrastructure
is costly and requires thoughtful, security-conscious design. Especially in the case
of aircraft, which must be able to communicate with unexpected ground stations,
keeping credentials up-to-date for all communications partners is a challenge. Secure
ACARS, available since 2001 [36], provides such an option, and not only to military
and government operators. However, we have not seen Secure ACARS in use in
the wild; in our data set of 1,749,142 messages from all three data links, we never
recorded a single message of this type.3 We speculate that the fact that it comes at a
surcharge to the ACARS service impedes its adoption.
This assumption is supported by the fact that there are several proprietary encryption
solutions in use for ACARS, which are not standardized, but potentially come at a
cheaper running cost. Unfortunately, many such solutions are insecure, quickly
broken and provide no more security than clear-text messages against any interested
adversary. One such example is discussed by Smith et al. [12], who show that it is
in wide use even in government and military aircraft. In our dataset, we found that
1.78% of the observed military and 11.36% of the observed government aircraft
used this obfuscation method, a serious lapse of operational security. In principle,
however, there is no fundamental obstacle to developing a secure proprietary ACARS
solution for exclusive use by a state’s sensitive aircraft as long as compatibility with
the existing system is ensured.
While ACARS messages can be encrypted by the user’s choice, this is not possible for
both ADS-B and SSR. As has been analyzed previously, the current technological lockin does not allow for a quick encryption solution for these protocols [15]. While there
are military equivalents to civil SSR and ADS-B in use and under development (NATO
STANAG 4193, SSR Modes 4 and 5), due to obvious secrecy requirements, very few
details are publicly available. As Mode 5 is believed to provide full confidentiality
using strong encryption, its use would indeed fully mitigate the information leakage
of ATC movement data. However, due to the lack of independent scrutiny, it is not
possible to make any reliable statements on the security of the system.
Unfortunately, even for those military operators with access to encrypted protocols,
the preference of civil ATC authorities for open systems and maximum compatibility
precludes any proprietary solutions as long as they are flying in civil airspace [14]. In
short, all operators must be aware that using any current civil ATC technology will
leak information immediately and widely.

D. Switch off civil ATC communication

The final mitigation option for military and government aircraft operators is to not use
civil ATC communications. For ACARS, this is fairly simple, as it is not a required
3

316

A distinct set of message labels is reserved in the ACARS standard for Secure ACARS messages, enabling
us to detect their presence even where it is not possible to decrypt them.

technology in controlled airspace and some operators choose to forgo ACARS for cost
reasons, including entire airlines. Yet, as shown above, many sensitive aircraft use
unencrypted ACARS, presumably for operational reasons.
When considering ADS-B and SSR, the picture is much more complex. Aircraft are
still not required to broadcast their precise position using ADS-B. As long as the
technology is not mandated for state aircraft in (mostly Western) civil airspaces, there
are many operators who choose to delay the upgrade in the first place for reasons of
cost, convenience, or indeed privacy. Overall, only around 6.7% of all government
aircraft but 57.1% of the military aircraft in our sample did not yet use ADS-B, which
is in line with previous research [11]. Naturally, this is only a solution in the very
short term and the consequences of upgrading will have to be addressed in the very
near future.

7. DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that tracking aircraft using civil ATC systems allows us to
glean significant intelligence that the aircraft operators or users might not be interested
in sharing. Indeed, with a relatively low level of skill and equipment used by a purely
passive attacker, this combination of public data sources can reveal much more than
where an aircraft is. Even though options exist to mitigate the problem, they are
largely ineffective against a reasonably persistent attacker. Naturally, this generates
some recommendations for how to improve the state of privacy in aviation. In the
short term, regulation provides a possible key to allowing relevant actors to protect
their privacy. Governments would have to legally restrict and regulate those entities
(private and commercial) that are sharing data about aircraft movements for which a
reasonable effort at privacy has been made. This would need to be a more concerted
effort than the BARR scheme, which is, to some extent, opt-in.
In the longer term, technical solutions should be developed to provide guarantees of
privacy. For example, a robust pseudonym system would go a long way to limiting
the ability to track aircraft over time, similar to the concept of Temporary Mobile
Subscriber Identity (TMSI) in cellular networks. There is no critical technical or
procedural need to have a consistent, publicly known identifier for aircraft — there
is in fact evidence of aircraft being prescribed alternative ICAO identifiers by the
authorities in situations such as sensitive military flights [33]. Doing away with the
inflexible current system in favor of a more transient one would in turn de-correlate
consecutive flights by a given aircraft. This measure alone would greatly reduce the
impact of ATC-based flight tracking.
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Hence, in our opinion, the only way to effectively create the opportunity for privacy
in ATC systems is through the combination of technical and regulatory measures.
Regulatory measures can cover the case of data generated by state entities, but
technical measures are needed to stop passive observers from easily collecting
significant amounts of data.
As discussed in [14], there is currently a preference for open systems in aviation, but
this is not necessarily wise if a good level of security and privacy is required. Parallels
can be drawn to the creation of the Internet in that, initially, open systems allowed
easy integration and global interaction between different networks. However, in the
longer term, malicious parties have resulted in both a desire and need for securing
all communications. Aviation networks carry bigger safety risk, so should aim for
similar, if not greater, levels of security than the Internet currently uses.

8. CONCLUSION
The findings we have presented in this work conclusively prove that it is possible to
collect, process, and ultimately exploit, a trove of open source air traffic communication
data for intelligence purposes. While examining all potential use cases for such data is
out of the scope of a single paper, we believe that our proof of concept is sufficient to
raise awareness of the issue among all concerned stakeholders.
It has also become clear that traditional ways of protecting the privacy of aircraft
owners are all but obsolete in the era of cheap software-defined radio receivers, and
relying on them should be done with extreme caution. Military and nation state actors
have superior means and resources to protect their operational privacy and security
in some cases, as evidenced by the existence of encrypted communications solutions.
However, the requirement to be able to communicate with civil ATC negates at least
some of this advantage as illustrated in this work. Consequently, only a change to those
civil communication technologies will lead to comprehensive privacy improvements
for those who seek it. In the meantime, many actors will be able to exploit the openly
available information gained in this domain for their purposes.
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Abstract: Organizations increasingly rely on cyber threat intelligence feeds to protect
their infrastructure from attacks. These feeds typically list IP addresses or domains
associated with malicious activities such as spreading malware or participating
in a botnet. Today, there is a rich ecosystem of commercial and free cyber threat
intelligence feeds, making it difficult, yet essential, for network defenders to quantify
the quality and to select the optimal set of feeds to follow. Selecting too many or lowquality feeds results in many false alerts, while considering too few feeds increases
the risk of missing relevant threats. Naïve individual metrics like size and update rate
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give a somewhat good overview about a feed, but they do not allow conclusions about
its quality and they can easily be manipulated by feed providers.
In this paper, we present FeedRank, a novel ranking approach for cyber threat
intelligence feeds. In contrast to individual metrics, FeedRank is robust against
tampering attempts by feed providers. FeedRank’s key insight is to rank feeds
according to the originality of their content and the reuse of entries by other feeds.
Such correlations between feeds are modelled in a graph, which allows FeedRank
to find temporal and spatial correlations without requiring any ground truth or an
operator’s feedback.
We illustrate FeedRank’s usefulness with two characteristic examples: (i) selecting the
best feeds that together contain as many distinct entries as possible; and (ii) selecting
the best feeds that list new entries before they appear on other feeds. We evaluate
FeedRank based on a large set of real feeds. The evaluation shows that FeedRank
identifies dishonest feeds as outliers and that dishonest feeds do not achieve a better
FeedRank score than the top-rated real feeds.
Keywords: cyber threat intelligence, intelligence feeds, cyber attacks, malware,
botnets, situational awareness

1. Introduction
States, organizations, companies and individuals are faced with ever-growing cyber
threats. The most prominent among these threats include phishing or spam campaigns,
malware distribution and DDoS attacks [1] [2]. To mitigate these threats, Cyber Threat
Intelligence Feeds (CTIFs, also known as blacklists or block lists) are a major source
of information for most network defenders [3]. The CTIF ecosystem is currently very
large and complex [4] and for reliable protection, network defenders need to correlate
data from multiple CTIFs [1].
However, while selecting the best set of CTIFs is crucial to maximizing efficiency, it
is also difficult as there is no easy way to objectively compare CTIFs. In fact, network
defenders often only evaluate feeds individually based on naïve metrics such as the
feed’s size. While these metrics allow for a rough assessment, they do not allow
conclusions about the combination of multiple feeds and – as we will show in this
paper – they are easy to manipulate for a dishonest CTIF provider in order to pretend
a higher quality and thus increase its impact and revenue.
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Problem statement. In this paper, we address the problem of finding an objective,
tamper-resistant ranking algorithm that allows well-grounded selections of high quality
CTIFs. We determine the quality of a feed by three key properties: completeness,
accuracy and speed. That is, an ideal CTIF lists all malicious entities, does not list
non-malicious entities and updates its entries promptly. In particular, we address the
following research questions:
•

•

•

How can the quality of a CTIF be estimated in a robust and scalable way?
Achieving this is challenging because there is no ground truth to compare
it with. Hence, one cannot rely on standard metrics such as precision and
recall.
How can the structure of the CTIF ecosystem be evaluated and how do
existing CTIFs differ in terms of completeness, accuracy and speed? In
particular, do CTIF providers cluster in groups or is there a large diversity
regarding the reported threats among the different providers?
Can we identify individual CTIFs that consistently outperform others and
CTIFs that seem to lack behind or borrow information from other feeds?
Specially, what are good metrics to identify outperformers and tamperingattempts by a subset of the feeds?

FeedRank. We present FeedRank, a novel metric for the ranking of CTIFs. The
key idea behind FeedRank is to model the correlations between CTIFs as a graph
and to obtain the ranking by applying algorithms to this graph. This way, FeedRank
quantifies the relative performance among CTIFs and is able to evaluate the quality of
feeds without a ground truth. At its core, FeedRank bears similarities with collective
intelligence approaches or PageRank [5], an algorithm to rank websites that is used
by Google.
The setting for ranking CTIFs bears similarities with the ranking of websites by search
engines in the following aspects:
• Websites can contain arbitrary content (including dummy keywords to
improve their ranking).
• Websites can contain links to any other website.
• There is no ground truth for the quality of websites.
• A website to which many other websites refer to is likely to be important.
Similar properties hold for CTIFs:
• CTIFs can contain arbitrary entries.
• CTIFs can copy entries from any other CTIF.
• There is no ground truth for the quality and validity of CTIF entries.
• A CTIF whose entries appear in other CTIFs is likely to be of high quality.
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Despite these similarities, applying website ranking algorithms (such as PageRank)
to CTIFs is challenging because of the particular semantic of the CTIF application
domain. The key idea to apply website ranking algorithms to CTIFs is to model
correlations between CTIFs in a graph. In particular, while PageRank uses the web
graph (a graph that models the links between websites), FeedRank uses a correlation
graph to model common entries in CTIFs and the time at which they appear in each
of the considered CTIFs. The correlation graph provides us with the foundation to
assess a CTIF’s quality as we argue that a CTIF whose entries later appear on many
other feeds has a high quality (like a website with many incoming links is assumed to
be important). However, since the correlation graph alone does not allow conclusions
about the completeness of a particular CTIF, FeedRank also performs an analysis of
the contribution of each CTIF.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are:
• A tamper-resistant approach to rank CTIFs at scale (Section 3) based on:
° correlations between CTIFs (Section 3B); and
° the individual contribution of each CTIF (Section 3C).
• A comprehensive evaluation based on large sets of freely available CTIFs
(Section 4).
• Two case-studies to demonstrate useful use-cases of FeedRank (Section 5).

2. Evaluating Cyber Threat
Intelligence Feeds
In this section, we provide an overview over Cyber Threat Intelligence Feeds (CTIFs)
and identify key properties that characterize good CTIFs, sketch traditional evaluation
metrics and identify strategies for how dishonest CTIF providers can tamper with
them.

A. Cyber Threat Intelligence Feeds

In general, CTIFs are collections of Indicators of Compromise (IOC) that characterize
malicious or non-malicious endpoints or activities. In this paper, we focus on feeds
that list IP addresses associated with malicious activities (such as sending spam or
hosting phishing sites). However, the obtained results are also applicable to other
types of feeds.
CTIFs are available from a variety of commercial and non-commercial providers and
can cover one or multiple types of threats (e.g. spam or phishing). The feeds are
typically provided in real time; that is, the contents are updated continuously or with
a certain frequency. New entries may be added when, for example, an endpoint is
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found to behave maliciously and removed if the malicious activity has stopped. CTIFs
obtain information about malicious endpoints in various ways. For example, malicious
activity can be detected by email providers, honeypots, CERTs or by manual reports
from users. CTIFs can also copy or fuse information from other CTIFs.

B. Properties of High Quality Feeds

An ideal CTIF is complete, accurate and fast. To be complete, the CTIF needs to
contain all malicious endpoints at a given time. To be accurate, the CTIF must not list
benign endpoints. To be fast, the completeness and accuracy property must hold at any
given point in time, i.e., an endpoint must appear exactly during the time it behaves
maliciously. This ideal state is obviously difficult to reach in practice, as there always
exist malicious endpoints that have not yet been identified as such.

C. Individual Feed Metrics

Naïve metrics which evaluate each CTIF individually are easy to calculate and widely
used. Examples of such individual metrics include the feed’s size, the update frequency
and the number of entries that are added or removed (cf. Table I). However, a major
problem with individual metrics is that they provide little insight about the quality
of a CTIF without a ground truth (i.e. a way to objectively verify the correctness
of the feed’s contents). Even worse, all the listed individual metrics can easily be
manipulated by adding or removing entries to/from a CTIF (cf. Table I).
With FeedRank, we present an advanced and tamper-resistant ranking metric that does
not require a ground truth. As we will describe in the following sections, analyzing
the correlations of CTIFs allows reasoning about the feed’s completeness, accuracy
and speed.
TABLE I: EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUAL FEED METRICS. THESE METRICS DO NOT ALLOW
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT A FEED’S QUALITY AND CAN BE MANIPULATED BY THE FEED PROVIDER.
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3. FeedRank
In this section, we present the design goals and an overview of FeedRank. Further,
we describe the two core components of FeedRank in more detail and explain why
FeedRank is robust against tampering attempts.

A. Overview

FeedRank allows us to identify high quality CTIFs, while at the same time being
robust against tampering attempts from CTIF providers, by combining the contribution
analysis and the correlation graph (see Table II).
TABLE II: KEY PROPERTIES OF HIGH QUALITY CTIFS AND
HOW THEY ARE REPRESENTED IN FEEDRANK.

FeedRank operates in three steps (see Figure 1). First, it collects snapshots of considered
CTIFs; second it builds a feed correlation graph and performs a contribution analysis;
and third, it computes a score for each considered CTIF.
FIGURE 1: FEEDRANK OPERATES IN THREE STEPS: IT COLLECTS SNAPSHOTS OF CTIFS, COMPUTES
A CORRELATION GRAPH AND A CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS AND OUTPUTS A RANKING.

I. Feed Collection. As an input, FeedRank requires at least two snapshots of each
considered feed. A snapshot consists of the timestamp and all entries of a CTIF. For
the most accurate results, the time between the two snapshots should be long enough
such that all CTIFs provide an update of the entries. The set of considered feeds can
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be specified by the operator who uses FeedRank. It should contain all the CTIFs that
the operator considers using in their environment.
II. a) Correlation Graph. Based on the snapshots, FeedRank builds a correlation
graph. The nodes in this graph correspond to the CTIFs and the (directed) edges
represent correlations between them.
II. b) Contribution Analysis. For each CTIF, FeedRank computes a contribution
metric that measures the CTIF’s contribution to the total number of listed entries.
III. Feed Rating. FeedRank runs an algorithm similar to PageRank on the correlation
graph. This, together with the results from the contribution analysis, assigns each feed
a score and allows to rank them.

B. Correlation Graph

The correlation graph is used to model correlations between CTIFs. It is a directed
graph where the vertices represent feeds and the weighted edges describe correlations
between them. Two CTIFs (X and Y) are connected with a directed edge from X to Y
if X contains entries that were contained in Y before they appeared in X. This means
that X implicitly confirms the respective entries from Y. In other words: both feeds
classify the entries as malicious, and Y was faster in listing them, which makes it more
likely that Y is accurate with respect to these entries.
The weight of this edge is determined by the percentage of entries that appear first in
Y and are later mentioned by X. For example, if Y contains 20 entries and 10 of them
appear later on X, the weight of the edge would be 50% as this is the percentage of
entries in Y that were confirmed by X.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of a correlation graph with 3 feeds with the following
characteristics:
•
•

B confirms 100% of the entries in A (i.e. every entry that appears in A later
appears in B)
C confirms 10% of the entries in A and 20% of the entries in B (i.e. 10% of
the entries in A and 20% of the entries in B appear later in C)

In this example, feed A achieves the highest score according to the correlation graph
and would thus be considered as the most valuable feed. The intuitive explanation
for this is that all of A’s entries are confirmed by B and no other feed is faster than A.
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FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE OF THE FEEDRANK GRAPH METRIC. IT RANKS FEEDS ACCORDING TO THE
AMOUNT OF ENTRIES THAT ARE CONFIRMED BY OTHER FEEDS (E.G. B CONFIRMS 100% OF THE
ENTRIES IN A).

To determine a ranking of CTIFs in the correlation graph, we apply the PageRank
algorithm [5]. PageRank is a ranking algorithm for websites (famously used by
Google) and is based on a graph that models the hyperlinks between websites. Besides
the web graph, PageRank requires two additional parameters: the damping factor and
a convergence condition.
The damping factor d in PageRank describes the probability with which a user
browsing at a certain website will click on any of the links to visit another website.
For FeedRank, we calculate the damping factor depending on the average path length
l (i.e., the average number of CTIFs that subsequently list an entry) of all entries that
appear in at least two CTIFs within the analyzed dataset. From l, we calculate the
probability that an entry “propagates” to another feed – along the lines of a user that
clicks on a link to move to another website – as:

Being an iterative algorithm, PageRank further requires a convergence condition. The
convergence condition in PageRank specifies the maximal delta between the graph
score of all nodes (i.e. the precision of the result).

C. Contribution Analysis

The contribution metric is the result of the contribution analysis and measures the
relative contribution of a single CTIF compared to the complete set of analyzed feeds.
Therefore, it provides the foundation to select a subset of the analyzed feeds that
together have a maximal contribution.
FeedRank’s contribution analysis works as follows. First, it computes the complete
set of all listed entries, i.e., the union of all entries listed in the considered feeds at any
of the recorded snapshots. For each entry, it determines the feed that listed the entry
first, and assigns the entry to that feed. In case multiple feeds add an entry at the same
time, the entry is assigned to the biggest feed. The resulting contribution metric is then
computed as the percentage of entries that each feed contributes to the complete set.
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D. Tamper-resistance

In this section, we explain why FeedRank is robust against an unfair CTIF which tries
to manipulate its rank. Since a CTIF provider can arbitrarily choose the contents of its
feed, there are no guarantees about the validity of entries.
At a high level, we distinguish between the following tampering strategies:
• Adding entries that are not contained in the original CTIF.
• Removing of entries from the original CTIF.
• Replacing existing entries by other values (i.e. pretend updates).
For each of these strategies, the dishonest CTIF provider needs to choose the entries
that will be added or removed. This can be done in at least the following ways:
• At random: New entries are generated randomly and randomly chosen
entries are removed from the feed.
• Based on the contents of another CTIF: A dishonest CTIF can copy a subset
or all entries from one or multiple other CTIFs and thus copy the behavior
of these CTIFs.
The manipulation strategies mentioned above work well for individual metrics (as
described in Section 2. C) but, as we explain in the following, they do not work with
FeedRank.
A dishonest CTIF that tries to manipulate its FeedRank score by adding entries is
not successful because: (i) if the added entries are chosen randomly, they will not be
confirmed by other feeds with very high probability; (ii) if the added entries are copied
from another CTIF, this is considered as if the dishonest feed confirms the other feed’s
entries and can therefore help the other feed, but not the dishonest feed. Obviously, a
feed that copies entries from another feed is always slower in listing these entries. If
a dishonest CTIF tries to improve its score by removing entries, each of the removed
entries is either of high quality (i.e. it is confirmed by other feeds) or of low quality
(it does not appear on other feeds). If a CTIF removes high quality entries, this lowers
its ranking because a smaller percentage of its entries are confirmed. If it removes
low quality entries, its overall quality increases and it (deservedly) obtains a better
ranking.
A dishonest CTIF that both adds and removes entries faces the union of the limitations
mentioned above. FeedRank does not measure the update frequency of CTIFs and
therefore a higher update frequency does not help to improve the score. Instead,
FeedRank is run with a certain frequency and based on the feed’s contents at the time
of execution. Therefore, as long as the update frequency of a CTIF is larger than or
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equal to the execution frequency of FeedRank, increasing the update frequency does
not change the FeedRank score.
While FeedRank is robust against a small percentage of dishonest CTIFs, it can be
susceptible to manipulation attempts by many colluding CTIFs. However, this is
hardly feasible in practice because it would require many CTIFs to become dishonest
and it only works if the user considers all of them when running FeedRank (it is easy
for a single entity to publish a large number of dishonest feeds, but it is unlikely that
a user would consider all of them). Such a set of colluding CTIFs can be identified by
doing basic cluster analysis based on the considered feeds and the correlation graph
(we show this in Section 4B).

4. Evaluation
In this section, we use real CTIFs to compare FeedRank with individual metrics and
show its tamper-resistance. In the following subsections, we describe and visualize
the dataset and show the evaluation results.

A. Dataset and Methodology

To evaluate FeedRank, we use both real CTIFs which we collected over a timespan of
almost 12 days and synthetic CTIFs with which we simulated the impact of tampering
strategies. Below, we provide more details about both types of feeds.
1) Collecting Real Feeds
For a comprehensive dataset, we fetched the feeds listed in Table III at regular intervals
(60 min) during almost 12 days in 2017. In this way, we obtained 277 snapshots
representing the activity of 27 feeds with a total of around 40 million entries. These
snapshots allowed us to analyze correlations between feeds at a granularity of an hour.
Some of the snapshots were incomplete because our collection infrastructure was
unable to fetch them due to connectivity issues, database overload or rate limiting by
the CTIF provider. The feed collection functionality was implemented in Python on
top of the stix [6] and libtaxii [7] modules. The collected feeds were normalized and
stored in an Elasticsearch database to facilitate analysis. We anonymized the feeds as
it is not our goal to provide a ranking of particular feed providers, but to demonstrate
the practicality of our algorithm.
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TABLE III: EVALUATED FEEDS. WE ANALYZE 27 FREELY
AVAILABLE CTIFS (LISTED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER HERE).

2) Generating Dishonest Feeds
To capture the effect of dishonest feeds, we considered two strategies: listing random
entries and imitating high-ranked feeds.
I. Adding random entries: Adding random entries is a straightforward approach for
a dishonest feed to improve its rank because it makes the feed appear larger and more
up-to-date. Particularly because random entries are unlikely to be contained in other
feeds, thus the tampering feed is the first to report them.
Adding random entries can be risky for a CTIF provider as it can increase the false
positive rate, especially if an entry maps to a popular non-malicious service. However,
by choosing unused (or rarely used) IP addresses or domains, a dishonest CTIF
provider can cheat with a low risk of being detected.
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We call a synthetic feed that follows such a strategy “RandomFeed” and generate it by
choosing 50k IP addresses uniformly at random at each time unit (i.e. 1 hour).
II. Copying entries from high-reputation feeds: For this case, we generate
“CopyFeed” by assuming that it copies all entries from the two best-ranked feeds
with a delay of one time unit (i.e. 1 hour). By doing so, CopyFeed becomes the most
complete feed but it lacks speed as it is never the first to announce any entry.
3) Parameters
PageRank, which is part of the graph ranking, requires the specification of a damping
factor and a convergence condition. As we explained in Section 3B, we compute
the damping factor as d=1-1/l where l is the average path length. For the evaluated
dataset, the average path length is 2.87, which leads to a damping factor of 0.65.
For the convergence condition, we choose a maximum delta (i.e. the precision of the
results) of 10-6.

B. FeedRank Dataset Baseline

In this section, we illustrate our dataset and the input of FeedRank with Figure 3 and
Figure 4 after listing basic properties of each analyzed CTIF in Table IV.
TABLE IV: SIZE OF THE EVALUATED CTIFS.

For a first insight in correlations in our dataset, we use Figure 3 to visualize a clustering
of the evaluated feeds according to the number of common entries. That is, we run the
Stoer-Wagner HCS (highly connected subgraphs) clustering algorithm [8] on a graph
where the nodes represent feeds and the edges connect feeds with common entries
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and are assigned a weight that equals the number of common entries. In Figure 3, we
observe four clusters:
• One big cluster containing 7 (out of 27) feeds of different providers.
• Two smaller clusters consisting of 2 and 3 feeds from the same provider.
• One small cluster of two feeds (F11 and F15) where the number of common
elements corresponds to the size of the smaller feed. This depicts an example
of a feed (F15) that most likely contains a subset of the entries from another
feed (F11).
Even though this clustering is not directly contained in the FeedRank algorithm, it
shows that there are indeed correlations between the analyzed feeds.
In Figure 4, we show the correlation graph for the evaluated feeds. As explained in
Section 3. B, this graph consists of nodes representing the feeds and directed, weighted
edges that describe the percentage of confirmed entries from another feed.
FIGURE 3: EVALUATED FEEDS CLUSTERED BY THE NUMBER OF COMMON ELEMENTS. ABOUT
25% OF ALL FEEDS ARE CONTAINED IN ONE CLUSTER. FEEDS FROM THE SAME PROVIDERS ARE
CONTAINED IN SMALLER CLUSTERS AND F15 DOES NOT LIST ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT IN F11.
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FIGURE 4: CORRELATION GRAPH FOR THE EVALUATED FEEDS. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE LARGEST
FEED (F1) AND ALL ITS IN- AND OUTGOING EDGES ARE HIGHLIGHTED. THE EDGE LABEL
DENOTES THE PERCENTAGE OF ENTRIES THAT A FEED CONFIRMS.

C. FeedRank vs. Individual Metrics

In this experiment, we compare the ranking obtained by individual metrics with the
ranking according to FeedRank (see Table V). In Table VI, we show the ranking for
all real feeds. The listed overall rank corresponds to the ranking according to the
combination of all individual (or FeedRank) metrics. In this non-malicious case, we
observe that the ranking according to the two metrics are strongly correlated (with a
Spearman correlation coefficient of ρ = 0.81).
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TABLE V: EVALUATED FEED METRICS.

TABLE VI: RANKING WITH INDIVIDUAL METRICS COMPARED WITH FEEDRANK. THE RANKINGS
ARE STRONGLY CORRELATED (ρ = 0.81).
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D. Tamper-resistance

In this experiment, we evaluate the impact of RandomFeed and CopyFeed on the
ranking. As the results in Table VII show, the dishonest feeds can obtain very good
ranks (rank 1 for RandomFeed and rank 3 for CopyFeed) according to individual
metrics, but not for FeedRank (rank 16 and 20).
TABLE VII: RANKING IN THE PRESENCE OF DISHONEST FEEDS. RANDOMFEED AND COPYFEED
CAN TAMPER WITH WITH INDIVIDUAL METRICS, BUT NOT WITH FEEDRANK.
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5. Case-Study
In this section, we come back to the two use-cases mentioned initially – network
defenders that want to: (i) select the best feeds that together contain as many distinct
entries as possible; and (ii) select the best feeds that list new entries before they appear
on other feeds.

A. Prioritizing Completeness

To find a set of CTIFs that covers as many entries as possible (i.e. is as complete as
possible) while not being susceptible to tampering attempts, FeedRank is used as
follows. First, we compute the ranking solely according to the contribution. Since
this ranking ignores the correlations, it is not tamper resistant and a CTIF that adds
random entries can achieve a good rank. In a second step, we ensure tamper-resistance
by excluding CTIFs whose graph score is below a user-defined percentile. Intuitively,
the choice of this percentile reflects how many dishonest feeds the user expects. Here,
we use the fifth percentile; that is, we assume that feeds whose graph metric is in the
upper 95% are non-malicious.
In Figure 5, we plot the contribution of all collected CTIFs. As the figure shows,
considering a small subset of all feeds is enough to cover a large percentage of all
entries (e.g. the best 5 feeds together cover 80% of all entries). The figure also shows
that by only looking at a feed’s size it is not possible to derive the feed’s contribution.
FIGURE 5: CONTRIBUTION OF ALL EVALUATED CTIFS. SELECTING 5 FEEDS IS ENOUGH TO
COVER 80% OF ALL REPORTED IPS.

In Tables VIII and IX, we show the ranking in the presence of dishonest feeds.
RandomFeed has a high contribution score because its entries are most likely not listed
on any other feed. However, because the vast majority of them are not confirmed by
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any other feed, the graph score is very low. In particular, the graph score is below the
5th percentile, which is why the feed is not eligible to be used. CopyFeed has a poor
contribution score because it is never the first feed to list any entry. However, because
the copied entries originate from highly ranked feeds, CopyFeed deservedly achieves
a good graph score.
TABLE VIII: RANKING ACCORDING TO THE CONTRIBUTION METRIC IN THE PRESENCE OF
RANDOMFEED. THE GRAPH METRIC IS USED TO EXCLUDE POTENTIALLY DISHONEST FEEDS.
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TABLE IX: RANKING ACCORDING TO THE CONTRIBUTION METRIC IN THE PRESENCE OF
COPYFEED. THE GRAPH METRIC IS USED TO EXCLUDE POTENTIALLY DISHONEST FEEDS.

B. Prioritizing Speed

In this case study, a network defender wants to select CTIFs such that new entries
are available as early as possible. For this, we rank the feeds according to the graph
metric (that is, we ignore the contribution). FeedRank’s correlation graph models the
order in which entries appear in the feeds. Therefore, a feed that scores well in the
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graph metric is one that is fast in including new entries. In contrast to computing the
added entries for each feed individually, FeedRank ensures that it is impossible for a
dishonest feed to tamper with the ranking.
In Table X, we show the resulting ranking with and without the dishonest feeds.
RandomFeed appears at the very end of the ranking because its entries are not
confirmed by other feeds. CopyFeed achieves a better rank because it copies the
entries of highly ranked feeds with only a one-hour delay. By doing so, it is faster in
listing these entries than other feeds that confirm the entries later.
TABLE X:
RANKING
ACCORDING
TO THE GRAPH
METRIC TO
SELECT THE
FASTEST FEEDS.
THE DISHONEST
FEEDS CANNOT
ACHIEVE TOP
RANKINGS.
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6. Discussion
In this section, we first summarize the answers to the research questions, then discuss
additional aspects of and choices that we made in the design of FeedRank.

A. Research Questions

Our research questions listed in Section 1 relate to the estimation of the quality of
CTIFs, the CTIF ecosystem and the tamper-resistance of the evaluation metrics.
CTIF quality estimation. We use a graph-based correlation analysis together with
a contribution analysis to measure correlations between CTIFs and the individual
contribution of each CTIF. This allows us to estimate the relative quality of each CTIF
with respect to all other analyzed CTIFs without requiring a ground truth.
CTIF ecosystem. Our correlation analysis allows finding clusters of highly correlated
CTIFs and shows that most of the evaluated feeds are contained in the same cluster
(i.e. most of the feeds overlap in terms of their entries but differ in terms of speed).
Tamper resistance. Our evaluation shows that correlation and contribution are
tamper-resistant metrics for ranking CTIFs. While FeedRank produces a ranking that
is strongly correlated with the ranking according to individual metrics in the absence
of dishonest feeds, only FeedRank allows to identify dishonest feeds and to prevent
them from achieving a good rank.

B. Speed of Dishonest Feeds vs. Execution Interval of FeedRank

For our evaluation, we use hourly snapshots and assume that the dishonest CopyFeed
copies entries with a delay of one hour. If the delay were to be shorter than the snapshot
interval, FeedRank could not determine whether CopyFeed and the two copied
(legitimate) feeds listed the entries simultaneously or not. To prevent this inaccuracy,
we envision the following mechanisms:
• The time between two snapshots can be decreased, which makes it more
likely to be faster than dishonest feeds.
• CTIF providers can provide FeedRank with exclusive access to updates
shortly before they are published.
• CTIF providers can add a few random (non-malicious and inactive) entries
to their feeds to detect if another feed copies them (if these entries appear on
another feed, it is highly likely that they were copied).
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C. Evaluating CTIFs Instead of Evaluating Entries in CTIFs

With FeedRank, we assess the quality of CTIFs as a whole and not the quality of
individual entries. With this, FeedRank provides the foundation to select CTIFs for
deployment. The problem of evaluating the quality of particular entries is orthogonal
to our work, but could be approached with a similar technique (e.g. by building a
graph that models individual entries). From a network defender’s point of view, the
advantages of scoring threat intelligence at the level of CTIFs instead of individual
entries are that: (i) reporting an IOC is delayed if an entry first needs to be verified by
multiple feeds; and (ii) scoring CTIFs can be done once before deciding which feeds
to use, which reduces operational and potential subscription costs.

D. Choice of the Evaluated Feeds

For our evaluation, we used a generic threat model and included a large set of freely
available feeds covering different domains (e.g. generic, malware or phishing).
Generally speaking, the set of considered CTIFs should contain all feeds that are
suitable for the network defender’s purpose. For example, a network defender that
wants to select CTIFs for a spam filter should only consider feeds in this domain to
get the most meaningful results.
Evaluating CTIFs for a more specific threat model or including commercial feeds is
possible without modifying FeedRank but it is out of the scope of this paper.

7. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to rank CTIFs based on their correlations
and to consider potential manipulation strategies from CTIF providers. However,
there has been previous work in the area of evaluating CTIFs and applying graphbased ranking algorithms in other domains.

A. Analysis and Evaluation of CTIFs

Sheng et al. study the effectiveness of phishing blacklists [9] and find that blacklists
are ineffective when protecting users against phishing attacks because most phishing
campaigns only last for a short time and blacklists are too slow in reacting.
Kührer and Holz describe a CTIF parser system [10] that records a large number of
CTIFs and allows users to compute intersections between feeds and to query entries
(e.g. domains). Entries that are contained in a large number of feeds are considered
as being dishonest with high certainty. In later work [11], Kührer et al. propose a
mechanism to identify parked domains and sinkholes (i.e. malicious domains that are
identified and mitigated) in CTIFs.
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Metcalf and Spring present an analysis of CTIFs over multiple years [12]. Similar
to our approach, they analyze individual and combined features of CTIFs. However,
they do not address the issue of dishonest CTIF providers that attempt to manipulate
the rankings.
The Ponemon Institute found in a survey [3] that the application of threat intelligence
is considered as very important for running secure systems but they did not investigate
in the quality or the ecosystem of threat intelligence providers.

B. Graph-based Ranking

Page and Brin developed PageRank to rank websites [5]. They showed that the
problem of ranking websites can be transferred to a graph problem and thus provided
the foundation of transferring problems with several connected parties to graph
problems.
Since then, concepts similar to PageRank have been applied to various problems,
including to:
• Predict future relevance of scientific articles [13].
• Rank authors and publications [14].
• Rank correspondents according to their degree of expertise [15].
• Find influential users [16] and important content [17] in social networks.

8. Conclusion and Future Work
The core concept of FeedRank is to model temporal correlations between feeds in a
graph structure and to rank feeds based on this graph and the individual contribution
of each feed. In contrast to traditional metrics that are applied to feeds individually,
FeedRank is robust against tampering attempts by potentially dishonest feed providers.
In the evaluation and two case studies, we use data from 27 real feeds and show that
FeedRank allows a reliable ranking even in the presence of dishonest feeds. For future
work, we suggest using FeedRank to track the rankings of CTIFs over time. This will
provide insights in the long-term behavior of CTIFs. Further, FeedRank could be
extended by additional metrics and applied to related problems such as the evaluation
of single entries in CTIFs.
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Abstract: We present research on the security of the most popular websites, ranked
according to Alexa’s top one million list, based on an HTTP response headers analysis.
For each of the domains included in the list, we made four different requests: an
HTTP/1.1 request to the domain itself and to its “www” subdomain and two more
equivalent HTTPS requests. Redirections were always followed. A detailed discussion
of the request process and main outcomes is presented, including X.509 certificate
issues and comparison of results with equivalent HTTP/2 requests.
The body of the responses was discarded, and the HTTP response header fields were
stored in a database. We analysed the prevalence of the most important response
headers related to web security aspects. In particular, we took into account StrictTransport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-XSS-Protection, X-Frame-Options,
Set-Cookie (for session cookies) and X-Content-Type. We also reviewed the contents
of response HTTP headers that potentially could reveal unwanted information, like
Server (and related headers), Date and Referrer-Policy.
This research offers an up-to-date survey of current prevalence of web security policies
implemented through HTTP response headers and concludes that most popular sites
tend to implement it noticeably more often than less popular ones. Equally, HTTPS
sites seem to be far more eager to implement those policies than HTTP only websites.
A comparison with previous works show that web security policies based on HTTP
response headers are continuously growing, but still far from satisfactory widespread
adoption.
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1. Introduction
The main goal of this research is to assess the current adoption rate of security policies
based on HTTP response headers on the most popular Internet websites. Declarative
web security through HTTP response headers constitute a powerful and easy way
to enhance website security, while relatively little effort is required from website
operators. It has been a recurrent research topic, aided by the fact that the nature of the
World Wide Web makes data publicly accessible to any interested party and that the
WWW itself is continuously growing and evolving.
Besides measuring security headers adoption in popular websites, we set out to
understand it in a deeper way by trying to find correlations between adoption rates
and variables like HTTPS usage and popularity rank position. We want to gain insight
into why and how policies based on HTTP headers are adopted. As will be shown,
the most popular a website is, the more likely it will apply security through HTTP
headers. Those sites also tend to be more prone to favouring HTTPS protocol over
HTTP.
Regarding the structure of this paper, in the first section we present a brief literature
review concerning different past security analysis and current online efforts. Next,
we proceed to describe in detail the data set that served as the basis for this research.
We then show our results for all analysed HTTP response headers, and we conclude
with a “conclusions” section where we summarize our findings and a last section on
planned future work.

2. Related work
Extensive analysis of Content Security Policy (CSP) adoption among the top one
million websites is provided by Ying et al. (2015). It was found that CSP is used in less
than 0.2% of the sites, and oftentimes incorrectly. They also investigated other relevant
security related headers. In particular, they found that X-XSS-Protection, X-FrameOptions and Strict-Transport-Security headers were implemented, respectively, in
about 4.4%, 4.1% and 1% of the websites they analysed. Despite the low adoption rate
of HTTP security related headers found by Ying et al., their results show a noticeable
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increase in the adoption rates observed over research done previously by Weissbacher
et al. (2014). In fact, they conducted the first CSP adoption study of the Top One
Million websites in 2012-2014 and found that CSP was used in less than 0.1% of
sites. Other security-related HTTP headers, like X-XSS-Protection, X-Frame-Options
and Strict-Transport-Security were seen on 4.6%, 4.1% and 0.3% of the websites,
respectively. Although both of these papers primarily concentrate on CSP adoption
rate and related implementation issues, they analysed other security headers as a byproduct.
Chang et al. (2017) investigated the “redirection trail”, which basically consists of
a set of pairs, each one formed by the Location header combined with redirection
HTTP status codes. Combining this redirection trail with other data readily available,
like protocol and host, allowed the researchers to evaluate the security of the Top
One Million websites. They found that 20.5% of them contained some configuration
inconsistency related to redirection requests that could be exploited by the adversary.
Sood et al.(2011) conducted a research in 2011 among the world’s top 43 banks. They
found that none of them implemented the HTTP security related headers available at
that time.
Response HTTP header analysis from a security standpoint is also present outside
academic literature. Scott Helme’s (2017) website has published multiple times
research on security headers prevalence and HTTPS adoption in the Alexa Top One
Million websites. The latest one we know of, at the time of this writing (October
2017), is from August 2017. He has been reporting positive trends of adoption rates
of most common HTTP headers. Additionally, his website (IO) provides a public tool
that enables checking of security headers for any website. Based on these results,
the tool assigns a given grade, from A to F, for the provided website. A similar tool
is provided by Mozilla Observatory that also gathers statistics from executed checks
and estimates that about 10% of the checked websites follow good practices regarding
security header configuration (Mozobs). April King (2017) has conducted similar
research on Alexa Top One Million websites and found similar results about positive
trends.

3. The Data Set
A. URL Set

This research makes use of Alexa “top one million” website list (1M) as the source
for domains to be analysed. For each domain contained in the list, we made four
HTTP/1.1 requests: to http://domain, https://domain, http://www.domain and https://
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www.domain. Timeout for connection establishment was set to 60 seconds, and
response timeout was also set to 60 seconds.

B. Data collection approach

We developed a custom Python tool based on Python requests library (Pyreq). After
an HTTP/1.1 response arrived, only HTTP response headers and status code were
saved to a relational database. The response body was disregarded. In order to mimic
real users, we set User-Agent and other request headers to match exactly those of
the Mozilla Firefox browser (version 50.0 on Ubuntu 17.04). For all the requests we
followed redirections, saved them all, and created convenient relationships between
them. Finally, duplicate URL requests that arose from redirections were removed
from the dataset.
Preliminary testing revealed that using Certification Authorities (CA) and
Intermediaries lists bundled inside Ubuntu were not sufficient for HTTPS requests.
Therefore, we made use of public CA lists Mozilla CA (Mozca) and Mozilla
Intermediaries (Mozinter) (they are both internally used by the Firefox browser).
Several full scans were performed during August and September 2017, and we always
updated website and CA lists right before the scanning process. In this paper we will
exclusively refer and analyse data gathered between September 1st and 4th, 2017.
After the scan was completed, we retried those websites that had failed all of our four
requests, since it just might indicate temporary network issues.

C. Data Overview

Our final dataset contained 3.135.962 recorded responses with unique URLs (either
the protocol, the domain or the subdomain was different). At least one response was
received from 975.729 websites (97.5% of all one million domains). Only 2.558
websites were successfully processed during the retrying process (to allow for
network issues). We observed large amounts, up to 1.4 million, of duplicate URL
records caused by redirection to an already visited URL. They were all removed from
the database. We obtained about 27% more responses from www-subdomains than
from direct domain requests.
For our current analysis we have considered only unique URL responses with HTTP
response status code 200, which amounts to 1.478.750 records.

D. Data quality

The Alexa top one million list was chosen because it is a large list, but not “too large”,
thus data collection can still be achieved in a few days or less. Moreover, the list
contains the most popular websites, an attractive target for attackers and security
researchers alike. As pointed out previously, it has been repeatedly used in various
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web security surveys. Alternative lists, like the ones by Majestic (Majestic) or Cisco
(Umbrella) also provide one million most popular sites, although to compare our work
with previous results we have adhered to Alexa’s list.
However, Alexa’s list, despite its usefulness, has some caveats. It makes use of
proprietary ranking and domain processing algorithms not fully disclosed and we
have observed inconsistencies within the list: it contains many domains that cannot be
accessed directly (typically because there is no DNS entry for them, like in cloudfront.
net), but can be through the www-subdomain. Additionally, a significant set of entries
in the list are actually subdomains (most common websites are tumblr.com, blogspot.
com and wordpress.com with 5.698, 2.904 and 2.696 respective subdomains).
Although content is different on these subdomains, these platforms usually provide
little to no control for header configuration to final website authors. In fact, all of their
subdomains will share the same security headers. Even some apparently unrelated
domains will share the same headers configuration because they are hosted by these
providers, although their domain name is totally unrelated to the hosting server.

E. Response Codes

Status code distribution observed in the responses for both HTTP and HTTPS requests
are presented in Tables 1 and 2. As clearly seen from these data, most websites seem
to prefer the www subdomain to the plain domain name, regardless of the protocol
(47% of HTTP sites and up to 63% for HTTPS ones). As for redirections, we have
observed that 45.7% of HTTP domain requests redirect to the corresponding www
subdomain, and 15.5% of HTTPS domain requests point to the www subdomain. Most
of the remaining requests are server-side errors either intermittent or permanent (e.g.,
web servers which are not properly configured to handle the domain or subdomain
requests).
TABLE 1. STATUS CODES FOR HTTP REQUESTS

Domain responses

WWW subdomain responses

status

count

status

count

301

46,8%

200

47.3%

200

38.9%

301

39.5%

302

12.0%

302

11.0%

403

0.7%

404

0.6%

404

0.7%

403

0.6%
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TABLE 2. STATUS CODES FOR HTTPS REQUESTS
Domain responses

WWW subdomain responses

status

count

status

count

200

47.3%

200

62.7%

301

39.5%

301

26.0%

302

11.0%

302

8.4%

404

0.6%

403

0.7%

403

0.6%

404

0.6%

F. HTTPS Subset

Our data set allowed for a detailed analysis of HTTPS deployment since we stored
all failed requests and their associated error messages. The result for over two million
HTTPS requests are presented in the Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. HTTPS RESPONSES

Only about half of the scanned domains and www subdomains (47.7%) are properly
configured for HTTPS. That number includes 24.2% of sites that are actually
responding with 200 OK status code and a substantial number of redirects and HTTP
errors (23.5%).
Many sites, 23.2% of all HTTPS requests, do not respond to HTTPS at all, either
because of the TCP connection being refused, timeout or missing DNS records.
We found a sizeable number of cases, 29.1% of all HTTPS requests, where it was
possible to establish a TCP connection on port 443, but HTTPS ultimately failed. The
reason for failure is related to verification errors (mostly expired certificates, selfsigned, signed by untrusted CA’s or malformed), handshake errors (usually outdated
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protocols) and hostname mismatching. A 29.1% rate is remarkable: it implies that
a large number of web servers are already somehow configured to handle HTTPS
requests, but have mostly missed the step of acquiring and installing the correct X.509
certificate (even though nowadays it is possible to quickly obtain a certificate for
free, for example from the highly popular “Let’s Encrypt” (Lets) online certification
authority).
Regarding handshake errors, 5.1% of all HTTPS requests, we found that there is a
small number of websites that work properly when requested by the real Mozilla
Firefox browser but not by our software. We traced back that behaviour to outdated
and misconfigured server sites that are still supported by the browser for backwards
compatibility, but not by the OpenSSL 1.0.2g library we used in our scanning software.
Host name mismatching happens in about 14.8% of all HTTPS requests we made. That
can happen because there is no Subject Alternative Name (SAN) and the requested
host does not match certificate’s Common Name (CN) or because, even though
CN and SAN are both present, the hostname does not match either of them. This
latter cause is more common (12.7%) than the former (2.1%). Name mismatching is
typically found in shared environments where several websites run on a single server
that oftentimes issues a “default” SSL certificate (as with the well-known shared
hosting provider Hostgator). The most common reason for name mismatching is that
CN is set to either www.domain or *.domain, and therefore certificate validation fails
for the https://domain request (like the high ranked website ups.com).

G. HTTP/2 Analysis

Our data gathering procedure, and the subsequent response headers analysis, is entirely
based on HTTP/1.1 requests. However, HTTP/2 is quickly growing in popularity
and it may replace HTTP/1.1 as the main web protocol in the near future. Different
protocol versions might be somehow correlated with different security settings (due,
for example, to different security awareness). That raises the question whether there
are different response headers, or different headers values, in HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2
data subsets. To answer this question, we used the same Alexa top one million websites
list (1M) and followed the same data gathering approach, but this time making an
additional HTTP/2 request to each website’s domain and www-subdomain. We made
use of Python hyper library (Hyper). If an HTTP/2 request was successful, we made
the equivalent HTTP/1.1 request to the same URL and compared the HTTP headers
and their values for both responses. To simplify HTTP header comparison, we did not
follow redirects and did not analyse response status codes. Furthermore, we did not
take into account the fact that multiple backends can serve a single domain or www
subdomain (in principle, those servers could have different configurations and that
might produce different HTTP headers).1
1

Those backends could be either serving requests using single IP address or multiple IP addresses, but we
chose not to manipulate to which IP addresses HTTP requests are being sent.

351

The resulting dataset consists of 746.758 records, totalling 211.638 unique domains
that support HTTP/2 protocol (21% of all Alexa top one million websites). This
percentage is a bit higher than the figure reported by the w3techs portal, 17%, as the
HTTP/2 support rate across all the world wide web (W3tech). However, it is coherent
with the fact that we are analysing most popular websites, not all existing ones. The
failure rate of HTTP/1.1 requests to same domain following successful HTTP/2
requests is insignificant (0.26%).
1) Missing headers
We analysed the top 10 HTTP headers missing from HTTP/2 responses but present
in HTTP/1.1 responses, and vice versa. The results, header names and their missing
count in their counterpart protocol requests, are presented in Table 3. As might be
expected, most significant differences are related to headers used in establishing
and maintaining the HTTP/1.1 connection (those headers are unneeded in HTTP/2).
Fortunately, none of these missing headers are related to any security issue.
Regarding security related headers, some may be missing in one version of the
protocol, but present in the other, although the numbers are insignificant in all cases.
For example, X-XSS-Protection response header is missing in 28 HTTP/2 requests
that issue it in the equivalent HTTP/1.1 requests. Similarly, 45 HTTP/1.1 requests did
not contain that header, although it was present in the equivalent HTTP/2 ones. We
found that no common misconfiguration pattern is distinguishable, and most common
cause could be attributed to responses coming from different backends serving the
same domain name, but different protocol.
TABLE 3. RESPONSE HEADERS NAMES COMPARISON
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count

Missing in HTTP/1

count

350152

content-length

11082

262147

link

3076

28559

pragma

1080

5816

set-cookie

1058

3014

vary

672

2983

cache-control

640

1987

expires

614

1137

x-pingback

415

1107

accept-ranges

405

1084

x-litespeed-cache-control

297

2) Different values in HTTP headers
The top 20 response headers that carry different values in equivalent HTTP/1.1 and
HTTP/2 requests are presented in Table 4.
TABLE 4. RESPONSE HEADERS VALUES COMPARISON
Missing in HTTP/2

Missing in HTTP/1.1

Header

count

count

set-cookie

215265

5229

cf-ray

183755

4921

date

181046

4838

expires

23789

4756

x-cache

14628

4706

server

10732

4434

content-length

9244

4384

x-varnish

6902

4295

via

6865

4283

x-amz-cf-id

6308

3664

Set-Cookie differences are due to different session identifiers. The differences in
the response headers Cf-Ray, X-Cache, X-Varnish, Via, X-amz-cf-id, X-Served-By,
X-Timer, X-Contextid, X-Servedby, X-Request-Id, X-Via and X-Cache-Hits are due to
debug information, usually set by cloud providers and caching frontend servers. Date,
Expires and Last-Modified response headers contain timestamps that are usually one
second apart, in agreement with the fact that the requests are made consecutively.
Content-Encoding differences are due to Brotli, the compression algorithm used for
HTTP/2. Differences in the Vary header value are related to different compression
algorithms. Content-Length variations are caused by the dynamic nature of the
generated content. Nevertheless, none of these headers can be related to any security
risk, and the variations are meaningless from the point of view of our security analysis.
Regarding security related headers, only Content-Security-Policy and X-XSSProtection showed any significant count difference in 401 and 358 of the requests,
respectively. Almost all of the CSP differences lie either in nonce tokens or report URI
identifiers. X-XSS-Protection differences can be always traced back to different report
URL’s found in the value of the header.
Server header values show some differences between the protocol versions and
in most cases it is irrelevant (variations of nginx server identified by names like
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openresty, Tengine, kinsta-nginx). For example, 68.6% of HTTP/2 requests carried
nginx as the Server value, but openresty for the equivalent HTTP/1.1 requests (77.2%
of these cases correspond to tumblr.com subdomains). However, in about 400 cases
we identified obvious attempts to try to conceal the server name by removing the
header or changing it to an undescriptive one in one of the protocol version, but not
in the alternative one.
In summary, regarding versions 1.1 and 2 of the HTTP protocol, no significant HTTP
response headers variations were found from the security perspective. The only
noticeable risk that shows some correlation with protocol version is information
leakage via Server response header. Additionally, a potential security risk could arise
due to inconsistent configuration management across sets of backend servers (which
still could be useful to an attacker). However, this issue requires further investigation
and lies outside the current research.

4. HTTP response headers analysis
As stated previously, the evaluation of the security of the websites is done through an
analysis of the HTTP headers sent from the web server. Some HTTP headers, among
all possible server-side headers, were devised to instruct the web browser to protect the
web application against certain security threads. Accordingly, their analysis constitute
the basis of our current research. Additionally, a few HTTP server-side headers may
carry information about the web application that potentially can help an attacker to
perform malicious actions. They will also be analysed as part of our research.
The headers involved in each group are the following:
Security headers:
• Strict-Transport-Security
• Content-Security-Policy (and related Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only)
• X-XSS-Protection
• X-Frame-Options
• Set-Cookie
• X-Content-Type
Information revealing headers:
• Server (and related headers)
• Date
• Referrer-Policy
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We have deliberately excluded HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) from our research.
Standardized in IETF 7469, HPKP provides a mechanism by which the TLS protocol
is protected against Certification Authority (CA) attacks and spoofed certificates.
However, it is well known that its implementation poses considerable risks for website
operators. It is currently supported by Chrome, Firefox and Opera. Nevertheless,
Google has recently announced that it will deprecate it in Chrome in May 2018, and
soon thereafter it will be completely removed Palmer 2017. Research by Scott Helme
(2017) regarding his own analysis of Alexa Top One Million sites indicates that it
is usually implemented wrongly by website operators. Security expert Ivan Ristic
(2016) has also pointed out similar concerns about HPKP.
Subresource Integrity (SRI) has been sometimes taken into account in the context
of top one million analysis (see Mozilla Observatory (Mozobs) or recent April King
results (l2017). By specifying a hash token together with the URL of any given
resource on a web page, a browser can check that the resulting content obtained from
actually downloading the resource has not been unexpectedly altered. This technique
is effective, for example, against attackers manipulating JavaScript libraries located
in Content Delivery Networks. Chrome, Firefox and Opera already implement this
feature. SRI is a relatively new protective mechanism, and current recommendation
is from 2016 (SRI). Despite the undeniable interest in measuring its current adoption
rate among the top one million websites, it entails parsing the HTML content found in
the body of the HTTP responses, and it lies outside the scope of the current research,
centred around HTTP response headers analysis.

A. Security Headers
1) Strict-Transport-Security Header
HTTP Strict-Transport-Security header (or HSTS, for short) allows a web server
to inform the browser that all subsequent connections for all requests should be
established exclusively through HTTPS, never through HTTP, using a valid certificate.
It helps prevent several man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that may arise in different
situations. Some common vulnerable situations are the following:
• A user types in a URL in the browser address bar. By default, this URL will
be requested by the browser through an HTTP connection, not an HTTPS
one.
• By means of social engineering techniques, a user is tricked into clicking
on an HTTP link, instead of an HTTPS one, therefore initiating the HTTP
request that can be captured by the MITM.
• An attacker sends a fake certificate, hoping that the user will accept it by
clicking through the warnings displayed by the browser.
• Forgotten HTTP links scattered throughout the web pages.
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All of these vulnerable situations can be avoided by the web application just by issuing
this header. In fact, no other server header or web application configuration exists
that can prevent these kind of MITM attacks (at least, regarding the first two cases).
That makes HSTS a key protective server-side header. The header specification was
published in 2012, (RFC 6797).
By parsing the scanning data obtained from the top one million web sites we have
found that most websites do not issue any HSTS header. The aggregated results can
be seen in Fig 2.
FIGURE 2. HSTS IMPLEMENTATION RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

It is readily appreciated that highly popular sites tend to implement HSTS more often
than those sites that are less popular. Nearly 38% of top one thousand sites implement
HSTS, while only 17.5% of top one million HTTPS websites implement it. This trend
will be recurrent for all headers analysed in this research: the most popular a site is,
the more security headers it will tend to implement.
Our numbers are comparable to the ones published by Helme (2017), who reports
a 7.3% penetration rate. The difference is due to the fact that Helme’s results are
referred to the whole dataset, just not to the HTTPS sites (about 40% of all websites).
Our 17.5% HSTS implementation rate becomes 7.0% when referred to the whole
dataset. April (2017) reports a 4.4% adoption rate in June 2017 (also referred to the
whole dataset). We believe, however, that HSTS rates should be referred to the HTTPS
subset, since HSTS does make sense in HTTP only sites.
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Only about 2% of HTTP websites redirect to an HTTPS site while simultaneously
enforcing HSTS policy. Finally, a small number of sites (0.7%) make use of HTTP
protocol and respond with a status code of 200, instead of responding with a redirection
300 code.
3) Content-Security-Policy Header
Content-Security-Policy (CSP) is a key response header that provides strong defence
mechanisms against Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and other client-side injection attacks
by whitelisting allowed sources and disabling certain insecure JavaScript features. It
can also be used to prevent attacks against HTTPS, mostly those related to inadvertent
HTTP links within HTTPS web pages. It has been standardized by W3C, originally in
2012 (CSP Level 1), then revised and augmented in 2015 (CSP Level 2) and currently
undergoing a third revision (CSP Level 3). CSP is currently supported by all major
browsers, with the exception of Microsoft Internet Explorer which uses the alternative
X-Content-Security-Policy header.
The header directives, up to 16 in CSP2, offer the possibility of a fine-grained
configuration, although at the cost of having to deal with non-trivial setup choices. In
fact, due to the growing complexity of client-side scripting code and the large number
of different assets handled by web applications (up to hundreds or even thousands
of different resources requested from within a given page), the adoption of a CSP
policy may result in unexpected glitches. Therefore, most implementation guidelines
recommend starting to implement CSP by making use of the related Content-SecurityPolicy-Report-Only response header that allows web administrators to test their CSP
policies before they are fully enforced without risking unwanted web application
behaviour.
Our results show that CSP is scarcely implemented in HTTPS sites (3.4%) and hardly
in HTTP sites (0.4%). The figures for Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only usage
are even smaller (0.3% and 0.1% respectively). Globally, including both HTTP and
HTTPS sites, CSP is implemented in 1.6% and CSP report only version in just 0.2% of
sites. On the other hand, the implementation rate of CSP with respect to the popularity
rank follows the same pattern as with other headers: more popular sites choose to
issue the CSP header more often than less popular ones. These findings can be easily
appreciated in Figure 3:
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FIGURE 3. CSP IMPLEMENTATION RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

Our results are similar to the ones by Helme (2017), from August 2017, about 2.0%
globally, while significantly higher than April’s (l2017), 0.04% in June 2017.
We have also observed that there are significant differences between the directives
used in HTTP and HTTPS sites. In fact, for HTTP sites, frameAncestors (48.27%),
scriptSrc (35.96%) and defaultSrc (35.72%) are the most common directives.
However, HTTPS sites typically issue different directives. The most common ones
being: upgradeInsecureRequests (61.79%), reportUri (53.34%) and defaultSrc
(20.37%).
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the CSP report only version seems to
differ from fully enforcing CSP. In fact, the most common directives in HTTP sites
are reportUri (94.68%), blockAllMixedContent (81.73%), defaultSrc (13.53%). And
for HTTPS sites, most common CSP report only directives are reportUri (94.68%),
blockAllMixedContent (81.73%), defaultSrc (13.53%).
4) X-XSS-Protection Header
This header is responsible for toggling off the XSS filter implemented by most
current browsers (except, notably, Firefox). By default, the XSS filter is enabled, but
website administrators can disable it by setting its value to zero (X-XSS-Protection:
0), possibly to prevent the browser from interfering with the desired behaviour of the
web application. Web sites that issue that header, and set its value to zero, risk being
vulnerable to reflected XSS attacks. Content Security Policy, and in particular CSP
level 2 contains a directive, “reflected-xss”, that completely replaces this header.
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Our scanning results for the full one million set show that about 12% of HTTPS sites
and 6% of HTTP sites set this header. Most of the times the header is issued so that
the browser is granted the right to apply its XSS filter, but in 3% of HTTP sites, and
nearly 2% of HTTPS sites, the configuration is such that the sites deny permission to
apply the filter. Therefore, as expected, HTTPS sites tend to be more concerned with
security. In a similar way, the more popular a site is, the more it will tend to set the
header, and will mostly do it so that the browser is granted the right to enable its filter.
Both trends can be appreciated in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4. X-XSS-PROTECTION IMPLEMENTATION
RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

Our findings are in agreement with a global implementation rate of [Helme2017],
9.3%, and [April2017], 8.1% (none of them break up implementation rates by protocol
or popularity of website).
5) X-Frame-Options Header
This header, standardized in RFC 7034, is used to instruct a browser whether a
given web page or resource is allowed to appear within a Frame, iFrame or Object,
thereby avoiding frame based attacks, like “clickjacking” (for example, rydstedt or
OWASPxfo). As with X-XSS-Protection, this header is superseded by CSP, which
contains a directive, “frame-ancestors”, that completely replaces X-XSS-Protection
header. There are three “options”, or directives, defined for this header: deny, sameorigin and allow-from.
The results from our scanning survey show once more that HTTPS sites are prone to
add this header more often than HTTP sites, 17.38% and 7.48%, respectively. For the
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sites that choose to issue this header, the most common directives found are “sameorigin” (86% in HTTP and 91% in HTTPS) and “deny” (12% in HTTPS and 7% in
HTTP). Again, highly popular sites make use of this protection more often than less
popular sites as can be readily appreciated in Figure 5:
FIGURE 5. X-FRAME-OPTIONS IMPLEMENTATION RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

These results do not essentially deviate from those of Helme (2017), 12.4% or April
(2017), 11%.
6) Set-Cookie Header
This header is used by web sites to send cookies to the client side as part of the
response message. Supported by all browsers, its current syntax was standardized by
IETF RFC 6265. From the security perspective, the interest on this header lies on the
“session cookies”, i.e., those cookies that are set from the server side with the purpose
of establishing a “session” between client and server (the stateless HTTP protocol
was devised without any built-in session mechanism). In principle, cookies can be
sent from the server to the browser without any particular security risk, unless they
are session cookies. These cookies constitute a major target of many web application
attacks, and therefore, we have tackled their study as part of the current research.
In order to prevent session hijacking and other web attacks that usually proceed
through Cross Site Scripting or MITM attacks, it is generally agreed that session
cookies should, at least, carry the directives “HttpOnly”, for both HTTP and HTTPS
sites, and “Secure”, for HTTPS sites. HttpOnly offers protection against cookies being
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accessed from client-side scripts (and therefore stolen under XSS attacks) and the
Secure flag prevents the cookies from being captured through an unintended HTTP
connection.
However, not all cookies need to be protected by HttpOnly or Secure flags, only
session ones. Given the fact that session cookies need not carry any flag or follow any
rules that distinguish them from non-session cookies, we have tried to tell them apart,
and therefore assess the presence of the mentioned flags, by parsing the Set-Cookie
value and search there for the token “sess” (case insensitively). While this is far from
being a satisfactory criterion, our research shows that most of “highly probable”
session cookies can be identified this way. Table 5 shows most frequent cookie names
observed in the responses obtained from our data set:
TABLE 5. MOST COMMON COOKIE NAMES
Cookie name

Frequency

__cfuid

24.3%

PHPSESSID

20.3%

ASP.NET_SessionId

4.5%

JSESSIONID

2.5%

Cloud Flare ID cookie, __cfuid, cannot be considered properly as a web site session
cookie (and indeed does not meet our criteria), while PHP sessions, ASP.NET sessions
and Java based sessions are identified using this “sess” token technique. Taking all
together, we can assume that 53.6% of all cookies received from server side are
properly identified as being, or not, a session cookie. A further inspection analysing
the 250 most popular cookie names proved that the “sess” token technique was enough
to tell apart session cookies from ordinary cookies, up to that level of “cookie name
popularity”.
Our results show that, regarding HTTP sites, about 49.4% of them set a session cookie
within the response to our first request, but 55.4% of those cookies do not set the
HttpOnly flag. Regarding HTTPS sites, 42.7% do not set HttpOnly flag and up to
80.7% of them do not make use of the Secure flag. The following graphs exhibit the
same pattern found in other security headers: HTTPS sites and popular sites seem to
be more security concerned than HTTP or less popular sites.
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FIGURE 6. SESSION COOKIES. HTTPONLY DIRECTIVE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

FIGURE 7. SESSION COOKIES. SECURE DIRECTIVE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

Finally, the “SameSite” cookie attribute recently implemented by Chrome and Opera,
but still lacking in all other browsers, is an interesting flag currently defined under
IETF draft (2016). It helps prevent Cross Site Request Forgery and cookie hijacking
by instructing the browser not to send a cookie with that attribute to any request other
than same-site requests. Although a very promising attribute, given its novelty and
lack of widespread implementation, it is understandable that only 0.05% of HTTPS
sites and 0.01% of HTTP sites make use of the flag.
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7) X-Content-Type-Options Header
This header was defined to protect browsers from MIME sniffing vulnerabilities, by
which an attacker may trick the browser into executing content that was not meant
to be executed by the web application. These kinds of attacks make use of the fact
that, under some circumstances, browsers do not follow the MIME type indicated in
the Content-Type header. It is implemented by all major browsers, after Microsoft
introduced it in IE8. The only allowed directive for this header is “nosniff”.
The results follow the same pattern observed in other security headers: HTTPS sites
set X-Content-Type-Options more often that HTTP ones (roughly, 16% vs 8%) and
popular web sites do it also more often than less popular ones, as shown in the next
figure:
FIGURE 8. X-CONTENT-TYPE-OPTIONS ADOPTION
RATE AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

Helme (2017) reports an adoption rate of 11.6%, whereas April (2017) finds 9.4%,
global rates.

C. Information Revealing Headers
1) Server Header (and other related server-side headers)
The Server header, defined as part of the RFC 7231 for HTTP/1.1 protocol, is a serverside header originally devised to inform a browser about software used in the web
application. Although it is not mandatory, it is issued by most web sites (according to
our scanning results, more than 90% of sites set this header). It typically contains the
name and version of the web server on which the web application is running.
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By itself, the presence of this header as part of an HTTP response does not pose any
security thread. However, it may help an attacker to easily obtain the web server name,
version and additional information, for example, the name of the CMS supporting the
web application. There are currently many “fingerprinting” tools that can be used to
obtain that information, regardless of the presence of the Server header. They include
well known utilities like command line command nmap, dedicated tool httprint or
web utilities like Netcraft that can reveal valuable information to any attacker willing
to make use of known vulnerabilities and their corresponding exploits.
The interest of this header from the point of view of the current research is twofold: on
the one hand, the Server header provides fast and valuable information to those attacks
that rely on large scale Internet web site scanning to find potential victims. On the
other hand, we want to study statistical correlation between this header and other web
site variables, specifically domain popularity and protocol (HTTP / HTTPS) in order
to help obtain a more accurate picture of the security of the sites we have analysed.
It should be taken into account that other HTTP headers, besides Server, can carry
information regarding web server and other relevant software. In particular, we
have taken into account the following additional headers: X-Powered-By, X-AspNetVersion, X-AspNetMvc-Version and X-Varnish. We have combined the information
carried by these headers, if present, with the one in the Server header, nearly always
present, in order to try to find the web server name and version. The results are shown
in next figure.
FIGURE 9. WEB SERVER INFORMATION AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY
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From last figure it is clearly appreciated two tendencies: a) HTTPS sites tend to be
more restrictive than HTTP served sites on the information they provide, at least
regarding Server and related headers, and b) the more popular a given domain is, the
less information it will probably leak. The overall picture, however, shows that a huge
amount of Internet web sites (at least, over 85% of them) expose their web server info
through their HTTPS headers. Our statistics indicates that, within those sites with
recognizable web server, most popular web server is Apache HTTP server (46% of
sites) followed by nginx (38% of sites) and IIS (14%).
Another common header, X-Powered-By header, appears in 48% of responses from
sites and typically (66% of cases) contains the PHP version used to develop the web
site.
2) Date Header
This header, defined as part of HTTP/1.1 specification, RFC 7231, contains the date
and time at which the response message was originated. In our research this header
is set in over 99% of all responses. It is, in fact, the most common header seen in
responses. Although it is not related to any significant security attack, server-side date
and time play an important role as part of the logging information needed to analyse
security incidents (see, for example, Prodromou 2016). Inaccurate timestamps will
yield unreliable logging records, and therefore making then inappropriate for forensics
tasks.
We see the general trends observed previously: a) HTTPS sites seem to run on more
precisely configured servers than HTTP ones and b) the more popular a site is, the
more secure it tends to be configured.
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FIGURE 10. SITES THAT SHOW TIME OFFSET IN DATE
RESPONSE HEADER AS A FUNCTION OF WEBSITE POPULARITY

3) Referer and Referer-Policy Headers
The Referer -sic- header, specified by RFC7231 allows the browser to inform the web
server to which the request is made about the URI from where the user made that
request. It is meant to provide information that can be processed on the server side
for logging or commercial analysis, for example, getting to know where customers
typically come from when reaching a given site. This header is also commonly used
as a key component of web tracking technologies.
In principle, Referer header poses a privacy concern, not a security one, since it reveals
information to a third party that a user might not want to be revealed. Sometimes,
however, a URL may carry sensitive information, for example, a session token or a
capability indicator [Cap2014], and under such circumstances the Referer header may
pose a security risk. Both, privacy and possible security risks, have led to the proposal
of a Referrer-Policy header (see W3C Editor’s draft at 2017). This header, currently
implemented by all major browsers, allows a website to control the information
carried by the Referer header in a rather fine-grained manner. It defines up to eight
different directives.
Our scanning database indicates that Referrer-Policy header is scarcely implemented.
Only 0.05% of HTTP responses, and 0.33% of HTTPS responses, contain some form
of a valid Referrer-Policy. The distribution of the different policies can be seen in
Table 6.
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TABLE 6. REFERER DIRECTIVES
Referrer-Policy Directives

HTTP Requests

HTTPS Requests

no-referrer

26.97%

14.86%

no-referrer-when-downgrade

23.63%

29.25%

origin

14.32%

7.06%

origin-when-cross-origin

11.46%

17.73%

same-origin

5.97%

9.18%

strict-origin

5.01%

2.87%

strict-origin-when-cross-origin

7.64%

10.77%

unsafe-URL

0%

0%

Finally, the P3P header, related to users’ privacy settings, was not included as part of
this study since it is not implemented by any major browser other than Microsoft IE
and Edge. However, it is still being issued by 7.5% of the sites (6.9% of HTTP sites
and 8.4% of HTTPS ones).

5. Conclusions
We have presented a new analysis of implementation rate in Alexa’s top one million
websites of web security policies based on HTTP response headers. A careful data
gathering process was carried out to collect HTTP response headers from four different
requests for each domain in the list: http://domain, http://www.domain, https://domain
and https://www.domain. Redirections were followed. HTTPS issues were examined,
finding in particular that a sizeable number of sites, 29.1% of all HTTPS requests
made, exhibit some incorrect TLS configuration. They are typically X.509 certificate
errors, as the leading causes for TLS misconfiguration are name mismatching and
verification errors (self-signed certificates, untrusted CA’s or expired certificates).
We also compared HTTP response headers obtained from HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2
equivalent requests and found that, besides some connection related headers, response
headers show no significant differences.
We repeatedly showed that security policies based on HTTP response headers are
always far more common in HTTPS websites that in HTTP sites. Those policies are
also noticeably more commonly implemented among highly popular sites than not
so popular ones. In fact, for all security headers analysed here, when implementation
rates are depicted against website popularity the resulting curve follows an exponential
decline pattern.
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In particular, we have found that HTTP Strict Transport Security policy is implemented
in about 38% among top one thousand HTTPS sites, but only 17.5% considering all
top one million websites. Content Security Policy, despite its powerful prevention
capability against Cross Site Scripting and other vulnerabilities, remains poorly
implemented at a global 1.6% among all one million websites. HTTPS sites show
a markedly larger adoption rate, 3.4%, whereas HTTP sites hardly implement this
policy, only 0.4% of them. Session cookies were also analysed and we found that
about 50% of sites do not set their HttpOnly flag (55.4 % of HTTP sites and 42.7% of
HTTPS sites) and and the Secure directive is issued for the session cookies in about
19.3% of all HTTPS sites. Although not so relevant as these headers, other securityrelated response headers were analysed (X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection and
X-ContentType-Options). We also analysed information leakage from web servers
through their Server and other related response headers and, again, we found that
information leakage is more common among less popular and HTTP sites than in
highly popular and HTTPS sites.
All in all, security policies based on HTTP headers remain low. They are slightly
increasing when compared to the figures reported by previous researches during
2017 (Helme 2017, April 2017), but still well below satisfactory rates. Notably
higher implementation rates observed in the most popular sites suggests that security
awareness could be influenced by factors like business size. Alternatively, it may be
argued that security-aware websites tend to thrive better.

6. Future Work
The authors plan to expand the current research in several ways. The survey offers a
picture of certain web security policies implemented by the top one million websites
at a given time (September 2017) and a periodical repetition of the scanning process
will be interesting, as it will show how the adoption of these policies are evolving.
Following similar initiatives like the ones by Mozilla Observatory and Scott Helme,
the authors plan to assign a “global” scoring (e.g., from A to F) for each website
and generate the corresponding global statistics and their correlation to HTTPS and
site popularity ranking. However, our initial work on this area shows that it is far
from obvious how to assign relative weights to each of the analysed HTTP headers
and we firmly believe that further work is needed, taking into account, at least, web
vulnerability prevalence statistics.
Additionally, we are currently exploring the possibility of considering more variables
in our work, like website country and Content Distribution Network usage and how
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it relates to web security policies based on HTTP response headers. Finally, we deem
interesting to study Subresource Integrity current adoption resources.
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Abstract: Machine learning is adopted in a wide range of domains where it shows its
superiority over traditional rule-based algorithms. These methods are being integrated
in cyber detection systems with the goal of supporting or even replacing the first level
of security analysts. Although the complete automation of detection and analysis is
an enticing goal, the efficacy of machine learning in cyber security must be evaluated
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with the due diligence. We present an analysis, addressed to security specialists, of
machine learning techniques applied to the detection of intrusion, malware, and spam.
The goal is twofold: to assess the current maturity of these solutions and to identify
their main limitations that prevent an immediate adoption of machine learning cyber
detection schemes. Our conclusions are based on an extensive review of the literature
as well as on experiments performed on real enterprise systems and network traffic.
Keywords: machine learning, deep learning, cyber security, adversarial learning

1. Introduction
The appeal and pervasiveness of machine learning (ML) is growing. Existing methods
are being improved, and their ability to understand and answer real issues is highly
appreciated. These achievements have led to the adoption of machine learning in
several domains, such as computer vision, medical analysis, gaming and social media
marketing [1]. In some scenarios, machine learning techniques represent the best
choice over traditional rule-based algorithms and even human operators [2]. This
trend is also affecting the cyber security field where some detection systems are being
upgraded with ML components [3]. Although devising a completely automated cyber
defence system is yet a distant objective, first level operators in Network and Security
Operation Centres (NOC and SOC) may benefit from detection and analysis tools
based on machine learning. This paper is specifically addressed to security operators
and aims to assess the current maturity of these solutions, to identify their main
limitations and to highlight some room for improvement.
Our study is based on an extensive review of the literature and on original experiments
performed on real, large enterprises and network traffic. Other academic papers
compare ML solutions for cyber security by considering one specific application (e.g.:
[4], [3], [5]) and are typically oriented to Artificial Intelligence (AI) experts rather
than to security operators. In the evaluation, we exclude the commercial products
based on machine learning (or on the abused AI term) because vendors do not reveal
their algorithms and tend to overlook issues and limitations. First, we present an
original taxonomy of machine learning cyber security approaches. Then, we map the
identified classes of algorithms to three problems where machine learning is currently
applied: intrusion detection, malware analysis, spam and phishing detection. Finally,
we analyse the main limitations of existing approaches. Our study highlights pros and
cons of different methods, especially in terms of false positive or false negative alarms.
Moreover, we point out a general underestimation of the complexity of managing ML
architectures in cyber security caused by the lack of publicly available and labelled
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data for training, and by the time required for fine-tuning operations in a domain
characterized by continuous change. We also consider recent results emphasizing the
effectiveness of adversarial attacks [6] [5] in evading ML detectors. The evidenced
drawbacks pave the way to future improvements that ML components require before
being fully adopted in cyber defence platforms.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes our original taxonomy of ML
algorithms applied to cyber security. Section 3 outlines the three classes of cyber
security problems considered in this paper and Section 4 compares and evaluates ML
solutions for cyber security. Section 5 concludes the paper with some final remarks.

2. Classification of Machine Learning
Algorithms for Cyber Security
Machine learning includes a large variety of paradigms in continuous evolution,
presenting weak boundaries and cross relationships. Furthermore, different views and
applications may lead to different classifications. Hence, we cannot refer to one fully
accepted taxonomy from literature, but we prefer to propose an original taxonomy
able to capture the differences among the myriad of techniques that are being applied
to cyber detection, as shown in Figure 1. This taxonomy is specifically oriented to
security operators and avoids the ambitious goal of presenting the ultimate classification
that can satisfy all AI experts and application cases. The first discriminant evidenced
in Figure 1 is between the traditional ML algorithms, which today can be referred
to as Shallow Learning (SL), in opposition to the more recent Deep Learning
(DL). Shallow Learning requires a domain expert (that is, a feature engineer) who
can perform the critical task of identifying the relevant data characteristics before
executing the SL algorithm. Deep Learning relies on a multi-layered representation
of the input data and can perform feature selection autonomously through a process
defined representation learning.
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FIGURE 1. CLASSIFICATION OF ML ALGORITHMS FOR CYBER SECURITY APPLICATIONS.

SL and DL approaches can be further characterized by distinguishing between
supervised and unsupervised algorithms. The former techniques require a training
process with a large and representative set of data that have been previously classified
by a human expert or through other means. The latter approaches do not require a prelabelled training dataset. In this section, we consider and compare the most popular
categories of ML algorithms, which appear as the leaves of the classification tree in
Figure 1. We remark that each category can include dozens of different techniques1.
1
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For a detailed list of existing ML algorithms, see: https://cran.r-project.org/web/views/MachineLearning.
html

A. Shallow Learning
1) Supervised SL algorithms
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Naïve Bayes (NB). These algorithms are probabilistic classifiers which make
the a-priori assumption that the features of the input dataset are independent
from each other. They are scalable and do not require huge training datasets
to produce appreciable results.
Logistic Regression (LR). These are categorical classifiers that adopt a
discriminative model. Like NB algorithms, LR methods make the a-priori
independency assumption of the input features. Their performance is highly
dependent on the size of the training data.
Support Vector Machines (SVM). These are non-probabilistic classifiers
that map data samples in a feature space with the goal of maximizing the
distance between each category of samples. They do not make any assumption
on the input features, but they perform poorly in multi-class classifications.
Hence, they should be used as binary classifiers. Their limited scalability
might lead to long processing times.
Random Forest (RF). A random forest is a set of decision trees, and
considers the output of each tree before providing a unified final response.
Each decision tree is a conditional classifier: the tree is visited from the top
and, at each node, a given condition is checked against one or more features
of the analysed data. These methods are efficient for large datasets and excel
at multiclass problems, but deeper trees might lead to overfitting.
Hidden Markov Models (HMM). These model the system as a set of states
producing outputs with different probabilities; the goal is to determine the
sequence of states that produced the observed outputs. HMM are effective
for understanding the temporal behaviour of the observations, and for
calculating the likelihood of a given sequence of events. Although HMM
can be trained on labelled or unlabelled datasets, in cyber security they have
mostly been used with labelled datasets.
K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN). KNN are used for classification and can be
used for multi-class problems. However, both their training and test phase
are computationally demanding as to classify each test sample, they compare
it against all the training samples.
Shallow Neural Network (SNN). These algorithms are based on neural
networks, which consist in a set of processing elements (that is, neurons)
organized in two or more communicating layers. SNN include all those types
of neural networks with a limited number of neurons and layers. Despite the
existence of unsupervised SNN, in cyber security they have mostly been
used for classification tasks.
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2) Unsupervised SL algorithms
•

•

Clustering. These group data points that present similar characteristics. Well
known approaches include k-means and hierarchical clustering. Clustering
methods have a limited scalability, but they represent a flexible solution
that is typically used as a preliminary phase before adopting a supervised
algorithm or for anomaly detection purposes.
Association. They aim to identify unknown patterns between data, making
them suitable for prediction purposes. However, they tend to produce an
excessive output of not necessarily valid rules, hence they must be combined
with accurate inspections by a human expert.

B. Deep Learning

All DL algorithms are based on Deep Neural Networks (DNN), which are large neural
networks organized in many layers capable of autonomous representation learning.
1) Supervised DL algorithms
•

•

•

Fully-connected Feedforward Deep Neural Networks (FNN). They are
a variant of DNN where every neuron is connected to all the neurons in
the previous layer. FNN do not make any assumption on the input data and
provide a flexible and general-purpose solution for classification, at the
expense of high computational costs.
Convolutional Feedforward Deep Neural Networks (CNN). They are a
variant of DNN where each neuron receives its input only from a subset of
neurons of the previous layer. This characteristic makes CNN effective at
analysing spatial data, but their performance decreases when applied to nonspatial data. CNN have a lower computation cost than FNN.
Recurrent Deep Neural Networks (RNN). A variant of DNN whose
neurons can send their output also to previous layers; this design makes them
harder to train than FNN. They excel as sequence generators, especially their
recent variant, the long short-term memory.

2) Unsupervised DL algorithms
•
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Deep Belief Networks (DBN). They are modelled through a composition of
Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM), a class of neural networks with no
output layer. DBN can be successfully used for pre-training tasks because
they excel in the function of feature extraction. They require a training
phase, but with unlabelled datasets.

•

Stacked Autoencoders (SAE). They are composed by multiple
Autoencoders, a class of neural networks where the number of input and
output neurons is the same. SAE excel at pre-training tasks similarly to
DBN, and achieve better results on small datasets.

3. Applications of Machine Learning
Algorithms to Cyber Security
We consider the three areas where most cyber ML algorithms are finding application:
intrusion detection, malware analysis, and spam detection. An outline of each field is
presented below.
Intrusion detection aims to discover illicit activities within a computer or a network
through Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Network IDS are widely deployed in
modern enterprise networks. These systems were traditionally based on patterns
of known attacks, but modern deployments include other approaches for anomaly
detection, threat detection [7] and classification based on machine learning. Within the
broader intrusion detection area, two specific problems are relevant to our analysis:
the detection of botnets and of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). A botnet
is a network of infected machines controlled by attackers and misused to conduct
multiple illicit activities. Botnet detection aims to identify communications between
infected machines within the monitored network and the external command-andcontrol servers. Despite many research proposals and commercial tools that address
this threat, several botnets still exist. DGA automatically generate domain names,
and are often used by an infected machine to communicate with external server(s) by
periodically generating new hostnames. They represent a real threat for organizations
because, through DGA which relies on language processing techniques, it is possible
to evade defences based on static blacklists of domain names. We consider DGA
detection techniques based on ML.
Malware analysis is an extremely relevant problem because modern malware can
automatically generate novel variants with the same malicious effects but appearing
as completely different executable files. These polymorphic and metamorphic features
defeat traditional rule-based malware identification approaches. ML techniques can be
used to analyse malware variants and attributing them to the correct malware family.
Spam and phishing detection includes a large set of techniques aimed at reducing
the waste of time and potential hazard caused by unwanted emails. Nowadays,
unsolicited emails, namely phishing, represent the preferred way through which an
attacker establishes a first foothold within an enterprise network. Phishing emails
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include malware or links to compromised websites. Spam and phishing detection is
increasingly difficult because of the advanced evasion strategies used by attackers to
bypass traditional filters. ML approaches can improve the spam detection process.
TABLE 1. APPLICATION OF ML TO CYBER SECURITY PROBLEMS.

Shallow Learning

Deep Learning

Intrusion Detection
Network

Botnet

Supervised

RNN [8]

RNN [9]

Unsupervised

DBN [13]
SAE [14]

Supervised

RF [3]
NB [3]
SVM [3]
LR [3]
HMM [3]
KNN [3]
SNN [3]

RF [19]
NB [19]
SVM [19]
LR [20]
KNN [21]
SNN [22]

Unsupervised

Clustering [29]
Association [30]

Clustering [5]

DGA

Malware
Analysis

Spam
Detection

FNN [10]
CNN [11]
RNN [12]
DBN [15]
SAE [16]

DBN [17]
SAE [18]

RF [23]
HMM [23]

RF [24]
NB [24]
SVM [24]
LR [24]
HMM [25]
KNN [24]
SNN [26]

RF [27]
NB [28]
SVM [28]
LR [27]
KNN [27]
SNN [27]

Clustering [31]

Clustering [24]
Association [32]

Clustering [33]
Association [34]

In Table 1 we report the main ML algorithms that have been proposed to address the
previously identified cyber security problems. In this table, rows report the family
of algorithms presented in Section 2, while columns denote cyber issues. Each cell
indicates which ML algorithms are used for each problem; empty cells denote that, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no proposal for that class of problems. From this
table, it emerges that SL algorithms are applied to all considered problems. Supervised
DL algorithms find wide application to malware analysis, less to intrusion detection;
spam detection relies only on unsupervised DL algorithms. Despite its relatedness to
natural language processing [2], no DL algorithm is applied to DGA detection. As
expected, the overall number of algorithms based on DL is considerably smaller than
those based on SL. Indeed, DL proposals based on huge neural networks are more
recent than SL approaches. This gap opens many research opportunities.
Finally, we highlight a significant difference among supervised and unsupervised
approaches: the former algorithms are used for classification purposes and can
implement complete detectors; the latter techniques perform ancillary activities [35].
Unsupervised SL algorithms are often used for grouping data with similar characteristics
independently of predefined classification criteria, and excel at identifying useful
features whenever the data to be analysed present high dimensionality [16].
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4. Evaluation
In this section we present seven issues that must be considered before deciding whether
to apply ML algorithms in NOC and SOC. We can anticipate that, at the current
state-of-the-art, no algorithm can be considered fully autonomous with no human
supervision. We substantiate each issue through experimental results from literature
or original experiments performed on large enterprises. We begin by describing the
testing environments of our experiments, and the metrics considered for evaluation.
The experiments focus on DGA Detection and Network Intrusion Detection, and
leverage two ML algorithms: Random Forest and Feedforward Fully Connected Deep
Neural Network.
For DGA Detection, we compose two labelled training datasets containing both DGA
and non-DGA domains. The former dataset contains DGA created through known
techniques, while the latter contains DGA created using more recent approaches.
Non-DGA domains are randomly chosen among the Cisco Umbrella top-1 million.
We report the meaningful metrics of the training datasets in Table 2. Moreover, we
build a testing dataset of 10,000 domains extracted evenly from each of the training
datasets. We also rely on a real and unlabelled dataset composed of almost 20,000
domains contacted by a large organization. The features extracted for this dataset are:
n-gram normality score [36]; meaningful characters ratio [36]; number-to-character
ratio; vowel-to-consonant ratio; and domain length. These datasets are used to train
and test a self-developed Random Forest classifier composed of 100 decision trees
leveraging the CART (classification and regression tree) algorithm.
TABLE 2. TRAINING DATASETS FOR DGA DETECTION EXPERIMENTS.
Dataset

DGA technique

DGA count

non-DGA count

1

Well-known

21,355

20,227

2

Well-known and recent

37,673

8,120

For Network Intrusion Detection, we use three labelled real training datasets
composed of benign and malicious network flows2 collected in a large organization
of nearly 10,000 hosts. The labels are created by flagging as malicious those flows
that raised alerts by the enterprise network IDS and reviewed by a domain expert.
Meaningful metrics of these training datasets are reported in Table 3. We also generate
a testing dataset of 50,000 flows evenly extracted among the training datasets. The
considered features for these datasets include: source/destination IP address, source/
destination port, number of incoming/outgoing bytes and packets, TCP flags, protocol
used, duration of the flow and list of alerts raised. These datasets are used to test
and train two self-developed classifiers, one based on Random Forests and one on
2

Cisco Netflow: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/ios-nx-os-software/ios-netflow/index.html
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Feedforward Fully-connected Deep Neural Network. Different topologies have been
considered for each algorithm. The RF is composed by 100 decision trees leveraging
the CART algorithm. For the FNN, the overall number of neurons ranges from 128
to 16,384, distributed between 2 to 16 layers; the hidden layers leverage the ReLU
activation function, whereas the output layer uses a sigmoid activation function.
TABLE 3. TRAINING DATASETS FOR NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION EXPERIMENTS.
Dataset
1
2
3

The quality of each classifier is measured through common performance metrics,
namely Precision, Recall, F1-score, which are computed as follows:

where TP, FP, and FN denote true positives, false positives, and false negatives,
respectively. For completeness, we consider a true positive to be a correct detection
of a malicious sample. Precision indicates how much a given approach is likely to
provide a correct result. Recall is used to measure the detection rate. The F1-score
combines Precision and Recall into a single value. We do not rely on Accuracy3
because, in a real organization, the number of legitimate events is several orders of
magnitude greater than illegitimate events. Hence, all the Accuracy values are close
to 1 and these results prevent capturing the true effectiveness of a classifier. Finally,
to reduce the possibility of biased results, each evaluation metric is computed after
performing 10-fold cross validation.

A. Shallow vs Deep Learning

Deep Learning is known to outperform Shallow Learning in some applications,
such as computer vision [2]. This is not always the case for cyber security where
some well configured SL algorithms may prevail, even given the DL proposals are
scarce with respect to SL techniques in this domain. Just to give an example, we
experimentally compare the performance of the two self-developed classifiers for
Network Intrusion Detection, one based on RF (Shallow Learning) and another based
on FNN (Deep Learning). Both are trained with the third dataset described in Table 3
and tested on the network intrusion detection testing dataset. To obtain more refined
results, we repeat the training and test phase of these classifiers multiple times using
different topologies. In Table 4, we show the classification results achieved by each
method; for the FNN we report the results obtained by the best topology consisting
3
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Accuracy =

, where TN denotes true negatives.

in 1.024 neurons spread across 4 hidden layers. The RF classifier performed better
than the FNN, with an F1-score of nearly 0.8, against the 0.6 obtained by the FNN.
Our takeaway is that security administrators should not be charmed by the alluring
neuronal multi-layer approach offered by Deep Learning, as some of these methods
might still be immature for cyber security.
TABLE 4. COMPARISON BETWEEN DL AND SL CLASSIFIERS.
F1-score

Precision

Recall

0.7985

0.8727

0.736

0.6085

0.7708

0.5027

B. General vs specific detectors

Products based on machine learning are often promoted by vendors as catch-all
solutions to a broad array of cyberattacks. However, unbiased experimental results
show that ML algorithms may provide superior performance when they focus on
specific threats instead of trying to detect multiple threats at once. We devise multiple
intrusion detection systems based on the self-developed RF classifiers for network
intrusion detection, each focusing on a specific type of attack, such as buffer overflows,
malware infection, DoS. The training dataset for each classifier is based on the third
dataset presented in Table 3. We train and test each classifier, and then compare their
classification results with the classifier described in the first row of Table 4 that is our
baseline. Table 5 shows the Precision, Recall and F1-score of the six classifiers that
obtained the best results, alongside the baseline reported in the bottom row. These
attack-specific classifiers obtain promising results on real traffic data with F1-scores
of over 0.95, while the ‘general-purpose’ classifier performs significantly poorly. We
conclude that entrusting a single ML detector to identify malicious flows is an enticing
but as yet unfeasible goal. On the other hand, by having multiple detectors, each
focusing on one attack type, it is possible to produce a defensive scheme with superior
detection capabilities.
TABLE 5. CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR ATTACK-SPECIFIC
CLASSIFIERS AND THE GENERAL CLASSIFIER.
F1-score

Precision

Recall

0.9953

0.9938

0.9969

0.9939

0.9933

0.9946

0.9916

0.9941

0.9892

0.9753

0.9953

0.9586

0.9676

0.9872

0.9506

0.9587

0.9939

0.9337

0.7985

0.8727

0.7360

381

C. Vulnerability to adversarial attacks

Competent adversaries use novel strategies to evade detectors based on machine
learning algorithms [5]. These activities, namely adversarial attacks, may attack the
integrity, the availability, or the privacy of the target system [6]. Integrity violations
evade a classification or a clustering algorithm by producing attacks classified as
licit activities. Availability violations produce a multitude of normal events that are
classified as an attack thus causing detectors to raise a huge amount of false alarms.
Privacy violations let the attacker acquire information on the target network by
exploiting the defensive ML algorithm. Moreover, recent advances in Deep Learning
led to the development of generative adversarial networks (GAN) [37], which are
DNN capable of automatically producing adversarial samples against a target ML
system.
TABLE 6. DETECTION RATES OF THE RF CLASSIFIER AGAINST DIFFERENT DGA TECHNIQUES [36].
DGA method

Recall

corebot

1

cryptolocker

1

dircrypt

0.99

kraken_v2

0.96

lockyv2

0.97

pykspa

0.85

qakbot

0.99

ramdo

0.99

ramnit

0.98

simda

0.96

DeepDGA GAN

0.48

To demonstrate the effectiveness of a GAN in evading classifiers we analyse the
case study of DeepDGA [36]. The authors initially train an RF classifier to detect
DGA using known datasets, and then show that this classifier identifies DGA with
good detection rates. Then, they develop a GAN to generate domains that evade such
classifier. Results are presented in Table 6, where the first ten rows show the detection
rate against ten real DGA, while the last row denotes the detection rate against samples
generated by the DeepDGA GAN. We observe that the performance of the classifier
(always above 0.85, and above 0.96 for nine out of ten DGA) drops below 50% for
GAN-generated samples.
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TABLE 7. DETECTION RATES OF THE RF CLASSIFIER AGAINST DIFFERENT DGA BEFORE AND
AFTER HARDENING [36].
DGA method

Baseline Recall

Hardened Recall

corebot

0.97

0.97

dircrypt

0.95

0.93

qakbot

0.94

0.94

ramnit

0.94

0.94

lockyv2

0.87

0.84

cryptolocker

0.87

0.88

simda

0.75

0.79

krakenv2

0.72

0.76

pykspa

0.67

0.71

ramdo

0.54

0.54

To counter adversarial attacks, novel proposals introduce the paradigm of adversarial
learning [6], in which adversarial samples are included in the training dataset to
harden the ML detector. As an example, authors in [36] demonstrate the advantages
of adversarial learning by enriching the training set of the classifier with adversarial
samples produced by the GAN. Table 7 compares the detection rates of the RF classifier
before and after this hardening process. Cells with a grey background represent the
DGA for which the detection rate improved after adversarial learning (it should be
noted that the dataset used for this test is different than that used for the experiments
reported in Table 6). Detection rates for 8 out of 10 DGA families improved, thus
showing the validity of adversarial learning.

D. Selection of a machine learning algorithm

Unbiased comparison of the effectiveness of two ML algorithms requires that they
are both trained on the same training dataset and tested on the same dataset [3].
Even though many cyber security proposals rely on few and old public datasets,
their results are not comparable due to several causes: the two algorithms consider
different features; one or both algorithms may implement pre-filtering operations
that alter the training dataset; and they may use a different split between test and
training dataset. For these reasons, meaningful comparisons between detection
performance in literature are extremely difficult. For example, papers such as [4] and
[5] discuss ML methods for two cyber security problems, but they do not consider the
different training and testing environments of the analysed works. Hence, although
some solutions achieve higher accuracy than others, it is possible that results change
significantly under different training settings. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a
method performing best on a test dataset confirms its superiority on different datasets.
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Security administrators should be aware of this issue, and should thoroughly question
the evaluation methodology before accepting the performance results of different
machine learning algorithms.

E. False positives and false negatives

The implicit cost of a misclassification in the cyber security domain is a serious
problem. False positives in malware classification and intrusion detection annoy
security operators and hinder remediation in case of actual infection. In phishing
detection, they might cause important, legitimate messages to not be delivered to end
users. In contrast, failing to detect malware, a network intrusion or a phishing email
can compromise an entire organization. We explore this problem by considering the
performance of ML solutions devoted to malware analysis and phishing detection
[27], while we perform an original experiment for intrusion detection that is oriented
to detect DGA in a real, large enterprise.
For malware analysis, we consider the approach in [24] that proposes an original and
effective method for malware classification. This paper contains a detailed analysis
and comparison of different ML techniques which were trained and tested on the
same datasets, thus satisfying the requirements for valid comparison of different
techniques. Hence, we deem this paper to be a good representation of the state-ofthe-art of ML for determining the family to which a malware sample belongs. The
evaluation is performed on the DREBIN dataset;4 for large malware families the
proposed approach, which outperforms all other baselines, obtains an F1-score of
0.95, whereas for small malware families it achieves an F1-score of 0.89.
For phishing detection, we report the results described in [27] that, to the best of our
knowledge, is the only paper on phishing email detection which compares different
ML algorithms against the same comprehensive dataset. Therefore, we consider this
work as a valid overview of the efficacy of different ML methods. The authors created
a custom dataset of ~3,000 phishing emails on which several ML classifiers were
tested: the best results were obtained by RF (lowest false positives) and LR (lowest
false negatives), obtaining an F1-score of 0.90 and 0.89, respectively.
The scenario for intrusion detection is different, as modern solutions can achieve
higher Accuracy scores [3]. Although near-perfect Accuracy may seem an appreciable
result, the massive amounts of events generated daily in a large enterprise account for
hundreds to thousands of false positives that need to be manually triaged by security
operators. We highlight this problem through an original experiment. We consider
two DGA detectors based on the self-developed Random Forest classifiers trained on
the first and second datasets of Table 2, respectively. We then validate them on the
real domain dataset. Results are summarized in Table 8 which presents the number
4
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DREBIN dataset: https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/~danarp/drebin/

of domains that are flagged as DGA by both classifiers, alongside its percentage on
the total amount of domains included in the dataset. We can observe that the two
classifiers obtain comparable detection performances on real traffic data, as they
both signal about 400 domains. However, manual inspection revealed that they were
not DGA, hence all the domains flagged as DGAs are actually false positives. As
anticipated, even a false positive rate of 2% can account to hundreds of false alarms
in a real organization.
TABLE 8. PERFORMANCE OF THE DGA DETECTION CLASSIFIERS WHEN USED ON REAL DATA.
Training Dataset
Well-known
Well-known and recent

Despite these apparently promising results which are well beyond acceptable levels in
other fields such as image recognition, these approaches are affected by an excessive
number of false positives and false negatives to be considered for cyber defences
without human supervision.

F. Re-training issues

A well-known limitation of traditional detection approaches based on static detection
rules is the need for frequent and continuous updates (e.g., daily updates of antivirus
definitions). A similar issue also influences advanced ML approaches; reliance on
outdated training datasets leads to poor detection performance. This is a critical
problem for all supervised learning approaches requiring labelled training datasets;
the manual creation of similar datasets is an expensive process because they need to
be sufficiently large and comprehensive to allow the algorithm to learn the difference
between the classes. Furthermore, these operations are error prone and may lead
to incorrect classifications. Finally, most organizations are unwilling to share their
internal network data. This scenario leads to an overall scarcity of publicly available
and labelled data for cyber security, thus rendering periodic retraining extremely
difficult or impossible.
To show the detrimental effects of obsolete training sets, we perform an experiment
comparing the performance of two instances of the same self-developed RF classifier
for DGA detection. The first and second instances are trained with the first and second
datasets reported in Table 2. Both classifiers are tested against the same synthetic
domain dataset described in Section 4. We report the results in Table 9, which shows
the Precision, Recall and F1-score obtained by the two classifiers for DGA detection.
As expected, the performance of the second classifier is significantly better because
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it obtains an F1-score for DGAs of 0.89 against 0.33. These results demonstrate that
classifier performances are extremely sensitive to the freshness of the training set.
TABLE 9. PERFORMANCE OF THE DGA DETECTION CLASSIFIERS WHEN TRAINED ON OUTDATED
AND RECENT DATASETS.
Training Dataset

F1-score

Precision

Recall

Well-known

0.3306

0.1984

0.9913

Well-known and recent

0.8999

0.9126

0.8875

G. Deployment process

Security solutions based on ML achieve appreciable detection rates only if the training
dataset is appropriate and the parameters of the algorithms are finely tuned. In most
scenarios, these operations are still executed empirically and represent a resource
intensive task that presents several risks. If these steps are not performed rigorously
and/or training is not based on the right datasets, the results are underwhelming. We
highlight these issues through a set of ML experiments applied to network intrusion
detection. The goal is to show the considerably different results achieved by the same
ML algorithm in different environments where either the number of features or the
training dataset is changed. To this purpose, we rely on the RF classifier for network
intrusion detection. We train it using the third dataset reported in Table 3 by choosing
5, 7, 10 or 12 features, selected through a feature agglomeration process; the testing
phase is performed on the test dataset. We report the Precision, Recall and F1-score
for the five sets of features in Table 10, where we observe that the same classifier
yields different results, especially with regards to its Recall, with values ranging from
0.57 to 0.74.
TABLE 10. PERFORMANCE OF THE INTRUSION DETECTION CLASSIFIER WHEN TRAINED WITH
DIFFERENT FEATURES.
Features

F1-score

Precision

Recall

12

0.7985

0.8727

0.7361

10

0.7801

0.8684

0.7093

7

0.7476

0.8893

0.6448

5

0.6920

0.8724

0.5734

Then, we keep the number of features fixed at 12 and we repeat the training process
two more times by using the first and then the second dataset reported in Table 3, and
then test them on the same testing dataset. Table 11 reports the Precision, Recall and
F1-score for the three training datasets. These results confirm that the Recall between
the best and the worst case may differ by 10% or over.
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TABLE 11. PERFORMANCE OF THE INTRUSION DETECTION CLASSIFIER WHEN TRAINED ON
DIFFERENT DATASETS.
Training Dataset

F1-score

Precision

Recall

1

0.7306

0.8753

0.6270

2

0.7757

0.8703

0.6996

3

0.7985

0.8727

0.7361

5. Conclusions
Machine and deep learning approaches are increasingly employed for multiple
applications and are being adopted also for cyber security, hence it is important to
evaluate when and which category of algorithms can achieve adequate results. We
analyse these techniques for three relevant cyber security problems: intrusion detection,
malware analysis and spam detection. We initially propose an original taxonomy of
the most popular categories of ML algorithms and show which of them are currently
applied to which problem. Then we explore several issues that influence the application
of ML to cyber security. Our results provide evidence that present machine learning
techniques are still affected by several shortcomings that reduce their effectiveness
for cyber security. All approaches are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and require
continuous re-training and careful parameter tuning that cannot be automatized.
Moreover, especially when the same classifier is applied to identify different threats,
the detection performance is unacceptably low; a possible mitigation can be achieved
by using different ML classifiers for detecting specific threats. Deep learning is still at
an early stage and no final conclusion can be drawn. Significant improvements may be
expected, especially considering the recent and promising development of adversarial
learning. Our takeaway is that machine learning techniques can support the security
operator activities and automate some tasks, but pros and cons must be known. The
autonomous capabilities of ML algorithms must not be overestimated, because the
absence of human supervision can further facilitate skilled attackers to infiltrate, steal
data, and even sabotage an enterprise.
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Abstract: Organizations not only need to defend their IT systems against external
cyber attackers, but also from malicious insiders, that is, agents who have infiltrated
an organization or malicious members stealing information for their own profit. In
particular, malicious insiders can leak a document by simply opening it and taking
pictures of the document displayed on the computer screen with a digital camera.
Using a digital camera allows a perpetrator to easily avoid a log trail that results from
using traditional communication channels, such as sending the document via email.
This makes it difficult to identify and prove the identity of the perpetrator. Even a
policy prohibiting the use of any device containing a camera cannot eliminate this
threat since tiny cameras can be hidden almost everywhere.
To address this leakage vector, we propose a novel screen watermarking technique
that embeds hidden information on computer screens displaying text documents. The
watermark is imperceptible during regular use, but can be extracted from pictures
of documents shown on the screen, which allows an organization to reconstruct the
1
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place and time of the data leak from recovered leaked pictures. Our approach takes
advantage of the fact that the human eye is less sensitive to small luminance changes
than digital cameras. We devise a symbol shape that is invisible to the human eye, but
still robust to the image artifacts introduced when taking pictures. We complement
this symbol shape with an error correction coding scheme that can handle very high
bit error rates and retrieve watermarks from cropped and compressed pictures. We
show in an experimental user study that our screen watermarks are not perceivable by
humans and analyze the robustness of our watermarks against image modifications.
Keywords: data theft, investigation, attribution, screen watermarking, malicious
insiders, infiltration

1. INTRODUCTION
Organizations not only need to protect their proprietary information from external
attackers but also from insiders [17], i.e., agents infiltrating the organization
or malicious employees. To this end, data loss prevention (DLP) solutions are
increasingly deployed. State-of-the-art DLP software can either be configured only
to log or additionally to block users’ actions, such as accessing the Internet, sending
emails, printing, taking screenshots or accessing external media. Consequently, data
leakage via these conventional communication channels can either be prevented or
there is at least a log trail that shows a perpetrator’s actions. This log trail can be
used as evidence against the malicious insider in forensic investigations. However,
DLP systems cannot prevent insiders from taking pictures of a computer screen with
a digital camera. Any employee who is authorized to open a particular document on
their computer screen can leak the contained information by taking a picture and
sharing it with unauthorized parties. Using a camera allows a perpetrator to easily
avoid a log trail, as DLP software cannot detect if a document is being photographed.
This makes it difficult to identify and prove the identity of the perpetrator based on
a recovered leaked picture. Smartphones with cameras have become ubiquitous and
new technologies like digital glasses or lenses are gaining momentum, making this
data leakage threat difficult to control [23]. Even a policy prohibiting the use of any
device containing a camera cannot eliminate this threat since tiny cameras can be
hidden almost everywhere.
We introduce a content-agnostic watermarking approach for textual information
displayed on computer screens. The watermark is imperceptible during regular use
but can be extracted a posteriori from pictures of documents shown on the screen.

392

This enables an organization to reconstruct the place and time of the data leak from
recovered leaked pictures, which greatly facilitates the forensic investigation of data
breaches involving leaked pictures of screens. Our contributions are:
•
•
•

an analysis of the data leakage channel computer screen – digital camera
(§3);
a watermarking schema specifically developed and optimized for this
leakage channel (§4); and
a comprehensive evaluation of the suggested watermarking system –
including a user study (§5) – and a discussion of attacks against our
attribution approach (§6).

2. RELATED WORK
One can distinguish between watermarking solutions for multimedia files and
approaches for text documents. Our scenario shows characteristics of both domains.
Watermarks need to be imperceptible on screens showing textual contents and must
be retained in pictures of the text.
Basic approaches for images simply place watermarks in the least significant bits
of individual pixels of an image [20,2,13]. The resulting small color variations are
imperceptible to humans, but most smart phone cameras also cannot capture color
variations of individual screen pixels, as we found in preliminary experiments. Caronni
[5] encodes the watermark by changing the brightness of multiple contiguous pixels,
which is similar to our approach. However, his approach requires the original image
for extraction of the watermark, while we do not require the original image. Most
advanced multimedia watermarking methods operate in a transformed domain, such
as an image’s frequency spectrum [7,18,19]. This allows them to embed unnoticeable
watermarks by introducing slight modifications in the frequency spectrum. This results
in noise patterns in the spatial domain. This noise is not noticeable in colorful images
but is usually well visible on text documents [12,1]. Therefore, image watermarking
approaches operating in a transformed domain are not suitable for the task at hand.
Existing approaches for watermarking of text documents modify the text directly.
Jalil et al. [9] distinguish between image-based, syntactic, and semantic approaches.
Image-based approaches [4,3] adapt the typesetting of the text. Syntactic and semantic
approaches modify the text itself. They fragment the text into blocks of words or
letters, which are then moved or replaced. However, we have to assume that employees
can edit documents. In this case, they will probably notice such text modifications.
Furthermore, the integration of text-based watermarks is computational-expensive
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and can hardly be embedded in real-time. Hence, text modifications are unsuitable
for our scenario.
Piec et al. [16] develop a real-time screen watermarking approach for embedding
watermarks into screenshots. Screenshots retain colors perfectly and no geometric
distortions occur, which allows them to use standard QR codes with their build-in
standard error correction for embedding the watermarks. In contrast, we use custom
watermark symbols and error correction codes such that our approach not only
works for screenshots, but also for pictures of computer screens, in which various
image artifacts are present. Kuhn et al. [11] analyzed in their seminal work various
approaches to tamper with as well as eavesdrop on information by modifying and
analyzing electromagnetic radiation. However, their work analyzes skilled attackers
who use hardware to process electromagnetic radiation, while we focus on an attacker
using a commodity camera. Petitcolas et al. [14] present criteria for benchmarking
watermark approaches and an overview of attacks against watermarks [15].
Printer stenography is related to our approach. For instance, color laser manufacturers
encode the date and time a document was printed with tiny yellow dots on printouts, which cannot be seen unless the print-out is magnified [24]. Recently, it was
reported that printer identification code helped to identify the whistleblower Reality
Winner in 2017 [25]. Unlike printer stenography, we encode our hidden information
on computer screens.

3. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND APPROACH
A. Problem Statement

State-of-the-art security measures cannot prevent insiders from breaching sensitive
documents by taking pictures of their computer screens. Taking pictures leaves no
log trail that identifies the perpetrator. As a result, it is very difficult to identify the
perpetrator based on a recovered leaked picture. We approach this problem with
respect to the two scenarios2 depicted in Figure 1. Both scenarios have in common
that: (i) an insider (attacker) takes a picture of sensitive information displayed on a
screen and (ii) a forensic investigator can access the recovered picture and needs to
identify the attacker based on the picture. In scenario M1, investigators get access to
the original, unmodified picture of the camera, e.g., because it was found during a
police raid. In scenario M2, investigators only see a modified version of the picture
as it has been published.

2
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Our methodology could also be applied to other scenarios where information needs to be transported in
pictures or screenshots.

FIGURE 1. USAGE SCENARIOS: AN INSIDER TAKES A PICTURE OF A COMPUTER SCREEN WHICH
IS LATER RECOVERED, EITHER THE ORIGINAL PICTURE (MODEL M1) OR A MODIFIED VERSION
OF IT (MODEL M2). THE WATERMARK IS THEN EXTRACTED TO DETERMINE WHEN AND WHERE
THE PICTURE WAS TAKEN.

B. Approach

We approach this security threat by embedding hidden watermarks in computer
screens. Our watermarks encode information such as the time and the workstation
(location). A picture of a watermarked computer screen carries this information. If
investigators get access to the (modified) photograph, they can decode this information
and identify the perpetrator by verifying who was logged in at the workstation at the
time. Watermarking text documents, images, and videos to trace their dissemination
is a well-established technique (see §2), but the threat scenario of an insider taking
pictures of sensitive data displayed on a screen poses several problems, which make
established watermarking techniques unsuitable for this task. In particular:
(a) as the attacker can take a picture at any time, there is no controlled release
process and the watermark must be present on any document displayed on
the screen at any time;
(b) the watermark must be unnoticeable on text documents, but still be robust
against the image artifacts introduced when taking photos of a computer
screen; and
(c) the approach should allow for blind extraction, i.e., watermark extraction
without the original document.3
While traditional text watermarking approaches encode data by modifying individual
text passages, we embed information by overlaying a pattern of slightly brighter/darker
areas to approach challenge (a). The corresponding overlay mask is independent of
the content displayed on the screen and can thus be pre-computed. This makes our
watermarking process suitable for real-time embedding. To handle challenge (b), we
develop watermarking symbols that are based on the fact that the human eye, especially
in light color areas [6], is insensitive to small continuous brightness gradients [2],
3

Alternatively, one would have to record all Desktop interactions resulting in major privacy issues.
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while digital cameras capture small changes in brightness well. Further, we modify
the design of a traditional convolutional coder and use evolutionary algorithms for
deriving optimized generator polynomials in order to handle the high error rates
caused by image artifacts. We use redundancy and split our watermarks into subwatermarks to allow extractions of partly corrupted watermarks. Furthermore, we
store cryptographic checksums in our watermarks to allow bit error corrections. To
approach challenge (c), we develop an algorithm for blind symbol extraction that is
based on the observation that the background color is clearly dominating in typical
text documents, allowing us to use local reference brightness values for the symbol
decoding.

4. DESIGN
Figure 2 shows the workflow of the proposed watermarking system. The embedding
process will interact with the graphics card on the watermarked end host (not
implemented in the prototype used for this evaluation), while an investigator
conducts the extraction using standalone software. We assume that a graphic card
implementation of the embedding process does not lead to a noticeable increase in
CPU usage or power consumption. Even if this assumption does not hold, the user has
no baseline for these characteristics that allow them to identify that screen watermarks
exist.
Watermark embedding involves the following steps:
(1) Logging: This module creates a bitstring that identifies the end host, user, and a
point in time.
(2) Checksum (see §4.C): This module calculates a cryptographic checksum
(incorporating a secret user key) for error detection and integrity checking. The
checksum block is appended to the payload and the resulting protected payload is
provided to the encoder.
(3) Encoding (see §4.B): The protected payload is encoded using an adapted
convolutional encoder.
(4) Embedding (see §4.A): Watermark symbols representing the encoded data are
generated and placed on the computer’s screen.
The extraction of a watermark involves these modules:
(1) Extraction (see §4.A): The watermark symbols are extracted from the recovered
picture.
(2) Decoding (see §4.B): The encoded data is decoded using the Viterbi algorithm
[21] in order to extract the protected payload.
(3) Checksum/logging (see §4.C): The logging system stores which user was logged in
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at the extracted time and location. The corresponding secret user key is retrieved from
a database and the cryptographic checksum is verified. If the checksum is correct, the
location and time are returned, otherwise the extraction fails with an error.
FIGURE 2. WATERMARKING OF A COMPUTER SCREEN (TOP) AND EXTRACTION FROM A
PHOTOGRAPH (BOTTOM). THE PAYLOAD CONSISTS OF P BITS. THE CHECKSUM MODULE
APPENDS A CHECKSUM TO THE PAYLOAD. THE ENCODING MODULE TRANSFORMS THE
PROTECTED PAYLOAD INTO SIX WATERMARK BLOCKS. THIS PROCESS IS REVERSED DURING
THE WATERMARK EXTRACTION.

A. Watermarking Symbols for Computer Screens

We introduce watermarking symbols that are a hybrid between traditional text and
image watermarking symbols. We operate in the spatial domain, similar to existing
text watermarking approaches. This way, the visible artifacts caused by embedding
watermarks in a transformed domain are avoided. Still, we avoid the processingintensive and thus slow text parsing by not changing or moving the text but by
overlaying a pattern of slightly brighter and darker areas. Similarly to Caronni [5],
we change the brightness of multiple contiguous pixels, which makes our symbols
more robust against image artifacts and modifications. However, Caronni’s symbol
embedding does not allow for blind extraction. To solve this problem, we apply a
form of pseudo-differential amplitude modulation. That is, instead of comparing the
color values between the watermarked and the original image at the same position in
the image, we compare, for each watermark symbol separately, the color within the
watermark symbol to the color in the surrounding area. Further, we use circular patterns
and soften their shapes by introducing white noise that causes as a smooth gradient
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between the watermark center and the surrounding area to avoid sharp contrasts that
can become visible on the homogeneous backgrounds in text documents.
The key steps for embedding and extracting watermarks are as follows:
Symbol embedding. Embedding watermark symbols is a two-step process: (i) we
calculate an overlay mask of slightly brighter/darker areas (symbols) and (ii) the
watermarking system applies this mask to the screen output. We point out that (i) can
be pre-computed, thus only (ii) is time critical.
Overlay mask. The symbol shape that we use for our approach is shown in Figure
3(a). Every symbol represents one bit. To embed a binary “0”, we make the center of
the symbol slightly brighter; and to embed a “1”, we make the center slightly darker.
A watermark consists of a matrix of these symbols. While the brightness of the innermost circle of the symbol (r1 in Figure 3(a)) is adapted, a smooth gradient and white
noise are applied to the area A2 to avoid any sharp brightness changes. The watermark
decoder compares the background in A1 to the background in A3 to tell which binary
value the symbol represents. To facilitate the manual extraction of watermarks, the
software can further be configured to mark the corners of watermarks using small black
markers, which look similar to pixel errors. A photograph of a resulting watermark for
an intensity Imax = 2 is show in Figure 3(b). Figure 3(c) highlights the watermarking
symbols for illustration.
Applying the overlay mask. The application of the overlay mask is quite similar
to applying a screen color profile. It requires only local brightness modifications,
resulting in a very lightweight embedding process that can be parallelized on a GPU.
Symbol extraction. The extraction of a watermarking symbols from photographs
takes place during forensic investigations and is the reverse of the symbol embedding.
In contrast to the symbol embedding, this process is not time critical. To extract
watermark symbols from a picture, the picture is de-skewed, the watermark symbols
are located and the color values of the center of each individual symbol are compared
to the surrounding area.
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FIGURE 3. A SINGLE WATERMARK SYMBOL (A) AND PICTURES OF A WATERMARKED SCREEN:
ORIGINAL (B) AND WITH HIGHLIGHTED SYMBOLS (C).

(a) A single watermark
symbol.

(b) Unmodified picture of
a watermarked screen.

(c) The same picture with
watermark symbols highlighted.

B. Encoding of Data in Watermarks

The proposed approach uses error-correcting convolutional codes to achieve a high
robustness against incorrectly transmitted symbols. More than one thousand watermark
symbols (“physical” bits) fit on a typical screen area of at least 1.024M pixels for our
largest symbol size of 32x32 pixels, but we will only need to transport few data bits
in a typical setup, therefore we can introduce a high degree of redundancy. Still, this
large coding budget is required for a high robustness because error correcting codes
for watermarks must be able to operate on short payloads and be robust against various
errors [10]. In particular, one has to compensate for cropped images and a very high
symbol error rate due to image artifacts. We achieve robustness against cropping by
modifying the design of a traditional convolutional encoder and optimizing the error
correcting polynomials for short payloads using evolutionary algorithms.
Instead of generating one large watermark, the output of the different generator
polynomials used by the encoder is decoupled. This generates multiple smaller,
independent sub-watermarks (blocks). Each block carries the complete payload
(including a checksum), which allows the decoder to arbitrarily combine the blocks
for extracting the payload. That is, on the one hand, one block with few bit errors can
already be sufficient to reconstruct the payload. On the other hand, if multiple blocks
are available, the decoder can arbitrarily combine these to an optimal combination
to compensate for higher bit-error-rate (BER), which leads to very powerful error
correcting capabilities. The difference between our and a traditional encoder is
illustrated in Figure 4. The traditional encoder merges the output of all generator
polynomials to one codeword. In contrast, our design partitions the outputs into
smaller sub-watermarks, each with a coding rate of R = 0.5 (termination not included).
Combining all sub-watermarks corresponds to the traditional decoder. For decoding
the data, we use the common Viterbi algorithm [21].
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FIGURE 4. INSTEAD OF MERGING THE OUTPUTS OF THE DIFFERENT GENERATORS (A), WE USE
EACH OUTPUT FOR A SEPARATE WATERMARK (B).

(a) Traditional encoder

(b) Our encoder

C. Cryptographic Checksum for Error Detection and Integrity Checking

As convolutional codes offer only limited capabilities in detecting errors, a Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) [22] is often included in communication protocols to detect
decoding errors. We use a cryptographic checksum instead, which additionally allows
us to verify the integrity of the extracted message. The checksum block is calculated
on the concatenation of the payload and a randomly chosen secret key ku. Every user
u has its own secret key ku assigned. This protects against accepting a maliciously or
accidentally modified message.

5. EVALUATION
We use the following terms throughout the evaluation.
•
•
•
•

Symbol: A symbol is a circular area on the screen that represents one raw bit.
Block: As outlined in §4.B, we split a watermark into multiple self-contained
blocks. A block is a collection of s symbols.
Symbol size: The size of a single symbol (as shown in Figure 3(a)) in pixels.
Watermark intensity: the intensity tells how much brighter or darker the
symbols are than the surrounding background. We measure the intensity as
tuple (Δr, Δg, Δb). The Δ-values are added to or subtracted from the red,
green and blue color channel, respectively.

In general, the stronger the watermarks, the more reliable is the watermarking
process. But stronger watermarks are also easier to perceive by humans and therefore
more disturbing. Thus, we aim to find an operation point at which the watermarks are
imperceptible to humans during regular use, but the watermarks can still be reliably
extracted from photographs. We evaluate in the following the perceptibility, bit error
rates, robustness to image transformation and overall performance of the watermarks.
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A. Perceptibility of Embedded Watermarks
1) Setup I
We conduct a user study with 17 adult test subjects working in the defense industry.
The aim of the study is to measure and elaborate the visibility of watermarks for
different intensities. We embed watermarks of different intensities into a text
document; some watermarks are placed in areas with text, while others are placed
in a way such that they are not covered by any text. The document is displayed on
a Samsung SynchMaster SA450 22 inch screen with a resolution of 1680 x 1050
pixels. The study participants were told that the study was on watermarks, but they
did not know what the watermarks looked like. The subjects were asked to read the
document. After reading the article, the subjects had to point out which watermarks
they could see.
2) Results I
The results of the experiment are presented in Table I. The table distinguishes between
watermarks placed on areas where there was no text (background) and watermarks
placed in regions with text. All subjects recognized the control watermarks with
intensity (20,20,20). But already half of all subjects did not recognize watermarks with
intensity (10,10,10) if placed in areas with text. No test subject noted the watermarks
of intensity (3,3,3) in text areas. On the other hand, in areas without text, 7 out of 17
subjects spotted watermarks of intensity (3,3,3). The watermarks of intensity (1,1,0)
were never identified by any study participant. There is an additional interesting
insight not shown in the table. We found that watermarks at the top of the screen were
perceived significantly more often than their counterparts at the bottom of the screen.
We inspected the screen that was used and found that color contrasts were stronger at
the top of the screen than at the bottom.
In summary, we conclude from this study that (i) one can use considerably higher
intensities for watermarks concealed by text and (ii) fine-tuning the intensity of
watermarks for different screen regions can be beneficial in order to compensate for
the inhomogeneous contrast representation of computer screens.
TABLE I. PERCEPTIBILITY FOR WATERMARKS OF DIFFERENT INTENSITIES. THE PERCEPTION
RATE DENOTES THE RATIO OF TEST SUBJECTS IDENTIFYING THE CORRESPONDING WATERMARK.
on white background

in regions with text

intensity

perception rate

intensity

perception rate

(1,1,0)

0/17

(3,3,3)

0/17

(1,2,1)

5/17

(5,5,5)

4/17

(2,2,2)

5/17

(10,10,10)

9/17

(3,3,3)

7/17

(20,20,20)

17/17
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B. Bit error rates
1) Setup II
We measure the bit error rate (BER), i.e., the ratio of symbols that are incorrectly
extracted, for different hardware devices. We focus on watermarks that are located in
areas with text. We embed watermarks of intensity (2,2,2) in a text document with font
size 10pt, display the text document on a Lenovo T430s such that the watermarks cover
the whole screen, and we take pictures with different cameras. This laptop features a
Twisted Nematic (TN) panel with a resolution of 1600 × 900 pixel. We use a different
device for this experiment than for the user study. However, we compared the low
contrast characteristics of the panels and found them to be very similar.4 We measure
the BER for three different symbol sizes and four smartphone cameras: Lumia920,
SonySk17i, SamsungNexus, and MotorolaXT910. We place two (three for symbol
size 20×20) randomly generated watermarks in the document such that they cover the
whole screen and take five pictures with each configuration.
2) Results II
The results for the smallest and largest symbol sizes are shown in Figure 5. Each data
point represents the BER for a single watermark. For reference, the right column in
each figure shows the BER for symbols directly extracted from a screenshot. We use
a screenshot for comparison to measure the influence of the image artifacts caused
by taking photographs of the screen. There is a clear trend towards lower BER for
larger symbol sizes. This is because pixels representing text are filtered during symbol
extraction and more pixels remain after filtering for larger symbols, making the
approach more robust. The screenshots also show some bit errors for the two smaller
symbol sizes. We confirm this finding by measurements conducted on a watermarked
document without any text (not shown in the Figure). For a blank document, the
photographs of all symbol sizes achieve a BER of around 0.05 and the screenshots
do not exhibit any errors. The user study already showed that contrasts were stronger
on the top than on the bottom of the screen. We verified this finding by analyzing the
topology of bit errors in Figure 6(a). Indeed, the BER is lower at the top of the screen
than at the bottom.
In summary, we conclude that larger symbols are better for watermarks in text areas.
For a symbol size of 32×32, we achieve a median BER between 0.12 and 0.25, the
maximum BER is 0.28.

4
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We tested three different TN panels and one PVA panel. The low contrast characteristics of all these
devices were similar.

FIGURE 5. BIT ERROR RATES (BER) FOR WATERMARKS IN TEXT AREAS FOR THE SMALLEST
AND LARGEST EVALUATED SYMBOL SIZES AND FOUR CAMERAS, AS WELL AS A REGULAR
SCREENSHOT FOR COMPARISON. THE BER FOR A SCREENSHOT IS ZERO FOR 32 × 32 SYMBOLS.
FIVE PHOTOS HAVE BEEN TAKEN FOR EACH CONFIGURATION.

(a) Symbol size 20 × 20.

(b) Symbol size 32 × 32.

C. Robustness to Image Transformations

We evaluate in the following the robustness of our approach to image transformations
in regard to scaling and color adjustments.
1) Setup III
To simulate a scenario in which images are compressed before being leaked, in this
experiment we compress the pictures taken with the mobile phones by a factor of four.
This means that the width and height of each image is halved. The resulting pixels
are interpolated. A reduction by a factor of four can be considered as a worst-case
scenario with respect to image compression for the pictures analyzed in this work,
because further decreasing the resolution would make the text in the document very
hard to read. Thus, it is unlikely that an attacker would further compress the images.
2) Results III
The resulting BER for a symbol size of 32 × 32 are shown in Figure 6(b). Resizing the
images increases the BER by 10 to 15 percentage points compared to their original
images, resulting in an average BER of approximately 25%.
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FIGURE 6. INHOMOGENEOUS ERROR DISTRIBUTIONS DUE TO DISPLAY CHARACTERISTICS
(LEFT) AND BER FOR RESIZED IMAGES (RIGHT).

(a) Ratio of correctly extracted symbols
in text areas on a Lenovo T430s.

(b) BER for resized images of
watermarked text. Symbol size 32 × 32.

D. Overall Performance
1) Setup V
We calculated the BER for different scenarios in the previous subsections of
the evaluation. As the last step of the evaluation, we now relate the BER and the
percentage of the available watermarked area to the probability that the transported
data can be successfully extracted from a watermark. For this evaluation, we assume
that a watermark capacity of p = 40 bit is required to encode a user identifier and a
timestamp; a payload of p = 40 bits results in a protected payload of length k = 72 bits
and s = (k + m - 1) * n = 172 symbols per block (see Figure 2). The parameter m=15
represents the length of the used shift register for the convolutional encoder and n=2
represents the number of output bits per input bit. We measure the performance of
the applied convolutional coding by conducting a Monte Carlo Simulation with 6000
runs. Bit errors are modeled as i.i.d according to the given BER.
2) Results V
The results are shown in Figure 7(b). Every line in this Figure shows the performance
of our approach for a different average BER. To give an example, the blue triangle in
the upper center of the plot shows that for a BER of 0.25 and 3 recovered watermark
blocks, the probability that the data can be successfully extracted from a watermark
is around 85%.
We first focus on pictures without color modifications (raw images). As shown in
Figure 5(b), the BER for a symbol size of 32 x 32 is always below 20% for three out
of the four mobile devices. Putting this number into Figure 7(b), we see that three
out of six watermark blocks are sufficient to decode the data in this case. For the
Lumia920, the average BER is 25%, thus we need four to six watermark blocks to
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successfully extract the data with high likelihood. The maximum observed BER is
28%. The probability that the payload can be successfully extracted for this case is at
least 98%, as Figure 7(b) shows.
Resizing pictures results in a BER of around 30% (see Figure 6(b)). Figure 7(b) shows
that the data can be extracted with a probability of 98% for a BER of 30%. Contrast
and brightness changes and automatic color enhancements resulted in a BER below
25% (see Figure 7(a)). Already four out of six watermark blocks are sufficient to
reconstruct the embedded data in 99% of cases.
We conclude that we can recover the watermarks from unmodified photographs
for all tested smartphones. The Lumia920 introduces a bit error rate of 25%, which
reduces the robustness to image modifications, such that 2/3 of the watermark blocks
of cropped images are required. For the other three smartphones, we can scale down
the image by a factor of four or increase the contrast and brightness by 10% and still
extract the encoded data. Watermarked pictures taken with these smartphones are also
very robust to cropping of the raw image, only 50% of the watermark blocks are
required to extract the watermark.
FIGURE 7. ERROR RATES FOR MODIFIED PICTURES (LEFT)
AND OVERALL PERFORMANCE (RIGHT).

(a) The first column shows the BER on
the original pictures. The other columns
show the resulting BER after applying
GIMP’s automatic color enhancement,
GIMP’s white balance function and
various brightness (bri) and contrast
(con) changes.

(b) Overall performance. The y-axis
shows the probability that the data encoded in a watermark can be extracted
depending on the number of available
watermark blocks and the Bit Error
Rate (BER).
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6. DISCUSSION
An attacker who is aware of the fact that computer screens are watermarked could
try to use our watermarking approach to hold another employee liable for a leaked
picture. First, an attacker could attempt to create a fake watermark that contains
the identifier of an employee E. However, the attacker also needs to generate the
correct cryptographic checksum, which is based on a secret key ku, otherwise the
watermarking system rejects the watermark (see §4.C). An attacker does not know ku,
so they can only guess what the correct checksum is. The odds for guessing the correct
checksum is in the order of one in one billion for a 32-bit checksum and six embedded
watermark blocks.
Second, an insider could use an unlocked workstation to access the critical information
or even access the information with stolen credentials. To detect such a case, one
could combine our watermarking approach with biometric techniques that identify the
employee currently using a workstation [8].
Third, an insider could take a picture of a document while another employee views
the document on their screen. To investigate such and similar cases one would need
to complement our approach with CCTV cameras monitoring the office environment.
After extracting time and location from a watermark, an investigator could check the
surveillance camera recordings of the corresponding office.
Finally, in order to frame an employee E, a skilled attacker could take a picture of E’s
screen, extract the watermark from the picture, and embed it into a picture showing
a document that E is not supposed to access. The watermark would show where and
when the attacker took the picture. This information can be compared against the logs
generated by our logging module (see §4), which would show that E never accessed
the document. Further, CCTV cameras could identify the attacker.

7. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our proposed watermarking scheme applies imperceptible lowintensity watermarks to the screen. The information embedded with our technique
can later be retrieved from photographs or screenshots. We develop a coding scheme
based on convolutional codes, which complements the watermarking technique and
can cope with the particular challenges of screen watermarking, such as high error
rates, inhomogeneous error distributions (caused by the underlying hardware) and
partial pictures of screens. We conduct a user study showing that our watermarks are
imperceptible during regular use and demonstrate in various experiments that our
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watermarks are robust regarding resizing and basic image manipulations. In future
work, we will investigate possible attacks against screen watermarks, e.g. by taking
advantage of physical screen characteristics, and corresponding protection methods.
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Abstract: Protecting Critical Infrastructure (CI) against increasing cyber threats has
become as crucial as it is complicated. To be effective in identifying and defeating cyber
attacks, cyber analysts require novel distributed detection and reaction methodologies
based on information security techniques that can automatically analyse incident
reports and securely share analysis results between Critical Infrastructure stakeholders.
Our goal is to provide solutions in real-time that could replace human input for cyber
incident analysis tasks (triage) to classify cyber incident reports, find related reports in
a fast and scalable way, eliminate irrelevant information, and automate reporting lifecycle management. Our effective and fast incident management method is based on
artificial intelligence and can support cyber analysts in establishing cyber situational
awareness, and allow them to quickly adopt suitable countermeasures in the case
of an attack. In this paper, we evaluate deep autoencoder neural network supported
by Blockchain technology as a system for incident classification and management,
and assess its accuracy and performance. This approach should reduce the number
of manual operations and save storage space. We used a Blockchain smart contract
technique to provide an automated trusted system for incident management workflow
that allows automatic acquisition, classification and enrichment of incident data. We
demonstrate how the presented techniques can be applied to support incident handling
tasks performed by security operation centres.
Keywords: cyber threat intelligence, neural network, blockchain
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1. Introduction
Cyber Situational Awareness (SA) [1] is a perception of security and threat situations
coupled with current and future impact assessment. In recent years, researchers in the
SA field have created increasingly complex tools across many application domains.
Speed of events, data overload, and meaning underload [2] make real-time SA of
cyber operations very difficult to evaluate. Addressing data that is often vague and
imprecise, we have to rely on imperfect information to detect real attacks and to
prevent an attack from happening through appropriate risk management. Security
Operation Centre (SOC) analysts receive a huge amount of daily threat reports. These
analysts face challenges finding relevant information in large, complex data sets when
exploring data to discover patterns and insights and following organisation business
processes, such as proper acquisition, use, archiving and disposal of threat reports.
For humans to be effective in identifying and defeating cyber attacks, novel tools that
can fill the gap between cyber data and situation comprehension are highly desired.
The research presented here is designed to aid in developing a system (see Figure 1)
that will automatically support a cyber analyst by analysing and classifying incoming
cyber incidents by searching similar high severity cyber incidents that could affect
cyber SA, and by life-cycle management of the incident.
Analysis is triggered by a cyber incident report generated by one of the stakeholders
in the CI network. The incident analysis can be performed for large amounts of data
by using a solid knowledge base (KB), and employing one of the available incident
analysis tools. A deep autoencoder (AE) method can be used to analyse existing KB
or particular large dataset. The primary purpose of designing a deep autoencoder for
SA is to increase the speed of sharing highly severe information and to enable fast
and trustworthy cyber incident classification, without the need for substantial human
involvement. In our study, we compare existing cyber threat intelligence tools and
techniques, describe automatic cyber intelligence analysis approach using a deep
autoencoder neural network, and present evaluation results. We leverage expertise
collected in available cyber intelligence tools with the power of the neural networks
approach.
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FIGURE 1. THE OVERVIEW OF ESTABLISHING THE CYBER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS USING
NEURAL NETWORKS (AE) AND SMART CONTRACTS FOR INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION AND
LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT.

The primary contribution of this work is a real-time solution that could replace human
input for a huge number of cyber incident analysis tasks. Another is a methodology,
developed to improve information organization and access in cyber security
information systems based on automatic classification of cyber security documents
according to their expected threat level. We hypothesise that the application of Smart
Contracts based on the existing Blockchain technology Ethereum [3] can solve some
SA problems. The main purpose of designing Smart Contracts for SA is to enable rapid
and trusted cyber incident classification and management, without the need for a large
centralised authority. We propose that Smart Contracts based on decentralised assets
such as Ethereum can reduce effort for incident life-cycle management and manual
analysis costs. Novel techniques that can automatically make predefined decisions
obvious by using Smart Contracts can help identify and defeat cyber attacks.
In our context, a Smart Contract basically is a piece of software that fixes and verifies
negotiated behaviour and cannot be manipulated because it is distributed and executed
on multiple nodes on a Blockchain. Another value of using Smart Contracts is that
once deployed, it can function automatically, without the need for human interaction.
In our proposed threat intelligence analysis system, we describe the incident handling
procedure and instructions using a Smart Contract programming language (Solidity)
and upload this Smart Contract to a Blockchain instance (a private Ethereum network).
The source code of the Smart Contract defines instructions and rules; for our system,
we created ‘Acquisition’, ‘Use’, ‘Archival’ and ‘Disposal’ Smart Contracts (see Figure
1). The state of the Smart Contracts is stored on the Blockchain and is transparent and
accessible to all registered community members. The Smart Contract code is executed
in parallel by a network of miners under consensus regarding the outcome of the
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execution. The execution of the Smart Contract results in an update of the contract’s
state (BLOCKn+2) on the Blockchain that is synchronised with every participating
user (CI1-CIn) through standard peer-to-peer mechanisms and a Proof-of-Work-based
consensus mechanism. An incident report produced by one of the users (security
expert protecting CIs) goes through the Smart Contracts and is handled automatically,
according to the programmed instructions.
The management system is aimed at the automatic management of threat reports
provided by threat analysis tools such as CAESAIR,1 IntelMQ2, or MISP3 and
should provide effective decision support for a SOC operator. Compared to manual
classification, automatic classification by threat level can significantly support and
accelerate reaction time of an SOC analyst. For example, the Collaborative Analysis
Engine for the Situational Awareness and Incident Response (CAESAIR) tool [4]
supports various security information correlation techniques and provides customizable
import capabilities from a multitude of security-relevant sources. These sources
include a custom repository, open source intelligence (OSINT) feeds and IT-security
bulletins, as well as a standardised vulnerability library (Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures – CVE). CVEs are especially important for Smart Contracts with regard
to likelihood assessments based on game theory [5] that implements risk scoring [6].
Employing CAESAIR with CVE scoring [7] and extending it by automated tagging
can provide valuable input for information classification and life-cycle management.
Such a system can be implemented using Smart Contracts created for a particular
organization. Each institution may have multiple classification profile definitions
dependent on the network, CI and the role of the cyber analyst.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of related work and
concepts. Section 3 explains the cyber incident classification workflow. The cyber
incident life cycle issues are covered in Section 4, Section 5 presents the experimental
setup, applied methods end evaluation and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Related work
Threat intelligence in the cyber security (CS) realm is provided by a number of
cyber incident analysis tools. For example, the CAESAIR tool provides analytical
support for security experts carrying out cyber incident handling tasks on national
and international levels, and facilitates the identification of implicit relations between
available pieces of information. IntelMQ is an open source tool collaboratively
developed by Austrian CERT and other parties aiming at parsing and correlating
cyber incidents. MISP, the Malware Information Sharing Platform is another open
source tool that performs automatic data correlation by finding relationships between
1
2
3
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http://caesair.ait.ac.at
https://github.com/certtools/intelmq
https://github.com/MISP/MISP

attributes and indicators from malware, attack campaigns, or analysis. It incorporates
an indicator database to store technical and non-technical information about malware
samples, incidents, attackers and intelligence; and a sharing functionality to facilitate
data exchange using different models of distribution.
The autoencoder approach is widely used for different analytical tasks. A machine
learning framework based on recursive autoencoders [8] can be used for sentence-level
prediction of sentiment label distributions. A very deep autoencoder [9] is employed for
content-based image retrieval. In our approach, we are using this method for similarity
searches. The advantage of the autoencoder method is that it learns automatically
from examples. The autoencoder makes use of neural networks which are already in
use by latent semantic analysis for text categorization [10] to reduce dimensionality
and to improve performance. Another application [11] employs an artificial neural
network to improve text classifier scalability. Classification methods implemented in
the previously mentioned threat intelligence tools suffer from large vector sizes and
are less effective as the number of incidents rise. The main drawback of existing text
classification methods, such as SVM [12], Word Embeddings Neural Networks or the
Gensim tool is that they require a huge database for training to provide meaningful
results, but expected SOCs datasets are not large enough for such semantic-based tasks.
Another common disadvantage of these techniques is the lack of results transparency
due to employing vectors containing real-valued numbers. These tools provide results,
but it is difficult to explain how the results were calculated. In particular, the SVM
approach is limited by the choice of the kernel. Another disadvantage is the inability
to handle unknown words or words which were not included previously in the training
vocabulary. Consequently, for the particular use case of threat incident classification
task for SOCs, we suggest using the autoencoder solution that scales well because of
the small vector size while maintaining a high level of accuracy.
Multiple researchers are developing an automated technology that will support an
information classification system. An attempt to classify the relationships between
documents and concepts [13] employs principles of ontology. To improve information
organization and access in construction management, a methodology [14] was
developed based on automatic hierarchical classification of construction project
documents according to project components. A survey of various cyber attacks and
their classification [15] attempted to develop an ontology for cyber security incidents.
They classify by characteristics, and by purpose and motivations. Additionally, cyber
attacks can be classified based on the severity of involvement, scope, or network
types with multiple sub classification terms. Contrary to this approach, we classify
only by threat level that can differ from organisation to organisation. Our goal is to
focus human expert resources on the most urgent incidents important for a particular
organisation. An information life-cycle model described in [16] is also applicable to
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the CS domain. Cyber incident reports are acquired, analysed and become outdated.
Effective automatic classification, retention and disposal policies can mitigate risks
to data and make information management more effective. Classification of data
enables a company or SOC to focus their resources toward the most valuable or urgent
incidents and to handle less valuable incidents, automatically saving time and other
costs.
Because members of a CI network do not necessarily trust each other, do not have a
central authority and have a need to store and share the life-cycle state of the incident,
we suggest a Blockchain-based solution for life-cycle management. An overview of
the Blockchain technology and its potential to facilitate money transactions, Smart
Contracts design, automated banking ledgers and digital assets is provided in [17].
A Blockchain platform comparison [18] discusses five general-use Blockchain
platforms and looks at how Blockchain technology can be used in applications outside
of Bitcoin to build custom applications on top of it. This comparison suggests that
Ethereum is currently the most suitable and well-established platform. Therefore,
for cyber incident analysis we employ an Ethereum Blockchain (specifically, the
Pyethereum implementation), which supports a focused Smart Contracts testing
environment without the need of mining. In the proposed system, we intend to apply
Smart Contracts for cyber incident classification and life-cycle management, which is
unique for the given domain.

3. Cyber incident classification
using autoencoder
For our study, we assume that a cyber expert is responsible for a CI and detects
suspicious behaviour in the system. The expert needs more information to select the
correct mitigation strategy. She must collect and analyse all the available information
related to ongoing and previous attacks for the particular use case, and transform it into
actionable intelligence. Security information such as incident reports, vulnerability
alerts, advisories, bulletins etc., usually come in the form of semi-structured text
documents. Acquiring cyber threat intelligence from such documents requires
manually reviewing and discerning what significant information they can find, and
identifying implicit correlations among them in order to estimate their impact and
outline possible mitigation strategies. To avoid this manual effort, the CIs expert can
provide an incident report as an input to a deep autoencoder and receive a threat
report back if it has sufficient severity. An automatic approach delivers a significant
improvement in terms of personnel costs when compared to manual cyber incident
handling. As a result, an analyst has the up-to-date SA status and we ensure fast and
scalable information exchange and enrichment.
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The idea behind applying the autoencoder approach is that we can map N-dimensional
data onto the M orthogonal directions in which the data have the most variance and
form a lower dimensional subspace. The acceptable drawback of this conversion is
that in the remaining orthogonal directions we lose information about the original data
point location.
FIGURE 2. THE WORKFLOW FOR CLASSIFICATION AND LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT OF CYBER
INCIDENT USING AUTOENCODER AND SMART CONTRACTS.

We employ a deep autoencoder that was trained as described in the workflow shown
in Figure 2. The workflow execution starts with reading the incident report (1) and
parsing the report content. Input data along with the expert profile settings, which
are specific to the organisation, are converted to a binary vector using the ‘bag of
words’ technique (2) and after the normalization step (3) passed to the autoencoder
in encoded form (4). In this step, we compile the words most used in documents. The
remaining vector is comprised of word counts irrespective of order. For simplicity,
we use a binary count where we mark 1 if a word count is bigger than 0, and 0 if the
given word is not present in an original document. Additionally, we ignore stop words
(words with no discriminatory power, such as common articles and prepositions, that
we do not need in analysis). To achieve reasonable performance and scalability, we
reduce each vector to a much smaller vector that still comprises enough information
about the content of the document. In the next step, we train the neural network to
reproduce its input vector as its output. This forces it to compress as much information
as possible into the 10 numbers in the central bottleneck. These 10 numbers are then a
result of deep autoencoder training and a good way to compare documents (5) in a fast
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and scalable way using the cosine similarity method. In the next step, we merge the
detected related incidents with institutional settings and decide which priority level
(see Equation 1) should be applied to the given incident. The compressed vectors are
stored on the hidden level of neural network (see Table 1).
𝑃  =  𝑓(𝐼𝑟, 𝑊𝑟, 𝑊𝑜, 𝑇𝑠, 𝑊𝑠)

(1)

Equation 1 shows the incident priority level P that returns the value – either 0
that corresponds to ‘Low’ or 1 representing ‘High’. Priority level is a function of
aggregated incident evaluation metrics, which depend on basis indicators, such as
‘number of related incidents’ 𝐼𝑟, ‘number of related words’ 𝑊𝑟, ‘number of original
words’ 𝑊𝑜, ‘detected significant terms’ 𝑇𝑠 and ‘vulnerability score’ 𝑉𝑠.

4. Cyber incident management
using smart contracts
We evaluate the application of Smart Contracts to classify and manage incident
reports labelled by the autoencoder as a high priority threat. Smart Contracts can be
used to estimate that the reported cyber incident is of high relevance, to remove it
after some predefined time, to tag it by acquisition, to search by tag, to assign access
rights (confidential, private, sensitive, public), to periodically check data integrity
(preventing manual or hardware corruption), or to determine data provenance. Our goal
is to save storage space, improve performance and to keep information up-to-date in a
trustworthy way by leveraging the distributed nature of Blockchain technology. Once
a Smart Contract is triggered, the analysis result is automatically propagated among
all participants through inherent Blockchain mechanisms. One of the advantages of
this approach is that Smart Contracts cannot be changed or compromised without
being detected (through hashed transactions) and that the messages can be verified
to originate from a trusted source (through public key encryption). After incident
acquisition, a Smart Contract performs the classification of a report by threat level,
stores the obtained threat level on a Blockchain and initiates the life-cycle management
process for the given incident. In the next step, this report will be used, archived and
disposed.
We employ four Smart Contracts for cyber incident processing, as depicted in Figure
2. The workflow execution after the classification steps performed by the autoencoder
proceeds with the analysis of an incident report by reading and parsing the report
content enriched with the classification results (6). Input data, along with organizationspecific expert profile settings, are passed to the first Smart Contract ‘acquisition’ (7),
which employs one of the threat intelligence tools. Classification occurs by employing
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incident text, split by words or phrases, specific terms separated by low, middle and
high threat relevance. We compute risk points, counting how many of terms are
included in the incident report for each threat level. For threat level calculation, we
either estimate threat level by applying thresholds for each level or we employ the
weighted method from Formula 2, where we additionally multiply the calculated
points on each threat level with a constant which represents the weight of the related
threat level. The threat level scale ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 is ‘low threat’ and 3 is
‘high threat’. Risk points RP is a sum of high risk points 𝐻𝑟𝑝 multiplied by high threat
weight 𝐻𝑇𝑤, middle risk points 𝑀𝑟𝑝 multiplied by middle threat weight 𝑀𝑇𝑤 and low
risk points 𝐿𝑟𝑝 multiplied by low threat weight 𝐿𝑇𝑤.

Where 𝐻𝑇𝑤 =3, 𝑀𝑇𝑤 =2, 𝐿𝑇𝑤=1 and 𝐻𝑇𝑡=10, 𝑀𝑇𝑡=3. Threat level 𝑇1 can be inferred
using high threat 𝐻𝑇𝑡 and middle threat 𝑀𝑇𝑡 thresholds and weighted risk points 𝑅𝑃 
from Formulas 2 and 3. The acquisition step (7) is split into different tasks. Automatic
classification by threat level defines one of three threat levels: ‘high’ level requires
fast reaction and mediation steps, triage process; ‘medium’ level assumes detection
of ‘Indicator of Corruption’ (IoC) or metrics that indicate possible vulnerabilities,
and requires SW update; and ‘low’ level addresses regular cyber security information
and logs, and requires attention but should not necessary be a threat. Tagging means
that specific tags can be assigned to a report to make it easier to find, shift or remove
later. Removing personal information from the incident report to protect personal data
may be required (by the European GDPR) before storing a normalised version of the
incident. In the ‘using’ step (8), the workflow supports an automated similarity search,
status and provenance retrieval, and enrichment with data and metadata periodic
check for data integrity (using the hash of the incident report). Finally, depending
on the threat level after some period of time, the incident can be archived (step 9) or
removed e.g. by date or by tag (step 10).
We believe that this automatic smart-contracts-based approach would substantially
support incident classification and management and could be used by analysts for the
defence of CI. The suggested method would make SA analysis less cost-intensive and
would perform with higher throughput. However, as is typical in this area, a humanbased approach performs with higher accuracy.
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5. Experimental Evaluation
In the evaluation section, we measure how accurate our automated computations are
and how long it takes for the deep autoencoder to make its calculations. Additionally,
we report on measurements of the automated cyber incident classification and
how long it takes for Smart Contracts to be executed and validated. We carried out
measurements for several incident reports. The goal of this evaluation was to leverage
the domain expert knowledge base for cyber incident classification and management
as described in the workflow (see Figure 2), pointing out threat level relevant for SA.

A. Evaluation Data Set

The cyber analyst’s goal is to prioritise a detected cyber incident, either to mitigate it
or to perform some other cyber incident response. For this test, we assumed that our
CI is a financial organisation that employs MS Office products on Windows OS and
using software products such as Internet Explorer, Firefox, Adobe, etc. The dataset
used was aggregated from OSINT sources on the Internet. The dataset contained
5,850 training documents and 584 test documents. We evaluated cyber incident reports
from the ‘seclists’ feed4 from the last three years addressing four report categories.
The ‘fulldisclosure’ category contained messages from the public, a vendor-neutral
forum for detailed discussion of vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques, as well as
tools, papers, news, and events of interest to the community. The ‘bugtraq’ category
is a general security mailing list. The ‘pen-test’ category discloses techniques and
strategies that would be useful to anyone with a practical interest in security and
network auditing. The ‘nmap-dev’ category comprises an unmoderated technical
development forum for debating ideas, patches, and suggestions regarding proposed
changes to Nmap5 and related projects. The specific cyber security terms were obtained
from the CS glossary.6 We anticipated that employing the described autoencoder and
Smart Contracts approach should classify cyber incidents among a very large number
of incident reports facilitating further cyber analysis and incident management.

B. Experimental Results and Interpretation

This evaluation took place on an Intel Core i7-3520M 2.66GHz computer using
Python on Ubuntu OS. We performed a total of 10 training iterations (epochs) for the
autoencoder. The autoencoder training and accuracy calculation process took about
262 seconds (see Figure 3). This figure shows that loss and validation loss decreased
and accuracy and validation accuracy increased with each epoch. A final accuracy of
0.942 was achieved; this demonstrates how well input is reconstructed compared to
the output.

4
5
6
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http://seclists.org/
https://nmap.org/
https://scottschober.com/glossary-of-cybersecurity-terms/

FIGURE 3. ACCURACY AND LOSS CHARACTERISTICS BY AUTOENCODER TRAINING.

The neural network used a total of 502,000 parameters during the autoencoder training.
The summary of the neural network training is presented in the Table 1. The neural
network is composed of 1 input layer and 5 hidden layers. The number of neurons in
these layers range from 10 to 2,000. Most layers use a rectified linear unit (ReLU) as
an activation function. The last decoding layer employs a sigmoid activation function.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE DEEP AUTOENCODER TRAINING PROCESS.
Layer

Type

Activation Function

Neurons #

Parameters #

Input layer

InputLayer

ReLU

2,000

0

Hidden layer 1

Dense

ReLU

2,000

4,002,000

Hidden layer 2

Dense

ReLU

250

500,250

Hidden layer 3

Dense

ReLU

10

2,510

Hidden layer 4

Dense

ReLU

250

2,750

Hidden layer 5

Dense

Sigmoid

2,000

502,000

The autoencoder model simply maps an input to its reconstruction. To achieve this,
we first train an autoencoder until it reaches the stable train/validation loss value. The
deep autoencoder system starts the SA analysis with incident content retrieval, which
is converted to an input vector by using word counts. This input vector then goes
through encoding in multiple hidden layers and is reconstructed to an output layer
after decoding in the final layers. Having trained the model, we were able to retrieve

419

the middle layer of the autoencoder model with the smallest number of neurons (10).
Therefore, we retrieved trained 10-number-long IDs for each of the 584 test vectors
and iterated this over all of the document vectors (10-numbers-long each) calculating a
cosine similarity value for each document. For instance, the trained vector of the query
incident report ‘bugtraq-2017-Aug-1.txt’ containing 10 numbers is [-8.73114914e10, 1.01575899e+01, 2.12457962e-09, 1.29858088e+00, 2.67755240e-09,
9.32977295e+00, 4.54857439e-01, -5.82076609e-11, 8.55403137e+00, 5.52972779e09]. This vector can be used for fast and scalable similarity search. Computation
demonstrated that, for the given incident report, the first three most similar documents
are: ‘nmap-dev-2017-q2-8.txt, fulldisclosure-2017-Jan-68.txt, fulldisclosure-2015Oct-71.txt’. During the correlation calculation using the deep autoencoder, there was a
minor fluctuation of accuracy value in the last epochs (between 0.942 and 0.943). This
is because the autoencoder employs a restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM), which
treats the word counts as probabilities and makes use of random values in calculations.
Therefore, it is possible that the highest level of accuracy can be achieved before all of
the epochs are calculated (epoch 4 in our case).

Source

Blockchain ID

Time (sec)

Terms #

Threat Level

fulldisclosure-2016-May-33.txt

108

Wolfgang feedyourhead at

68

0.371

5

3

Fulldisclosure-2015-Feb-q1-53

nmap-dev-2017-q2-8.txt

54

Scott Arciszewski

1,304

0.370

3

2

Fulldisclosure-2015-Feb-q1-90

fulldisclosure-2016-Aug-118.txt

83

Praveen D

1,314

0.451

1

1

Bugtraq-2017-Jan-q1-18

bugtraq-2016-Jan-146.txt

125

Vulnerability Lab

3,419

0.677

13

3

Bugtraq-2017-Jun-q2-56

fulldisclosure-2015-May-52.txt

130

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

3,829

0.532

13

3

Bugtraq-2016-Jan-q1-75

nmap-dev-2015-q2-40.txt

79

Slackware Security Team

4,009

0.332

2

1

Bugtraq-2017-Apr-q2-158

nmap-dev-2017-q2-8.txt

54

Salvatore Bonaccorso

4,215

0.432

1

1

Nmap-dev-2017-Mar-q1-226

bugtraq-2016-Apr-36.txt

65

Henri Doreau

4,831

0.533

3

2

Nmap-dev-2015-Nov-q4-107

fulldisclosure-2016-May-33.txt

108

Peter Houppermans

6,849

0.600

8

3

Nmap-dev-2015-Oct-q4-63

nmap-dev-2015-q4-276.txt

68

Mark Scrano

6,853

0.496

1

1

Pen-test-2017-Jul-q3-1

bugtraq-2017-Jul-8.txt

63

Hafez Kamal

7,994

0.252

3

2

Pen-test-2016-Feb-q1-2

nmap-dev-2017-q2-8.txt

54

Francisco Amato

8,071

0.357

2

1

Pen-test-2016-Dec-q4-0

bugtraq-2017-Mar-39.txt

115

ERPScan inc

8,072

0.521

9

3

Related
Incident ID

Fulldisclosure-2017-Jan-q1-75

Incident ID

Similarity

TABLE 2. EXCERPT OF CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR CYBER INCIDENT REPORTS BY THEIR
ACQUISITION USING SMART CONTRACTS.

In the test scenario, we investigated incident reports from ‘seclists’ CS feed to
classify those by threat level and to automatically manage them from acquisition
to disposal without involvement of human analyst (see Table II). Due to the large
number of results in this table, we describe only selected classification results, which
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demonstrate typical cases. Query incident ID in ‘seclists’ terms is presented in the
first column. The second column shows the first of the detected related incident IDs.
The similarity score for found related incidents for selected examples is nearly 1.0.
In the third column, we show a number of detected common words between query
and found incidents. Column ‘Source’ depicts an incident source that can be a person
or an organisation. The next four columns are related to Smart Contracts and show
assigned Blockchain ID, consumed time, number of significant terms and threat level.
The experimental results are represented in Figure 4 and show the distribution of
threat incident reports over the last three years, respective of high, middle, and low
threat levels. Each incident category is flagged by an assigned colour. The Y axis is
a range of the number of incidents and the X axis is a time scale split into quarters.
The figure shows that the most productive category for high (up to 325) and low (up
to 215) threats is a ‘bugtraq’ category, whereas ‘nmap-dev’ (93) and ‘fulldisclosure’
(97) are dominating middle threat reports. For a given period of time, most active
phase for all levels is from ‘Q4-2015’ to ‘Q3-2016’. Visualization of incident reports
provides an analyst with a quick and descriptive SA picture. To focus on a particular
area, the analyst can perform fine tuning, adjust the time scale or select a particular
category or source.
FIGURE 4. PLOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OF THREAT INCIDENT REPORTS OVER LAST THREE YEARS
FOR DIFFERENT THREAT LEVELS SHARED QUARTERLY.

As a use case scenario, assume that SOC has received an incident report from
Vulnerability Lab in January 2017. On receiving this report, our Smart Contract
triggers automatic analysis and classification of this incident report. According to
Table 2, we see that this incident is assigned a Smart Contract identifier 3419 and the
contract identifies 13 significant terms. Going through the contract logic we estimate
both the regular and the weighted threat level as a ‘high threat’ (3). That means it
should be handled soonest and with highest priority. The incident is automatically
tagged and enriched with additional data from CS feeds and tools. Links to similar
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incidents are established. All this facilitates the triage process for a cyber analyst and
performs analysis steps that are usually done manually. According to the evaluated
classification level, Smart Contract defines timestamps for automated archival and
disposal of incident data. Therefore, a cyber analyst does not need to worry about the
incident life-cycle and can focus their resources on triage for urgent cases.
The smallest duration for one Smart Contract operation was 0.252 seconds from
Blockchain ID 7994 report and the longest operation time 0.677 report with ID 3419.
This difference can be explained by the different report sizes (we calculate hash for
report content) and different risk points numbers (3 for ID 7994 vs. 13 for ID 3419).
This evaluation also gives a simple overview of detected significant terms, such as
‘attack’, ‘hack’, ‘phishing’ for high threat incidents, ‘access’, ‘authentication’, and
‘encode’ for middle threat incidents and ‘key’, ‘capability’, and ‘investigation’ for low
level threats. Having a Smart Contract ID, the analyst is able to retrieve status data
of a particular incident report from Blockchain using Smart Contract (e.g. by hash,
provenance, time, tags, owner).
TABLE 3. OVERVIEW ABOUT AGGREGATED THREAT
REPORTS FOR DIFFERENT THREAT CATEGORIES.
Threat Category

High Threat

Middle Threat

Low Threat

Total

Fulldisclosure

724

558

590

1,872

Bugtraq

758

147

542

1,447

Pen-test

55

43

4

102

Nmap-dev

430

674

1,325

2,429

Sum

1,967

1,422

2,461

5,850

The category overview experimental results are presented in Table 3 which shows
the distribution of high, middle and low threat level incidents for different incident
categories. This table demonstrates that most incident reports (2,429) come from
the ‘nmap-dev’ category, followed by ‘fulldisclosure’ (1,872) and ‘bugtraq’ (1,447).
Most of incident reports belong to the low threat level (2,461) but the report number
classified as high threat is also high (1,967). Most high threat level reports come
from the ‘fulldisclosure’ (724) and ‘bugtraq’ (758) categories. That means that these
categories should be addressed first by incident management.

C. Evaluation Effectiveness

We can see that, in general, the autoencoder training accuracy improves with every
iteration (epoch) from 0.674 at the beginning to 0.942 at the end, which is sufficiently
good; whereas training loss (error) of original information decreases from 0.691 to
0.152. This means that the decompressed outputs will be degraded compared to the
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original inputs, but it is an acceptable rate. Similarly, validation accuracy is in the
range between 0.616 and 0.915. Validation loss decreases from 0.684 to 0.220.
FIGURE 5. ROC SPACE PLOT.

The classification effectiveness for high priority incidents can be determined in terms
of a Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC) using the labelled ground truth query
dataset. SA analysis divided the provided incident reports into two groups: ‘high’ and
‘low priority’ by associated expert parameters and thresholds for each category; e.g.
for the ‘fulldisclosure’ category the provided algorithm detected 229 true positive
incidents, 14 true negative reports, one false positive incident and two false negative
documents. The primary statistical performance metrics for ROC evaluation are
sensitivity (0.991) or true positive rate and false positive rate (0.059). The associated
ROC value is represented by the point (0.059, 0.991). The ROC space (see Figure 5)
demonstrates that the calculated FPR and TPR values for the evaluated categories are
located very close to the so called perfect classification point (0, 1). The calculation
results demonstrate that the calculated similarity score values for the query documents
are located very close to the labelled classification. These results demonstrate that an
automatic approach for cyber incident classification of the method described is very
effective and is a significant improvement on manual analysis. Therefore, an analysis
method based on deep autoencoder techniques can be suggested as an effective method
for incident classification, and as a supporting method to establish cyber SA. The
results of the analysis confirm our hypothesis that an automated approach is able to
reliably classify incidents, thus making analysis of a large number of cyber incidents
a feasible and affordable process. However, further research is required to improve the
decision and accuracy metrics of this method.
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6. Conclusions
In this work, we have presented an automated approach to classify and manage
incident reports for establishing cyber situational awareness using a deep autoencoder
neural network for classification and a Smart Contracts technique provided by
Blockchain technology for incident management. The developed system should
assist cyber analysts by protecting Critical Infrastructures against increasing cyber
threats. The main contribution of this work is a real-time solution that could replace
human input for a large number of cyber incident analysis tasks in order to facilitate
cyber incident classification, eliminate irrelevant information and focus on important
information to promptly perform mitigation steps. Another contribution is the use
of the Smart Contract techniques to provide an automated trusted system for an
incident management life-cycle that allows automatic acquisition, classification, use,
archiving, and disposal. An additional advantage of this approach is a reduction of
human analysis costs. Ultimately, our research will lead to the creation of automated
security assessment tools with more effective handling of cyber incidents.
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Abstract: This paper describes CyGraph, a prototype tool for improving network
security posture, maintaining situational understanding in the face of cyberattacks,
and focusing on protection of mission-critical assets. CyGraph captures complex
relationships among entities in the cyber security domain, along with how mission
elements depend on cyberspace assets. Pattern-matching queries traverse the graph
of interrelations according to user-specified constraints, yielding focused clusters of
high-risk activity from the swarm of complex interrelationships. Analytic queries
are expressed in CyGraph Query Language (CyQL), a domain-specific language
for expressing graph patterns of interest, which CyGraph translates to the backend
native query language. CyGraph automatically infers the structure of its underlying
graph model through analysis of the ingested data, which it presents to the user for
generating queries in an intuitive way. CyGraph has been experimentally validated in
both enterprise and tactical military environments.
Keywords: common operating picture, situational understanding, mission assurance,
graph analytics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Through centuries of experience and modern advances in technology, military
commanders can rely on a fairly sophisticated common operating picture (COP) of
the kinetic battlespace. However, significant challenges remain for extending the
COP to include cyberspace as an operational domain [1]. Such an extended COP is
needed for achieving appropriate levels of resilience to attack, maintaining situational
awareness and understanding, and providing command and control of cyber (and joint
cyber/kinetic) operations [2]. A cyber-extended COP needs to support the analysis of
complex interactions among disparate data for decision making.
This paper describes CyGraph, a prototype tool for improving cyber resilience,
maintaining situational awareness in the face of cyberattacks, and focusing on
protection of mission-critical assets. CyGraph builds rich graph models from various
network and host data sources, fusing isolated data and events into a unified model.
From this, cyber operators can apply powerful graph queries that uncover multistep graph reachability from threats to key cyber assets, as well as other patterns
of cyber risk. In this way, the tool correlates and prioritizes alerts in the context of
vulnerabilities and key assets. CyGraph analytics extract ‘needle in haystack’ patterns
of cyber risk focused on mission assets, with interactive visualization of query results,
giving a common operating picture of cyberspace.
Traditional graph formulations with entities (vertices) and relationships (edges) of a
single homogeneous type lack the expressiveness required for representing the rich
structures involved in analyzing cyber risk. CyGraph employs property graphs, i.e.,
attributed, multi-relational graphs with vertices and edges having arbitrary properties
[3]. Property graphs have the power needed for expressing a range of heterogeneous
vertex and edge types, which arise from combining data from a variety of sources into
a coherent unified cyber security graph model.
Unlike previous graph-based tools that focus on specific analytic use cases against
fixed data models, CyGraph employs a schema-free design with a property-graph data
model. The specific security data model is defined implicitly, according to how source
data are transformed to a property graph. To help analysts more easily work with
such complex models, CyGraph automatically infers the underlying data model for
a populated graph. It’s domain-specific query language provides a simplifying layer
of abstraction from the native query language of the graph database implementation.
CyGraph has been tested in military environments, including at the enterprise
backbone and tactical command levels. In this paper, for sensitivity reasons, we
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describe CyGraph analytics through simulated data; these datasets mimic patterns
that we have observed in real data.

2. PREVIOUS WORK
There has been considerable previous work in graph-based approaches to cyber
security. For example, a review in 2013 [4] describes hundreds of papers that employ
various kinds of graph representations for security, with over 30 categories just for
the specific case of modelling network attacks and defenses with acyclic graphs. A
more recent study [5] examines over 50 proposed graph-based security models, each
having key differences in representation. The state of practice has reached a level of
maturity such that various off-the-shelf tools (both commercial and governmental)
have emerged for graph analytics in operational environments [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
[12] [13].
The wide range of proposed graph representations address the fundamental issue
that classical graph algorithms alone are insufficient for solving analytic problems
in cyberspace. Instead, specific data models are needed that capture the structure and
semantics of the various kinds of entities and their relationships. But a significant
limitation of the current generation of tools is that they have fixed data models, which
limits their scope and ability to adapt to changes in operational environments and
analytic requirements.
The idea of leveraging graph database technology for cyber security analysis is
first explored in 2015 [14]. A proof-of-concept version of the CyGraph tool, which
is implemented as a Java-based application running on a single host, is described
[15] [16]. The proof-of-concept tool was applied for some security use cases, using
simulated data or isolated examples of real operational data [17] [18]. A particular
limitation of these preliminary examples is that mission functional dependency
relationships are analyzed separately from cyberspace relationships.
Based on our initial success in proving the CyGraph concept, we have developed
a more mature and capable CyGraph tool. This advanced prototype is a web-based
(JavaScript) client-server application, distributed across three machines (user web
browser as GUI, middle-tier intermediary service, and back-end database service).
Leveraging this architecture, we have implemented multiple technologies for the
CyGraph back-end graph database, including support for Apache Rya [19] within the
Big Data Platform (BDP) [20] developed by the US Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA). The advanced CyGraph prototype also integrates with the Elastic
Stack [21] (for Neo4j) or Accumulo [22](for DISA BDP) for scalable data ingest and
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intermediate storage. A high-level overview of this tool architecture is described in
[2], although no specific analytic results are given there.
The new web-based CyGraph tool has been validated using real data in operational
network environments, at enterprise-level scale. The analytic examples that we
describe in this paper are abstracted versions of the kinds of results we obtained
for real data (abstracted here to protect the sensitive real data). This includes the
development and validation of joint models for cyberspace and mission functions,
e.g., for showing mission risk and/or impact as we describe. The present work also
experimentally validates that CyGraph’s loosely-coupled client-server architecture
can support multiple back-end graph persistence technologies, while insulating the
front-end functionality from the choice of back-end implementation. This in turn
provides flexibility in matching the analytic architecture to the performance and
scaling requirements for a given organization.

3. CYGRAPH MODEL
We begin by defining the formal structures that form the basis of an instance of a
CyGraph model. A graph G = (N, E) is a pair of sets of nodes and edges. The edges
are, themselves, ordered pairs of nodes (n1, n2) from N. A property graph is a graph in
which the nodes and edges come equipped with attributes, that is, arbitrary key/value
pairs describing properties of the elements. We generally assume that nodes and edges
have some minimal structure. Namely, nodes have attributes for a unique identifier
and a type. Edges also have an attribute describing their type. They additionally have
attributes identifying their source and destination nodes. Additional attributes may
include such things as location information, mission criticality, or traffic packet counts.
A CyGraph model instance is defined by the properties attributed to the nodes and
edges, as well as any constraints that may be in effect. Typically, particular property
graphs conforming to a CyGraph model instance are progressively built from
heterogeneous data sources with records containing information about the nodes and
edges. Rather than requiring a fixed schema for the data sources, CyGraph applies
data transformations that map elements of the source data to nodes, edges, and their
properties. Thus, these data transformations implicitly define an instantiated CyGraph
model.
To better understand how a property graph is built, consider the process of reading
in a record r from a data source. Assume the graph built so far is G = (N, E), and the
transform T extracts information about two nodes, n1 and n2, and an edge e between
them. The new graph is G’ = (N ∪ {n1, n2}, E ∪ {e}), where the properties of n1, n2,
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and e are defined by the transform T. If n1 or n2 was already in N then we simply
update their properties according to any extra information contained in record r.
In general, any property (of nodes or edges) that has potential analytic value (in the
sense of constraining graph queries) can be included as a node or edge property. The
type for a node or edge can then be defined as an arbitrary function of its properties.
Thus, the node and edge types depend on the source data, via the transformation to a
CyGraph property graph.
For example, alerts from Host Based Security System (HBSS) [23] yield node types
describing the category of the alert for the destination node, e.g., whether they are
reconnaissance events (such as port scans) or represent actual host compromise.
Network flow records yield the region in which the node is located (US, non-US,
country of concern) or indicate that the node is key terrain (based on knowledge
of services hosted there and mission dependencies). This transform prioritizes type
information from HBSS alerts over the other two, so that if a host is in the US and
is compromised, it is simply identified as compromised. One could easily define a
different transform that extracts a type in the Cartesian product of the types defined by
each data source. The choice of transform depends on the sort of questions one wants
answered regarding the graph (i.e., the analytic queries).
Once CyGraph has constructed the property graph from its data sources, an analyst
can explore the graph with queries expressed in CyGraph Query Language (CyQL),
a domain-specific query language. An important aspect of graph structure pertains to
reachability. CyQL allows for the specification of structural features of trajectories
through a graph. When a query Q is applied to a graph G it results in a (possibly empty)
subgraph G’ ⊆ G. This matching subgraph is then displayed in the user interface.

A directed trajectory is an alternating sequence of nodes and edges (n0, e1, n1,…, ek,
nk) in which, for every 0 < i ≤ k, the source of ei is ni-1 and the destination is ni. An
undirected trajectory is similar, except for any edge ei, its source and destination may
be ni and ni-1 respectively. The length of a trajectory is the number of edges. The graph
of a trajectory is ({n0,…,nk}, {e1,…,ek}) in which the sequence information has been
forgotten. A trajectory t is a trajectory of graph G = (N, E), if the trajectory’s graph (N’,
E’) is a subgraph of G (i.e. N’ ⊆ N and E’ ⊆ E).

CyQL specifies trajectories by constraining the number of hops, and the types of the
initial node, the end node, and the edges. Queries are built from the following clauses
with their associated semantics:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

hops($numHops): A trajectory satisfies this clause if its length is
$numHops.
hops($minHops,$maxHops): A trajectory satisfies this clause if its
length is between $minHops and $maxHops (inclusive).
startType($type): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if n0 is
of type $type.
endType($type): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if nk is of
type $type.
startId($id): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if the unique
node identifier u(n0) of node n0 is equivalent to $id.
endId($id): Trajectory (n0, e1,…,nk) satisfies this clause if the unique
node identifier u(nk) of node nk is equivalent to $id.
edgeTypes($types): A trajectory satisfies this clause if each edge is of
one of the types in the comma separated list $types.
undirected(): By default, satisfying trajectories must be directed.
When this clause is used, undirected trajectories also satisfy the query.

A CyQL clause is a concatenated sequence of such clauses. A trajectory t satisfies a
CyQL query Q (written t | = Q) if it satisfies all of the clauses. The result of applying
Q to graph G is simply the union of all trajectories of G that satisfy Q. That is:
Q(G) = {t ∈ trajectories of G: t | = Q}.

CyQL provides a key aspect of risk analysis in CyGraph. In terms of the semantics
of attack paths, query trajectory through the property graph corresponds to multi-step
attack (or attack reachability) through the network. Conceptually, the aspects of CyQL
can be organized as shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. GRAPH TRAJECTORY PATH CONSTRAINTS IN CYGRAPH QUERY LANGUAGE (CYQL)

The left side of Figure 1 represents elements of risk within a network; i.e., things
that we are protecting against. By specifying such risk elements as constraints on the
starting points of a query traversal, trajectories represent ‘downstream’ relationships
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emanating from risk points. Conversely, the right side represents high-valued assets
within the environment; i.e., things that we are trying to protect. Defining those
things as constraints on the traversal ending points cause paths to be focused on
those assets as reachable from the risky elements. CyQL clauses that occur between
these starting and ending extremes generally serve to constrain path trajectories in
particular ways that help tune analytic focus; e.g., for managing the trade-off between
comprehensiveness of query results and cognitive overload.
CyQL queries involve identifying trajectories that start from nodes representing risk
elements, and end in nodes representing priorities for protection. The set of trajectories
can be further refined by specifying additional traversal constraints regarding the edge
types or total path length. This serves to focus an analyst’s attention on the relationships
that matter the most. By visualizing the results of CyQL queries, CyGraph allows
users to quickly identify known risky patterns or anomalous structures that warrant
further investigation.
For example, given the appropriate data sources, CyQL makes it straightforward to
identify the set of hosts with vulnerabilities that reside within the same connected
component as a key cyber asset. By limiting the query to vulnerable hosts within two
hops of key cyber assets, one can more easily identify the vulnerable hosts that pose
the greatest risks. Queries may also help to identify clusters within the graph that have
interesting properties. A highly connected cluster of hosts with host-based alerts may
be an indication of vigorous adversarial exploration and exploitation.

4. CYGRAPH ARCHITECTURE
CyGraph ingests data from various sources and normalizes it. It then transforms the
elements of the normalized model into a graph model specific to the cyber security
domain. Graph queries are issued from the client front end (translated from CyQL
to native query language in a middle-tier service) and then executed on the backend
database. The resulting query matches are then visualized in the web client (browser).
In this agile architecture, the graph model is defined by how the data sources are
transformed into a property graph, rather than conforming to a predetermined schema.
Model extensions are simply the creation of additional of nodes, relationships, and
properties in the property graph model, and require no schema changes or other
database renormalizing. CyGraph supports two options for backend data storage and
query processing:
• Neo4j graph database [24] with normalized data in Elasticsearch [21].
• Apache Rya [19] RDF store with normalized data in Apache Accumulo [22].
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Each of these options is available as open-source software, and (with the exception
of Rya) have commercial support available. The second option (Rya+Accumulo) is
available as part of DISA’s Big Data Platform (BDP) [20].
In the CyGraph front-end analyst dashboard, graph pattern-matching queries are
expressed in CyQL, which CyGraph compiles to Cypher [25] (for Neo4j) or SPARQL
[26] (for Rya). This presents a simplifying layer of abstraction, designed specifically
for the desired risk analysis, freeing the analyst from learning a complex generalpurpose query language.
Typical inputs to CyGraph fall under four categories:
1. Network Infrastructure. This captures the configuration and policy aspects
of the network environment.
2. Security Posture. Specification of network infrastructure is combined with
vulnerability data to map potential attack paths through the network.
3. Cyber Threats. This captures events and indicators of actual cyberattacks,
which are correlated with security posture to provide context for risk analysis
and attack response.
4. Mission Dependencies. This captures how elements of enterprise missions
depend on cyber assets.
CyGraph relies on other tools and data sources to build its cyber security graphs. For
example, the TVA/Cauldron tool [6] [7] [8] [9] can build network attack graphs from
host vulnerabilities, firewall rules and network topology. CyGraph can ingest data for
both potential and actual threats, including Splunk [27], Wireshark [28], the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) [29], and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (CAPEC) [30]. For capturing mission dependencies on cyber assets
[17] [18], CyGraph ingests models developed through other tools [16], including
Crown Jewels Analysis (CJA) [31] and Cyber Command System (CyCS) [32].
The CyGraph implementation is schema-free, so the model is decoupled from the
storage implementation. The particular way in which the data is transformed to a
property graph determines an instantiated CyGraph model. So, for example, not all of
the data sources in the four categories listed above are necessarily needed for useful
analysis – often only a single data source is ingested.
Data is continually streaming in that must be analysed for cyber risk correlation
and prioritization by CyGraph. Leveraging the open source Elastic Stack, the Beats
platform provides agents for gathering data, with Logstash for transformation and
ingest into Elasticsearch. A CyGraph web service then creates a property graph model
and imports it into the CyGraph graph data base (Neo4j).
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There is a similar analytic flow for CyGraph deployment on BDP, in which data
streams are processed by Apache Storm [33], stored in Accumulo [22] and queried in
Rya [19]. In this analytic flow, the CyGraph data model is mapped to RDF. The result
of a query is a combination of alerts, network flows and vulnerabilities represented
as graph nodes and edges. The matching subgraphs for queries are typically orders of
magnitude smaller than the full graph stored in Neo4j or Rya.

5. CYGRAPH OPERATION
After ingesting data from various sources, CyGraph maps the data to a property graph
stored in a graph database. It automatically infers the underlying graph model through
inspection of the graph database. It then presents the model to the user in the browser
user interface as an interactive graph visualization.
The analyst can interact with this graph model to generate queries in the domainspecific CyQL query language. In particular, user-selected combinations of edge types
(diamonds) populate the CyQL edgeTypes($types) clause, which specifies edge
types to be matched in a query. For example, edges of type IN define relationships
between Machine nodes and Domain nodes, i.e., network machine membership in
protection domains (e.g., subnets) [14].
Core clauses in CyQL define patterns of reachability through a graph, i.e.,
hops($numHops), hops($minHops,$maxHops), startType($type),
endType($type), startId($id), endId($id), edgeTypes($type),
and undirected(). CyQL includes other features for matching patterns in the
cyber security domain [15], including keywords for host names, IP addresses, subnet
address ranges, arbitrary Boolean combinations of clauses and wildcards in parameter
values. CyGraph queries are stored for sharing and reuse.
Once a query is executed, CyGraph displays the query results, as shown in Figure
2. Each query submission creates a new query pane, with tabs for selecting panes.
The query results (matched subgraph) are visualized in a main panel. Optionally, the
properties for selected nodes or edges are displayed below the graph visualization.
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FIGURE 2. CYGRAPH WEB USER INTERFACE (QUERY RESULTS)

One of the user-interface options is to cluster elements of the visualized graph in
particular ways, i.e., by user-selected nodes, incoming or outgoing edges for a node,
or by node type. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3. CLUSTERING NODES IN GRAPH QUERY VISUALIZATION

The top of Figure 3 is a query result, before clustering is applied. In the middle,
clustering is applied via a node property denoting mission functions. At the bottom
of the figure, additional clustering is applied, based on a node property denoting key
terrain. Visually, such a clustering merges a set of nodes to a single one, with adjacent
edges to other (non-clustered) nodes preserved. This kind of interactive visual
clustering helps manage the complexity of graph analytics in CyGraph. For example,
in Figure 3, clustering the mission and key terrain nodes helps focus attention on the
alert destinations (triangles) and vulnerable hosts (ellipses) that are potential risks.
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For time-varying models, CyGraph can dynamically visualize the evolving graph
state. This is shown in Figure 4. This capability depends on time stamps being defined
for edges during the ingestion process. Then, when a query result has a time defined
for each edge, the user interface enables the timeline feature. This feature builds a
time tick for each discrete event (unique value of time in the query result edge set).
The timeline then provides video controls (e.g., play, single step forward/back, speed)
for displaying the graph as edges appear over time.
FIGURE 4. INTERACTIVE TIMELINE FOR VISUALIZING GRAPH EVOLUTION OVER TIME

6. EXAMPLE CYGRAPH ANALYTICS
In this section, we describe a number of example applications of CyGraph for security
analytics. These examples all use simulated data sets (thus avoiding sensitivity issues),
which are designed to mimic patterns that we have observed in real datasets.
The first example (Figure 5) is based on intrusion detection alerts. CyGraph
automatically infers the model (top left of the figure) from the populated graph. Nodes
are typed as either Compromised (for destinations of alerts reporting compromise)
or IpAddress (sources/destinations for other general kinds of alerts), rendered as in
the legend. An edge is one or more alerts from source to destination.
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FIGURE 5. GRAPH MODEL BASED ON INTRUSION ALERTS

One use for risk analysis is identifying attack reachability in a particular direction,
consistent with adversary lateral movement. This pattern is expressed in the CyQL
query language via the hops($numHops) clause, as examined in Figure 6.
The upper left of Figure 6 shows the results for the full (unconstrained) query. The
other portions of the figure show query results for hops(2) (upper right), hops(3)
(lower left), and hops(4) (lower right). Queries with larger values of $numHops
are more tightly constrained, in the sense of matching deeper traversal. Smaller (more
loosely constrained) values of $numHops yield larger matching subgraphs.
Operationally, an analyst can adjust trajectory depth according to analytic need. One
can begin with a larger value of $numHops to discover deep network infiltration as
a higher-priority incident. Then, as deeper-level (and more rarely occurring) incidents
are resolved, more shallow ones can be investigated. For example, an organization can
set the trajectory depth such that there are available resources available to investigate
the resulting graph query match.
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FIGURE 6. GRAPH QUERY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT TRAJECTORY DEPTHS

Clauses in CyGraph can be combined for further constraining query results.
Semantically, this is a conjunction (Boolean AND), in the sense that conditions in
all clauses must match in the query results. This is examined in Figure 7. Here, we
combine the hops() clause with endType(), which constrains matching paths to
end with a node of type Compromised.
As a use case for operational security, this example focuses on a more severe intrusion
alert category as the locus of potential lateral movement by an adversary. Comparing
the upper left of Figure 7 (no endType constraint) with the upper right of Figure
6 (with endType constraint), we see the result of constraining the endType (for
trajectory depth 2). The query result is much smaller, with all trajectories ending at
nodes of type Compromised. In terms of security analysis, this focuses on paths
leading to (reportedly) compromised hosts, e.g., for investigating events leading up
to those in question. We see the same kind of result for Figure 7 (upper right) versus
Figure 6 (lower left), this time with a trajectory depth of 3. For alert response, this is
tracing the investigation deeper into the potential attack.
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We now consider a more complex CyGraph example, shown in Figure 8. Like realworld data, such an unconstrained graph visualization is difficult to understand in
its entirety. This underscores the need for CyGraph to extract ‘needle in haystack’
patterns of cyber risk, focused on mission protection.
FIGURE 7. MULTIPLE CLAUSES IN QUERIES
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FIGURE 8. GRAPH POPULATED FROM MISSION FUNCTIONS, INTRUSION ALERTS, NETWORK
FLOWS, AND HOST VULNERABILITIES

The graph in Figure 8 is populated via a process that transforms host vulnerabilities,
network flows, intrusion alerts and mission functional dependencies (i.e., the data
sources in Figure 9) to a property-graph model. CyGraph automatically infers the
model from the populated graph database, which is the right side of Figure 9.
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FIGURE 9. GRAPH VISUALIZATION LEGEND, DATA SOURCES, AND GRAPH MODEL FOR FIGURE 8

In this model, mission nodes are connected to one another (and to key cyber terrain)
in terms of their dependencies (from ‘provides’ to ‘needs’). Alert edges connect
source and destination nodes of various types: key terrain, compromised (assumed
vulnerable), vulnerable (not compromised), and other general alerts sources and
destinations. General addresses observed in network flows which are not associated
with alerts are connected to each other and to alert addresses via flow edges. In this
way, network flows serve to fill in potential gaps from adversary activity not detected
by intrusion detection (false negatives).
We now apply queries to the graph in Figure 8, in which various combinations of
CyQL clauses match subgraphs of interest for analyzing this richer security model.
These query clauses generally follow the pattern of constraining paths to start at risky
elements and end at high-value mission elements, with intermediate constraints that
tune analytic focus. Our examples here also demonstrate another kind of strategy for
operational security – tightly constraining queries to initially focus on riskier patterns,
then subsequently relaxing constraints to uncover new patterns of the next higher
priority.
The top of Figure 10 is the query result for a significantly risky pattern – reported
compromises that lead to mission functions within three steps. This query result shows
that a compromised node is the source of another alert whose destination is key cyber
terrain which supports a mission function. There is also traffic flow (dashed arrow) to
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another key terrain node that supports a mission function. The traffic from KT 2 to KT
6 might warrant deeper inspection for potential missed detections (false negatives).
In the bottom of Figure 10, query constraints are relaxed somewhat to expand the
analytic scope. In particular, the unlimited trajectory depth via hops(*) admits
paths of any depth leading to mission nodes, and startType(AlertSrc)
has paths starting at alert sources (any severity of alert) rather than compromised
destinations. This query result shows additional alert trajectories (all starting from
node a), including ones that end on vulnerable hosts, which have traffic to other key
terrain supporting other mission functions.
FIGURE 10. RISKY PATHS TO MISSION FUNCTIONS

Next, we apply the undirected() clause of CyQL, which explores nearness
by ignoring path directionality. This is shown in Figure 11. Here, we again apply
startType(Compromised), along with endType(KeyTerrain), which
stops at key terrain rather than going beyond to mission functions that depend on
them. We also apply a more constrained hops(1,2) that admits only paths of depths
one or two.
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FIGURE 11. IGNORING DIRECTIONALITY IN QUERIES

This query finds compromise-related paths in addition to those in Figure 10. This
includes nine compromised nodes that communicate with key terrain KT 7, which
we find by having the query end at key terrain rather than mission functions. As we
show in Figure 12, key terrain KT 7 does not have a known mission function that it
supports, so this query identifies risk to such nodes. The query in Figure 11 also finds
compromised node p.8, which communicates with KT 1. In this case, the network flow
has KT 1 as the source (e.g., the initiator of the flow). By ignoring directionality, this
admits the possibility of general communication types, e.g., involving attacks against
client-side vulnerabilities.
The left side of Figure 12 shows all mission dependencies in this graph model.
Mission dependencies are represented as edges of type MISSION, between key
terrain or mission functions, oriented from ‘provides’ to ‘needs.’ Thus, the CyQL
clause edgeType(MISSION), with no other query conditions, finds all such
dependencies. Formally, because there is no hops clause, the query result is the union
of edges rather than path trajectories.
The right side of Figure 12 finds all vulnerable hosts that are relevant to a particular
mission function. The clause startType(Vulnerable) causes paths to start
at vulnerable nodes. The clause endId(‘function 4’) causes paths to end at
function 4. The hops(*) allows paths of any depth.
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FIGURE 12. ALL MISSION DEPENDENCIES (LEFT) AND VULNERABILITIES FOR A PARTICULAR
MISSION FUNCTION (RIGHT)

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Maintaining situational understanding and a common operating picture in cyberspace
requires making sense of complex relationships among aspects as varied as security
posture, cyber threats, security alerts, and mission dependencies on cyber assets. The
volume and complexity of data needed for security operations are far too large for
manual inspection or analysis. These challenges multiply with the need to go beyond
considering isolated events, matching single-step rules, or generating summary
statistics, which yield limited insight into complex adversary actions.
CyGraph creates a unified multi-relational graph model of cyber terrain, events,
and mission dependencies. This rich repository of relationships among cyberspace
and mission elements supports advanced analytic and visual capabilities. Through
pattern-matching queries, CyGraph discovers clusters of high-risk activity from the
swarm of complex interrelationships. This allows cyber operators to more easily
understand evolving cyberattack situations, and to recommend best courses of action
to commanders. By including mission dependencies on cyber assets, CyGraph shows
how cyberspace activities influence mission success.
In CyGraph, domain-specific graph queries extract nuggets of important patterns
from the swarm of data through query clauses that fine-tune graph path trajectories
during query matching. These queries uncover multi-step graph reachability from
vulnerabilities and threats to key cyber assets and mission functions. The domainspecific language provides a layer of abstraction that simplifies the operational burden.
CyGraph also infers the underlying data model from a populated graph database,
presenting that to the analyst to further aid in formulating queries.
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CyGraph has a schema-free data model for flexibility in combining various types
of relationships, aimed at addressing a wide variety of analytical questions. It is
implemented as a 3-tier client-server web application with a graph database or triple
store backend and interactive graphical interface in the browser. CyGraph employs a
combination of powerful graph-based queries and advanced interactive visualization.
It thus provides a significant capability to enable the storage and processing of diverse,
mission-relevant cyber data at scale while making the technology readily accessible
to cyber analysts. This in turn enables more accurate and rapid decision making for
command and control.
CyGraph includes a number of custom capabilities for interactively visualizing and
navigating graph query results. This includes clustering nodes according to various
criteria, and dynamic rendering of time-varying graph evolution. Overall, these
analytic and visual capabilities enable the discovery and understanding of ‘needle in
haystack’ patterns of cyber risk focused on mission assets.
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